In the interest of saving time: a critique of discrete perception

Temporal windows of unconscious processing cannot easily be disrupted

Conscious perception is preceded by long periods of unconscious processing. These periods are crucial for analyzing temporal information and for solving the many ill-posed problems of vision. An important question is what starts and ends these windows and how they may be interrupted. Most experimental paradigms do not offer the methodology required for such investigation. Here, we used the sequential metacontrast paradigm, in which two streams of lines, expanding from the center to the periphery, are presented, and participants are asked to attend to one of the motion streams. If several lines in the attended motion stream are offset, the offsets are known to integrate mandatorily and unconsciously, even if separated by up to 450 ms. Using this paradigm, we here found that external visual objects, such as an annulus, presented during the motion stream, do not disrupt mandatory temporal integration. Thus, if a window is started once, it appears to remain open even in the presence of disruptions that are known to interrupt visual processes normally. Further, we found that interrupting the motion stream with a gap disrupts temporal integration but does not terminate the overall unconscious processing window. Thus, while temporal integration is key to unconscious processing, not all stimuli in the same processing window are integrated together. These results strengthen the case for unconscious processing taking place in windows of sensemaking, during which temporal integration occurs in a flexible and perceptually meaningful manner.

New Evidence for Retrospectively Cued Perception

Past research suggests a continuity between perception and memory, as reflected in influences of orienting of spatial attention by cues presented after a visual target offset (post-target cues) on target perception. Conducting two experiments, we tested and confirmed this claim. Our study revealed an elevated reliance on post-target cues for target detection with diminishing target visibility, leading to better performance in validly versus invalidly cued trials, indicative of contrast gain. We demonstrated this post-target cueing impact on target perception without a postcue response prompt, meaning that our results truly reflected a continuity between perception and memory rather than a task-specific impact of having to memorize the target due to a response prompt. While previous studies found an improvement in accuracy through valid compared to invalid cues using liminal targets, in Experiment 1, we further showed an influence of attention on participants' response time by the post-target cues with cues presented away from a clearly visible target. This suggests that visual interactions at the target location provided no better explanation of post-target cueing effects. Our results generalize prior research with liminal targets and confirm the view of a perception-memory continuum so that visual target processing is not shielded against visuospatial orienting of attention elicited by events following the offset of the visual target.

The self and conscious experience

The primary determinant of the self (S) is the conscious experience (CE) we have of it. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that empirical research on S mainly resorts to the CE (or lack of CE) that subjects have of their S. What comes as a surprise is that empirical research on S does not tackle the problem of how CE contributes to building S. Empirical research investigates how S either biases the cognitive processing of stimuli or is altered through a wide range of means (meditation, hypnosis, etc.). In either case, even for different reasons, considerations of how CE contributes to building S are left unspecified in empirical research. This article analyzes these reasons and proposes a theoretical model of how CE contributes to building S. According to the proposed model, the phenomenal aspect of consciousness is produced by the modulation-engendered by attentional activity-of the energy level of the neural substrate (that is, the organ of attention) that underpins attentional activity. The phenomenal aspect of consciousness supplies the agent with a sense of S and informs the agent on how its S is affected by the agent's own operations. The phenomenal aspect of consciousness performs its functions through its five main dimensions: qualitative, quantitative, hedonic, temporal, and spatial. Each dimension of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness can be explained by a specific aspect of the modulation of the energy level of the organ of attention. Among other advantages, the model explains the various forms of S as outcomes resulting from the operations of a single mechanism and provides a unifying framework for empirical research on the neural underpinnings of S.

Processing load, and not stimulus evidence, determines the duration of unconscious visual feature integration

Integration across space and time is essential for the analysis of motion, low contrast, and many more stimuli. A crucial question is what determines the duration of integration. Based on classical models of decision-making, one might expect that integration terminates as soon as sufficient evidence about a stimulus is accumulated and a threshold is crossed. However, there is very little research on this question as most experimental paradigms cannot monitor processing following stimulus presentation. In particular, it is difficult to determine when processing terminates. Here, using the sequential metacontrast paradigm (SQM), in which information is mandatorily integrated along motion trajectories, we show that the processing load determines the extent of integration but that evidence accumulation does not. Further, the extent of integration is determined by absolute time instead of the number of elements presented. These results have important implications for understanding the time course and mechanisms of temporal integration.

