Confronting diminished epistemic privilege and epistemic injustice in pregnancy by challenging a "panoptics of the womb"

A critical and systematic literature review of epistemic justice applied to healthcare: recommendations for a patient partnership approach

Invalidation from healthcare practitioners is an experience shared by many patients, especially those marginalized or living with contested conditions (e.g., chronic pain, fibromyalgia, etc.). Invalidation can include not taking someone's testimony seriously, imposing one's thoughts, discrediting someone's emotions, or not perceiving someone's testimony as equal and competent. Epistemic injustices, that is, the disqualification of a person as a knower, are a form of invalidation. Epistemic injustices have been used as a theoretical framework to understand invalidation that occurs in the patient-healthcare provider relationship. However, to date, the different recommendations to achieve epistemic justice have not been listed, analyzed, nor compared yet. This paper aims at better understanding the state of the literature and to critically review possible avenues to achieve epistemic justice in healthcare. A systematic and critical review of the existing literature on epistemic justice was conducted. The search in four databases identified 629 articles, from which 35 were included in the review. Strategies to promote epistemic justice that can be applied to healthcare are mapped in the literature and sorted in six different approaches to epistemic justice, including virtuous, structural, narrative, cognitive, and partnership approaches, as well as resistance strategies. These strategies are critically appraised. A patient partnership approach based on the Montreal Model, implemented at all levels of healthcare systems, seems promising to promote epistemic justice in healthcare.

Unravelling epistemic injustice in medical education: The case of the underperforming learner

CONTEXT

Epistemic injustice refers to a wrong done to someone in their capacity as a knower. While philosophers have detailed the pervasiveness of this issue within healthcare, it is only beginning to be discussed by medical educators. The purpose of this article is to expand the field's understanding of this concept and to demonstrate how it can be used to reframe complex problems in medical education.

METHODS

After outlining the basic features of epistemic injustice, we clarify its intended (and unintended) meaning and detail what is required for a perceived harm to be named an epistemic injustice. Using an example from our own work on introversion in undergraduate medical education, we illustrate what epistemic injustice might look like from the perspectives of both educators and students and show how the concept can reorient our perspective on academic underperformance.

RESULTS

Epistemic injustice results from two things: (1) social power dynamics that give some individuals control over others, and (2) identity prejudice that is associated with discriminatory stereotypes. This can lead to one, or both, forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial and hermeneutical. Our worked example demonstrates how medical educators can be unaware of when and how epistemic injustice is happening, yet the effects on students' well-being and sense of selves can be profound. Thinking about academic underperformance with epistemic injustice in mind can reveal an emphasis within current educational practices on diagnosing learning deficiencies, to the detriment of holistically representing its socially constructed and structural nature.

CONCLUSIONS

This article builds upon recent calls to recognise epistemic injustice in medical education by clarifying its terminology and intended use and providing in-depth application and analysis to a particular case: underperformance and the introverted medical student. Equipped with a more sophisticated understanding of the term, medical educators may be able to re-conceptualise long-standing issues including, but also beyond, underperformance.

Anti-Black Medical Gaslighting in Healthcare: Experiences of Black Women in Canada

BACKGROUND

Stereotype about Black people contribute to nurses and healthcare providers gaslighting and dismissing of their health concerns. Despite the popularity of the term medical gaslighting in mainstream literature, few studies have explored the experiences of Black women during pregnancy and childbirth.

PURPOSE

This paper aims to provide an in-depth insight into Black women's experiences of anti-Black medical gaslighting when accessing care during pregnancy and childbirth.

METHODS

Utilizing qualitative methods, we conducted 24 semi-structured interviews with Black women in the Greater Toronto Area. We used thematic analysis to ground the data analysis and to generate insight into Black women's experiences.

RESULTS

Three overarching themes: 1) Not Being Understood: Privileging of Medical Knowledge Contributing to the Downplaying of Health Concerns, 2) Not Being Believed: Stereotypes Contributing to Dismissive Healthcare Encounters and 3) Listen to Us: Turning off the Cycle of Medical Gaslighting. These themes highlight ways anti-Black medical gaslighting manifests in Black women's healthcare encounters to create differential access to treatment and care.

