1
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Kühberger A. A systematic review of risky-choice framing effects. EXCLI JOURNAL 2023; 22:1012-1031. [PMID: 37927347 PMCID: PMC10620856 DOI: 10.17179/excli2023-6169] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/12/2023] [Accepted: 09/12/2023] [Indexed: 11/07/2023]
Abstract
Classic decision theory requires that rational agents show description invariance: which description is chosen should not matter for judgments, preferences, or choices given the descriptions are co-extensive. Framing research has amply demonstrated a failure of description invariance by showing that the choice of the description has a systematic effect on judgments, preferences, and choices. Specifically, framing research has shown that linguistically different descriptions of seemingly equivalent options frequently lead to preference reversals. I summarize the research on framing in situations entailing risk. This includes the characterization of different research designs used, the size and robustness of the framing effects reported for those designs, and the theoretical accounts put forward to explain framing effects. The theoretical accounts are evaluated with respect to their merits, empirically and theoretically. I end by providing the implications of framing research. My central point is that the existence of framing effects points to the adaptiveness of the processes underlying human judgment and choice rather than simply showing human irrationality.
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Affiliation(s)
- Anton Kühberger
- Department of Psychology & Centre of Cognitive Neurosciences, University of Salzburg, Austria
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2
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Rosati AG, Sabbi KH, Bryer MAH, Barnes P, Rukundo J, Mukungu T, Sekulya P, Ampeire I, Aligumisiriza H, Kyama S, Masereka J, Nabukeera W, Okello A, Waiga B, Atwijuze S, Peña NC, Cantwell A, Felsche E, Flores-Mendoza K, Mohamed S, Monroe I, Mulhinch M, O'Gorman K, Salamango J, Shamah R, Otali E, Wrangham RW, Machanda ZP. Observational approaches to chimpanzee behavior in an African sanctuary: Implications for research, welfare, and capacity-building. Am J Primatol 2023; 85:e23534. [PMID: 37461356 PMCID: PMC10530331 DOI: 10.1002/ajp.23534] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/09/2023] [Revised: 07/01/2023] [Accepted: 07/08/2023] [Indexed: 08/04/2023]
Abstract
Research in African ape sanctuaries has emerged as an important context for our understanding of comparative cognition and behavior. While much of this work has focused on experimental studies of cognition, these animals semi-free-range in forest habitats and therefore can also provide important information about the behavior of primates in socioecologically-relevant naturalistic contexts. In this "New Approaches" article, we describe a project where we implemented a synthetic program of observational data collection at Ngamba Island Chimpanzee Sanctuary in Uganda, directly modeled after long-term data collection protocols at the Kibale Chimpanzee Project in Uganda, a wild chimpanzee field site. The foundation for this project was a strong partnership between sanctuary staff, field site staff, and external researchers. We describe how we developed a data-collection protocol through discussion and collaboration among these groups, and trained sanctuary caregivers to collect novel observational data using these protocols. We use these data as a case study to examine: (1) how behavioral observations in sanctuaries can inform primate welfare and care practices, such as by understanding aggression within the group; (2) how matched observational protocols across sites can inform our understanding of primate behavior across different contexts, including sex differences in social relationships; and (3) how more robust collaborations between foreign researchers and local partners can support capacity-building in primate range countries, along with mentoring and training students more broadly.
