Clinical Ethics Consultants are not "Ethics" Experts-But They do Have Expertise

Professionalization of Clinical Ethics Consultants: A Need for Liability Protection?

Clinical Ethics Consultation (CEC) has grown significantly in the last decade, and efforts are being made to professionalize the practice. The American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH) has been instrumental in this process, having published the Code of Ethics and Professional Responsibilities for Healthcare Ethics Consultants and founded and endorsed the creation of the Healthcare Ethics Consultant Certified (HCEC) Certification Commission. The ASBH also published "core competencies" for healthcare ethics consultants and has delineated a clear identity and role of such consultants distinct from that other healthcare professionals. In addition, more enter the field armed with advanced degrees (MA and PhD) or certification in clinical ethics consultation. While some have questioned the trend toward professionalization, the momentum is clearly in its favor. This paper explores three questions: Does the professionalization of healthcare ethics consultation expose those engaged in the field to the types of liability claims faced by professionals in other fields? What specific liabilities could affect a healthcare ethics consultant? And finally, what should healthcare ethics consultants do to protect themselves against liability claims? We conclude that while the risk of liability remains low, those engaged in the field should accept that risk just as part of their status as professionals and, like those in allied professions, seek appropriate protection in the form of liability insurance.

Nurse ethicists: Innovative resource or ideological aspiration?

In recent years, there have been growing calls for nurses to have a formal advanced practice role as nurse ethicists in hospital contexts. Initially proposed in the cultural context of the USA where nurse ethicists have long been recognised, the idea is being advocated in other judications outside of the USA such as the UK, Australia and elsewhere. Such calls are not without controversy, however. Underpinning this controversy are ongoing debates about the theoretical, methodological and political dimensions of clinical ethics support services generally, and more recently where nurses might 'fit' within such a service. In considering whether nurse ethicists ought to have a place in clinical ethics support services, a number of questions arise such as: Is such a role warranted? If so, what credentials should nurses assuming the title of 'nurse ethicist' be required to have? What standards of practice ought nurse ethicists be required to uphold? What is the ultimate role and function of nurse ethicists in hospital contexts? And in what contexts might a nurse ethicist be most useful? In this essay, brief attention will be given to addressing these questions. It will be concluded that, as a minimum, nurses wishing to assume an advanced nursing practice role as a nurse ethicist must have substantive grounding in the foundational knowledge of the disciplines of both moral philosophy and nursing ethics. They must also not lose sight of the ultimate goal of nursing ethics, notably, to promote and advance ethical nursing practice and the provision of 'good' nursing care.

Credentialing Character: A Virtue Ethics Approach to Professionalizing Healthcare Ethics Consultation Services

In the process of professionalization, the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH) has emphasized process and knowledge as core competencies for clinical ethics consultants; however, the credentialing program launched in 2018 fails to address both pillars. The inadequacy of this program recalls earlier critiques of the professionalization effort made by Giles R. Scofield and H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.. Both argue that ethics consultation is not a profession and the effort to professionalize is motivated by self-interest. One argument they offer against professionalization is that ethics consultants lack normative expertise. Although the question of expertise cannot be resolved completely, the accusation of self-interest can be addressed. Underlying these critiques is a concern for hubris, which can be addressed in certification and the vetting of candidates.Drawing on the virtue ethics literature of Alasdair MacIntyre and Edmund D. Pellegrino, I argue that medicine is a moral community in which ethics consultants are moral agents with a duty to foster the virtue of humility (or what Pellegrino and Thomasma call self-effacement). The implications of this argument include a requirement for self-reflection in one's role as a moral agent and reflection on one's progress toward developing or deepening virtuous engagement with the moral community of medicine. I recommend that professionalization of clinical ethics consultants include a self-reflective narrative component in the initial certification and ongoing renewal of certification where clinical ethics consultants address the emotional dimensions of their work as well as their own moral development. Adopting a teleological view of ethics consultation and incorporating narratives that work toward that purpose will mitigate the self-interest and hubris of the professionalization project.

