Living Organ Donation for Transplantation in Bangladesh: Reality and Problems

The stipulation of living organ transplantation policy and practice in Bangladesh is family-oriented, with relatives being the only people legally eligible to donate organs. There have been very few transplantations of bone marrows, liver lobes, and kidneys from related-living donors in Bangladesh. The major question addressed in this study is why Bangladesh is not getting adequate organs for transplantation. In this study, I examin the stipulations of the policy and practice of living organ donation through the lens of 32 key stakeholders including physicians and nurses, a health administrator, organ donors and recipients, and their family members, as they can shed light on the realities and problems of organ donation for transplantation in Bangladesh. My ethnography reveals that the family members are always encouraged to donate organs for transplantation, and saving the lives of relatives through organ donation is seen as a moral obligation. Many view saving the life of a relative by donating one's organs as equivalent to saving one's own life. An assessment of the dynamics of biomedicine, religion, and culture leads to the conclusion that the family-oriented organ donation policy and practice have been widely endorsed and accepted in Bangladesh, and Islamic ethical principles and collective family ethos undergird that policy and practice. However, the unavailability of medical resources, lack of post-operative coverage for organ donors, religious misconceptions and unawareness of the general public, and the absence of posthumously donated vital organs for transplantation are perceived to be the most common barriers to a successful living donor-recipient pair organ transplantation. By overcoming these obstacles, Bangladesh can develop a successful living donor-recipient pair organ transplantation program that will ensure improved healthcare outcomes, promote altruism and solidarity among Bangladeshi families, and protect the poor from having their organs sold to wealthy patients.

Squaring the Circle. Brain death and organ transplantation

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

The adoption of brain death played a crucial role in the development of organ transplantation, but the concept has become increasingly controversial. This essay will explore the current state of the controversy and its implications for the field.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The brain death debate, long limited to the bioethics community, has in recent years burst into the public consciousness following several high-profile cases. This has culminated in the reevaluation of the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA), which is in the process of being updated. Any change to the UDDA has the potential to significantly impact the availability of organs.

SUMMARY

The current update to the UDDA introduces an element of uncertainty, one the brain death debate had not previously had.

Living Donor Ethics and Uterus Transplantation

This article provides an in-depth ethical analysis of living donor uterus transplantation, incorporating clinical, psychological, and qualitative study data into the discussion. Although the concept of living organ donors as patients in their own right has not always been present in the field of transplantation, this conceptualization informs the framework for living donor ethics that we apply to living uterus donation. This framework takes root in the principles of research ethics, which include respect for persons, beneficence, and justice. It incorporates an analysis based on eight potential vulnerabilities of living donors: capacitational, juridic, deferential, social, medical, situational, allocational, and infrastructural. Finally, it recognizes that special relationships-such as that of the living donor advocate with the potential donor-require special responsibilities, including identifying vulnerabilities and engaging donors in a shared decision-making process. Directed and non-directed uterus donors require separate ethical analyses because their different relationships with recipients will influence the types of vulnerabilities, they are subject to as well as the potential benefits they may gain from donation.

Canadian Society of Transplantation White Paper: Ethical and Legal Considerations for Alcohol and Cannabis Use in Solid Organ Listing and Allocation

Alcohol and cannabis use as a contraindication to organ transplantation is a controversial issue. Until recently, patients in Canada with alcohol-associated liver disease were required to demonstrate abstinence for 6 mo to receive a liver transplant. There is no equivalent rule that is applied consistently for cannabis use. There is some evidence that alcohol and cannabis use disorder pretransplant could be associated with worse outcomes posttransplantation. However, early liver transplantation for patients with alcohol-associated liver disease in France and in the United States has led to challenges of the 6-mo abstinence rule in Canada in the media. It has also resulted in several legal challenges arguing that the rule violates human rights laws regarding discrimination in the provision of medical services and that the rule is also unconstitutional (this challenge is still before the court). Recent legalization of cannabis use for adults in Canada has led to questions about the appropriateness of limiting transplant access based on cannabis use. The ethics committee of the Canadian Society of Transplantation was asked to provide an ethical analysis of cannabis and alcohol abstinence policies. Our conclusions were as follows: neither cannabis use nor the 6-mo abstinence rule for alcohol use should be an absolute contraindication to transplantation, and transplant could be offered to selected patients, further research should be conducted to ensure evidence-based policies; and the transplant community has a duty not to perpetuate stigma associated with alcohol and cannabis use disorders.

COVID-19 and Solid Organ Transplantation: A Review Article

The coronavirus pandemic has significantly impacted solid organ transplantation (SOT). Early in the outbreak period, transplant societies recommended suspending living kidney transplant programs in communities with widespread transmission to avoid exposing recipients to increased risk of immunosuppression, while recommendations were made to reserve deceased-donor kidney transplantation for likely life-saving indications. SOT recipients may be at high risk from COVID-19 disease due to chronic immunosuppressive treatment and other medical comorbidities. Mortality rates reported between 13 to over 30% in SOT recipients. In addition to high rates of complications and mortality attributable to COVID-19 infections, the pandemic has also led to additional complexities in transplantation including new questions regarding screening of donors and recipients, decision making to accept a patient for kidney transplant or wait after pandemic. The clinical implications of COVID-19 infection may also differ depending on the type of the transplanted organ and recipient comorbidities which further impacts decisions on continuing transplantation during the pandemic. Transplant activity during a pandemic should be tailored with careful selection of both donors and recipients. Furthermore, while tremendous strides have been made in treatment strategies and vaccinations, the impact of these in transplant recipients may be attenuated in the setting of their immunosuppression. In this review, we aim to summarize several aspects of COVID-19 in transplantation, including the immune response to SARS-CoV-2, SARS-CoV-2 diagnostics, clinical outcomes in SOT recipients, and end-stage kidney disease patients, transplant activity during the pandemic, and treatment options for COVID-19 disease.