Holistic temporal order judgment of tones requires top-down disentanglement

How temporal sequence gets organized is a central topic in cognitive processing. In a high-frequency time window of tens of milliseconds, the temporal order is reconstructed rather than mirroring the sequence of events objectively in physical time. Two separate phases or strategies, a holistic coding phase that groups successively presented events as a gestalt and a disentanglement phase that decodes the temporal order of discrete events from the gestalt representation, may presumably be involved in the perception of temporal order across different modalities. With a temporal order adaptation protocol of pure tones using glide adaptors, the present study demonstrated a dissociation between constant discriminability and shifted subjective simultaneity across different adaptor directions. While discriminability of temporal order was not adapted by glides, revealing a constant coding sensitivity of different asynchronies, the shift of subjective simultaneity indicated the recalibration of a top-down disentanglement of the holistic processing under the influence of glide adaptors. The results suggest a dual-phase holistic processing in temporal order perception, supporting two separate cognitive strategies for event timing on the sub-second level.

From the origins to the stream of consciousness and its neural correlates

There are now dozens of very different theories of consciousness, each somehow contributing to our understanding of its nature. The science of consciousness needs therefore not new theories but a general framework integrating insights from those, yet not making it a still-born "Frankenstein" theory. First, the framework must operate explicitly on the stream of consciousness, not on its static description. Second, this dynamical account must also be put on the evolutionary timeline to explain the origins of consciousness. The Cognitive Evolution Theory (CET), outlined here, proposes such a framework. This starts with the assumption that brains have primarily evolved as volitional subsystems of organisms, inherited from primitive (fast and random) reflexes of simplest neural networks, only then resembling error-minimizing prediction machines. CET adopts the tools of critical dynamics to account for metastability, scale-free avalanches, and self-organization which are all intrinsic to brain dynamics. This formalizes the stream of consciousness as a discrete (transitive, irreflexive) chain of momentary states derived from critical brain dynamics at points of phase transitions and mapped then onto a state space as neural correlates of a particular conscious state. The continuous/discrete dichotomy appears naturally between the brain dynamics at the causal level and conscious states at the phenomenal level, each volitionally triggered from arousal centers of the brainstem and cognitively modulated by thalamocortical systems. Their objective observables can be entropy-based complexity measures, reflecting the transient level or quantity of consciousness at that moment.

From Shorter to Longer Timescales: Converging Integrated Information Theory (IIT) with the Temporo-Spatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC)

Time is a key element of consciousness as it includes multiple timescales from shorter to longer ones. This is reflected in our experience of various short-term phenomenal contents at discrete points in time as part of an ongoing, more continuous, and long-term ‘stream of consciousness.’ Can Integrated Information Theory (IIT) account for this multitude of timescales of consciousness? According to the theory, the relevant spatiotemporal scale for consciousness is the one in which the system reaches the maximum cause-effect power; IIT currently predicts that experience occurs on the order of short timescales, namely, between 100 and 300 ms (theta and alpha frequency range). This can well account for the integration of single inputs into a particular phenomenal content. However, such short timescales leave open the temporal relation of specific phenomenal contents to others during the course of the ongoing time, that is, the stream of consciousness. For that purpose, we converge the IIT with the Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC), which, assuming a multitude of different timescales, can take into view the temporal integration of specific phenomenal contents with other phenomenal contents over time. On the neuronal side, this is detailed by considering those neuronal mechanisms driving the non-additive interaction of pre-stimulus activity with the input resulting in stimulus-related activity. Due to their non-additive interaction, the single input is not only integrated with others in the short-term timescales of 100–300 ms (alpha and theta frequencies) (as predicted by IIT) but, at the same time, also virtually expanded in its temporal (and spatial) features; this is related to the longer timescales (delta and slower frequencies) that are carried over from pre-stimulus to stimulus-related activity. Such a non-additive pre-stimulus-input interaction amounts to temporo-spatial expansion as a key mechanism of TTC for the constitution of phenomenal contents including their embedding or nesting within the ongoing temporal dynamic, i.e., the stream of consciousness. In conclusion, we propose converging the short-term integration of inputs postulated in IIT (100–300 ms as in the alpha and theta frequency range) with the longer timescales (in delta and slower frequencies) of temporo-spatial expansion in TTC.

Intrinsic Network Activity Reflects the Fluctuating Experience of Tonic Pain

Although we know sensation is continuous, research on long-lasting and continuously changing stimuli is scarce and the dynamic nature of ongoing cortical processing is largely neglected. In a longitudinal study, 38 participants across four sessions were asked to continuously rate the intensity of an applied tonic heat pain for 20 min. Using group-independent component analysis and dual regression, we extracted the subjects' time courses of intrinsic network activity. The relationship between the dynamic fluctuation of network activity with the varying time courses of three pain processing entities was computed: pain intensity, the direction of pain intensity changes, and temperature. We were able to dissociate the spatio-temporal patterns of objective (temperature) and subjective (pain intensity/changes of pain intensity) aspects of pain processing in the human brain. We found two somatosensory networks with distinct functions: one network that encodes the small fluctuations in temperature and consists mainly of bilateral primary somatosensory cortex (SI), and a second right-lateralized network that encodes the intensity of the subjective experience of pain consisting of SI, secondary somatosensory cortex, the posterior cingulate cortex, and the thalamus. We revealed the somatosensory dynamics that build up toward a current subjective percept of pain. The timing suggests a cascade of subsequent processing steps toward the current pain percept.