Klinische Ethik systemisch betrachtet – Vom Einfluss systemischer Grundannahmen und Methoden auf die Gestaltung einer effektiven Ethikberatung

Krankenhäuser müssen sich an der ethischen Qualität ihrer Versorgung messen lassen. Es geht dabei um einen Zustand, in dem allgemein anerkannte moralische Normen in der Patient:innenversorgung konsequent berücksichtigt werden. Damit sind zwei Ebenen angesprochen: die der ethisch-normativen Deutung und die der Gestaltung intra- und interpersonaler Prozesse. Die Klinische Ethik ist die Disziplin, die in der Verbindung beider ihre zentrale Aufgabe sieht. Um sie zu erfüllen, muss Ethikarbeit auf der Basis komplexer Kompetenzen erfolgen. Neben fundiertem Ethikwissen ist das Beherrschen von geeigneten Methoden für die Steuerung solcher Prozesse eine unabdingbare Voraussetzung. Dazu aber ist die Studienlage vergleichsweise dünn. Die vorliegende Arbeit greift dieses Desiderat auf und geht dabei von der Hypothese aus, dass die Systemik einen wichtigen Beitrag zu einer im obigen Sinne effektiven Ethikarbeit leisten kann. Die Darstellung gibt einen Einblick in das systemische Denken und diskutiert die Möglichkeiten, die systemisches Handwerkszeug für die Herausforderungen der Klinischen Ethik bereithält. Die Ausführungen laden dazu ein, über den Einfluss systemischer Grundannahmen und Methoden auf die Gestaltung einer effektiven Ethikarbeit nachzudenken. Darüber hinaus ruft dieser Beitrag dazu auf, die Beratungsmethodik als solche mehr in den Fokus zu rücken.

Defending secular clinical ethics expertise from an Engelhardt-inspired sense of theoretical crisis

The national standards for clinical ethics consultation set forth by the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH) endorse an "ethics facilitation" approach, which characterizes the role of the ethicist as one skilled at facilitating consensus within the range of ethically acceptable options. To determine the range of ethically acceptable options, ASBH recommends the standard model of decision-making (informed consent, advance directives, surrogates, best interests), which is grounded in the values of autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr. has sharply criticized the standard model for presuming contentful moral claims in circumscribing the range of ethically acceptable options, which, he argues, cannot be rationally justified in a pluralistic context. Engelhardt's solution is a secular clinical ethics based on a contentless principle of permission. The first part of this article lays out Engelhardt's negative claim, that reason cannot establish contentful moral claims, and his positive claim, that secular clinical ethics ought to be based on a contentless principle of permission. The second part critiques these negative and positive claims. The purpose of this paper is to defend secular clinical ethics expertise-defined as the ability of ethicists to offer justified moral recommendations grounded in consensus positions endorsed by the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities-from the radical critiques of Engelhardt, who argues that no moral or metaphysical claims, and hence no bioethical consensus, can be rationally justified. Engelhardt's critiques have caused some to worry that secular clinical ethics is in a state of theoretical crisis; this article concludes that Engelhardt's view is an unstable basis for that worry.

What is the appropriate role of reason in secular clinical ethics? An argument for a compatibilist view of public reason

This article describes and rejects three standard views of reason in secular clinical ethics. The first, instrumental reason view, affirms that reason may be used to draw conceptual distinctions, map moral geography, and identify invalid forms of argumentation, but prohibits recommendations because reason cannot justify any content-full moral or metaphysical commitments. The second, public reason view, affirms instrumental reason, and claims ethicists may make recommendations grounded in the moral and metaphysical commitments of bioethical consensus. The third, comprehensive reason view, also affirms instrumental reason, but encourages ethicists to make recommendations grounded in the moral and metaphysical commitments of their private worldviews. A compatibilist view of public reason is then defended, which holds that each standard view captures an important role for reason in different aspects of secular clinical ethics. The article ends by identifying three implications for enduring theoretical debates in clinical ethics.

Secular Clinical Ethicists Should Not Be Neutral Toward All Religious Beliefs: An Argument for a Moral-Metaphysical Proceduralism

Secular clinical ethics has responded to the problem of moral pluralism with a procedural approach. However, defining this term stirs debate: H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr. has championed a contentless proceduralism (P1), while others, conversely, argue for a proceduralism that permits some content in the form of moral claims (P2). This paper argues that the content P2 permits ought to be expanded to include some metaphysical commitments, in an approach referred to as P2+. The need for P2+ is demonstrated by analyzing and rejecting three standards (the best interest or harm principle, internal reasonability, and the child's right to an open future) used by P2 to justify overriding religiously motivated refusals of treatment for children. These approaches fail because each maintains a neutral stance regarding the truth of religious belief. This paper drives at the broader thesis that the proceduralism of secular clinical ethics requires some moral and metaphysical commitments.

Core competencies for ethics experts in health technology assessment

OBJECTIVES

There is no consensus on who might be qualified to conduct ethical analysis in the field of health technology assessment (HTA). Is there a specific expertise or skill set for doing this work? The aim of this article is to (i) clarify the concept of ethics expertise and, based on this, (ii) describe and specify the characteristics of ethics expertise in HTA.