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Affiliation(s)
- Alexandra G Rosati
- Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
- Department of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
| | - Kris H Sabbi
- Department of Anthropology, Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts, USA
- Kibale Chimpanzee Project, Kibale National Park, Uganda
| | - Margaret A H Bryer
- Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
| | - Paige Barnes
- Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
| | - Joshua Rukundo
- Ngamba Island Chimpanzee Sanctuary/Chimpanzee Trust, Entebbe, Uganda
| | - Titus Mukungu
- Ngamba Island Chimpanzee Sanctuary/Chimpanzee Trust, Entebbe, Uganda
| | - Phillip Sekulya
- Ngamba Island Chimpanzee Sanctuary/Chimpanzee Trust, Entebbe, Uganda
| | - Innocent Ampeire
- Ngamba Island Chimpanzee Sanctuary/Chimpanzee Trust, Entebbe, Uganda
| | | | - Stanley Kyama
- Ngamba Island Chimpanzee Sanctuary/Chimpanzee Trust, Entebbe, Uganda
| | - Joseph Masereka
- Ngamba Island Chimpanzee Sanctuary/Chimpanzee Trust, Entebbe, Uganda
| | - Winnie Nabukeera
- Ngamba Island Chimpanzee Sanctuary/Chimpanzee Trust, Entebbe, Uganda
| | - Amos Okello
- Ngamba Island Chimpanzee Sanctuary/Chimpanzee Trust, Entebbe, Uganda
| | - Boris Waiga
- Ngamba Island Chimpanzee Sanctuary/Chimpanzee Trust, Entebbe, Uganda
| | | | | | - Averill Cantwell
- Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
| | - Elisa Felsche
- Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
- Department of Comparative Cultural Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany
| | | | - Safa Mohamed
- Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
| | - Isabelle Monroe
- Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
| | - Megan Mulhinch
- Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
- Department of Psychology, University of California San Diego, La Jolla, California, USA
| | - Kathleen O'Gorman
- Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
| | - Julia Salamango
- Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
| | - Rayna Shamah
- Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
| | - Emily Otali
- Kibale Chimpanzee Project, Kibale National Park, Uganda
| | - Richard W Wrangham
- Department of Biology, Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts, USA
- Department of Human Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
| | - Zarin P Machanda
- Department of Anthropology, Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts, USA
- Department of Biology, Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts, USA
- Kibale Chimpanzee Project, Kibale National Park, Uganda
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3
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Brosnan SF, Wilson BJ. Comparative economics: how studying other primates helps us better understand the evolution of our own economic decision making. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2023; 378:20210497. [PMID: 36934757 PMCID: PMC10024989 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2021.0497] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/27/2022] [Accepted: 10/13/2022] [Indexed: 03/21/2023] Open
Abstract
The origins of evolutionary games are rooted in both economics and animal behaviour, but economics has, until recently, focused primarily on humans. Although historically, specific games were used in targeted circumstances with non-human species (i.e. the Prisoner's Dilemma), experimental economics has been increasingly recognized as a valuable method for directly comparing both the outcomes of economic decisions and their underlying mechanisms across species, particularly in comparison with humans, thanks to the structured procedures that allow for them to be instantiated across a variety of animals. So far, results in non-human primates suggest that even when outcomes are shared, underlying proximate mechanisms can vary substantially. Intriguingly, in some contexts non-human primates more easily find a Nash equilibrium than do humans, possibly owing to their greater willingness to explore the parameter space, but humans excel at more complex outcomes, such as alternating between two Nash equilibria, even when deprived of language or instruction, suggesting potential mechanisms that humans have evolved to allow us to solve complex social problems. We consider what these results suggest about the evolution of economic decision-making and suggest future directions, in particular the need to expand taxonomic diversity, to expand this promising approach. This article is part of the theme issue 'Half a century of evolutionary games: a synthesis of theory, application and future directions'.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sarah F. Brosnan
- Departments of Psychology & Philosophy, Neuroscience Institute, Center for Behavioral Neuroscience, and the Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30302, USA
| | - Bart J. Wilson
- Smith Institute for Political Economy and Philosophy & Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, Orange, CA 92866, USA
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4
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Burdfield-Steel E, Burdfield C. How to fail in advertising: The potential of marketing theory to predict the community-level selection of defended prey. J Evol Biol 2023. [PMID: 36820741 DOI: 10.1111/jeb.14160] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/14/2022] [Revised: 12/14/2022] [Accepted: 01/16/2023] [Indexed: 02/24/2023]
Abstract
Economics and ecology both present us with a key challenge: scaling up from individual behaviour to community-level effects. As a result, biologists have frequently utilized theories and frameworks from economics in their attempt to better understand animal behaviour. In the study of predator-prey interactions, we face a particularly difficult task-understanding how predator choices and strategies will impact the ecology and evolution not just of individual prey species, but whole communities. However, a similar challenge has been encountered, and largely solved, in Marketing, which has created frameworks that successfully predict human consumer behaviour at the community level. We argue that by applying these frameworks to non-human consumers, we can leverage this predictive power to understand the behaviour of these key ecological actors in shaping the communities they act upon. We here use predator-prey interactions, as a case study, to demonstrate and discuss the potential of marketing and human-consumer theory in helping us bridge the gap from laboratory experiments to complex community dynamics.
