Why should we compensate organ donors when we can continue to take organs for free? A response to some of my critics

The general public's attitude towards accepting payment for kidney donation

Introduction

Kidney transplantation has become the most cost-effective treatment for patients with end-stage kidney disease (ESKD) and offers them the highest quality of life. Yet, kidney donation is often inaccessible due to cultural and traditional beliefs about organ donation. The goal of our study is to assess the value of kidney donation using the Willingness to Accept (WTA) technique. We also aim to understand the factors influencing an individual's willingness to donate an organ.

Methods

A self-administered survey was completed by 985 participants from the general public. The quantitative method and survey design that were chosen used descriptive, correlational, nonparametric, and multivariate statistical tests.

Results

Most of the respondents, 895 (90.9%) are not willing to donate a kidney while alive. Four hundred and five (41.1%) of the respondents are not willing to donate a kidney after their death, while the rest are willing to donate their kidney after their death without financial compensation. The same attitude applies to the donation of a kidney from their relatives. Significant predictors from the results of the logistic regression model in predicting the lowest (minimal) amount that will encourage donation of one kidney after death were: Marital status; Nationality; Adi card holder; Knowing people who need a kidney donation; confidence in the medical staff; and consideration of the family's opinions regarding organ donation.

Discussion

Using cost benefit analysis (CBA), with the aim of evaluating the willingness of individuals to accept payment for innovative medical procedures, such as kidney donation, allows an assessment of the perceived value of the medical procedure and enables policymakers to decide whether to allocate funds or offer subsidies for kidney donation, given the limited healthcare resources available. During our research, we found that most participants did not support the commercialization of organs. Our recommendation for policymakers and health professionals is to continue providing adequate funding for kidney donations and to implement educational programs aimed at improving attitudes towards organ donation.

How a compensated kidney donation program facilitates the sale of human organs in a regulated market: the implications of Islam on organ donation and sale

BACKGROUND

Advocates for a regulated system to facilitate kidney donation between unrelated donor-recipient pairs argue that monetary compensation encourages people to donate vital organs that save the lives of patients with end-stage organ failure. Scholars support compensating donors as a form of reciprocity. This study aims to assess the compensation system for the unrelated kidney donation program in the Islamic Republic of Iran, with a particular focus on the implications of Islam on organ donation and organ sales.

METHODS

This study reviews secondary documents for philosophical argumentation and ethical analysis of human organ donation and sale for transplantation.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

According to Islamic law, organ donation is an act of sadaqatul jariyah, and individuals are permitted to donate organs with the intention of saving lives. The commercialization of humans as organ sellers and buyers is contrary to the Islamic legal maxim eethaar, undermining donors of 'selfless' or 'altruistic' motivations. Such an act should be considered immoral, and the practice should not be introduced into other countries for the sake of protecting human dignity, integrity, solidarity, and respect. I, therefore, argue that Iran's unrelated kidney donation program not only disregards the position of the Islamic religion with respect to the provision or receipt of monetary benefits for human kidneys for transplantation but that it also misinterprets the Islamic legal proscription of the sale of human organs. I also argue that the implementation of Iran's unrelated kidney donor transplantation program is unethical and immoral in that potential donors and recipients engage in a bargaining process akin to that which sellers and buyers regularly face in regulated commodity exchange markets. Conversely, I suggest that a modest fixed monetary remuneration as a gift be provided to a donor as a reward for their altruistic organ donation, which is permissible by Islamic scholars. This may remove the need to bargain for increased or decreased values of payment in exchange for the organ, as well as the transactional nature of 'buyer and seller', ensuring the philosophy of 'donor and recipient' is maintained.

CONCLUSIONS

Offering a fixed modest monetary incentive to organ donors would serve to increase organ supply while protecting donors' health and reducing human suffering without legalizing the human organ trade.

