Motivation alters impression formation and related neural systems

Are you worth the wait? Waiting time modulates the social feedback processing: Evidence from event-related potentials

Processing social feedback is essential for establishing appropriate social connections. However, social feedback is not always immediate, and the impact of waiting time on social feedback processing remains unexplored. Using electroencephalography (EEG) and event-related potentials (ERPs), the present study investigated how waiting time affects the N170, reward positivity (RewP), and P3. Participants (N = 36) completed a social evaluation task, awaiting feedback from liked and disliked peers with short (800-1200 ms) or long (5000-6000 ms) waiting times. Participants were more motivated to receive feedback from liked peers, and they rated acceptance from liked peers as more pleasant than rejection. Notably, participants found longer waits more worthwhile when receiving acceptance from liked peers, but less worthwhile when awaiting feedback from disliked peers. EEG results revealed that the RewP was increased for long waiting times for feedback from liked peers, and, conversely, reduced for long waiting times for feedback from disliked peers. Additionally, N170 and P3 were found to be sensitive to waiting time, with larger amplitudes for long compared to short waits. Overall, this study demonstrates that waiting time differentially affects social feedback processing, as reflected by changes in the N170, RewP, and P3. Our findings suggest that increased waiting time does not necessarily reduce reward value; it can enhance it depending on subjective social preferences. The increased N170 and P3 amplitudes during longer waits may indicate heightened attentional and memory demands. This study advances our understanding of the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying social decision-making.

Tracking politically motivated reasoning in the brain: the role of mentalizing, value-encoding, and error detection networks

Susceptibility to misinformation and belief polarization often reflects people's tendency to incorporate information in a biased way. Despite the presence of competing theoretical models, the underlying neurocognitive mechanisms of motivated reasoning remain elusive as previous empirical work did not properly track the belief formation process. To address this problem, we employed a design that identifies motivated reasoning as directional deviations from a Bayesian benchmark of unbiased belief updating. We asked the members of a proimmigration or an anti-immigration group regarding the extent to which they endorse factual messages on foreign criminality, a polarizing political topic. Both groups exhibited a desirability bias by overendorsing attitude-consistent messages and underendorsing attitude-discrepant messages and an identity bias by overendorsing messages from in-group members and underendorsing messages from out-group members. In both groups, neural responses to the messages predicted subsequent expression of desirability and identity biases, suggesting a common neural basis of motivated reasoning across ideologically opposing groups. Specifically, brain regions implicated in encoding value, error detection, and mentalizing tracked the degree of desirability bias. Less extensive activation in the mentalizing network tracked the degree of identity bias. These findings illustrate the distinct neurocognitive architecture of desirability and identity biases and inform existing cognitive models of politically motivated reasoning.

Focusing on the positive or the negative: Self-construal moderates negativity bias in impression updating

Negativity bias refers to the phenomenon whereby people put more weight on negative information. Although evolutionarily favorable for survival, negative bias in impression processing is detrimental to relationships and cooperation. To explore whether the motivation to maintain relationships, indicated by self-construal, mitigates negativity bias, two studies were conducted. In study 1, participants interacted with three agents (worsened, improved, baseline) in a modified social learning task and evaluated the moral level of these agents. Results showed that positivity bias appeared among interdependent individuals, with larger updating for the improved agent than for the worsened agent. Moreover, interdependent individuals exhibited less immediate decreases toward the worsened agent and steeper increases toward the improved agent than did independent individuals. To validate the results of study 1, we used a narrative description paradigm in study 2. Participants read the behavior descriptions of agents and rated them on morality. The negativity bias was significantly mitigated among individuals with high interdependence, though it did not reverse. These results indicate that interdependent individuals focus more on positive information when others change, yielding a more positive pattern in impression updating. This flexible interpersonal coping strategy can bring advantages to social interaction and cooperation.

How unexpected events are processed in theory of mind regions: A conceptual replication

Recent research in social neuroscience has postulated that Theory of Mind (ToM) regions play a role in processing social prediction error (PE: the difference between what was expected and what was observed). Here, we tested whether PE signal depends on the type of prior information people use to make predictions - an agent's prior mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires, preferences) or an agent's prior behavior - as well as the type of information that confirms or violates such predictions. That is, does prior information about mental states (versus behavior) afford stronger predictions about an agent's subsequent mental states or behaviors? Additionally, when information about an agent's prior mental states or behavior is available, is PE signal strongest when information about an agent's subsequent mental state (vs behavior) is revealed? In line with prior research, results suggest that DMPFC, LTPJ, and RTPJ are recruited more for unexpected than expected outcomes. However, PE signal does not seem to discriminate on the basis of prior or outcome information type. These findings suggest that ToM regions may flexibly incorporate any available information to make predictions about, monitor, and perhaps explain, inconsistencies in social agents.

The (un)learning of social functions and its significance for mental health

Social interactions are dynamic, context-dependent, and reciprocal events that influence prospective strategies and require constant practice and adaptation. This complexity of social interactions creates several research challenges. We propose a new framework encouraging future research to investigate not only individual differences in capacities relevant for social functioning and their underlying mechanisms, but also the flexibility to adapt or update one's social abilities. We suggest three key capacities relevant for social functioning: (1) social perception, (2) sharing emotions or empathizing, and (3) mentalizing. We elaborate on how adaptations in these capacities may be investigated on behavioral and neural levels. Research on these flexible adaptations of one's social behavior is needed to specify how humans actually "learn to be social". Learning to adapt implies plasticity of the relevant brain networks involved in the underlying social processes, indicating that social abilities are malleable for different contexts. To quantify such measures, researchers need to find ways to investigate learning through dynamic changes in adaptable social paradigms and examine several factors influencing social functioning within the three aformentioned social key capacities. This framework furthers insight concerning individual differences, provides a holistic approach to social functioning, and may improve interventions for ameliorating social abilities in patients.

Learning from Ingroup Experiences Changes Intergroup Impressions

Humans form impressions toward individuals of their own social groups (ingroup members) and of different social groups (outgroup members). Outgroup-focused theories predict that intergroup impressions are mainly shaped by experiences with outgroup individuals, while ingroup-focused theories predict that ingroup experiences play a dominant role. Here we test predictions from these two psychological theories by estimating how intergroup impressions are dynamically shaped when people learn from both ingroup and outgroup experiences. While undergoing fMRI, male participants had identical experiences with different ingroup or outgroup members and rated their social closeness and impressions toward the ingroup and the outgroup. Behavioral results showed an initial ingroup bias in impression ratings which was significantly reduced over the course of learning, with larger effects in individuals with stronger ingroup identification. Computational learning models revealed that these changes in intergroup impressions were predicted by the weight given to ingroup prediction errors. Neurally, the individual weight for ingroup prediction errors was related to the coupling between the left inferior parietal lobule and the left anterior insula, which, in turn, predicted learning-related changes in intergroup impressions. Our findings provide computational and neural evidence for ingroup-focused theories, highlighting the importance of ingroup experiences in shaping social impressions in intergroup settings.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Living in multicultural societies, humans interact with individuals of their own social groups (ingroup members) and of different social groups (outgroup members). However, little is known about how people learn from the mixture of ingroup and outgroup interactions, the most natural experiences in current societies. Here, participants had identical, intermixed experiences with different ingroup and outgroup individuals and rated their closeness and impressions toward the ingroup and the outgroup. Combining computational models and fMRI, we find that the weight given to ingroup experiences (ingroup prediction errors) is the main source of intergroup impression change, captured by changes in connectivity between the parietal lobe and insula. These findings highlight the importance of ingroup experiences in shaping intergroup impressions in complex social environments.

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