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Affiliation(s)
- Emily Burdfield-Steel
- Institute for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Dynamics, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
| | - Claire Burdfield
- Sheffield University Management School, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
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5
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Rationality and cognitive bias in captive gorillas' and orang-utans' economic decision-making. PLoS One 2022; 17:e0278150. [PMID: 36516129 PMCID: PMC9749992 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0278150] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/09/2021] [Accepted: 11/10/2022] [Indexed: 12/15/2022] Open
Abstract
Human economic decision-making sometimes appears to be irrational. Partly, this is due to cognitive biases that can lead to suboptimal economic choices and context-dependent risk-preferences. A pertinent question is whether such biases are part of our evolutionary heritage or whether they are culturally acquired. To address this, we tested gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) and orang-utans (Pongo abelii) with two risk-assessment experiments that differed in how risk was presented. For both experiments, we found that subjects increased their preferences for the risky options as their expected gains increased, showing basic understanding of reward contingencies and rational decision-making. However, we also found consistent differences in risk proneness between the two experiments, as subjects were risk-neutral in one experiment and risk-prone in the other. We concluded that gorillas and orang-utans are economically rational but that their decisions can interact with pre-existing cognitive biases which modulates their risk-preference in context-dependent ways, explaining the variability of their risk-preference in previous literature.
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6
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Pothos EM, Pleskac TJ. Rethinking Rationality. Top Cogn Sci 2022; 14:451-466. [PMID: 35261177 DOI: 10.1111/tops.12585] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/17/2021] [Revised: 10/13/2021] [Accepted: 10/13/2021] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
We seek to understand rational decision making and if it exists whether finite (bounded) agents may be able to achieve its principles. This aim has been a singular objective throughout much of human science and philosophy, with early discussions identified since antiquity. More recently, there has been a thriving debate based on differing perspectives on rationality, including adaptive heuristics, Bayesian theory, quantum theory, resource rationality, and probabilistic language of thought. Are these perspectives on rationality mutually exclusive? Are they all needed? Do they undermine an aim to have rational standards in decision situations like politics, medicine, legal proceedings, and others, where there is an expectation and need for decision making as close to "optimal" as possible? This special issue brings together representative contributions from the currently predominant views on rationality, with a view to evaluate progress on these and related questions.
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7
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Risky choice framing by experience: A methodological note. JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 2021. [DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500008445] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/04/2023]
Abstract
AbstractIn classic research on judgment and decision making under risk, risk is described by providing participants with the respective outcomes and probabilities in a summary format. Recent research has introduced a different paradigm – decisions-by-experience – where participants learn about risk by sampling from the outcomes, rather than by summary descriptions. This latter research reports a description-experience gap, indicating that some of the classic patterns of risk attitude reverse when people experience the risk. Recent research has attempted to investigate risky choice framing in the decisions-by-experience paradigm. I discuss how this research runs into problems in properly manipulating framing in decisions by experience. Drawing from framing research with animals, I argue that framing effects also exist in experience tasks. The classic Asian Disease task, however, awaits proper translation into an experience paradigm.
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8
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Haux LM, Engelmann JM, Herrmann E, Hertwig R. How chimpanzees decide in the face of social and nonsocial uncertainty. Anim Behav 2021. [DOI: 10.1016/j.anbehav.2021.01.015] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/15/2022]
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9
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Keupp S, Grueneisen S, Ludvig EA, Warneken F, Melis AP. Reduced risk-seeking in chimpanzees in a zero-outcome game. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2021; 376:20190673. [PMID: 33423631 PMCID: PMC7815432 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2019.0673] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/30/2022] Open
Abstract
A key component of economic decisions is the integration of information about reward outcomes and probabilities in selecting between competing options. In many species, risky choice is influenced by the magnitude of available outcomes, probability of success and the possibility of extreme outcomes. Chimpanzees are generally regarded to be risk-seeking. In this study, we examined two aspects of chimpanzees' risk preferences: first, whether setting the value of the non-preferred outcome of a risky option to zero changes chimpanzees’ risk preferences, and second, whether individual risk preferences are stable across two different measures. Across two experiments, we found chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes, n = 23) as a group to be risk-neutral to risk-avoidant with highly stable individual risk preferences. We discuss how the possibility of going empty-handed might reduce chimpanzees' risk-seeking relative to previous studies. This malleability in risk preferences as a function of experimental parameters and individual differences raises interesting questions about whether it is appropriate or helpful to categorize a species as a whole as risk-seeking or risk-avoidant. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates’.