Assessment of Somatic Support Process for Pregnant Brain Death Patients Occurring in a Transition Country Between Asia and Europe from Medical, Ethical, Legal and Religious Aspects

In spite of the fact that brain death during pregnancy is not a common occurrence, it is an important ethical problem for all cultures and religions can have a significant influence on the donation decision after brain death. Therefore, this study aimed to present the case of a pregnant patient developing brain death which occurred in our intensive care unit and to compare the medical, ethical and legal problems relating to pregnant cases developing brain death with 24 cases in the literature. A 21-year-old 19-week pregnant case with gestational diabetes was monitored in the anesthesia intensive care unit and developed brain death due to intracranial mass and intraventricular hemorrhage. Though brain death is a situation well understood by organ transplant professionals, brain death developing in pregnant patients still involves many medical, ethical and legal problems.

Uncontrolled Donation After Circulatory Death: A Unique Opportunity

Uncontrolled donation after circulatory death (uDCD) refers to donation from persons who die following an unexpected and unsuccessfully resuscitated cardiac arrest. Despite the large potential for uDCD, programs of this kind only exist in a reduced number of countries with a limited activity. Barriers to uDCD are of a logistical and ethical-legal nature, as well as arising from the lack of confidence in the results of transplants from uDCD donors. The procedure needs to be designed to reduce and limit the impact of the prolonged warm ischemia inherent to the uDCD process, and to deal with the ethical issues that this practice poses: termination of advanced cardiopulmonary resuscitation, extension of advanced cardiopulmonary resuscitation beyond futility for organ preservation, moment to approach families to discuss donation opportunities, criteria for the determination of death, or the use of normothermic regional perfusion for the in situ preservation of organs. Although the incidence of primary nonfunction and delayed graft function is higher with organs obtained from uDCD donors, overall patient and graft survival is acceptable in kidney, liver, and lung transplantation, with a proper selection and management of both donors and recipients. Normothermic regional perfusion has shown to be critical to achieve optimal outcomes in uDCD kidney and liver transplantation. However, the role of ex situ preservation with machine perfusion is still to be elucidated. uDCD is a unique opportunity to improve patient access to transplantation therapies and to offer more patients the chance to donate organs after death, if this is consistent with their wishes and values.

Triage during the COVID-19 epidemic in Spain: better and worse ethical arguments

The COVID-19 pandemic has generated an imbalance between the clinical needs of the population and the effective availability of advanced life support (ALS) resources. Triage protocols have thus become necessary. Triage decisions in situations of scarce resources were not extraordinary in the pre-COVID-19 era; these protocols abounded in the context of organ transplantation. However, this prior experience was not considered during the COVID-19 outbreak in Spain. Lacking national guidance or public coordination, each hospital has been forced to put forth independent and autonomous triage protocols, most of which were, nonetheless, based on common ethical principles and clinical criteria. However, controversial, non-clinical criteria have also been defended by Spanish scientific societies and public institutions, including setting an age cut-off value for unilaterally withholding ALS, using 'social utility' criteria, prioritising healthcare professionals or using 'first come, first served' policies. This paper describes the most common triage criteria used in the Spanish context during the COVID-19 epidemic. We will highlight our missed opportunities by comparing these criteria to those used in organ transplantation protocols. The problems posed by subjective, non-clinical criteria will also be discussed. We hope that this critical review might be of use to countries at earlier stages of the epidemic while we learn from our mistakes.

Anonymity and Organ Donation: Ethical and Policy Implications After the Opinion Released by the Italian Committee for Bioethics

According to Law 91/1999, art. 18, in Italy, health care professionals and administrative staff involved in the process of organ collection and transplantation are required to ensure anonymity of both the donor and the recipient. Against this backdrop, in 2018, the Italian Committee for Bioethics (ICB) released an official opinion titled "Opinion on the preservation of the anonymity of donor and receiver in the transplantation of organs" that offers a new perspective on the topic, effectively opening the possibility of anonymity ending at certain conditions. The relevance of anonymity within the transplant network is a globally recognized principle with a strong ethical value. In this article, based on the experience of one author directly involved in the ICB opinion drafting, we examine the document and discuss how such a proposal could be implemented at the legislative level.

The ethical debate over child priority in post-mortem organ allocation: A scoping review and practical-ethical outlook

BACKGROUND

Organ allocation guidelines in many countries give children relative priority, but the normative justification of child priority is seldom articulated.

METHODOLOGY

We conducted a scoping review of the recent international literature (2013-2019) to identify moral positions and normative frameworks to justify or criticize pediatric priority in all kind of organ allocation. We identified 11 relevant papers.