The Human Organ Transplantation Act in Bangladesh: Towards Proper Family-Based Ethics and Law

The Human Organ Transplantation Act came into officially force in Bangladesh on April 13, 1999, allowing organ donations from both living and brain-dead donors. The Act was amended by the Parliament on January 8, 2018, with the changes coming into effect shortly afterwards on January 28. The Act was revised to extend a living donor pool from close relatives (e.g., parents, adult sons and daughters, adult brothers and sisters, uncles and aunts from both the paternal and maternal sides, and spouses) to include certain other relatives such as grandparents, grandchildren, and first cousins (Section 2:4). The Act was also revised to allow individuals to prioritize family members in receiving their organs after their death (Section 7c:3). The aim of this paper is not to carry out an ethical analysis of the Act as a whole but only to focus on aspects relating to priority access for family members to organs. Despite Islam encouraging Muslims to be sympathetic, and to save the life of any member of humankind (Quran 5:32), saving the life of a relative through organ donation is even more highly valued. The collective and extended structure of the family impacts on the provisions of the Act that only allows Bangladeshis to legally donate their organs to save the lives of relatives and allows individuals to prioritize family members. Recent progress in the practice of organ transplantation raises a number of ethical dilemmas around the allocation of available organs in the context of organ scarcity. A key purpose of introducing incentive into the system of organ allocation is to increase the number of donations from living relatives and initiation of vital organ donations from brain-dead donors. However, allocation criteria based on a living organ donation incentive system would appear to be unethical because there is no provision in the Act with regard to financial compensation for a distant relative donor’s post-operative care in the absence of healthcare coverage. Receiving organs from a distant relative without giving financial compensation for post-operative care places them in a grave health condition and violates the biomedical principle of non-maleficence. An incentive system around brain-dead donors would appear to be ethical as the amended Act allows individuals to prioritize relatives in receiving their organs after death. This provision is intended to initiate the transplantation of vital organs (e.g., kidney, liver, heart, pancreas, bone marrow) from brain-dead donors as families might bear the cost of keeping the organs alive for transplantation. Regular reassessment of the impact of the Act is necessary to maximize the donation rate of transplantable organs using ethical means.

Sometimes Merely as a Means: Why Kantian Philosophy Requires the Legalization of Kidney Sales

Several commentators have tried to ground legal prohibitions of kidney sales in some form of Kant's moral arguments against such sales. This paper reconsiders this approach to justifying laws and policies in light of Kant's approach to law in his political philosophy. The author argues that Kant's political philosophy requires that kidney sales be legally permitted, although contracts for such sales must remain unenforceable. The author further argues that Kant's approach to laws, such as those governing kidney distribution, was formed in part by considering and rejecting an assumption frequently employed in the bioethics literature, namely, that legal duties can be grounded directly in moral duties. The author explains some of Kant's reasons for rejecting this assumption and concludes that arguments pertaining to the legality of kidney sales developed on the basis of Kant's moral philosophy should no longer be considered tenable.

What Money Cannot Buy and What Money Ought Not Buy: Dignity, Motives, and Markets in Human Organ Procurement Debates

Given the current organ shortage, a prevalent alternative to the altruism-based policy is a market-based solution: pay people for their organs. Receiving much popular and scholarly attention, a salient normative argument against neoliberal pressures is the preservation of human dignity. This article examines how advocates of both the altruistic status quo and market challengers reason and weigh the central normative concept of dignity, meant as inherent worth and/or rank. Key rhetorical strategies, including motivations and broader social visions, of the two positions are analyzed and evaluated, and the separation of morally normative understandings of dignity from market encroachment is defended.

Organ Vouchers and Barter Markets: Saving Lives, Reducing Suffering, and Trading in Human Organs

The essays in this issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy explore an innovative voucher program for encouraging kidney donation. Discussions cluster around a number of central moral and political/theoretical themes: (1) What are the direct and indirect health care costs and benefits of such a voucher system in human organs? (2) Do vouchers lead to more effective and efficient organ procurement and allocation or contribute to greater inequalities and inefficiencies in the transplantation system? (3) Do vouchers contribute to the inappropriate commodification of human body parts? (4) Is there a significant moral difference between such a voucher system and a market in human organs for transplantation? This paper argues that while kidney vouchers constitute a step in the right direction, fuller utilization of market-based incentives, including, but not limited to, barter exchanges (e.g., organ exchanges, organ chains, and organ vouchers), would save more lives and further reduce human suffering.

