A Multimodal Strategy Based on Pay-Per-Performance to Improve Quality of Care of Family Practitioners in Argentina

A realist review to assess for whom, under what conditions and how pay for performance programmes work in low- and middle-income countries

Pay for performance (P4P) programmes are popular health system-focused interventions aiming to improve health outcomes in low-and middle-income countries (LMICs). This realist review aims to understand how, why and under what circumstance P4P works in LMICs.We systematically searched peer-reviewed and grey literature databases, and examined the mechanisms underpinning P4P effects on: utilisation of services, patient satisfaction, provider productivity and broader health system, and contextual factors moderating these. This evidence was then used to construct a causal loop diagram.We included 112 records (19 grey literature; 93 peer-reviewed articles) assessing P4P schemes in 36 countries. Although we found mixed evidence of P4P's effects on identified outcomes, common pathways to improved outcomes include: community outreach; adherence to clinical guidelines, patient-provider interactions, patient trust, facility improvements, access to drugs and equipment, facility autonomy, and lower user fees. Contextual factors shaping the system response to P4P include: degree of facility autonomy, efficiency of banking, role of user charges in financing public services; staffing levels; staff training and motivation, quality of facility infrastructure and community social norms. Programme design features supporting or impeding health system effects of P4P included: scope of incentivised indicators, fairness and reach of incentives, timely payments and a supportive, robust verification system that does not overburden staff. Facility bonuses are a key element of P4P, but rely on provider autonomy for maximum effect. If health system inputs are vastly underperforming pre-P4P, they are unlikely to improve only due to P4P. This is the first realist review describing how and why P4P initiatives work (or fail) in different LMIC contexts by exploring the underlying mechanisms and contextual and programme design moderators. Future studies should systematically examine health system pathways to outcomes for P4P and other health system strengthening initiatives, and offer more understanding of how programme design shapes mechanisms and effects.

How are pay-for-performance schemes in healthcare designed in low- and middle-income countries? Typology and systematic literature review

BACKGROUND

Pay for performance (P4P) schemes provide financial incentives to health workers or facilities based on the achievement of pre-specified performance targets and have been widely implemented in health systems across low and middle-income countries (LMICs). The growing evidence base on P4P highlights that (i) there is substantial variation in the effect of P4P schemes on outcomes and (ii) there appears to be heterogeneity in incentive design. Even though scheme design is likely a key determinant of scheme effectiveness, we currently lack systematic evidence on how P4P schemes are designed in LMICs.

METHODS

We develop a typology to classify the design of P4P schemes in LMICs, which highlights different design features that are a priori likely to affect the behaviour of incentivised actors. We then use results from a systematic literature review to classify and describe the design of P4P schemes that have been evaluated in LMICs. To capture academic publications, Medline, Embase, and EconLit databases were searched. To include relevant grey literature, Google Scholar, Emerald Insight, and websites of the World Bank, WHO, Cordaid, Norad, DfID, USAID and PEPFAR were searched.

RESULTS

We identify 41 different P4P schemes implemented in 29 LMICs. We find that there is substantial heterogeneity in the design of P4P schemes in LMICs and pinpoint precisely how scheme design varies across settings. Our results also highlight that incentive design is not adequately being reported on in the literature - with many studies failing to report key design features.

CONCLUSIONS

We encourage authors to make a greater effort to report information on P4P scheme design in the future and suggest using the typology laid out in this paper as a starting point.

Colonoscopy overuse in colorectal cancer screening and associated factors in Argentina: a retrospective cohort study

Background

In recent years, there has been growing concern about the overuse of colonoscopy (CC). Our objective was to evaluate the incidence rate and cumulative probability of having a potentially inadequate CC (PI-CC, e.g. a CC that was performed earlier that recommended) and the association between the report of a hyperplastic polyp in the baseline CC report and the probability of having a PI-CC.