RESULTS

Our analysis revealed a complex juxtaposition of pro and contra argumentations along three main normative lines: a) equal treatment of each individual, b) individual benefit, and c) social benefit and the public good. The general type of argument can be found independent of the organ allocated. For each of these three lines we identified and categorized two types of argumentations: those in favor and those critical of the priority rule. Additionally, we discuss a problematic issue that has not yet been mentioned in the literature, namely the effects of age thresholds related to child-priority rules in organ allocation. We illustrate this problem with an analysis of selected German data with allocated postmortal kidneys and livers. These data show non-normal distributions of organ transplantations and waiting times for patients between the ages of 16 and 19.

DISCUSSION

Our overview serves as a matrix to reconsider existing guideline policy. The review can assist policy makers or experts on organ allocation committees in increasing the transparency of child priority rules, in explaining their justifications, and in reforming existing guidelines.

Ethical Considerations in Crossing the Xenobarrier

Chimeras have been an important part of animal research for decades. Yet crossing the species barrier has always been seen as potentially morally problematic. In recent years, advances in chimeric research and the attendant possibilities-organ xenotransplantation, cognitive enhancement, and others-have given rise to further ethical concern. This contribution surveys the main ethical questions that have been discussed in the literature. We examine two arguments-from the order of nature and from human dignity-which aim to show that chimerization is inherently wrong. Finding the first untenable and the second largely inapplicable, we then turn to two unconvincing arguments designed to show that chimerization must necessarily lead to negative outcomes. Having thus found that no blanket statements can be made on the ethics of chimerization, we examine two important parameters relevant to the ethical evaluation of proposed chimeric research: the argument from moral status and from risk.

Ethical Issues in Organ Transplantation at End of Life: Defining Death

End-of-life vital organ transplantation involves singular ethical issues, because survival of the donor is impossible, and organ retrieval is ideally as close to the death of the donor as possible to minimize organ ischemic time. Historical efforts to define death have been met with confusion and discord. Fifty years on, the Harvard criteria for brain death continue to be problematic and now face significant legislative efforts to limit their authority.

Producing Parenthood: Islamic Bioethical Perspectives & Normative Implications

Biomedicine has opened up new possibilities for parenthood. Once resigned to remaining childless or pursuing adoption, infertile couples can now pursue options such as gamete donation, in-vitro fertilization, and uterine transplantation, as well as surrogacy. Muslim thinkers have viewed these strategies with both promise and caution given new types of kinship and parenthood result. By drawing upon leading medical fiqh academy resolutions this paper critically analyses Islamic normative views on the production of parenthood. We start with an overview of the Sunni rulings on gamete donation, gestational surrogacy and uterus transplantation, and the rationale and scriptural sources that undergird these moral assessments. Next, we discuss the contested relational bonds in light of larger discussions on genetics and the preservation of lineage. Finally, we comment on how scientific data, social imaginaries, and empirical gaps impact Islamic normativity regarding the production of parenthood so as to inform more holistic Islamic bioethical assessments.

Pure Altruistic Gift and the Ethics of Transplant Medicine

The article argues that altruistic giving based on anonymity, which is expected to promote social solidarity and block trade in human body parts, is conceptually defective and practically unproductive. It needs to be replaced by a more adequate notion which responds to the human practices of giving and receiving. The argument starts with identification of the main characteristics of the anonymous altruistic donation: social separation of the organ donor (or donor family) from the recipient, their mutual replaceability, non-obligatoriness of donation, and non-obligatoriness of reciprocation on the recipient's part. Since these characteristics are also central to typical market relations, anonymous altruistic donation not only cannot promote solidarity but may encourage proposals for (regulated) markets of transplantable organs. Thus, transplant ethics needs to be reframed. It needs to be rooted in, rather than promote, the practices of giving and receiving known to human societies. As the basis for such reframing, the idea of sharing in another's misfortune is proposed. It relies on the human practices of giving and receiving and, with appropriate regulatory safeguards, can provide a better conceptual basis for blocking commercial exchanges of human body parts.

[An ethical evaluation of presumed consent for organ donation in Switzerland]

Following a current trend in European countries, Switzerland is about to decide to adopt (or reject) a presumed consent legislation for organ donation. In such a system, every citizen is considered as a potential organ donor except in case of expressed refusal during lifetime. The presumed consent system raises ethical and practical issues that need to be carefully understood and weighed before deciding on its fate. This article reviews the most pressing ethical issues and provides the empirical data necessary for assessing the presumed consent legislation in Switzerland. At the end of the analysis, the reader will be able to form her own informed opinion on the issue.

Considering Uterus Transplantation for a Same-Sex Couple: A Case Study

A woman with congenital absence of a uterus applied for participation in a clinical trial for uterus transplantation. She was married to a woman who had the potential to carry a child without the need for aggressive medical intervention. Thus, the question arose regarding whether the infertile partner should be considered for uterus transplantation. In this article we discuss the ethical issues with uterus transplantation for a member of a same-sex couple, whose partner could carry a pregnancy. We review the medical criteria for uterus transplantation, discuss the additional options for parenthood in same-sex couples, examine how to determine if this meets the criteria of just distribution of uterus grafts, and ultimately argue that the value of gestation is at the level of the individual rather than the couple.