METHODS

Based on the current literature and experiences in conducting ethical analysis in HTA, a group of members of the Health Technology Assessment International (HTAi) Interest Group on Ethical Issues in HTA critically analyzed the collected information during two face-to-face workshops. On the basis of the analysis, working definitions of "ethics expertise" and "core competencies" of ethics experts in HTA were developed. This paper reports the output of the workshop and subsequent revisions and discussions online among the authors.

RESULTS

Expertise in a domain consists of both explicit and tacit knowledge and is acquired by formal training and social learning. There is a ubiquitous ethical expertise shared by most people in society; nevertheless, some people acquire specialist ethical expertise. To become an ethics expert in the field of HTA, one needs to acquire general knowledge about ethical issues as well as specific knowledge of the ethical domain in HTA. The core competencies of ethics experts in HTA consist of three fundamental elements: knowledge, skills, and attitudes.

CONCLUSIONS

The competencies described here can be used by HTA agencies and others involved in HTA to call attention to and strengthen ethical analysis in HTA.

A Guide to Establishing Ethics Committees in Behavioral Health Settings

Ethical statements typically involve rules. All rules can vary in accuracy and specificity depending on the context to which they are applied. Codes of ethics often involve ethical rules that are written generally to cover the wide-ranging set of possible situations that any one member of the profession may encounter. But, despite being written generally, codes of ethics are applied to specific situations that professional members encounter. The application of general rules to specific contexts can sometimes be challenging and complex. Health care organizations have several options to help their employees behave ethically. One approach is to appoint a single ethics coordinator. In contrast, the dominant approach in most health care organizations is to develop an organizational ethics committee (Moon Pediatrics, 143(5), e20190659, 2019). Despite the popularity of the ethics committee in other professions, the extent to which organizations that provide applied behavior analysis services have established and operate ethics committees is unknown. Ethics coordinator roles and ethics committees both have benefits and drawbacks. This article reviews the benefits and drawbacks of appointing an ethics coordinator and establishing an ethics committee. And, for interested organizations, this article outlines the steps and considerations that organizations can use to guide the creation of an ethics committee.

Reasoning "Uncharted Territory": Notions of Expertise Within Ethics Review Panels Assessing Research Use of Social Media

The fast changing field of social media (SM) research presents unique challenges for research ethics committees (RECs). This article examines notions of experience and expertise in the context of REC members reviewing proposals for SM research and considers the role of the RECs in this area of review. We analyze 19 interviews with REC members to highlight that a lack of personal and professional experience of SM, compounded by a lack of institutional and professional guidelines, mean many REC members feel they do not possess sufficient expertise to review SM research. This view was supported by 14 interviews with SM researchers. REC members drew on strategies to overcome their lack of experience, although most SM researchers still found this problematic, to varying degrees. We recommend several steps to ensure REC expertise in SM research keeps pace of this fast-developing field, taking a pro-active, dialogic approach.

Evaluation of a paediatric clinical ethics service

AIM

To evaluate a paediatric clinical ethics service incorporating both normative and empirical analysis.

METHODS

Section 1: Review of consensus guidelines to identify emerging standards for clinical ethics services (CES) and evaluation of the service in relation to these. Section 2: Description of service activity data. Section 3: Feedback from clinical staff involved in clinical ethics consultations was collected using a web-based survey.

RESULTS

Four guideline documents were reviewed, and clear emerging consensus standards were identified. Our service fulfils identified knowledge and skill core competencies and at least partially fulfils all of the identified service-level standards. Clinicians report that clinical ethics consultation decreases their moral distress.

CONCLUSIONS

There is emerging consensus for staff competencies and service-level standards for CES. The role of CES in staff well-being needs to be explored. Collaborative, multi-modal research to develop standards and evaluate CES is needed.