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Affiliation(s)
- Stefanie Keupp
- Department of Psychology, University of Warwick, University Road, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK.,Experimental Psychology, University College London, 26 Bedford Way, London WC1H 0AP, UK
| | - Sebastian Grueneisen
- Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, 530 Church Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1043, USA.,Center for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Lentzeallee 94, 14195 Berlin, Germany
| | - Elliot A Ludvig
- Department of Psychology, University of Warwick, University Road, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
| | - Felix Warneken
- Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, 530 Church Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1043, USA
| | - Alicia P Melis
- Experimental Psychology, University College London, 26 Bedford Way, London WC1H 0AP, UK
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10
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Brosnan SF. What behaviour in economic games tells us about the evolution of non-human species' economic decision-making behaviour. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2021; 376:20190670. [PMID: 33423638 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2019.0670] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/17/2023] Open
Abstract
In the past decade, there has been a surge of interest in using games derived from experimental economics to test decision-making behaviour across species. In most cases, researchers are using the games as a tool, for instance, to understand what factors influence decision-making, how decision-making differs across species or contexts, or to ask broader questions about species' propensities to cooperate or compete. These games have been quite successful in this regard. To what degree, however, do these games tap into species' economic decision-making? For the purpose of understanding the evolution of economic systems in humans, this is the key question. To study this, we can break economic decision-making down into smaller components, each of which is a potential step in the evolution of human economic behaviour. We can then use data from economic games, which are simplified, highly structured models of decision-making and therefore ideal for the comparative approach, to directly compare these components across species and contexts, as well as in relation to more naturalistic behaviours, to better understand the evolution of economic behaviour and the social and ecological contexts that influenced it. The comparative approach has successfully informed us about the evolution of other complex traits, such as language and morality, and should help us more deeply understand why and how human economic systems evolved. This article is part of the theme issue 'Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates'.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sarah F Brosnan
- Departments of Psychology & Philosophy, Neuroscience Institute, Center for Behavioral Neuroscience, Language Research Center, Georgia State University, PO Box 5010, Atlanta, GA 30302-5010, USA
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11
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De Petrillo F, Rosati AG. Variation in primate decision-making under uncertainty and the roots of human economic behaviour. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2021; 376:20190671. [PMID: 33423637 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2019.0671] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/31/2022] Open
Abstract
Uncertainty is a ubiquitous component of human economic behaviour, yet people can vary in their preferences for risk across populations, individuals and different points in time. As uncertainty also characterizes many aspects of animal decision-making, comparative research can help evaluate different potential mechanisms that generate this variation, including the role of biological differences or maturational change versus cultural learning, as well as identify human-unique components of economic decision-making. Here, we examine decision-making under risk across non-human primates, our closest relatives. We first review theoretical approaches and current methods for understanding decision-making in animals. We then assess the current evidence for variation in animal preferences between species and populations, between individuals based on personality, sex and age, and finally, between different contexts and individual states. We then use these primate data to evaluate the processes that can shape human decision-making strategies and identify the primate foundations of human economic behaviour. This article is part of the theme issue 'Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates'.