Methods

A retrospective cohort of adults 50y/o or older with a complete baseline CC between January 1st and December 31st 2005, without reported lesions or with hyperplastic polyps, based on secondary data extracted from the electronic medical record of the Hospital Italiano of Buenos Aires. The outcome consisted of time until a PI-CC, defined as the time measured between basal colonoscopy and a colonoscopy performed earlier than the inter-screening interval recommended by the USPSTF and the USMSTF.

Results

389 patients were included. The cumulative probability of receiving a PI-CC over 10 years was 0.29 (95% CI 0.241, 0.342). The incidence rate resulted in 30.91 PI-CC per 1000 person-years (95% CI 25.14, 38). The crude analysis of the association between the outcome and the presence of hyperplastic polyps in the baseline CC, showed a statistically significant difference between both groups (log rank, p 0.036). The multivariate analysis yielded a hazard ratio of 1.67 (95% CI 1.02–2.73).

Conclusion

We observed that 3 in every 10 patients treated in our health system received a PI-CC during the first ten consecutive years after a normal complete CC. Furthermore, this could be in part attributed to the presence of a hyperplastic polyp in the baseline CC.

Secondary CV Prevention in South America in a Community Setting: The PURE Study

BACKGROUND

Despite the availability of evidence-based therapies, there is no information on the use of medications for the secondary prevention of cardiovascular disease in urban and rural community settings in South America.

OBJECTIVES

This study sought to assess the use, and its predictors, of effective secondary prevention therapies in individuals with a history of coronary heart disease (CHD) or stroke.

METHODS

In the PURE (Prospective Urban Rural Epidemiological) study, we enrolled 24,713 individuals from South America ages 35 to 70 years from 97 rural and urban communities in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. We assessed the use of proven therapies with standardized questionnaires. We report estimates of drug use at national, community, and individual levels and the independent predictors of their utilization through a multivariable analysis model.

RESULTS

Of 24,713 individuals, 910 had a self-reported CHD event (at a median of 5 years earlier) and 407 had stroke (6 years earlier). The proportions of individuals with CHD who received antiplatelet medications (30.1%), beta-blockers (34.2%), angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors, or angiotensin-receptor blockers (36.0%), or statins (18.0%) were low; with even lower proportions among stroke patients (antiplatelets 24.3%, angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors/angiotensin-receptor blockers 37.6%, statins 9.8%). A substantial proportion of patients did not receive any proven therapy (CHD 31%, stroke 54%). A minority of patients received either all 4 (4.1%) or 3 proven therapies (3.3%). Male sex, age >60 years, better education, more wealth, urban location, diabetes, and obesity were associated with higher rates of medication use. In a multivariable model, markers of wealth had the largest impact in secondary prevention.

CONCLUSIONS

There are large gaps in the use of proven medications for secondary prevention of cardiovascular disease in South America. Strategies to improve the sustained use of these medications will likely reduce cardiovascular disease burden substantially.

The effectiveness of a pay for performance program on diabetes care in Taiwan: A nationwide population-based longitudinal study

Over the past two decades, studies have widely examined the effectiveness of pay-for-performance (P4P) programs by conducting biochemical tests and assessing complications; however, the reported effectiveness of such programs among participants selected through purposeful sampling is controversial. Therefore, the objective of the current study was to analyze the effectiveness of a P4P program on patients' prognoses, including hospitalization for chronic diabetic complications, and all-cause mortality during specific follow-up years by using a nationwide population-based database in Taiwan. Based on 125,315 newly diagnosed type 2 diabetes patient cohort during 2002-2006, two control sets were designed by propensity-score-matching strategy according to participation of P4P program and followed up to 2012. The results indicated that full participants demonstrated the lowest risks of developing complications and all-cause mortality compared with nonparticipants. These findings confirm the long-term effect of P4P programs on full participants and reveal that this effect is not due to confounding variables. The results indicate the importance of performance management and adherence to interventions for patients with chronic diseases in a long-term observation. Comprehensive and continuous care is suggested to improve patient prognosis and quality of care.