Evolutionary Advantages of Stimulus-Driven EEG Phase Transitions in the Upper Cortical Layers

Spatio-temporal brain activity monitored by EEG recordings in humans and other mammals has identified beta/gamma oscillations (20-80 Hz), which are self-organized into spatio-temporal structures recurring at theta/alpha rates (4-12 Hz). These structures have statistically significant correlations with sensory stimuli and reinforcement contingencies perceived by the subject. The repeated collapse of self-organized structures at theta/alpha rates generates laterally propagating phase gradients (phase cones), ignited at some specific location of the cortical sheet. Phase cones have been interpreted as neural signatures of transient perceptual experiences according to the cinematic theory of brain dynamics. The rapid expansion of essentially isotropic phase cones is consistent with the propagation of perceptual broadcasts postulated by Global Workspace Theory (GWT). What is the evolutionary advantage of brains operating with repeatedly collapsing dynamics? This question is answered using thermodynamic concepts. According to neuropercolation theory, waking brains are described as non-equilibrium thermodynamic systems operating at the edge of criticality, undergoing repeated phase transitions. This work analyzes the role of long-range axonal connections and metabolic processes in the regulation of critical brain dynamics. Historically, the near 10 Hz domain has been associated with conscious sensory integration, cortical "ignitions" linked to conscious visual perception, and conscious experiences. We can therefore combine a very large body of experimental evidence and theory, including graph theory, neuropercolation, and GWT. This cortical operating style may optimize a tradeoff between rapid adaptation to novelty vs. stable and widespread self-organization, therefore resulting in significant Darwinian benefits.

The color phi phenomenon: Not so special, after all?

We show how anomalous time reversal of stimuli and their associated responses can exist in very small connectionist models. These networks are built from dynamical toy model neurons which adhere to a minimal set of biologically plausible properties. The appearance of a "ghost" response, temporally and spatially located in between responses caused by actual stimuli, as in the phi phenomenon, is demonstrated in a similar small network, where it is caused by priming and long-distance feedforward paths. We then demonstrate that the color phi phenomenon can be present in an echo state network, a recurrent neural network, without explicitly training for the presence of the effect, such that it emerges as an artifact of the dynamical processing. Our results suggest that the color phi phenomenon might simply be a feature of the inherent dynamical and nonlinear sensory processing in the brain and in and of itself is not related to consciousness.

Time and time again: a multi-scale hierarchical framework for time-consciousness and timing of cognition

Temporality and the feeling of ‘now’ is a fundamental property of consciousness. Different conceptualizations of time-consciousness have argued that both the content of our experiences and the representations of those experiences evolve in time, or neither have temporal extension, or only content does. Accounting for these different positions, we propose a nested hierarchical model of multiple timescales that accounts for findings on timing of cognition and phenomenology of temporal experience. This framework hierarchically combines the three major philosophical positions on time-consciousness (i.e. cinematic, extensional and retentional) and presents a common basis for temporal experience. We detail the properties of these hierarchical levels and speculate how they could coexist mechanistically. We also place several findings on timing and temporal experience at different levels in this hierarchy and show how they can be brought together. Finally, the framework is used to derive novel predictions for both timing of our experiences and time perception. The theoretical framework offers a novel dynamic space that can bring together sub-fields of cognitive science like perception, attention, action and consciousness research in understanding and describing our experiences both in and of time.

No evidence for a single oscillator underlying discrete visual percepts

Theories of perception based on discrete sampling posit that visual consciousness is reconstructed based on snapshot-like perceptual moments, as opposed to being updated continuously. According to a model proposed by Schneider (2018), discrete sampling can explain both the flash-lag and the Fröhlich illusion, whereby a lag in the conscious updating of a moving stimulus alters its perceived spatial location in comparison to stationary stimulus. The alpha-band frequency, which is associated with phasic modulation of stimulus detection and the temporal resolution of perception, has been proposed to reflect the duration of perceptual moments. The goal of this study was to determine whether a single oscillator (e.g., alpha) is underlying the duration of perceptual moments, which would predict that the point of subjective equality (PSE) in the flash-lag and Fröhlich illusions are positively correlated across individuals. Although our displays induced robust flash-lag and Fröhlich effects, virtually zero correlation was seen between the PSE in the two illusions, indicating that the illusion magnitudes are unrelated across observers. These findings suggest that, if discrete sampling theory is true, these illusory percepts either rely on different oscillatory frequencies or not on oscillations at all. Alternatively, discrete sampling may not be the mechanism underlying these two motion illusions or our methods were ill-suited to test the theory.