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Affiliation(s)
- Francesca De Petrillo
- Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, Toulouse, Occitanie, France.,Unità di Primatologia Cognitiva e Centro Primati, Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Roma, Lazio, Italy.,Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
| | - Alexandra G Rosati
- Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA.,Department of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
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12
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Abstract
While non-human primate studies have long been conducted in laboratories, and more recently at zoological parks, sanctuaries are increasingly considered a viable setting for research. Accredited sanctuaries in non-range countries house thousands of primates formerly used as subjects of medical research, trained performers or personal pets. In range countries, however, sanctuaries typically house orphaned primates confiscated from illegal poaching and the bushmeat and pet trafficking trades. Although the primary mission of these sanctuaries is to rescue and rehabilitate residents, many of these organizations are increasingly willing to participate in non-invasive research. Notably, from a scientific standpoint, most sanctuaries provide potential advantages over traditional settings, such as large, naturalistic physical and social environments which may result in more relevant models of primates' free-ranging wild counterparts than other captive settings. As a result, an impressive scope of research in the fields of primate behaviour, cognition, veterinary science, genetics and physiology have been studied in sanctuaries. In this review, we examine the range and form of research that has been conducted at accredited sanctuaries around the world. We also describe the potential challenges of sanctuary-based work and the considerations that external researchers may face when deciding to collaborate with primate sanctuaries on their research projects.
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Affiliation(s)
- Stephen R Ross
- Lester E. Fisher Center for the Study and Conservation of Apes, Lincoln Park Zoo, 2001 North Clark St., Chicago, IL 60614, USA
| | - Jesse G Leinwand
- Lester E. Fisher Center for the Study and Conservation of Apes, Lincoln Park Zoo, 2001 North Clark St., Chicago, IL 60614, USA
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13
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Gains v. losses, or context dependence generated by confusion? Anim Cogn 2020; 23:361-366. [PMID: 31965401 PMCID: PMC7018787 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-019-01339-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/21/2019] [Revised: 12/10/2019] [Accepted: 12/13/2019] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Tversky and Kahneman introduced the term framing for the finding that people give different answers to the same question depending on the way it is posed. One form of framing involves presenting the same outcome as either a gain or a loss. An experiment on starlings by Marsh and Kacelnik suggests that this form of framing occurs in non-humans. We argue that the experimental result demonstrates framing in the general sense of context dependence but does not provide compelling evidence of framing in terms of gains and losses. A version of scalar utility theory which is extended to include the possibility of memory errors accounts for the data and suggests future lines of research.
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14
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De Petrillo F, Rosati AG. Ecological rationality: Convergent decision-making in apes and capuchins. Behav Processes 2019; 164:201-213. [DOI: 10.1016/j.beproc.2019.05.010] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/06/2018] [Revised: 05/02/2019] [Accepted: 05/08/2019] [Indexed: 02/07/2023]
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15
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Krupenye C, Call J. Theory of mind in animals: Current and future directions. WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS. COGNITIVE SCIENCE 2019; 10:e1503. [DOI: 10.1002/wcs.1503] [Citation(s) in RCA: 61] [Impact Index Per Article: 12.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/14/2018] [Revised: 04/03/2019] [Accepted: 04/09/2019] [Indexed: 02/06/2023]
Affiliation(s)
| | - Josep Call
- School of Psychology & Neuroscience University of St Andrews St Andrews UK
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16
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Noble R, Noble D. Harnessing stochasticity: How do organisms make choices? CHAOS (WOODBURY, N.Y.) 2018; 28:106309. [PMID: 30384641 DOI: 10.1063/1.5039668] [Citation(s) in RCA: 26] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/10/2018] [Accepted: 07/20/2018] [Indexed: 06/08/2023]
Abstract
Choice in the behavior of organisms involves novelty, which may be unpredictable. Yet in retrospect, we can usually provide a rationale for the choice. A deterministic view of life cannot explain this. The solution to this paradox is that organisms can harness stochasticity through which they can generate many possible solutions to environmental challenges. They must then employ a comparator to find the solution that fits the challenge. What therefore is unpredictable in prospect can become comprehensible in retrospect. Harnessing stochastic and/or chaotic processes is essential to the ability of organisms to have agency and to make choices.