What constitutes a reasonable compensation for non-commercial oocyte donors: an analogy with living organ donation and medical research participation

There is a growing consensus that the offer of a reasonable compensation for oocyte donation for reproductive treatment is acceptable if it does not compromise voluntary and altruistically motivated donation. However, how to translate this 'reasonable compensation' in practice remains unclear as compensation rates offered to oocyte donors between different European Union countries vary significantly. Clinics involved in oocyte donation, as well as those in other medical contexts, might be encouraged in calculating a more consistent and transparent compensation for donors if the elements that constitute a reasonable compensation are explicated. In doing so, lessons can be learnt from living organ donation and medical research participation. Practices in which the elements of a reasonable compensation for the individuals involved have already been more defined in the literature. By means of analogical reasoning, we will outline the different components of a reasonable compensation and subsequently apply these to the context of oocyte donation. We will argue that oocyte donors should first of all be reasonably reimbursed direct expenses related to the donation, without standard remuneration of lost wages. Second, donating oocytes requests a serious time investment, therefore donors are entitled to suitable compensation for their time spent and efforts made. Finally, we will explain that a reasonable compensation consisting of these two components allows for altruism to remain the key value of oocyte donation for reproductive treatment. However, if we acknowledge that donors' motives are more complex and often include reasons from self-interest, the reasonable compensation may be complemented with modest (non)monetary benefits.

Should Lack of Social Support Prevent Access to Organ Transplantation?

Transplantation programs commonly rely on clinicians' judgments about patients' social support (care from friends or family) when deciding whether to list them for organ transplantation. We examine whether using social support to make listing decisions for adults seeking transplantation is morally legitimate, drawing on recent data about the evidence-base, implementation, and potential impacts of the criterion on underserved and diverse populations. We demonstrate that the rationale for the social support criterion, based in the principle of utility, is undermined by its reliance on tenuous evidence. Moreover, social support requirements may reinforce transplant inequities, interfere in patients' personal relationships, and contribute to biased and inconsistent listing procedures. As such, accommodating the needs of patients with limited social support would better balance ethical commitments to equity, utility, and respect for persons in transplantation. We suggest steps for researchers, transplantation programs, and policymakers to improve fair use of social support in transplantation.

Uterus transplantation in women who are genetically XY

Uterus transplantation is an emerging technology adding to the arsenal of treatments for infertility; specifically the only available treatment for uterine factor infertility. Ethical investigations concerning risks to uteri donors and transplant recipients have been discussed in the literature. However, missing from the discourse is the potential of uterus transplantation in other groups of genetically XY women who experience uterine factor infertility. There have been philosophical inquiries concerning uterus transplantation in genetically XY women, which includes transgender women and women with complete androgen insufficiency syndrome. We discuss the potential medical steps necessary and associated risks for uterus transplantation in genetically XY women. Presently, the medical technology does not exist to make uterus transplantation a safe and effective option for genetically XY women, however this group should not be summarily excluded from participation in trials. Laboratory research is needed to better understand and reduce medical risk and widen the field to all women who face uterine factor infertility.

When is somebody just some body? Ethics as first philosophy and the brain death debate

I, along with others, have been critical of the social construction of brain death and the various social factors that led to redefining death from cardiopulmonary failure to irreversible loss of brain functioning, or brain death. Yet this does not mean that brain death is not the best threshold to permit organ harvesting-or, as people today prefer to call it, organ procurement. Here I defend whole-brain death as a morally legitimate line that, once crossed, is grounds for families to give permission for organ donation. I do so in five moves. First, I make the case that whole-brain death is a social construction that transformed one thing, coma dépassé, into another thing, brain death, as a result of social pressures. Second, I explore the way that the 1981 President's Commission tried to establish the epistemological certainty of brain death, hoping to avoid making arcane metaphysical claims and yet still utilizing metaphysical claims about human beings. Third, I explore the moral meaning of the social construction of a definition that cannot offer metaphysical certainty about the point at which somebody becomes just some body. Fourth, I describe how two moral communities-Jewish and Catholic-actually ground their metaphysical positions with regard to brain death in the normativity of prior social relations. Finally, I conclude with a reflection on the aesthetic-moral enterprise of the metaphysical-epistemological apparatus of brain death, concluding that only such an aesthetic-moral approach is sufficiently strong to stave off the utility-maximizing tendencies of late-modern Western cultures.

Will more organs save more lives? Cost-effectiveness and the ethics of expanding organ procurement

The assumption that procuring more organs will save more lives has inspired increasingly forceful calls to increase organ procurement. This project, in contrast, directly questions the premise that more organ transplantation means more lives saved. Its argument begins with the fact that resources are limited and medical procedures have opportunity costs. Because many other lifesaving interventions are more cost-effective than transplantation and compete with transplantation for a limited budget, spending on organ transplantation consumes resources that could have been used to save a greater number of other lives. This argument has not yet been advanced in debates over expanded procurement and could buttress existing concerns about expanded procurement. To support this argument, I review existing empirical data on the cost-effectiveness of transplantation and compare them to data on interventions for other illnesses. These data should motivate utilitarians and others whose primary goal is maximizing population-wide health benefits to doubt the merits of expanding organ procurement. I then consider two major objections: one makes the case that transplant candidates have a special claim to medical resources, and the other challenges the use of cost-effectiveness to set priorities. I argue that there is no reason to conclude that transplant candidates' medical interests should receive special priority, and that giving some consideration to cost-effectiveness in priority setting requires neither sweeping changes to overall health priorities nor the adoption of any specific, controversial metric for assessing cost-effectiveness. Before searching for more organs, we should first ensure the provision of cost-effective care.