'Because you can't live on love': living kidney donors' perspectives on compensation and payment for organ donation

CONTEXT AND OBJECTIVE

Living kidney donation accounts for approximately half of all kidney transplantation in many countries and is central to health policy focused on increasing organ supply. However, little examination of the economic consequences of living kidney donation has been undertaken from the perspective of donors themselves. This article documents living kidney donors' views regarding recompense and payment for organ donation, based on their experience.

PARTICIPANTS

Twenty-five living kidney donors from New Zealand participated in this study.

METHODS

This qualitative study, based on thematic analysis, uses semi-structured in-depth interviews to examine the experiences of living kidney donors. Themes were organized around altruism and the 'gift', perceptions of shared corporeality and identity, and donor support.

RESULTS

Most participants agreed the donation process was costly in terms of time and money. Many incurred personal costs, and some experienced financial hardship. All the participants viewed financial hardship as a barrier to organ donation and favoured recompense for direct and indirect costs. Most did not support payment for organs, and none supported commercialization.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The findings show that framing organ donation as a 'gift' can stymie discussion about reciprocity, remuneration and exchange, making talk about financial recompense difficult. Financial well-being, nonetheless, has implications for the ability to care for self and others post-operatively. We conclude that the economic consequences for living kidney donors in jurisdictions where recompense for direct and indirect costs is insufficient are unfair. Review of financial assistance for live organ donors is therefore recommended.

Altruism, gift giving and reciprocity in organ donation: a review of cultural perspectives and challenges of the concepts

Living and deceased organ donation are couched in altruism and gift discourse and this article reviews explores cultural views towards these concepts. Altruism and egoism theories and gift and reciprocity theories are outlined from a social exchange theory perspective to highlight the key differences between altruism and the gift and the wider implications of reciprocation. The notion of altruism as a selfless act without expectation or want for repayment juxtaposed with the Maussian gift where there are the obligations to give, receive and reciprocate. Lay perspectives of altruism and the gift in organ donation are outlined and illustrate that there are differences in motivations to donate in different programmes of living donation and for families who decide to donate their relative's organs. These motivations reflect cultural views of altruism and the gift and perceptions of the body and death.

Why public moralities matter--the relevance of socioempirical premises for the ethical debate on organ markets

The ongoing bioethical debate about organ markets rests not only on theoretical premises, but also on assumptions regarding public views of and attitudes toward organ donation that need closer socioempirical examination. Summarizing results from our previous qualitative social research in this field, this paper illustrates the ethical significance of such public moralities in two respects: On one hand, it analyzes the implicit bias of the common rhetoric of "organ scarcity" which motivates much of the commercialization debate. On the other hand, it explores the blind spots of the paradigm of "altruistic donation" which informs many arguments against commercialization. We conclude that the ethical discourse has to appreciate the social nature of organ donation as a reciprocal interaction between different parties with irreducibly different but equally relevant viewpoints. We criticize the neglect of such well-founded public considerations in certain philosophical-ethical approaches and stress the need for further systematic and comparative socioempirical studies about peoples' actual perspectives in bioethics.

Addressing the shortage of kidneys for transplantation: purchase and allocation through chain auctions

Transplantation is generally the treatment of choice for those suffering from kidney failure. Not only does transplantation offer improved quality of life and increased longevity relative to dialysis, it also reduces end-stage renal disease program expenditures, providing savings to Medicare. Unfortunately, the waiting list for kidney transplants is long, growing, and unlikely to be substantially reduced by increases in the recovery of cadaveric kidneys. Another approach is to obtain more kidneys through payment to living "donors," or vendors. Such direct commodification, in which a price is placed on kidneys, has generally been opposed by medical ethicists. Much of the ethical debate, however, has been in terms of commodification through market exchange. Recognizing that there are different ethical concerns associated with the purchase of kidneys and their allocation, it is possible to design a variety of institutional arrangements for the commodification of kidneys that pose different sets of ethical concerns. We specify three such alternatives in detail sufficient to allow an assessment of their likely consequences and we compare these alternatives to current policy in terms of the desirable goals of promoting human dignity, equity, efficiency, and fiscal advantage. This policy analysis leads us to recommend that kidneys be purchased at administered prices by a nonprofit organization and allocated to the transplant centers that can organize the longest chains of transplants involving willing-but-incompatible donor-patient dyads.