Pay-for-Performance in Health Care: What Can We Learn From International Experience?

Compounding inequity: a qualitative study of gout management in an urban marae clinic in Auckland

INTRODUCTION Gout remains a health equity issue; Māori and Pacific peoples are disproportionately afflicted, with increased burden and loss of quality of life, yet are less likely to receive appropriate management, which mainly occurs in primary care. AIM This study aims to understand the perspectives of the mainly Māori and Pacific clinicians and staff at an urban marae practice about barriers and challenges to delivering effective care to a Māori and Pacific community with high burden of gout. METHODS Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 10 staff members delivering health care to a mostly Indigenous community. Interviews sought to ascertain staff views of enablers and barriers to optimal gout management and analyse them thematically. RESULTS Three themes were identified: community disadvantage; demands unique to Indigenous providers; and challenges and opportunities for optimising gout management. High prevalence and heavy impact of gout on wellbeing in the community was intertwined with socioeconomic disadvantage, precariousness of employment and entrenched inaccurate (yet pliable) patient views on gout, to the detriment of focused, effective care. Structural and funding demands on providers inhibited staff focus on the clear community need. Providers saw the culturally safe and competent approach necessary for improvement as requiring community empowerment with appropriate clinical tools and adequate resourcing. DISCUSSION Despite provider intent to deliver culturally appropriate and safe care and equitable health outcomes for patients suffering from gout, general practice initiatives without aligned resourcing or incentives are inhibited when inequity is pervasive. Simply asking Māori providers to do more for the same amount of resource may not be effective.

An integrated approach for designing in-time and economically sustainable emergency care networks: A case study in the public sector

Emergency Care Networks (ECNs) were created as a response to the increased demand for emergency services and the ever-increasing waiting times experienced by patients in emergency rooms. In this sense, ECNs are called to provide a rapid diagnosis and early intervention so that poor patient outcomes, patient dissatisfaction, and cost overruns can be avoided. Nevertheless, ECNs, as nodal systems, are often inefficient due to the lack of coordination between emergency departments (EDs) and the presence of non-value added activities within each ED. This situation is even more complex in the public healthcare sector of low-income countries where emergency care is provided under constraint resources and limited innovation. Notwithstanding the tremendous efforts made by healthcare clusters and government agencies to tackle this problem, most of ECNs do not yet provide nimble and efficient care to patients. Additionally, little progress has been evidenced regarding the creation of methodological approaches that assist policymakers in solving this problem. In an attempt to address these shortcomings, this paper presents a three-phase methodology based on Discrete-event simulation, payment collateral models, and lean six sigma to support the design of in-time and economically sustainable ECNs. The proposed approach is validated in a public ECN consisting of 2 hospitals and 8 POCs (Point of Care). The results of this study evidenced that the average waiting time in an ECN can be substantially diminished by optimizing the cooperation flows between EDs.

Effect of a national primary care reform on avoidable hospital admissions (2000-2015): A difference-in-difference analysis

In 2006 a major primary care reform was initiated in Portugal. The most significant aspect of this reform was the creation of a new organizational model of primary care provision: Family Health Units (FHUs), consisting of small voluntarily constituted multidisciplinary teams that have functional autonomy and are partly financed through capitation and pay-for-performance. The creation of FHUs sought to increase access to care and to chronic disease management by improving the long-term relationship between health professionals and patients. The objectives of this study are to evaluate the impact of the FHUs implementation on population health outcomes, measured by the rate of hospitalizations for ambulatory care sensitive conditions (ACSC), i.e. avoidable hospital inpatient admissions, and to explore the effectiveness of the pay-for-performance in primary care by analysing the subset of disease specific hospitalizations for ACSC related to the financial incentives. Using data from 276 Portuguese municipalities from 2000 to 2015 (n = 4416) and exploiting the gradual introduction of the FHUs over time, we used a difference-in-differences approach contrasting the evolution of the hospitalization rate for ACSC in municipalities that implemented or not the FHUs. We then explored heterogeneous effects by incentivized (diabetes and hypertension) and non-incentivized disease-specific rates of hospitalizations for ACSC. During the period under analysis, 448 FHUs were created in 126 municipalities. No significant impact of the FHUs implementation on the reduction of the hospitalization rate for ACSC was found. This result also held for the incentivized hospitalizations for ACSC. We only found a statistically significant effect of the FHUs implementation in the reduction of one non-incentivized area (the rate of urinary tract infection ACSC). Our results question the capacity of this payment mechanism to achieve better health outcomes, and invites a more careful and evidence-based action toward its wider diffusion.

An Analysis of Pay-for-Performance Schemes and Their Potential Impacts on Health Systems and Outcomes for Patients

Pay-for-performance (P4P) programs have been introduced into the Canadian medical system in the last decades. This paper examines the underlying characteristics of P4P and describes both their advantages and drawbacks. Most P4P programs provide the advantage of rewarding medical acts, thus providing an incentive to take on complex patients. There is a variety of nuanced P4P initiatives, which provide financial incentive according to differing criteria, based on quality measures, incentives, and/or benchmark structures. However, there is no conclusive evidence demonstrating that P4P programs provide better value for money than traditional pay schemes, regardless of particular structural choices. Some evidence has even shown that P4P may be detrimental, especially in disadvantaged and high-risk populations. Additionally, there are a number of ethical and practical concerns that arise with the use of P4P, such as the risk of financial incentives being misused or misinterpreted and patients being refused or referred during treatment. P4P initiatives require careful examination and the creation of solid, evidence-based criteria for evaluation and implementation in Canadian medical systems.