Leaving gift-giving behind: the ethical status of the human body and transplant medicine

The paper argues that the idea of gift-giving and its associated imagery, which has been founding the ethics of organ transplants since the time of the first successful transplants, should be abandoned because it cannot effectively block arguments for (regulated) markets in human body parts. The imagery suggests that human bodies or their parts are transferable objects which belong to individuals. Such imagery is, however, neither a self-evident nor anthropologically unproblematic construal of the relation between a human being and their body. The paper proposes an alternative conceptualization of that relation, the identity view according to which a human being is identical with their living body. This view, which offers a new ethical perspective on some central concepts of transplant medicine and its ethical and legal standards and institutions, supports widely shared intuitive ethical judgments. On this proposal, an act of selling a human body or one of its parts is an act of trade in human beings, not in owned objects. Transfers of human body parts for treatment purposes are to be seen as sharing in another human being's misfortune rather than as giving owned objects. From the perspective of policy-making, the proposal requires, first, that informed consent for removal of transplant material be obtained from the potential benefactor. Secondly, explicit consent by the prospective benefactor is obligatory in the case of removal of transplant material from a living benefactor. Thirdly, in the case of posthumous retrieval, informed consent by the potential benefactor during their life is not ethically indispensable. Additionally, while refusal of posthumous retrieval expressed by a potential benefactor during their life must be respected, such a refusal needs ethical justification and explanation.

Waiting for a miracle or best medical practice? End-of-life medical ethical dilemmas in Bahrain

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

In Bahrain, maintaining life support at all costs is a cultural value considered to be embedded in the Islamic religion. We explore end-of-life decision making for brain dead patients in an Arab country where medical cultures are dominated by Western ideas and the lay culture is Eastern.

METHODS

In-depth interviews were conducted from February to April 2018 with 12 Western-educated Bahraini doctors whose medical practice often included end-of-life decision making. Discussions were about who should make withdrawal of life support decisions, how decisions are made and the context for decision making. To develop results, we used the inductive method of thematic analysis.

RESULTS

Informants considered it difficult to engage non-medical people in end-of-life decisions because of people's reluctance to talk about death and no legal clarity about medical responsibilities. There was disagreement about doctors' roles with some saying that end-of-life decisions were purely medical or purely religious but most maintaining that such decisions need to be collectively owned by medicine, patients, families, religious advisors and society. Informants practised in a legal vacuum that made their ethics interpretations and clinical decision making idiosyncratic regarding end-of-life care for brain dead patients. Participants referred to contrasts between their current practice and previous work in other countries, recognising the influences of religious and cultural dimensions on their practice in Bahrain.

CONCLUSIONS

End-of-life decisions challenge Western-trained doctors in Bahrain as they grapple with aligning respect for local culture with their training in the ethical practice of Western medicine.

Uterine Transplant: A Risk to Life or a Chance for Life?

Being inherently different from any other lifesaving organ transplant, uterine transplantation does not aim at saving lives but supporting the possibility to generate life. Unlike the kidneys or the liver, the uterus is not specifically a vital organ. Given the non-lifesaving nature of this procedure, questions have been raised about its feasibility. The ethical dilemma revolves around whether it is worth placing two lives at risk related to surgery and immunosuppression, amongst others, to enable a woman with absolute uterine factor infertility to experience the presence of an organ enabling childbirth. In the year 2000, the first uterine transplantation, albeit unsuccessful, was performed in Saudi Arabia from where it has spread to the rest of the world including Sweden, the United States and now recently India. The procedure is, however, still in the preclinical stages and several ethical, legal, social and religious concerns are yet to be addressed before it can be integrated into the clinical setting as standard of care for women with absolute uterine factor infertility.

Compliance with ethical standards in the reporting of donor sources and ethics review in peer-reviewed publications involving organ transplantation in China: a scoping review

OBJECTIVES

The objective of this study is to investigate whether papers reporting research on Chinese transplant recipients comply with international professional standards aimed at excluding publication of research that: (1) involves any biological material from executed prisoners; (2) lacks Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval and (3) lacks consent of donors.

DESIGN

Scoping review based on Arksey and O'Mallee's methodological framework.

DATA SOURCES

Medline, Scopus and Embase were searched from January 2000 to April 2017.

ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA

We included research papers published in peer-reviewed English-language journals reporting on outcomes of research involving recipients of transplanted hearts, livers or lungs in mainland China.

DATA EXTRACTION AND SYNTHESIS

Data were extracted by individual authors working independently following training and benchmarking. Descriptive statistics were compiled using Excel.

RESULTS

445 included studies reported on outcomes of 85 477 transplants. 412 (92.5%) failed to report whether or not organs were sourced from executed prisoners; and 439 (99%) failed to report that organ sources gave consent for transplantation. In contrast, 324 (73%) reported approval from an IRB. Of the papers claiming that no prisoners' organs were involved in the transplants, 19 of them involved 2688 transplants that took place prior to 2010, when there was no volunteer donor programme in China.

DISCUSSION

The transplant research community has failed to implement ethical standards banning publication of research using material from executed prisoners. As a result, a large body of unethical research now exists, raising issues of complicity and moral hazard to the extent that the transplant community uses and benefits from the results of this research. We call for retraction of this literature pending investigation of individual papers.

