Can Bar Code Scanning Improve Data Capture in a National Register? Findings from the Irish National Orthopaedic Register

Accuracy and completeness of registry-reported unicompartmental knee arthroplasty revision

INTRODUCTION

The key outcome of joint registries is revision events, which inform clinical practice and identify poor-performing implants. Registries record revision events and reasons, but accuracy may be limited by a lack of standardized definitions of revision. Our study aims to assess the accuracy and completeness of unicompartmental knee arthroplasty (UKA) revision and indications reported to the New Zealand Joint Registry (NZJR) with independent clinical review.

METHODS

Case record review of 2272 patients undergoing primary UKA at four large tertiary hospitals between 2000 and 2017 was performed, identifying 158 patients who underwent revision. Detailed review of clinical findings, radiographs and operative data was performed to identify revision cases and the reasons for revision using a standardized protocol. These were compared to NZJR data using chi-squared and Fisher exact tests.

RESULTS

The NZJR recorded 150 (95%) of all UKA revisions. Osteoarthritis progression was the most common reason on the systematic clinical review (35%), however, this was underreported to the registry (8%, P < 0.001). A larger proportion of revisions reported to the registry were for 'pain' (30% of cases vs. 5% on clinical review, P < 0.001). A reason for revision was not reported to the registry for 10% of cases.

CONCLUSION

The NZJR had good capture of UKA revisions, but had significant differences in registry-reported revision reasons compared to our independent systematic clinical review. These included over-reporting of 'pain', under-reporting of osteoarthritis progression, and failing to identify a revision reason. Efforts to improve registry capture of revision reasons for UKA could be addressed through more standardized definitions of revision and tailored revision options for UKA on registry forms.

Local Validation of a National Orthopaedic Registry

BACKGROUND/OBJECTIVE

Registries are limited by the quality of the data they collect. We aimed to measure the data entry error rate at a regional orthopaedic unit in a national arthroplasty registry and to assess a proposed intervention of restricting data entry to senior trainees.

METHODS AND MATERIALS

A total of 200 primary and revision arthroplasty cases (119 hips, 81 knees) were randomly selected from a single year, 2020. The Irish National Orthopaedic Registry was examined for the grade of the trainee that populated the form and the accuracy of 24 parameters by comparison with data recorded elsewhere in the patient record.

RESULTS

The mean number of errors per form was 2.17 (95% confidence interval (CI): 1.95-2.39), giving an overall error rate of 9% (95% CI: 8%-10.0%). Eighty-seven percent of forms examined contained inaccuracies, ranging from one to nine errors (4%-38%). Some parameters were more prone to errors, ranging from 1% to 28%. There was no evidence of total errors varying by trainee grade (analysis of variance (ANOVA) p-value: 0.34).

CONCLUSIONS

Error rates were in line with the literature. Results did not support restricting data entry to senior trainees.

A Systematic Review of Data Collection by National Joint Replacement Registries: What Opportunities Exist for Enhanced Data Collection and Analysis?

BACKGROUND

National joint replacement registries assist surgeons and hospitals with guiding decision making and quality of care. The data points collected are essential to interpret and analyze data and to understand confounding variables and other sources of bias, which can impair retrospective observational research. The aim of this study was to review all national joint replacement registries to assess what data points are recorded, and in what manner, for primary and revision total hip arthroplasty (THA) and total knee arthroplasty (TKA) so that improvements can be made to enhance data collection, interpretation, and analysis.

METHODS

All national registries were identified through Internet and publication search and contacted to invite participation. Data collection forms for both primary and revision THA and TKA were requested. Data collected were entered into an Excel spreadsheet.