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Affiliation(s)
- Raymond Noble
- Institute for Women's Health, University College London, London WC1E 6AU, UK
| | - Denis Noble
- Department of Physiology, Anatomy & Genetics, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 3PT, UK
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17
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Law EA, Bennett NJ, Ives CD, Friedman R, Davis KJ, Archibald C, Wilson KA. Equity trade-offs in conservation decision making. CONSERVATION BIOLOGY : THE JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY FOR CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 2018; 32:294-303. [PMID: 28861904 DOI: 10.1111/cobi.13008] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/17/2016] [Accepted: 07/28/2017] [Indexed: 06/07/2023]
Abstract
Conservation decisions increasingly involve multiple environmental and social objectives, which result in complex decision contexts with high potential for trade-offs. Improving social equity is one such objective that is often considered an enabler of successful outcomes and a virtuous ideal in itself. Despite its idealized importance in conservation policy, social equity is often highly simplified or ill-defined and is applied uncritically. What constitutes equitable outcomes and processes is highly normative and subject to ethical deliberation. Different ethical frameworks may lead to different conceptions of equity through alternative perspectives of what is good or right. This can lead to different and potentially conflicting equity objectives in practice. We promote a more transparent, nuanced, and pluralistic conceptualization of equity in conservation decision making that particularly recognizes where multidimensional equity objectives may conflict. To help identify and mitigate ethical conflicts and avoid cases of good intentions producing bad outcomes, we encourage a more analytical incorporation of equity into conservation decision making particularly during mechanistic integration of equity objectives. We recommend that in conservation planning motivations and objectives for equity be made explicit within the problem context, methods used to incorporate equity objectives be applied with respect to stated objectives, and, should objectives dictate, evaluation of equity outcomes and adaptation of strategies be employed during policy implementation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Elizabeth A Law
- ARC Centre of Excellence for Environmental Decisions, The University of Queensland, St Lucia, 4072, Australia
- School of Biological Sciences, The University of Queensland, St Lucia, 4072, Australia
| | - Nathan J Bennett
- Institute for Resources, Environment and Sustainability, University of British Columbia, 2202 Main Mall, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4, Canada
- School of Marine and Environmental Affairs, University of Washington, Box 355685, Seattle, WA 98195-5685, U.S.A
- Center for Ocean Solutions, Stanford University, 99 Pacific Street, Suite 555E, Monterey, CA 93940, U.S.A
| | - Christopher D Ives
- School of Geography, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham, NG7 2RD, U.K
| | - Rachel Friedman
- ARC Centre of Excellence for Environmental Decisions, The University of Queensland, St Lucia, 4072, Australia
- School of Biological Sciences, The University of Queensland, St Lucia, 4072, Australia
| | - Katrina J Davis
- ARC Centre of Excellence for Environmental Decisions, The University of Queensland, St Lucia, 4072, Australia
- School of Biological Sciences, The University of Queensland, St Lucia, 4072, Australia
- UWA School of Agriculture & Environment, University of Western Australia, 35 Stirling Highway, Crawley, 6009, Australia
| | - Carla Archibald
- ARC Centre of Excellence for Environmental Decisions, The University of Queensland, St Lucia, 4072, Australia
- School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, The University of Queensland, St Lucia, 4072, Australia
| | - Kerrie A Wilson
- ARC Centre of Excellence for Environmental Decisions, The University of Queensland, St Lucia, 4072, Australia
- School of Biological Sciences, The University of Queensland, St Lucia, 4072, Australia
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18
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The Impact of Perceived Threat of Infectious Disease on the Framing Effect. EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2018. [DOI: 10.1007/s40806-018-0145-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/17/2022]
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Krupenye C, Hare B. Bonobos Prefer Individuals that Hinder Others over Those that Help. Curr Biol 2018; 28:280-286.e5. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cub.2017.11.061] [Citation(s) in RCA: 27] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/25/2017] [Revised: 10/13/2017] [Accepted: 11/27/2017] [Indexed: 10/18/2022]
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Reactivation of associative structure specific outcome responses during prospective evaluation in reward-based choices. Nat Commun 2017; 8:15821. [PMID: 28598438 PMCID: PMC5472730 DOI: 10.1038/ncomms15821] [Citation(s) in RCA: 37] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/12/2016] [Accepted: 05/05/2017] [Indexed: 01/02/2023] Open
Abstract
Before making a reward-based choice, we must evaluate each option. Some theories propose that prospective evaluation involves a reactivation of the neural response to the outcome. Others propose that it calls upon a response pattern that is specific to each underlying associative structure. We hypothesize that these views are reconcilable: during prospective evaluation, offers reactivate neural responses to outcomes that are unique to each associative structure; when the outcome occurs, this pattern is activated, simultaneously, with a general response to the reward. We recorded single-units from macaque orbitofrontal cortex (Area 13) in a riskless choice task with interleaved described and experienced offer trials. Here we report that neural activations to offers and their outcomes overlap, as do neural activations to the outcomes on the two trial types. Neural activations to experienced and described offers are unrelated even though they predict the same outcomes. Our reactivation theory parsimoniously explains these results. How the brain evaluates options to make a reward-based choice is unclear. Here, authors show that, prior to choice, neural activity patterns to the potential outcomes are reactivated in macaque orbitofrontal cortex, in a way that reflects the unique event sequences leading up to the outcomes.