Problems of transplantation of human organs and other anatomical materials and directions of their solution in Ukraine

OBJECTIVE

Introduction: The focus of the work is the importance of transplantation of human organs and other anatomical materials as the method of treating and a way of saving people's lives and it also attaches particular importance to solving issues of transplantations in Ukraine. The aim: To find out the problems of human organ transplantation and other anatomical materials and determine the directions of their solutions in Ukraine.

PATIENTS AND METHODS

Materials and methods: The assessment and analysis of domestic and foreign experience has been developed. In addition, data collected from Ukrainian and international organizations and the results of scientific research by scientists are used in the work.

RESULTS

Review and conclusions: Investigating the legislation of Ukraine in the part of transplantation of human organs and other anatomical materials, conclusions were made on the necessity of its improvement, in particular, Article 16 of the Law of Ukraine «On the application of transplantation of anatomical materials to a person» dated by May 17, 2018, is proposed to be worded as follows: «Any adult may give written consent or disagreement to become a donor of anatomical materials in case of his death. In the absence of such a statement of disagreement with the transplantation of his organs or other anatomical materials, consent of relatives or others is not required. In this case, the deceased person is deemed to have given consent to the transplantation of his organs or other anatomical materials». It is proposed to make changes and significant additions to Art. 17 of the Law of Ukraine «On the application of transplantation of anatomical materials to a person» of May 17, 2018 regarding the creation of the Unified State Register of persons in need of transplantation, as well as to consolidate the procedure for its administration. In the context of urgent transformations, the necessity to significantly increase state funding for the provision of medical services, raise the awareness and informality of citizens about transplantation, as well as to change their misconceptions about this issue are sometimes put forward.

Wrestling with the Monster: Frankenstein and Organ Transplantation

In December 1967, Louis Washkansky, a grocer living in South Africa, became the first person to awaken after a heart transplant. Some accounts say that his first words were, "I am the new Frankenstein." Others claim that Christiaan Barnard, his transplant surgeon, uttered these. Much as people have long mixed up who Frankenstein is-creature or creator?-in Mary Shelley's novel, so patient and surgeon, repaired and repairer, are confused in retellings of this post-op Frankensteinian moment. Whether Washkansky identified with Frankenstein's monster or not, he was probably feeling a bit monstrous after taking the donor heart of Denise Darvall into his chest. I know I was, over thirty years later, standing naked before a mirror and gazing at my shorn and bloated torso for the first time since a kidney transplant. My boundaries had been rearranged: a crescentic scar marked the frontier between me and not-me.

Conceptual Issues in DCDD Donor Death Determination

Despite the popularity, success, and growth of programs of organ donation after the circulatory determination of death (DCDD), a long-standing controversy persists over whether the organ donor is truly dead at the moment physicians declare death, usually following five minutes of circulatory and respiratory arrest. Advocates of the prevailing death determination standard claim that the donor is dead when declared because of permanent cessation of respiration and circulation. Critics of this standard argue that while the cessation of respiration and circulation may be permanent, it may not be irreversible at the moment death is declared because, if cardiopulmonary resuscitation were performed, it might succeed. And because irreversibility of cessation of respiration and circulation is required by both the statute and the biological concept of death, the donor must be alive. Who is correct? Making two related distinctions clarifies the cause of the disagreement over whether the DCDD donor is dead and points to a possible resolution. First, in a determination of death, there is an important distinction between the permanent and the irreversible cessation of circulation and respiration-two associated phenomena that are often confounded. Second, there is an important distinction between the medical practice standard for death determination, in which physicians certify the permanent cessation of vital functions as sufficient for death declaration, and the underlying biological concept of death that requires the irreversible cessation of vital functions because death, by definition, is an irreversible event.

Brain Death at Fifty: Exploring Consensus, Controversy, and Contexts

This special report is published in commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the "Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death," a landmark document that proposed a new way to define death, with implications that advanced the field of organ transplantation. This remarkable success notwithstanding, the concept has raised lasting questions about what it means to be dead. Is death defined in terms of the biological failure of the organism to maintain integrated functioning? Can death be declared on the basis of severe neurological injury even when biological functions remain intact? Is death essentially a social construct that can be defined in different ways, based on human judgment? These issues, and more, are discussed and debated in this report by leading experts in the field, many of whom have been engaged with this topic for decades.

Positioning uterus transplantation as a 'more ethical' alternative to surrogacy: Exploring symmetries between uterus transplantation and surrogacy through analysis of a Swedish government white paper

Within the ethics and science literature surrounding uterus transplantation (UTx), emphasis is often placed on the extent to which UTx might improve upon, or offer additional benefits when compared to, existing 'treatment options' for women with absolute uterine factor infertility, such as adoption and gestational surrogacy. Within this literature UTx is often positioned as superior to surrogacy because it can deliver things that surrogacy cannot (such as the experience of gestation). Yet, in addition to claims that UTx is superior in the aforementioned sense it is also often assumed (either implicitly or explicitly) that UTx is less fraught with ethical difficulties and thus should be considered a less morally problematic option. This article seeks to examine this assumption. Given that much UTx research has been performed in Sweden, a country where surrogacy is effectively although not currently explicitly forbidden, we do this through an analysis of the arguments underpinning a 2016 Swedish white paper which considered amending existing policy such that altruistic surrogacy arrangements would be permitted. By applying the white paper's arguments for a restrictive position on altruistic surrogacy to the case of UTx using living altruistic donors we find that such arguments, if they hold in the case of surrogacy, apply similarly to UTx. We thus suggest that, for reasons of consistency, a similar stance should be taken towards the moral and legal permissibility of these two practices.