A guideline for linking brain wave findings to the various aspects of discrete perception

Brain waves, determined by electrical and magnetic brain recordings (e.g., EEG and MEG), and fluctuating behavioral responses, determined by response time or accuracy measures, are frequently taken to support discrete perception. For example, it has been proposed that humans experience only one conscious percept per brain wave (e.g., during one alpha cycle). However, the proposed link between brain waves and discrete perception is typically rather vague. More importantly, there are many models and aspects of discrete perception and it is often not apparent in what theoretical framework brain wave findings are interpreted and to what specific aspects of discrete perception they relate. Here, we review different approaches to discrete perception and highlight issues with particular interpretations. We then discuss how certain findings on brain waves may relate to certain aspects of discrete perception. The main purpose of this meta‐contribution is to give a short overview of discrete models of perception and to illustrate the need to make explicit what aspects of discrete theories are addressed by what aspects of brain wave findings.

Special Issue: Consciousness science and its theories Time consciousness: the missing link in theories of consciousness

There are plenty of issues to be solved in order for researchers to agree on a neural model of consciousness. Here we emphasize an often under-represented aspect in the debate: time consciousness. Consciousness and the present moment both extend in time. Experience flows through a succession of moments and progresses from future predictions, to present experiences, to past memories. However, a brief review finds that many dominant theories of consciousness only refer to brief, static, and discrete "functional moments" of time. Very few refer to more extended, dynamic, and continuous time, which is associated with conscious experience (cf. the "experienced moment"). This confusion between short and discrete versus long and continuous is, we argue, one of the core issues in theories of consciousness. Given the lack of work dedicated to time consciousness, its study could test novel predictions of rival theories of consciousness. It may be that different theories of consciousness are compatible/complementary if the different aspects of time are taken into account. Or, if it turns out that no existing theory can fully accommodate time consciousness, then perhaps it has something new to add. Regardless of outcome, the crucial step is to make subjective time a central object of study.

The postdictive effect of choice reflects the modulation of attention on choice

Our conscious perception of the world is not an instantaneous, moment-by-moment construction. Rather, our perception of an event is influenced, over time, by information gained after the event; this is known as a postdictive effect. A recent study reported that this postdictive effect could occur even in choice. The present study sought to test whether the striking postdictive effect of choice reflects the modulation of attention on choice, by directly and systematically manipulating attention in two experiments. Specifically, Experiment 1 revealed that the robust postdictive effect of choice was almost completely eliminated when attentional bias was removed. More important, Experiment 2 demonstrated that the postdictive effect of choice could be modulated by directly manipulating participants’ attention with a spatial cue, in particular, when the cue appeared at short time delays. These results suggest that choice could be considerably postdictively influenced by attention and this effect was most pronounced within a short time window wherein decision making was most likely in progress. The current study not only enables clarification of the mechanism of the newly discovered postdictive effect of choice, but also extends evidence of the modulation of attention on decision making.

All in Good Time: Long-Lasting Postdictive Effects Reveal Discrete Perception

Is consciousness a continuous stream of percepts or is it discrete, occurring only at certain moments in time? This question has puzzled philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists for centuries. Both hypotheses have fallen repeatedly in and out of favor. Here, we review recent studies exploring long-lasting postdictive effects and show that the results favor a two-stage discrete model, in which substantial periods of continuous unconscious processing precede discrete conscious percepts. We propose that such a model marries the advantages of both continuous and discrete models and resolves centuries old debates about perception and consciousness.

Consciousness Without Content: A Look at Evidence and Prospects

Many traditions in the East have proposed that consciousness without content is possible and could be achieved with mental training. However, it is not clear whether such a state is possible given that intentionality is a critical property of mentality and consciousness in many theories of consciousness. A prominent recent attempt to account for such states of "minimal phenomenal experience" is the ascending reticular arousal system (ARAS) model, which proposes a specific type of non-conceptual representational content to address such a state. Consciousness without content can also be understood by studying related or similar states of minimal phenomenal experience and this paper discusses such findings from such states including dreamless sleep experience and their implications. One way to argue for the need for proposing consciousness without content is to locate a property of consciousness that would necessitate postulating it. A continuous state of consciousness without content may be needed to understand continuity of conscious experience. Finally, I discuss the implications of consciousness without content for current theories of consciousness.