Impact of pay for performance on behavior of primary care physicians and patient outcomes

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

Pay-for-performance is a financial incentive which links physicians' income to the quality of their services. Although pay-for-performance is suggested to be an effective payment method in many pilot countries (ie the UK) and enjoys a wide application in primary health care, researches on it are yet to reach an agreement. Thus, a systematic review was conducted on the evidence of impact of pay-for-performance on behavior of primary care physicians and patient outcomes aiming to provide a comprehensive and objective evaluation of pay-for-performance for decision-makers.

METHODS

Studies were identified by searching PubMed, EMbase, and The Cochrane Library. Electronic search was conducted in the fourth week of January 2013. As the included studies had significant clinical heterogeneity, a descriptive analysis was conducted. Quality Index was adopted for quality assessment of evidences.

RESULTS

Database searches yielded 651 candidate articles, of which 44 studies fulfilled the inclusion criteria. An overall positive effect was found on the management of disease, which varied in accordance with the baseline medical quality and the practice size. Meanwhile, it could bring about new problems regarding the inequity, patients' dissatisfaction and increasing medical cost.

CONCLUSIONS

Decision-makers should consider the baseline conditions of medical quality and the practice size before new medical policies are enacted. Furthermore, most studies are retrospective and observational with high level of heterogeneity though, the descriptive analysis is still of significance.

Impact of pay-for-performance on management of diabetes: a systematic review

OBJECTIVES

To review and synthesize published evidence of pay-for-performance (P4P) effects on management of diabetes.

METHODS

Databases including Ovid MEDLINE, EMbase, PubMed, The Cochrane Library (Issue 3, 2012) were comprehensively searched for the effects of P4P programs in terms of patient outcomes and physician behaviors. Studies covering detailed data were included and synthesized. The quality of the body of evidence for each quality indicator was determined using Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development, and Evaluation (GRADE) system.

RESULTS

Among 742 identified articles, 12 interrupted time series studies, 7 controlled before-after studies, and 2 cross-sectional studies were included. Additionally, 12 studies were further included for quantitative analysis. Results of meta-analysis showed that P4P produced generally positive effects in most indicators (eg, patients with records of total cholesterol or blood pressure). However, these results were inconsistent. The percentage of patients with HbA1c ≤ 7% or 53 mmol/mol showed a pooled odds ratio of 0.98 in patients, but a pooled mean difference of 19.71% in the physician groups. The odds ratios of receiving tests/reaching an outcome level were also diverse in patients (odds ratios ranged from 0.98 to 3.32). Besides, process indicators had higher rates of improvement than outcome indicators.

CONCLUSIONS

P4P programs have variable impacts on patient outcomes of diabetes as well as physician behaviors, with various effects from negligible to strongly beneficial. Considering the low quality of the included studies, this conclusion should be cautiously interpreted.

Pay for Performance in Health Care

Pay for performance (P4P) has become a popular approach to performance improvement in health care. Most of the P4P literature has focused on the United States and there is limited insight in the characteristics of major programs initiated in other countries. This article systematically describes and reviews P4P programs outside the United States. Our literature search identified 13 programs initiated in 9 countries. Although the programs share many similarities, they differ in several important respects, also when compared with the typical P4P program in the United States. In addition, there are clearly possibilities to increase incentive strength and minimize incentives for undesired behavior. In part, observed heterogeneity will be a consequence of contextual differences, but design choices often also seem to be made arbitrarily. In designing their programs, purchasers are hampered by limited knowledge of the influence of specific design choices and effective strategies to mitigate undesired behavior.

Physician practice responses to financial incentive programs: exploring the concept of implementation mechanisms

PURPOSE

To develop a framework for studying financial incentive program implementation mechanisms, the means by which physician practices and physicians translate incentive program goals into their specific office setting. Understanding how new financial incentives fit with the structure of physician practices and individual providers' work may shed some insight on the variable effects of physician incentives documented in numerous reviews and meta-analyses.