CONCLUSIONS

Anti-Black medical gaslighting contributes to differential access to treatment and care. Improving equitable access to treatment and care must involve addressing structural and epistemic biases in healthcare and fostering a culture of listening to humanize the experience of illness.

Phenomenological Interview and Gender Dysphoria: A Third Pathway for Diagnosis and Treatment

Gender dysphoria (GD) is marked by an incongruence between a person's biological sex at birth, and their felt gender (or gender identity). There is continuing debate regarding the benefits and drawbacks of physiological treatment of GD in children, a pathway, beginning with endocrine treatment to suppress puberty. Currently, the main alternative to physiological treatment consists of the so-called "wait-and-see" approach, which often includes counseling or other psychotherapeutic treatment. In this paper, we argue in favor of a "third pathway" for the diagnosis and treatment of GD in youths. To make our case, we draw on a recent development in bioethics: the phenomenological approach. Scholars such as Slatman and Svenaeus have argued that the extent to which the body can (or should be) manipulated or reconstructed through medical intervention is not only determined by consideration of ethical frameworks and social and legal norms. Rather, we must also take account of patients' personal experience of their body, the personal and social values associated with it, and their understanding of its situation in their life: their narrative identities. We apply this phenomenological approach to medicine and nursing to the diagnosis and treatment of GD in youth. In particular, we discuss Zahavi and Martiny's conception of the phenomenological interview, in order to show that narrative techniques can assist in the process of gender identification and in the treatment of youth presenting with GD. We focus on two case studies that highlight the relevance of a narrative-based interview in relations between patients, HCPs, and family, to expose the influence of social ideologies on how young people presenting with GD experience their bodies and gender.

Epistemic Peerhood as a Model To Improve Gender-Affirming Care in Medical Education

Issue: Inadequate training around gender-affirming care is a critical gap in health care and medical education that causes disparities and leads to injury for transgender, nonbinary, and other gender-diverse patients. In contrast to this widespread provider knowledge gap, gender-diverse patients bring critical knowledge from their own experiences to health care. Embracing varied epistemologies, or sources of knowledge, within medical education has the potential to enhance gender-affirming care by intentionally placing value on the lived experiences and emphasizing the credibility of gender-diverse patients. Evidence: In this article, the authors endorse a model of epistemic peerhood in which the embodied knowledge of gender-diverse patients and the authoritative knowledge of providers are each valued for their contribution to care. The authors reflect on experiences developing gender-affirming healthcare curricula and how medical education has not yet adequately addressed gender-diverse care without embracing community knowledge. Implications: The authors identify three vital areas to integrate epistemic peerhood in medical training to address gaps in gender-affirming care: (1) collaborative student training methods that reflect embodied knowledge in the absence of, or in addition to, clinical expertise on gender-affirming care; (2) sustainable partnerships between academic programs and gender-diverse communities that foster continuous engagement from collaborators with lived experience; and (3) broad community input about best practices for representing gender diversity in patient simulation. Embracing epistemic peerhood in each of these areas would result in broader gender-diverse community representation and leadership in medical education, which would ultimately strengthen gender-affirming healthcare training.

A stigmatizing dilemma in the labour room: Irrationality or selfishness?

Nowadays, a considerable number of women have a negative or outright traumatic birth experience. Literature shows that being involved in decision-making and exercising autonomy are important factors in having a positive birth experience. In this article, I explore the hypothesis that some views characteristic of the biomedical model of childbirth may hinder women's involvement in decision-making, leading them to what I have dubbed as a 'stigmatizing dilemma'; that is, to be perceived and treated as either irrational or selfish when trying to exercise their autonomy in the labour room. I suggest that such a stigmatizing dilemma arises when the following views are uncritically and unqualifiedly endorsed: (1) childbirth is a process fraught with risk, particularly to babies; (2) labouring women's reports are unreliable and their subjective perspective does not constitute a valuable source of information; (3) medical knowledge and procedures are the safest means to give birth. In a scenario where (1)-(3) are strongly endorsed, if birthing women act according to instrumental rationality and want the best for their babies, they will be expected to just leave decisions to medical experts. Thus, not following expert directions might lead women to fall under the stigma of either irrationality or selfishness: they could be perceived and treated as either irrational, since they may not seem to seek the best means to accomplish their goal; or selfish, since they may seem to pursue goals other than the baby's health. I examine these stigmas in relation to two ideals: that of disembodied rationality and that of selfless motherhood. I also explore different ways in which the views and prejudices underlying this stigmatizing dilemma could be challenged.