Hard criteria for empirical theories of consciousness

Consciousness is now a well-established field of empirical research. A large body of experimental results has been accumulated and is steadily growing. In parallel, many Theories of Consciousness (ToCs) have been proposed. These theories are diverse in nature, ranging from computational to neurophysiological and quantum theoretical approaches. This contrasts with other fields of natural science, which host a smaller number of competing theories. We suggest that one reason for this abundance of extremely different theories may be the lack of stringent criteria specifying how empirical data constrains ToCs. First, we argue that consciousness is a well-defined topic from an empirical point of view and motivate a purely empirical stance on the quest for consciousness. Second, we present a checklist of criteria that, we propose, empirical ToCs need to cope with. Third, we review 13 of the most influential ToCs and subject them to the criteria. Our analysis helps to situate these different ToCs in the theoretical landscapeand sheds light on their strengths and weaknesses from a strictly empirical point of view.

Feature integration within discrete time windows

Sensory information must be integrated over time to perceive, for example, motion and melodies. Here, to study temporal integration, we used the sequential metacontrast paradigm in which two expanding streams of lines are presented. When a line in one stream is offset observers perceive all other lines to be offset too, even though they are straight. When more lines are offset the offsets integrate mandatorily, i.e., observers cannot report the individual offsets. We show that mandatory integration lasts for up to 450 ms, depending on the observer. Importantly, integration occurs only when offsets are presented within a discrete window of time. Even stimuli that are in close spatio-temporal proximity do not integrate if they are in different windows. A window of integration starts with stimulus onset and integration in the next window has similar characteristics. We present a two-stage computational model based on discrete time windows that captures these effects.

In order to perceive moving or changing objects, sensory information must be integrated over time. Here, using a visual sequential metacontrast paradigm, the authors show that integration occurs only when subsequent stimuli are presented within a discrete window of time after the initial stimulus.

Dynamic Computation in Visual Thalamocortical Networks

Contemporary neurodynamical frameworks, such as coordination dynamics and winnerless competition, posit that the brain approximates symbolic computation by transitioning between metastable attractive states. This article integrates these accounts with electrophysiological data suggesting that coherent, nested oscillations facilitate information representation and transmission in thalamocortical networks. We review the relationship between criticality, metastability, and representational capacity, outline existing methods for detecting metastable oscillatory patterns in neural time series data, and evaluate plausible spatiotemporal coding schemes based on phase alignment. We then survey the circuitry and the mechanisms underlying the generation of coordinated alpha and gamma rhythms in the primate visual system, with particular emphasis on the pulvinar and its role in biasing visual attention and awareness. To conclude the review, we begin to integrate this perspective with longstanding theories of consciousness and cognition.

Visual Entrainment at 10 Hz Causes Periodic Modulation of the Flash Lag Illusion

It has long been debated whether visual processing is, at least partially, a discrete process. Although vision appears to be a continuous stream of sensory information, sophisticated experiments reveal periodic modulations of perception and behavior. Previous work has demonstrated that the phase of endogenous neural oscillations in the 10 Hz range predicts the "lag" of the flash lag effect, a temporal visual illusion in which a static object is perceived to be lagging in time behind a moving object. Consequently, it has been proposed that the flash lag illusion could be a manifestation of a periodic, discrete sampling mechanism in the visual system. In this experiment we set out to causally test this hypothesis by entraining the visual system to a periodic 10 Hz stimulus and probing the flash lag effect (FLE) at different time points during entrainment. We hypothesized that the perceived FLE would be modulated over time, at the same frequency as the entrainer (10 Hz). A frequency analysis of the average FLE time-course indeed reveals a significant peak at 10 Hz as well as a strong phase consistency between subjects (N = 25). Our findings provide causal evidence for fluctuations in temporal perception and indicate an involvement of occipital alpha oscillations.

Building perception block by block: a response to Fekete et al

Is consciousness a continuous stream, or do percepts occur only at certain moments of time? This age-old question is still under debate. Both positions face difficult problems, which we proposed to overcome with a 2-stage model, where unconscious processing continuously integrates information before a discrete, conscious percept occurs. Recently, Fekete et al. criticized our model. Here, we show that, contrary to their proposal, simple sliding windows cannot explain apparent motion and related phenomena within a continuous framework, and that their supervenience argument only holds true for qualia realists, a philosophical position we do not adopt.