Financing uterus transplants: The United States context

The first baby has successfully been born by uterus transplantation (UTx) in the United States and the procedure is swiftly becoming a viable clinical option for patients with uterine factor infertility (UFI). This raises a practical ethical question: should health insurers finance UTx and what issues should they consider in coming to this decision? The article lays forth some of the factors that shape the decision over whether to finance UTx in the United States, including what procedures must be covered, whether UTx is more like organ transplantation or infertility treatment (which are treated differently in the United States), and the benefits and alternatives of the procedure. Then, the article explores arguments around why UTx should be financed, or at least considered along with other important medical needs. The paper argues that UTx ought to be considered along with other competing claims for healthcare services. In countries that generously cover other infertility services, it may logically follow that medical services that enable gestation should be insured when the healthcare system covers services to conceive. In the United States, however, many groups have long suffered inadequate access to medical care, in the context of infertility and more broadly. U.S. healthcare may need to be made more widely equitable, before covering UTx is seen as financially or politically possible.

Uterus transplantation as radical reproduction: Taking the adoption alternative more seriously

This paper urges reconsideration of analyses of the alternatives to reproductive uterus transplantation (UTx). I focus here specifically on the adoption alternative. Importantly, my purpose is not to oppose UTx provision. Rather, it is to propose ways in which ethical analysis and provision of UTx can potentially accommodate the concerns discussed here. I argue that the adoption alternative to UTx is too readily dismissed, and that this is a dismissal with significant moral costs. I suggest that the radical nature of UTx as a form of assisted reproduction calls for an equivalently radical socio-moral agenda for reform and transformation of adoption law, policy and practice, as well as of the norms that prevail within our presently strongly bio-normative reproductive context. In doing so I widen the ethical frame of responsible provision of assisted reproduction to encompass not just obligations towards donors and recipient, but also our broader social responsibilities to ensure that we are doing our best to meet the significant needs of some of the most vulnerable members of our society.

How important is social support in determining patients' suitability for transplantation? Results from a National Survey of Transplant Clinicians

BACKGROUND

National guidelines require programmes use subjective assessments of social support when determining transplant suitability, despite limited evidence linking it to outcomes. We examined how transplant providers weigh the importance of social support for kidney transplantation compared with other factors, and variation by clinical role and personal beliefs.

METHODS

The National survey of the American Society of Transplant Surgeons and the Society of Transplant Social Work in 2016. Using a discrete choice approach, respondents compared two hypothetical patient profiles and selected one for transplantation. Conditional logistic regression estimated the relative importance of each factor; results were stratified by clinical role (psychosocial vs medical/surgical providers) and beliefs (outcomes vs equity).

RESULTS

Five hundred and eighy-four transplant providers completed the survey. Social support was the second most influential factor among transplant providers. Providers were most likely to choose a candidate who had social support (OR=1.68, 95% CI 1.50 to 1.86), always adhered to a medical regimen (OR=1.64, 95% CI 1.46 to 1.88), and had a 15 years life expectancy with transplant (OR=1.61, 95% CI 1.42 to 1.85). Psychosocial providers were more influenced by adherence and quality of life compared with medical/surgical providers, who were more influenced by candidates' life expectancy with transplant (p<0.05). For providers concerned with avoiding organ waste, social support was the most influential factor, while it was the least influential for clinicians concerned with fairness (p<0.05).

CONCLUSIONS

Social support is highly influential in listing decisions and may exacerbate transplant disparities. Providers' beliefs and reliance on social support in determining suitability vary considerably, raising concerns about transparency and justice.

Uterus transplants and the insufficient value of gestation

Uterus transplants provide another treatment for infertility. Some might think that we should embrace such transplants as one more way to assist people to have children. However, in this paper I argue that uterus transplants are not something that we ought to fund, nor something that we should make easy to access. First, I argue that any justification of providing uterus transplants must be based on the value of the experience of gestation, rather than on claims of meeting medical need or promoting normal functioning. Second, I demonstrate that such a justification has limited prospects of success. The value of experiencing gestation is unlikely to be sufficient to justify state funding of uterus transplants and, further, we have reason to refrain from enabling such transplants.

Pushing the boundaries: Uterine transplantation and the limits of reproductive autonomy

Over the course of recent years, various scientific advances in the realm of reproduction have changed the reproductive landscape, enhancing women's procreative rights and the choices available to them. Uterus transplants (UTx) are the latest of such medical innovations aimed at restoring fertility in women suffering from absolute uterine factor infertility, providing them with the possibility not only of conceiving a genetically related child but also of gestating their own pregnancies. This paper critically examines the primacy of reproductive liberty in the context of uterus transplantation. It questions whether and to what extent we should respect the reproductive autonomy of a woman who chooses UTx, given the significant risks that attach to the procedure and existing concerns that UTx may perpetuate potentially troubling gendered norms surrounding pregnancy and the role of women's bodies in reproduction, which may place undue reproductive pressures on women.

