Frequency-dependent fitness induces multistability in coevolutionary dynamics

Turing Instabilities are Not Enough to Ensure Pattern Formation

Symmetry-breaking instabilities play an important role in understanding the mechanisms underlying the diversity of patterns observed in nature, such as in Turing's reaction-diffusion theory, which connects cellular signalling and transport with the development of growth and form. Extensive literature focuses on the linear stability analysis of homogeneous equilibria in these systems, culminating in a set of conditions for transport-driven instabilities that are commonly presumed to initiate self-organisation. We demonstrate that a selection of simple, canonical transport models with only mild multistable non-linearities can satisfy the Turing instability conditions while also robustly exhibiting only transient patterns. Hence, a Turing-like instability is insufficient for the existence of a patterned state. While it is known that linear theory can fail to predict the formation of patterns, we demonstrate that such failures can appear robustly in systems with multiple stable homogeneous equilibria. Given that biological systems such as gene regulatory networks and spatially distributed ecosystems often exhibit a high degree of multistability and nonlinearity, this raises important questions of how to analyse prospective mechanisms for self-organisation.

Extinction scenarios in evolutionary processes: a multinomial Wright-Fisher approach

We study a discrete-time multi-type Wright-Fisher population process. The mean-field dynamics of the stochastic process is induced by a general replicator difference equation. We prove several results regarding the asymptotic behavior of the model, focusing on the impact of the mean-field dynamics on it. One of the results is a limit theorem that describes sufficient conditions for an almost certain path to extinction, first eliminating the type which is the least fit at the mean-field equilibrium. The effect is explained by the metastability of the stochastic system, which under the conditions of the theorem spends almost all time before the extinction event in a neighborhood of the equilibrium. In addition to the limit theorems, we propose a maximization principle for a general deterministic replicator dynamics and study its implications for the stochastic model.

The characteristics of average abundance function with mutation of multi-player threshold public goods evolutionary game model under redistribution mechanism

BACKGROUND

In recent years, the average abundance function has attracted much attention as it reflects the degree of cooperation in the population. Then it is significant to analyse how average abundance functions can be increased to promote the proliferation of cooperative behaviour. However, further theoretical analysis for average abundance function with mutation under redistribution mechanism is still lacking. Furthermore, the theoretical basis for the corresponding numerical simulation is not sufficiently understood.

RESULTS

We have deduced the approximate expressions of average abundance function with mutation under redistribution mechanism on the basis of different levels of selection intensity [Formula: see text] (sufficiently small and large enough). In addition, we have analysed the influence of the size of group d, multiplication factor r, cost c, aspiration level [Formula: see text] on average abundance function from both quantitative and qualitative aspects.

CONCLUSIONS

(1) The approximate expression will become the linear equation related to selection intensity when [Formula: see text] is sufficiently small. (2) On one hand, approximation expression when [Formula: see text] is large enough is not available when r is small and m is large. On the other hand, this approximation expression will become more reliable when [Formula: see text] is larger. (3) On the basis of the expected payoff function [Formula: see text] and function [Formula: see text], the corresponding results for the effects of parameters (d,r,c,[Formula: see text]) on average abundance function [Formula: see text] have been explained.

Public goods games in populations with fluctuating size

Many mathematical frameworks of evolutionary game dynamics assume that the total population size is constant and that selection affects only the relative frequency of strategies. Here, we consider evolutionary game dynamics in an extended Wright-Fisher process with variable population size. In such a scenario, it is possible that the entire population becomes extinct. Survival of the population may depend on which strategy prevails in the game dynamics. Studying cooperative dilemmas, it is a natural feature of such a model that cooperators enable survival, while defectors drive extinction. Although defectors are favored for any mixed population, random drift could lead to their elimination and the resulting pure-cooperator population could survive. On the other hand, if the defectors remain, then the population will quickly go extinct because the frequency of cooperators steadily declines and defectors alone cannot survive. In a mutation-selection model, we find that (i) a steady supply of cooperators can enable long-term population survival, provided selection is sufficiently strong, and (ii) selection can increase the abundance of cooperators but reduce their relative frequency. Thus, evolutionary game dynamics in populations with variable size generate a multifaceted notion of what constitutes a trait's long-term success.

Finite-size effects and switching times for Moran process with mutation

We consider the Moran process with two populations competing under an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma in the presence of mutation, and concentrate on the case where there are multiple evolutionarily stable strategies. We perform a complete bifurcation analysis of the deterministic system which arises in the infinite population size. We also study the Master equation and obtain asymptotics for the invariant distribution and metastable switching times for the stochastic process in the case of large but finite population. We also show that the stochastic system has asymmetries in the form of a skew for parameter values where the deterministic limit is symmetric.