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21
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Abstract
Risk attitudes in humans depend on the format used to present the gamble: we are more risk-averse for common gambles in the gains domain whose properties are described to us verbally than for those whose properties we learned about solely through experience. This difference, which constitutes part of the description-experience gap, is important, because it highlights the role of knowledge acquisition in decision-making. The reasons for the gap remain obscure, but could depend upon uniquely human cognitive abilities, such as those associated with language. Thus, the gap may or may not extend to nonhuman animals. For this study, rhesus monkeys performed a novel task in which the properties of some gambles were explicitly cued (described), whereas others were learned through previous choices (experienced). Our monkeys displayed a description-experience gap. Overall, monkeys were more risk-seeking for experienced than for described gambles. This difference was observed for a range of gamble probabilities (from 20% to 80% likelihood of payoff), indicating that it is not limited to low probability events. These results suggest that the description-experience gap does not depend on uniquely human cognitive abilities, such as those associated with language, and support the idea that epistemic influences on risk attitudes are evolutionarily ancient.
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Abstract
Individuals that participate in exchanges with delayed rewards can be exploited if their partners don't reciprocate. In humans, friendships are built on trust, and trust enhances cooperation. New evidence suggests that close social bonds also enhance trust in chimpanzees.
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Affiliation(s)
- Joan Silk
- School of Human Evolution and Social Change, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-2402, USA.
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Kanngiesser P, Woike JK. Framing the debate on human-like framing effects in bonobos and chimpanzees: a comment on Krupenye et al. (2015). Biol Lett 2016; 12:20150718. [PMID: 26763216 DOI: 10.1098/rsbl.2015.0718] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Patricia Kanngiesser
- Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Deutscher Platz 6, Leipzig 04103, Germany
| | - Jan K Woike
- Center for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Lentzeallee 94, Berlin 14195, Germany
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Krupenye C, Rosati AG, Hare B. What's in a frame? Response to Kanngiesser & Woike (2016). Biol Lett 2016; 12:20150959. [PMID: 26763218 DOI: 10.1098/rsbl.2015.0959] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Affiliation(s)
| | - Alexandra G Rosati
- Department of Human Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
| | - Brian Hare
- Department of Evolutionary Anthropology, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA
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Why Brains Are Not Computers, Why Behaviorism Is Not Satanism, and Why Dolphins Are Not Aquatic Apes. THE BEHAVIOR ANALYST 2015; 39:9-23. [PMID: 27606181 DOI: 10.1007/s40614-015-0047-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 25] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/22/2022]
Abstract
Modern psychology has, to all intents and purposes, become synonymous with cognitive psychology, with an emphasis on the idea that the brain is a form of computer, whose job is to take in sensory input, process information, and produce motor output. This places the brain at a remove from both the body and environment and denies the intimate connection that exists between them. As a result, a great injustice is done to both human and nonhuman animals: On the one hand, we fail to recognize the distinctive nature of nonhuman cognition, and on the other hand, we continue to promote a somewhat misleading view of human psychological capacities. Here, I suggest a more mutualistic, embodied, enactive view might allow us to ask more interesting questions about how animals of all kinds come to know their worlds, in ways that avoid the (inevitable) anthropocentric baggage of the cognitivist viewpoint.
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