DESIGN/METHODOLOGY/APPROACH

Reviewing select articles on pay-for-performance evaluations to identify and characterize the presence of implementation mechanisms for designing, communicating, implementing, and maintaining financial incentive programs as well as recognizing participants' success and effects on patient care.

FINDINGS

Although uncommonly included in evaluations, evidence from 26 articles reveals financial incentive program sponsors and participants utilized a variety of strategies to facilitate communication about program goals and intentions, to provide feedback about participants' progress, and to assist-practices in providing recommended services. Despite diversity in programs' geographic locations, clinical targets, scope, and market context, sponsors and participants deployed common strategies. While these methods largely pertained to communication between program sponsors and participants and the provision of information about performance through reports and registries, they also included other activities such as efforts to engage patients and ways to change staff roles.

LIMITATIONS

This review covers a limited body of research to develop a conceptual framework for future research; it did not exhaustively search for new articles and cannot definitively link particular implementation mechanisms to outcomes.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

Our results underscore the effects implementation mechanisms may have on how practices incorporate new programs into existing systems of care which implicates both the potential rewards from small changes as well as the resources which may be required to obtain buy-in and support.

ORIGINALITY/VALUE

We identify gaps in previous research regarding actual changes occurring in physician practices in response to physician incentive programs. We offer suggestions for future evaluation by proposing a framework for understanding implementation. Our model will assist future scholars in translating site-specific experiences with incentive programs into more broadly relevant guidance for practices by facilitating comparisons across seemingly disparate programs.

The effect of financial incentives on the quality of health care provided by primary care physicians

BACKGROUND

The use of blended payment schemes in primary care, including the use of financial incentives to directly reward 'performance' and 'quality' is increasing in a number of countries. There are many examples in the US, and the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QoF) for general practitioners (GPs) in the UK is an example of a major system-wide reform. Despite the popularity of these schemes, there is currently little rigorous evidence of their success in improving the quality of primary health care, or of whether such an approach is cost-effective relative to other ways to improve the quality of care.

OBJECTIVES

The aim of this review is to examine the effect of changes in the method and level of payment on the quality of care provided by primary care physicians (PCPs) and to identify:i) the different types of financial incentives that have improved quality;ii) the characteristics of patient populations for whom quality of care has been improved by financial incentives; andiii) the characteristics of PCPs who have responded to financial incentives.

SEARCH STRATEGY

We searched the Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC) Trials Register, Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL) and Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (CDSR) (The Cochrane Library), MEDLINE, HealthSTAR, EMBASE, CINAHL, PsychLIT, and ECONLIT. Searches of Internet-based economics and health economics working paper collections were also conducted. Finally, studies were identified through the reference lists of retrieved articles, websites of key organisations, and from direct contact with key authors in the field. Articles were included if they were published from 2000 to August 2009.

SELECTION CRITERIA

Randomised controlled trials (RCT), controlled before and after studies (CBA), and interrupted time series analyses (ITS) evaluating the impact of different financial interventions on the quality of care delivered by primary healthcare physicians (PCPs). Quality of care was defined as patient reported outcome measures, clinical behaviours, and intermediate clinical and physiological measures.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

Two review authors independently extracted data and assessed study quality, in consultation with two other review authors where there was disagreement. For each included study, we reported the estimated effect sizes and confidence intervals.

