Total Brain Death and the Integration of the Body Required of a Human Being

The Fundamental Concept of Death-Controversies and Clinical Relevance: The UDDA Revision Series

When the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) was recently in the process of revising the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA), Neurology® ran a series of debates over certain controversial issues being deliberated. Omitted was a debate over the fundamental concept underlying brain death. In his introductory article, Bernat offered reasons for this omission: "It is not directly relevant to practicing neurologists who largely accept brain death, do not question its conceptual basis, …." In this article I argue the opposite: the fundamental concept of death is highly relevant to the clinical criteria and tests used to diagnose it. Moreover, most neurologists in fact disagree with the conceptual basis articulated by Bernat. Basically, there are 3 competing concepts of death: (1) biological: cessation of the integrative unity of the organism as a whole (endorsed by Bernat and the 1981 President's Commission), (2) psychological: cessation of the person, equated with a self-conscious mind (endorsed by half of neurologists), and (3) the vital work concept proposed by the 2008 President's Council on Bioethics. The first actually corresponds to a circulatory, not a neurologic, criterion. The second corresponds to a "higher brain" criterion. The third corresponds loosely to the UK's "brainstem death" criterion. In terms of the biological concept, current diagnostic guidelines entail a high rate of false-positive declarations of death, whereas in terms of the psychological concept, the same guidelines entail a high rate of false-negative declarations. Brainstem reflexes have nothing to do with any death concept (their role is putatively to guarantee irreversibility). By shining a spotlight on the deficiencies of the UDDA through attempting to revise it, the ULC may have unwittingly opened a Pandora's box of fresh scrutiny of the concept of death underlying the neurologic criterion-particularly on the part of state legislatures with irreconcilably opposed worldviews.

Death as the Cessation of an Organism and the Moral Status Alternative

The mainstream concept of death-the biological one-identifies death with the cessation of an organism. In this article, I challenge the mainstream position, showing that there is no single well-established concept of an organism and no universal concept of death in biological terms. Moreover, some of the biological views on death, if applied in the context of bedside decisions, might imply unacceptable consequences. I argue the moral concept of death-one similar to that of Robert Veatch-overcomes such difficulties. The moral view identifies death with the irreversible cessation of a patient's moral status, that is, a state when she can no longer be harmed or wronged. The death of a patient takes place when she is no longer capable of regaining her consciousness. In this regard, the proposal elaborated herein resembles that of Veatch yet differs from Veatch's original project since it is universal. In essence, it is applicable in the case of other living beings such as animals and plants, provided that they have some moral status.

The Moral Illicitness of Relying Solely on Neurological Criteria for the Determination of Death: A Catholic Response to "Brain Death"

This paper presents the biological, philosophical, and theological arguments against "brain death" or death determined strictly through neurological criteria. It is rooted in a realistic, Thomistic metaphysical and anthropological view of the human person and the objective reality of death. Part I of the paper reviews the medical evidence that the bodies of those declared brain death are alive and makes clear that the bodies of "brain dead" patients are not biologically analogous to severed body parts. Part II presents the philosophical and theological argument that it is impossible to be a live human being and not a person. Since then those declared brain dead are somatically alive, they are live human persons with the right to life and cannot be subject to the extraction of vital, unpaired organs, since this would violate the dead donor rule. Part III reviews why the Magisterium has not unconditionally approved the determination of death through neurological criteria, and why it would be within the competence of the Magisterium to preclude medical professionals from determining death strictly through neurological criteria. The paper argues that there should be a ban on all vital, unpaired organ donation from "brain dead" donors.

Eugène Bouchut's (1818-1891) Early Anticipation of the Concept of Brain Death

The conventional historical account of the concept of brain death credits developments and discoveries of the twentieth century with its inception, emphasizing the role of technological developments and professional conferences, notably the 1968 Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death. This essay argues that the French physician Eugène Bouchut anticipated the concept of brain death as early as 1846. Correspondence with Bouchut's understanding of brain death and one important contemporary concept of brain death is established then contrasted with current trends of defining death as the death of the brain. The philosophical factors that influenced Bouchut and the later developments of concepts of brain death are considered, with special reference to mechanistic philosophy and vitalism.

Heads, Bodies, Brains, and Selves: Personal Identity and the Ethics of Whole-Body Transplantation

Plans to attempt what has been called a head transplant, a body transplant, and a head-to-body transplant in human beings raise numerous ethical, social, and legal questions, including the circumstances, if any, under which it would be ethically permissible to attempt whole-body transplantation (WBT) in human beings, the possible effect of WBT on family relationships, and how families should shape WBT decisions. Our assessment of many of these questions depends partially on how we respond to sometimes centuries-old philosophical thought experiments about personal identity. As with so much in bioethics, it is impossible to escape, or at least inadvisable to try to bypass, the relevant foundational philosophical concerns.