Designing the ideal perioperative pain management plan starts with multimodal analgesia

Multimodal analgesia is defined as the use of more than one pharmacological class of analgesic medication targeting different receptors along the pain pathway with the goal of improving analgesia while reducing individual class-related side effects. Evidence today supports the routine use of multimodal analgesia in the perioperative period to eliminate the over-reliance on opioids for pain control and to reduce opioid-related adverse events. A multimodal analgesic protocol should be surgery-specific, functioning more like a checklist than a recipe, with options to tailor to the individual patient. Elements of this protocol may include opioids, non-opioid systemic analgesics like acetaminophen, non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs, gabapentinoids, ketamine, and local anesthetics administered by infiltration, regional block, or the intravenous route. While implementation of multimodal analgesic protocols perioperatively is recommended as an intervention to decrease the prevalence of long-term opioid use following surgery, the concurrent crisis of drug shortages presents an additional challenge. Anesthesiologists and acute pain medicine specialists will need to advocate locally and nationally to ensure a steady supply of analgesic medications and in-class alternatives for their patients’ perioperative pain management.

Effectiveness of Pay-for-Performance Incentive Designs on Diabetes Care

BACKGROUND

Taiwan's National Health Insurance program implemented a pay-for-performance (P4P) program based on process measures in 2001. In late 2006, the P4P was revised to also include achievement of outcome measures.

OBJECTIVES

This study examined whether a change in P4P incentive design structure affected diabetes outcomes.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD

We used a longitudinal cohort study design using 2 population-based databases. Newly enrolled P4P patients with diabetes in 2002-2003 (phase 1) and 2007-2008 (phase 2) made up the study cohorts. Propensity score matching was used to match comparable cohorts in each phase. In total, 46,286 matched cohorts in phase 1 and 2 were analyzed. Process measures were defined as the provision of tests of glycosylated hemoglobin A1c (HbA1c), low-density lipoprotein cholesterol, and blood pressure, and outcome measures as changes in those values between baseline and last follow-up within 3 years. Patient-level generalized linear regression models were used and patient characteristics, physician characteristics, and health care facility characteristics were adjusted for.

RESULTS

Our results indicated that the process measures of HbA1c and low-density lipoprotein cholesterol tests did not differ significantly between the 2 phases. In addition, better improvements were noted in outcome measures for the phase 2 patients (ie, HbA1c level and lipid profiles), whereas nonincentivized intermediate measures (eg, blood pressure) showed no negative unintended consequences.

CONCLUSIONS

Quality of care tended to be better when both process and targeted outcome measures were combined as quality metrics in the P4P program in Taiwan.

The role of GP's compensation schemes in diabetes care: evidence from panel data

We investigate the impact of the implementation of Diabetes Management Programs with financial incentives in the Italian Region Emilia-Romagna between 2003 and 2005. We focus on avoidable hospitalisations for diabetic patients for whom GPs receive additional payments exceeding capitation. We estimate a panel count data model to test the hypothesis that those patients under the responsibility of GPs receiving a higher share of their income through ad-hoc payments, are less likely to experience avoidable hospitalisations. Our findings indicate that financial transfers may help improve the quality of care, even when they are not based on the ex-post verification of performance. The estimated effect indicates that, at sample averages, an increase of 100 Euros of the financial incentives paid to GPs (around 17% of the yearly payment received by GPs for diabetes programmes) is expected to reduce the number of diabetic ACSCs by 1%, around 100 cases when projected on the entire region.

When incentives work too well: locally implemented pay for performance (P4P) and adverse sanctions towards home birth in Tanzania - a qualitative study

BACKGROUND

Despite limited evidence of its effectiveness, performance-based payments (P4P) are seen by leading policymakers as a potential solution to the slow progress in reaching Millennium Development Goal 5: improved maternal health. This paper offers insights into two of the aspects that are lacking in the current literature on P4P, namely what strategies health workers employ to reach set targets, and how the intervention plays out when implemented by local government as part of a national programme that does not receive donor funding.

METHODS

A total of 28 in-depth interviews (IDIs) with 25 individuals were conducted in Mvomero district over a period of 15 months in 2010 and 2011, both before and after P4P payments. Seven facilities, including six dispensaries and one health centre, were covered. Informants included 17 nurses, three clinical officers, two medical attendants, one lab technician and two district health administrators.

RESULTS

Health workers reported a number of strategies to increase the number of deliveries at their facility, including health education and cooperation with traditional health providers. The staff at all facilities also reported that they had told the women that they would be sanctioned if they gave birth at home, such as being fined or denied clinical cards and/or vaccinations for their babies. There is a great uncertainty in relation to the potential health impacts of the behavioural changes that have come with P4P, as the reported strategies may increase the numbers, but not necessarily the quality. Contrary to the design of the P4P programme, payments were not based on performance. We argue that this was due in part to a lack of resources within the District Administration, and in part as a result of egalitarian fairness principles.

CONCLUSIONS

Our results suggest that particular attention should be paid to adverse effects when using external rewards for improved health outcomes, and secondly, that P4P may take on a different form when implemented by local implementers without the assistance of professional P4P specialists.