MAIN RESULTS

Seven studies were included in this review. Three of the studies evaluated single-threshold target payments, one examined a fixed fee per patient achieving a specified outcome, one study evaluated payments based on the relative ranking of medical groups' performance (tournament-based pay), one study examined a mix of tournament-based pay and threshold payments, and one study evaluated changing from a blended payments scheme to salaried payment. Three cluster RCTs examined smoking cessation; one CBA examined patients' assessment of the quality of care; one CBA examined cervical screening, mammography screening, and HbA1c; one ITS focused on four outcomes in diabetes; and one controlled ITS (a difference-in-difference design) examined cervical screening, mammography screening, HbA1c, childhood immunisation, chlamydia screening, and appropriate asthma medication. Six of the seven studies showed positive but modest effects on quality of care for some primary outcome measures, but not all. One study found no effect on quality of care. Poor study design led to substantial risk of bias in most studies. In particular, none of the studies addressed issues of selection bias as a result of the ability of primary care physicians to select into or out of the incentive scheme or health plan.

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

The use of financial incentives to reward PCPs for improving the quality of primary healthcare services is growing. However, there is insufficient evidence to support or not support the use of financial incentives to improve the quality of primary health care. Implementation should proceed with caution and incentive schemes should be more carefully designed before implementation. In addition to basing incentive design more on theory, there is a large literature discussing experiences with these schemes that can be used to draw out a number of lessons that can be learned and that could be used to influence or modify the design of incentive schemes. More rigorous study designs need to be used to account for the selection of physicians into incentive schemes. The use of instrumental variable techniques should be considered to assist with the identification of treatment effects in the presence of selection bias and other sources of unobserved heterogeneity. In randomised trials, care must be taken in using the correct unit of analysis and more attention should be paid to blinding. Studies should also examine the potential unintended consequences of incentive schemes by having a stronger theoretical basis, including a broader range of outcomes, and conducting more extensive subgroup analysis. Studies should more consistently describe i) the type of payment scheme at baseline or in the control group, ii) how payments to medical groups were used and distributed within the groups, and iii) the size of the new payments as a percentage of total revenue. Further research comparing the relative costs and effects of financial incentives with other behaviour change interventions is also required.

Systematic review: Effects, design choices, and context of pay-for-performance in health care

BACKGROUND

Pay-for-performance (P4P) is one of the primary tools used to support healthcare delivery reform. Substantial heterogeneity exists in the development and implementation of P4P in health care and its effects. This paper summarizes evidence, obtained from studies published between January 1990 and July 2009, concerning P4P effects, as well as evidence on the impact of design choices and contextual mediators on these effects. Effect domains include clinical effectiveness, access and equity, coordination and continuity, patient-centeredness, and cost-effectiveness.

METHODS

The systematic review made use of electronic database searching, reference screening, forward citation tracking and expert consultation. The following databases were searched: Cochrane Library, EconLit, Embase, Medline, PsychINFO, and Web of Science. Studies that evaluate P4P effects in primary care or acute hospital care medicine were included. Papers concerning other target groups or settings, having no empirical evaluation design or not complying with the P4P definition were excluded. According to study design nine validated quality appraisal tools and reporting statements were applied. Data were extracted and summarized into evidence tables independently by two reviewers.

RESULTS

One hundred twenty-eight evaluation studies provide a large body of evidence -to be interpreted with caution- concerning the effects of P4P on clinical effectiveness and equity of care. However, less evidence on the impact on coordination, continuity, patient-centeredness and cost-effectiveness was found. P4P effects can be judged to be encouraging or disappointing, depending on the primary mission of the P4P program: supporting minimal quality standards and/or boosting quality improvement. Moreover, the effects of P4P interventions varied according to design choices and characteristics of the context in which it was introduced.Future P4P programs should (1) select and define P4P targets on the basis of baseline room for improvement, (2) make use of process and (intermediary) outcome indicators as target measures, (3) involve stakeholders and communicate information about the programs thoroughly and directly, (4) implement a uniform P4P design across payers, (5) focus on both quality improvement and achievement, and (6) distribute incentives to the individual and/or team level.

CONCLUSIONS

P4P programs result in the full spectrum of possible effects for specific targets, from absent or negligible to strongly beneficial. Based on the evidence the review has provided further indications on how effect findings are likely to relate to P4P design choices and context. The provided best practice hypotheses should be tested in future research.