The intractable problems with brain death and possible solutions

Brain death has been accepted worldwide medically and legally as the biological state of death of the organism. Nevertheless, the literature has described persistent problems with this acceptance ever since brain death was described. Many of these problems are not widely known or properly understood by much of the medical community. Here we aim to clarify these issues, based on the two intractable problems in the brain death debates. First, the metaphysical problem: there is no reason that withstands critical scrutiny to believe that BD is the state of biological death of the human organism. Second, the epistemic problem: there is no way currently to diagnose the state of BD, the irreversible loss of all brain functions, using clinical tests and ancillary tests, given potential confounders to testing. We discuss these problems and their main objections and conclude that these problems are intractable in that there has been no acceptable solution offered other than bare assertions of an 'operational definition' of death. We present possible ways to move forward that accept both the metaphysical problem - that BD is not biological death of the human organism - and the epistemic problem - that as currently diagnosed, BD is a devastating neurological state where recovery of sentience is very unlikely, but not a confirmed state of irreversible loss of all [critical] brain functions. We argue that the best solution is to abandon the dead donor rule, thus allowing vital organ donation from patients currently diagnosed as BD, assuming appropriate changes are made to the consent process and to laws about killing.

Diagnosing death: the "fuzzy area" between life and decomposition

This paper aims to determine whether it is necessary to propose the extreme of putrefaction as the only unmistakable sign in diagnosing the death of the human organism, as David Oderberg does in a recent paper. To that end, we compare Oderberg's claims to those of other authors who align with him in espousing the so-called theory of hylomorphism but who defend either a neurological or a circulatory-respiratory criterion for death. We then establish which interpretation of biological phenomena is the most reasonable within the metaphysical framework of hylomorphism. In this regard, we hold that technology does not obscure the difference between life and death or confect metaphysically anomalous beings, such as living human bodies who are not organisms or animals of the human species who are informed by a vegetative soul, but instead demands a closer and more careful look at the "fuzzy area" between a healthy (living) organism and a decaying corpse. In the light of hylomorphism, we conclude that neurological and circulatory-respiratory criteria are not good instruments for diagnosing death, since they can offer only probabilistic prognoses of death. Of the two, brain death is further away from the moment of death as it merely predicts cardiac arrest that will likely result in death. Putrefaction, the criterion that Oderberg proposes, is at the opposite end of the fuzzy area. This is undoubtedly a true diagnosis of death, but it is not necessary to wait for putrefaction proper-a relatively late stage of decomposition-to be sure that death has already occurred. Rather, early cadaveric phenomena demonstrate that the matter composing a body is subject to the basic forces governing all matter in its environment and has thus succumbed to the universal current of entropy, meaning that the entropy-resisting activity has ceased to constitute an organismal unity. When this unity is lost, there is no possibility of return.

[Brain death criterion and organ donation: current neuroscientific perspective]

In der akademischen und öffentlichen Debatte wird der irreversible Hirnfunktionsausfall als Kriterium des Todes (Hirntodkriterium) immer wieder hinterfragt. Im vorliegenden Artikel werden 6 prototypische Thesen gegen das Hirntodkriterium diskutiert: 1) Nichtsuperiorität des Gehirns gegenüber anderen Organen, 2) Unsicherheit der Hirntoddiagnostik, 3) erhaltene Schmerzempfindung Hirntoter, 4) (spontane) sexuelle Reifung und erhaltene Reproduktionsfunktion Hirntoter, 5) Symmetrie von Hirntod und Embryonalphase, 6) Gleichsetzung des intensivmedizinisch erhaltenen Restorganismus Hirntoter mit dem lebenden Menschen.