Toward the Darwinian transition: Switching between distributed and speciated states in a simple model of early life

It has been hypothesized that in the era just before the last universal common ancestor emerged, life on earth was fundamentally collective. Ancient life forms shared their genetic material freely through massive horizontal gene transfer (HGT). At a certain point, however, life made a transition to the modern era of individuality and vertical descent. Here we present a minimal model for stochastic processes potentially contributing to this hypothesized "Darwinian transition." The model suggests that HGT-dominated dynamics may have been intermittently interrupted by selection-driven processes during which genotypes became fitter and decreased their inclination toward HGT. Stochastic switching in the population dynamics with three-point (hypernetwork) interactions may have destabilized the HGT-dominated collective state and essentially contributed to the emergence of vertical descent and the first well-defined species in early evolution. A systematic nonlinear analysis of the stochastic model dynamics covering key features of evolutionary processes (such as selection, mutation, drift and HGT) supports this view. Our findings thus suggest a viable direction out of early collective evolution, potentially enabling the start of individuality and vertical Darwinian evolution.

Fixation in finite populations evolving in fluctuating environments

The environment in which a population evolves can have a crucial impact on selection. We study evolutionary dynamics in finite populations of fixed size in a changing environment. The population dynamics are driven by birth and death events. The rates of these events may vary in time depending on the state of the environment, which follows an independent Markov process. We develop a general theory for the fixation probability of a mutant in a population of wild-types, and for mean unconditional and conditional fixation times. We apply our theory to evolutionary games for which the payoff structure varies in time. The mutant can exploit the environmental noise; a dynamic environment that switches between two states can lead to a probability of fixation that is higher than in any of the individual environmental states. We provide an intuitive interpretation of this surprising effect. We also investigate stationary distributions when mutations are present in the dynamics. In this regime, we find two approximations of the stationary measure. One works well for rapid switching, the other for slowly fluctuating environments.

Aspiration dynamics in structured population acts as if in a well-mixed one

Understanding the evolution of human interactive behaviors is important. Recent experimental results suggest that human cooperation in spatial structured population is not enhanced as predicted in previous works, when payoff-dependent imitation updating rules are used. This constraint opens up an avenue to shed light on how humans update their strategies in real life. Studies via simulations show that, instead of comparison rules, self-evaluation driven updating rules may explain why spatial structure does not alter the evolutionary outcome. Though inspiring, there is a lack of theoretical result to show the existence of such evolutionary updating rule. Here we study the aspiration dynamics, and show that it does not alter the evolutionary outcome in various population structures. Under weak selection, by analytical approximation, we find that the favored strategy in regular graphs is invariant. Further, we show that this is because the criterion under which a strategy is favored is the same as that of a well-mixed population. By simulation, we show that this holds for random networks. Although how humans update their strategies is an open question to be studied, our results provide a theoretical foundation of the updating rules that may capture the real human updating rules.

Periodic versus intermittent adaptive cycles in quasispecies coevolution

We study an abstract model for the coevolution between mutating viruses and the adaptive immune system. In sequence space, these two populations are localized around transiently dominant strains. Delocalization or error thresholds exhibit a novel interdependence because immune response is conditional on the viral attack. An evolutionary chase is induced by stochastic fluctuations and can occur via periodic or intermittent cycles. Using simulations and stochastic analysis, we show how the transition between these two dynamic regimes depends on mutation rate, immune response, and population size.

Aspiration dynamics of multi-player games in finite populations

On studying strategy update rules in the framework of evolutionary game theory, one can differentiate between imitation processes and aspiration-driven dynamics. In the former case, individuals imitate the strategy of a more successful peer. In the latter case, individuals adjust their strategies based on a comparison of their pay-offs from the evolutionary game to a value they aspire, called the level of aspiration. Unlike imitation processes of pairwise comparison, aspiration-driven updates do not require additional information about the strategic environment and can thus be interpreted as being more spontaneous. Recent work has mainly focused on understanding how aspiration dynamics alter the evolutionary outcome in structured populations. However, the baseline case for understanding strategy selection is the well-mixed population case, which is still lacking sufficient understanding. We explore how aspiration-driven strategy-update dynamics under imperfect rationality influence the average abundance of a strategy in multi-player evolutionary games with two strategies. We analytically derive a condition under which a strategy is more abundant than the other in the weak selection limiting case. This approach has a long-standing history in evolutionary games and is mostly applied for its mathematical approachability. Hence, we also explore strong selection numerically, which shows that our weak selection condition is a robust predictor of the average abundance of a strategy. The condition turns out to differ from that of a wide class of imitation dynamics, as long as the game is not dyadic. Therefore, a strategy favoured under imitation dynamics can be disfavoured under aspiration dynamics. This does not require any population structure, and thus highlights the intrinsic difference between imitation and aspiration dynamics.