The hermeneutics of symptoms

The clinical encounter begins with presentation of an illness experience; but throughout that encounter, something else is constructed from it – a symptom. The symptom is a particular interpretation of that experience, useful for certain purposes in particular contexts. The hermeneutics of medicine – the study of the interpretation of human experience in medical terms – has largely taken the process of symptom-construction to be transparent, focussing instead on how constellations of symptoms are interpreted as representative of particular conditions. This paper examines the hermeneutical activity of symptom-construction more closely. I propose a fourfold account of the clinical function of symptoms: as theoretical entities; as tools for communication; as guides to palliative intervention; and as candidates for medical explanation or intervention. I also highlight roles they might play in illness experience. I use this framework to discuss four potential failures of symptom-interpretation: failure of symptom-type and symptom-token recognition; loss of the complete picture of illness experience through overwhelming emphasis on its symptomatic interpretation; and intersubjective feedback effects of symptom description altering the ill person’s own perceptions of their phenomenal experience. I conclude with some suggestions of potential remedies for failures in the process of symptom-construction.

Epistemic Injustice in Incident Investigations: A Qualitative Study

Serious incident investigations-often conducted by means of Root Cause Analysis methodologies-are increasingly seen as platforms to learn from multiple perspectives and experiences: professionals, patients and their families alike. Underlying this principle of inclusiveness is the idea that healthcare staff and service users hold unique and valuable knowledge that can inform learning, as well as the notion that learning is a social process that involves people actively reflecting on shared knowledge. Despite initiatives to facilitate inclusiveness, research shows that embracing and learning from diverse perspectives is difficult. Using the concept of 'epistemic injustice', pointing at practices of someone's knowledge being unjustly disqualified or devalued, we analyze the way incident investigations are organized and executed with the aim to understand why it is difficult to embrace and learn from the multiple perspectives voiced in incident investigations. We draw from 73 semi-structured interviews with healthcare leaders, managers, healthcare professionals, incident investigators and inspectors, document analyses and ethnographic observations. Our analysis identified several structures in the incident investigation process, that can promote or hinder an actor's epistemic contribution in the process of incident investigations. Rather than repeat calls to 'involve more' and 'listen better', we encourage policy makers to be mindful of and address the structures that can cause epistemic injustice. This can improve the outcome of incident investigations and can help to do justice to the lived experiences of the involved actors in the aftermath of a serious incident.

Toward a Harm-Based Account of Microaggressions

In this article, we critique the dominant understanding of microaggressions introduced by Derald Wing Sue and his colleagues-what we call the act-based account of microaggressions-by identifying its theoretical and practical shortcomings. On the basis of this critique, we introduce and defend an alternative, ameliorative account of microaggressions, what we call the harm-based account of microaggressions. Instead of understanding microaggressions on the basis of the acts committed by the microaggressing agent, we call for a reorientation of the concept so that the recipients of microaggressions and the harms they experience become the focal point.

Female family carers' experiences of violent, abusive or harmful behaviour by the older person for whom they care: a case of epistemic injustice?

Family carers affected by violent, abusive or harmful behaviour by the older person for whom they care face social and epistemic challenges in developing and sharing knowledge about their experiences. These difficulties have contributed to a situation in which there is a paucity of evidence and public discourse about how we understand violence and harm instigated by people who have care needs or are 'vulnerable'. This paper reports the findings of a qualitative study that involved 12 in-depth interviews with female carers affected by violence, abuse or harm. The study was informed theoretically by Miranda Fricker's concept of epistemic injustice which was used as a framework for analysis. There were two principal findings: (1) Carers were sensitive to anticipatory stigma and loss of moral autonomy. As a result, they self-censured what they shared and, at times, were met with subtle but powerful processes of silencing. (2) Carers had limited linguistic and conceptual resources to explain the emotional and social aspects of the harm they experienced, exacerbated by implicit social norms about the 'private' and gendered nature of familial care. To conclude, we discuss the implications of these findings for sociological research and health and social care practice.