Keine dieser Thesen hält einer kritischen Analyse stand. In Deutschland wird das Ganzhirntodkriterium angewendet. Der Hirntod geht mit dem völligen Ausfall jeglicher Empfindung, Bewusstheit, Mimik, Augen‑, Zungen- und Schlundmotorik, Willkürmotorik und Sexualfunktion einher (funktionelle „Enthauptung“). Medizinisch-technisch können andere Organe bzw. ihre Primitivsteuerung ersetzt werden, nicht aber das Gehirn. Das Gehirn, nicht der Körper, ist bestimmend für das menschliche Individuum. Die Gleichsetzung des künstlich erhaltenen Restorganismus, naturphilosophisch als lebendiges System interpretierbar, mit dem Organismus desselben lebenden Menschen wird durch die beliebige Reduzierbarkeit der Anzahl beteiligter Organe ad absurdum geführt. Der irreversible Hirnfunktionsausfall führt unausweichlich zum Herzstillstand, unbehandelt innerhalb von Minuten, unter Intensivtherapie i. d. R. innerhalb von Tagen. Auch beim Embryo/Fötus führt die Fehlanlage des gesamten Gehirns zum (vorgeburtlichen) Tod. Die in Deutschland gesetzliche Richtlinie zur Hirntodfeststellung hat eine im internationalen Vergleich hohe Diagnosesicherheit, es sind damit keine bestätigten Fehldiagnosen aufgetreten.

Humility before New Scientific Evidence: We No Longer Have Moral Certainty that "Brain Death" Is True Death

In light of the current medical evidence, physicians and ethicists no longer have the moral certainty that Pope John Paul II deemed vital for vital organ transplantation. The current medical evidence suggests that some brain-dead patients do seem to exhibit signs of global integration. This article will analyze the interpretations of this evidence, both from ethicists for and against the neurological criteria. Even the strongest arguments in favor of the neurological criteria in light of the new evidence fail to prove that the patient with total brain failure (TBF) has died. Furthermore, the recent Jahi McMath case demonstrates a new and alarming reality that there is no way in practice to distinguish global ischemic penumbra from TBF. In the absence of the moral certainty required by Pope John Paul II, it is clear that the Catholic Church should immediately call for a halt on vital organ transplantation.

SUMMARY

This article analyzes the current medical evidence about brain death and argues that we have lost the moral certainty that Pope John Paul II deemed necessary for vital organ transplantation.

What Demarks the Metamorphosis of Human Individuals to Posthuman Entities?

Humans often seek to improve themselves, whether through self-discipline or through the use of science and technology. At some point in the future, techniques might become available that will change humans to such a degree that they might have to be regarded as something other than human: posthuman. This essay tries to define the point at which such a human-to-posthuman metamorphosis may occur. This is achieved by discerning what is it that makes human substance distinct, i.e. what is the human essence. This is accomplished by examining the features of the human body, looking at the mode of human existence in society and trying to grasp the importance of the body-soul relationship. Throughout the process, humans are compared to animals as well as entities from literature, film, and the gaming world. These are used as case studies to shape and test the ideas developed throughout the essay. This essay's conclusions might become useful when decisions will have to be made as to the legal status of posthumans, by providing a tool for discerning when metamorphosis has occurred. Moreover, insights from this essay might also inform debates surrounding the ethical status of certain modalities of human enhancement.

How (not) to think of the 'dead-donor' rule

Although much has been written on the dead-donor rule (DDR) in the last twenty-five years, scant attention has been paid to how it should be formulated, what its rationale is, and why it was accepted. The DDR can be formulated in terms of either a Don't Kill rule or a Death Requirement, the former being historically rooted in absolutist ethics and the latter in a prudential policy aimed at securing trust in the transplant enterprise. I contend that the moral core of the rule is the Don't Kill rule, not the Death Requirement. This, I show, is how the DDR was understood by the transplanters of the 1960s, who sought to conform their practices to their ethics-unlike today's critics of the DDR, who rethink their ethics in a question-begging fashion to accommodate their practices. A better discussion of the ethics of killing is needed to move the debate forward.

Brain Death and Human Organismal Integration: A Symposium on the Definition of Death

Does the ability of some brain dead bodies to maintain homeostasis with the help of artificial life support actually imply that those bodies are living human organisms? Or might it be possible that a brain dead body on life support is a mere collection of still-living cells, organs and tissues which can coordinate with one another, but which lack the genuine integration that is the hallmark of a unified human organism as a whole? To foster further study of these difficult and timely questions, a Symposium on the Definition of Death was held at The Catholic University of America in June 2014. The Symposium brought together scholars from a variety of disciplines-law, medicine, biology, philosophy and theology-who all share a commitment to the dead donor rule and to a biological definition of death, but who have differing opinions regarding the validity of neurological criteria for human death. The papers found in this special issue are among the fruits of this Symposium.

Symposium on the Definition of Death: Summary Statement

This statement summarizes the conclusions of the Symposium on the Definition of Death, held at The Catholic University of America in June 2014. After providing the background and context for contemporary debates about brain death and describing the aims of the symposium, the statement notes points of unanimous and broad agreement among the participants, and highlights areas for further study.