Two Troubling Trends in the Conversation Over Whether Clinical Ethics Consultants Have Ethics Expertise

In a recent issue of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, several scholars wrote on the topic of ethics expertise in clinical ethics consultation. The articles in this issue exemplified what we consider to be two troubling trends in the quest to articulate a unique expertise for clinical ethicists. The first trend, exemplified in the work of Lisa Rasmussen, is an attempt to define a role for clinical ethicists that denies they have ethics expertise. Rasmussen cites the dependence of ethical expertise on irresolvable meta-ethical debates as the reason for this move. We argue against this deflationary strategy because it ends up smuggling in meta-ethical assumptions it claims to avoid. Specifically, we critique Rasmussen's distinction between the ethical and normative features of clinical ethics cases. The second trend, exemplified in the work of Dien Ho, also attempts to avoid meta-ethics. However, unlike Rasmussen, Ho tries to articulate a notion of ethics expertise that does not rely upon meta-ethics. Specifically, we critique Ho's attempts to explain how clinical ethicists can resolve moral disputes using what he calls the "Default Principle" and "arguments by parity." We show that these strategies do not work unless those with the moral disagreement already share certain meta-ethical assumptions. Ultimately, we argue that the two trends of (1) attempting to avoid meta-ethics by denying that clinical ethicists have ethics expertise, and (2) attempting to articulate how ethics expertise can be used to resolve disputes without meta-ethics both fail because they do not, in fact, avoid doing meta-ethics. We conclude that these trends detract from what clinical ethics consultation was founded to do and ought to still be doing-provide moral guidance, which requires ethics expertise, and engagement with meta-ethics. To speak of ethicists without ethics expertise leaves their role in the clinic dangerously unclear and unjustified.

Were the "Pioneer" Clinical Ethics Consultants "Outsiders"? For Them, Was "Critical Distance" That Critical?

"Clinical ethics consultants" have been practicing in the United States for about 50 years. Most of the earliest consultants-the "pioneers"-were "outsiders" when they first appeared at patients' bedsides and in the clinic. However, if they were outsiders initially, they acclimated to the clinical setting and became "insiders" very quickly. Moreover, there was some tension between traditional academics and those doing applied ethics about whether there was sufficient "critical distance" for appropriate reflection about the complex medical ethics dilemmas of the day if one were involved in the decision making. Again, the pioneers deflected concerns by identifying and instituting safeguards to assure professional objectivity in clinical ethics consultation services. One might suggest that in moving inside and establishing normative practices, the pioneer clinical ethics consultants anticipated adoption of their routines and professionalization of the field.

Clinical Ethics Support for Healthcare Personnel: An Integrative Literature Review

This study describes which clinical ethics approaches are available to support healthcare personnel in clinical practice in terms of their construction, functions and goals. Healthcare personnel frequently face ethically difficult situations in the course of their work and these issues cover a wide range of areas from prenatal care to end-of-life care. Although various forms of clinical ethics support have been developed, to our knowledge there is a lack of review studies describing which ethics support approaches are available, how they are constructed and their goals in supporting healthcare personnel in clinical practice. This study engages in an integrative literature review. We searched for peer-reviewed academic articles written in English between 2000 and 2016 using specific Mesh terms and manual keywords in CINAHL, MEDLINE and Psych INFO databases. In total, 54 articles worldwide described clinical ethics support approaches that include clinical ethics consultation, clinical ethics committees, moral case deliberation, ethics rounds, ethics discussion groups, and ethics reflection groups. Clinical ethics consultation and clinical ethics committees have various roles and functions in different countries. They can provide healthcare personnel with advice and recommendations regarding the best course of action. Moral case deliberation, ethics rounds, ethics discussion groups and ethics reflection groups support the idea that group reflection increases insight into ethical issues. Clinical ethics support in the form of a "bottom-up" perspective might give healthcare personnel opportunities to think and reflect more than a "top-down" perspective. A "bottom-up" approach leaves the healthcare personnel with the moral responsibility for their choice of action in clinical practice, while a "top-down" approach risks removing such moral responsibility.

The "Ethics" Expertise in Clinical Ethics Consultation

The nature, possibility, and implications of ethics expertise (or moral expertise) in general and of bioethics expertise in particular has been the focus of extensive debate for over thirty years. What is ethics expertise and what does it enable experts to do? Knowing what ethics expertise is can help answer another important question: What, if anything, makes a claim of expertise legitimate? In other words, how does someone earn the appellation "ethics expert?" There remains deep disagreement on whether ethics expertise is possible, and if so, what constitutes such expertise and what it entails and legitimates. Discussion of bioethics expertise has become particularly important given the growing presence of bioethicists in the clinical setting as well as efforts to professionalize bioethics through codes of ethics and certification (or quasi-certification) efforts. Unlike in the law or in engineering, where there may be a body of knowledge that professional organizations or others have articulated as important for education and training of experts, ethics expertise admits of no such body of knowledge or required experience. Nor is there an entity seen as having the authority to articulate the necessary scope of knowledge. Questions about whether there is such a body of knowledge for particular areas within bioethics have emerged and played a central role in professionalization efforts in recent years, especially in the area of clinical ethics.