A Injustiça Epistêmica na violência obstétrica

Resumo: Temos como objetivo, no presente artigo, apontar aspectos epistêmicos presentes na violência obstétrica. Para isso, apresentaremos o conceito de injustiça epistêmica proposto por Miranda Fricker e como tem sido utilizado para reflexões sobre as práticas de saúde na literatura de epistemologia social. Posteriormente, nos deteremos em analisar relatos de casos de violência obstétrica bem como um caso de esterilização forçada, examinando o Relatório Final da CPMI acerca da incidência de esterilização em massa de mulheres no Brasil e artigos científicos que descrevem casos de violência obstétrica. Com isso, buscamos apontar que há um aspecto epistêmico em tais violações e que uma mudança na distribuição de credibilidade pode ser relevante para o enfrentamento à violência obstétrica.

"What gets measured better gets done better": The landscape of validation of global maternal and newborn health indicators through key informant interviews

Background

A large number of indicators are currently used to monitor the state of maternal and newborn health, including those capturing dimensions of health system and input, care access and availability, care quality and safety, coverage and outcomes, and impact. Validity of these indicators is a key issue in the process of assessing indicator performance and suitability. This paper aims to understand the meaning of indicator validity in the field of maternal and newborn health, and to identify key recommendations for future research.

Methods

This qualitative study used purposive sampling to identify key informants until thematic saturation was achieved. We interviewed 32 respondents from a variety of backgrounds using semi-structured interviews covering five themes: the meaning of indicator validity, methodological approaches to assessing validity, acceptable levels of indicator validity, gaps in validation research, and recommendations for addressing these gaps. Interview transcripts were analysed data using thematic content approach.

Results

Three conceptually different definitions of indicator validity were described by respondents. They considered indicator validity to encompass meaning and potential to spur action, going beyond diagnostic validity. Indicator validation was seen as an ongoing process of building and synthesising a wide range of evidence rather than a one-size-fits-all cut-off in diagnostic validity tests. Gaps identified included assessing validity of indicators of quality of care and indicators based on facility-level data, as well as expanding studies to a broader range of global settings. The key recommendation was to develop a coordinated approach to summarising and evaluating research on indicator validity, including capacity building in appraising and communicating the available evidence for country-specific needs.

Conclusion

The findings will inform future recommendations around indicator testing and validation.

Epistemic injustice in healthcare encounters: evidence from chronic fatigue syndrome

Chronic fatigue syndrome or myalgic encephalomyelitis (CFS/ME) remains a controversial illness category. This paper surveys the state of knowledge and attitudes about this illness and proposes that epistemic concerns about the testimonial credibility of patients can be articulated using Miranda Fricker's concept of epistemic injustice. While there is consensus within mainstream medical guidelines that there is no known cause of CFS/ME, there is continued debate about how best to conceive of CFS/ME, including disagreement about how to interpret clinical studies of treatments. Against this background, robust qualitative and quantitative research from a range of countries has found that many doctors (and medical students) display uncertainty about whether CFS/ME is real, which may result in delays in diagnosis and treatment for patients. Strikingly, qualitative research evinces that patients with CFS/ME often experience suspicion by healthcare professionals, and many patients vocally oppose the effectiveness, and the conceptualisation, of their illness as psychologically treatable. We address the intersection of these issues and healthcare ethics, and claim that this state of affairs can be explained as a case of epistemic injustice (2007). We find evidence that healthcare consultations are fora where patients with CFS/ME may be particularly vulnerable to epistemic injustice. We argue that the (often unintentional) marginalisation of many patients is a professional failure that may lead to further ethical and practical consequences both for progressive research into CFS/ME, and for ethical care and delivery of current treatments among individuals suffering from this debilitating illness.