RESULTS

The study group for primary and revision THA consisted of 28 national registries, with 26 agreeing to participate. The study group for primary TKA consisted of 27 national registries, with 24 agreeing to participate. Patient identification details were recorded uniformly. Only a minority recorded patient details beyond American Society of Anesthesiologists and body mass index. Most registries did not record surgeon variables: who actually performed or assisted the procedure and their level of training. There was variation in the degree of detail recorded for diagnosis, mostly regarding secondary causes of osteoarthritis and fracture. The details regarding case complexity were limited. Half recorded previous operations, and fewer recorded bone defects. The location of knee arthritis, preoperative limb alignment, and deformities were rarely recorded. Surgical approach and technological adjuncts were routinely collected, but few other details on the surgical technique were recorded. Implant details and fixation were uniformly collected, although a minority recorded specific details, including cement antibiotic or cementing technique. It was uncommon to record whether additional or adjunctive procedures were concurrently performed. Approximately half the registries lacked a revision specific form. The majority recorded reoperations in addition to revision procedures. Patient, surgeon, case, and postoperative details were recorded similar to primary procedures. There was variation in the degree of details recorded for the reasons underlying the revision +/- reoperation, with most recording greater detail for infection and fracture. Many included details on case complexity and bone defects, including the severity, classification, and how the defect was managed. The majority recorded the specific revision procedure that was performed (total or partial), the fixation used, and the components removed or revised. Other specific aspects of fixation including acetabular screws, cone or sleeve use, stems, and augments were less commonly recorded.

CONCLUSION

Substantial data are recorded by all registries, although each one is different. Data solicited lack many patient factors, surgeon variables, case complexity, and surgical techniques. Separate revision forms are not universal, and many registries do not record reoperation procedures, specific causes of revision, and the revision construct.

LEVEL OF EVIDENCE

Level II, therapeutic study. See Instructions for Authors for a complete description of levels of evidence.

The Irish National Orthopaedic Register Under Cyberattack: What Happened, and What Were the Consequences?

BACKGROUND

On May 14, 2021, a criminal cyberattack was launched against the Irish public healthcare system, the Health Service Executive, resulting in a complete shutdown of all national healthcare computer systems, including the Irish National Orthopaedic Register (INOR). Cyberattacks of this kind occur sporadically, and postevent analyses can inform future preparedness efforts, but few such analyses have been published.

QUESTION/PURPOSE

What was the impact of the cyberattack in terms of (1) registry downtime, (2) harms to patients, and (3) costs to the INOR for data contingency and reconciliation?

METHODS

All nine hospitals using the INOR were included for data collection. Since establishment in 2014, the INOR has been rolled out to all eight public elective hospitals, capturing all hip and knee arthroplasty procedures. One private hospital was also captured, with plans to expand the private sector coverage. Individual institutional records and central INOR records were queried with respect to downtime, potential harms to patients (including intraoperative complications because of a lack of data on existing implanted components and complications directly attributed to delayed or canceled procedures), and costs related to additional person-hours addressing data reconciliation. Objective data directly related to the uncontrolled INOR downtime were collected, including duration of downtime, contingency methods employed, quality of contingency data collected, adverse patient events, methods of data salvage and reconciliation, and the cost of data contingency and reconciliation measures. Costs were estimated by the additional person-hours of work completed, multiplied by the hourly rate of that employee. Employees at each of the nine hospitals were asked to provide their additional person-hours of work performed because of the attack. These hours were corroborated by observing the time taken at each unit to reconcile data for single cases multiplied by the number of cases at that unit. Employees included nurses, clinical nurse specialists, and doctors of various grades. Person-hour rates were calculated using the Health Service Executive's published salary scales.

RESULTS

The INOR suffered a median downtime of 134 days (range 119 to 272 days) across nine sites. No serious adverse patient events were identified. The immediate implementation of a paperwork fallback method for the INOR successfully resulted in 100% case capture during the downtime. However, 2850 additional person-hours were required for data reconciliation at an estimated cost of USD 181,000 to USD 216,000. More subjectively, as reported by interviews with INOR leads at each hospital, the cyberattack negatively impacted operating room efficiency with delays between procedures because of additional paperwork data collection, disrupted patient flow for paperwork data collection on the ward level and in the outpatient clinics, and disrupted resource allocations and staff capabilities because of additional paperwork requirements during the contingency period.

CONCLUSION

Disruptions to data collection and data accessibility after this cyberattack were successfully countered by a contingency plan; however, substantial financial costs and additional resources were required for data conservation and reconciliation.

CLINICAL RELEVANCE

In addition to robust preventative security measures, national registers and other healthcare systems should have secondary data backup facilities and reliable fallback procedures prepared for such events.