Ethical issues surrounding the transplantation of organs from animals into humans

In this paper, the authors provide an analysis of the ethical issues surrounding the transplantation of organs from animals into humans. The main objections to xenotransplantation relate to safety concerns for the recipient; public health concerns about new viruses spreading from animals to humans; the possibility of animals developing human features; concerns about human dignity; and the fact that animals must be sacrificed so humans can benefit from their organs. Despite these objections, the urgency of the organ shortage situation is such that xenotransplantation may be justified, if further advances make it a realistic possibility.

New Zealand transplant patients and organ transplantation in China: some ethical considerations

In this viewpoint article we consider the situation of organ procurement from China, and address some of the ethical aspects arising for health professionals when New Zealand transplant patients contemplate traveling to China for an organ. We also consider some of the challenges facing health professionals involved in providing care to such patients.

Uterus Transplantation: The Ethics of Using Deceased Versus Living Donors

Research teams have made considerable progress in treating absolute uterine factor infertility through uterus transplantation, though studies have differed on the choice of either deceased or living donors. While researchers continue to analyze the medical feasibility of both approaches, little attention has been paid to the ethics of using deceased versus living donors as well as the protections that must be in place for each. Both types of uterus donation also pose unique regulatory challenges, including how to allocate donated organs; whether the donor / donor's family has any rights to the uterus and resulting child; how to manage contact between the donor / donor's family, recipient, and resulting child; and how to track outcomes moving forward.

Influencing relatives to respect donor autonomy: Should we nudge families to consent to organ donation?

Refusing consent to organ donation remains unacceptably high, and improving consent rates from family or next-of-kin is an important step to procuring more organs for solid organ transplantation in countries where this approval is sought. We have thus far failed to translate fully our limited understanding of why families refuse permission into successful strategies targeting consent in the setting of deceased organ donation, primarily because our interventions fail to target underlying cognitive obstacles. Novel interventions to overcome these hurdles, incorporating an understanding of cognitive psychology and behavioral change therapy, may be beneficial. One potential intervention is to use the concept of nudge theory, where decision-making is influenced by encouraging positive reinforcement and indirect suggestion. Purposefully nudging families to given consent for organ donation by understanding, and then overcoming, their inherent cognitive biases is novel but also controversial. This article explores the roles of relatives in decisions about organ donation, how nudge theory translates to organ donation and discusses the arguments for and against its application.

Increasing organ donation rates by revealing recipient details to families of potential donors

Many families refuse to consent to donation from their deceased relatives or over-rule the consent given before death by the patient, but giving families more information about the potential recipients of organs could reduce refusal rates. In this paper, we analyse arguments for and against doing so, and conclude that this strategy should be attempted. While it would be impractical and possibly unethical to give details of actual potential recipients, generic, realistic information about the people who could benefit from organs should be provided to families before they make a decision about donation or attempt to over-rule it.

Do the 'brain dead' merely appear to be alive?

The established view regarding 'brain death' in medicine and medical ethics is that patients determined to be dead by neurological criteria are dead in terms of a biological conception of death, not a philosophical conception of personhood, a social construction or a legal fiction. Although such individuals show apparent signs of being alive, in reality they are (biologically) dead, though this reality is masked by the intervention of medical technology. In this article, we argue that an appeal to the distinction between appearance and reality fails in defending the view that the 'brain dead' are dead. Specifically, this view relies on an inaccurate and overly simplistic account of the role of medical technology in the physiology of a 'brain dead' patient. We conclude by offering an explanation of why the conventional view on 'brain death', though mistaken, continues to be endorsed in light of its connection to organ transplantation and the dead donor rule.

A quiet revolution in organ transplant ethics

A quiet revolution is occurring in the field of transplantation. Traditionally, transplants have involved solid organs such as the kidney, heart and liver which are transplanted to prevent recipients from dying. Now transplants are being done of the face, hand, uterus, penis and larynx that aim at improving a recipient's quality of life. The shift away from saving lives to seeking to make them better requires a shift in the ethical thinking that has long formed the foundation of organ transplantation. The addition of new forms of transplants requires doctors, patients, regulators and the public to rethink the risk and benefit ratio represented by trade-offs between saving life, extending life and risking the loss of life to achieve improvements in the quality of life.

Can 'Best Interests' derail the trolley? Examining withdrawal of clinically assisted nutrition and hydration in patients in the permanent vegetative state

In this paper, I explore under what circumstances it might be morally acceptable to transplant organs from a patient lacking capacity. I argue, with a developed hypothetical based around a mother and son, that (1) 'Best interests' should be interpreted broadly to include the interests that people have previously expressed in the well-being of others. It could, therefore, be in the 'best interests' of an unconscious patient to donate a non-vital organ to a family member. (2) Further expanding upon this case, and developing a variation on the 'trolley problems' I argue that where it is inevitable that an incapacitous patient is going to die-and specifically when it has been agreed through the courts that a patient in a permanent vegetative state is going to have clinically assisted nutrition and hydration withdrawn (with the inevitable consequence of death, and causing desiccation of the organs such that they are no longer able to be donated)-it could be in a patient's best interests to actively end their life with a drug that would stop the heart both to minimise potential suffering and in order to be able to have vital organs donated. I argue that in this case the strict adherence to the distinction between acts and omissions is not in the patient's best interests and should be reconsidered.