Neuroimaging 'will to fight' for sacred values: an empirical case study with supporters of an Al Qaeda associate

Psychological significance of name changes: A case study of (north) Macedonia's name referendum

Multiple instances of rebranding of corporations or sports teams, or changes of personal names suggest that imposed change of symbols that people identify with leads to resistance towards the symbol change. In this paper, we examine the predictive role of sacred values, identity fusion, identification and essentialism in explaining such resistance, in a unique political context of a national referendum to change Macedonia to North Macedonia. Participants (ethnic Macedonians, N = 301) took a survey measuring these variables, along with their voting intentions and behaviour, 1 week prior to a national referendum on the name change, and again several weeks later. The results indicated that while all variables predicted negative attitudes towards the name change, only considering the name a sacred value and, to a lesser extent, being identified with the country, uniquely predicted this outcome, and only sacred values uniquely predicted voting behaviour. A large proportion of the participants were fully fused with the name "Macedonia," which may have limited its predictive value. A cross-lagged analysis suggested a potential causal path from national identification to viewing the name as sacred, essentializing it and becoming fused with it. This study is the first to examine the psychological mechanisms that drive resistance to symbol change.

The Misleading count: an identity-based intervention to counter partisan misinformation sharing

Interventions to counter misinformation are often less effective for polarizing content on social media platforms. We sought to overcome this limitation by testing an identity-based intervention, which aims to promote accuracy by incorporating normative cues directly into the social media user interface. Across three pre-registered experiments in the US (N = 1709) and UK (N = 804), we found that crowdsourcing accuracy judgements by adding a Misleading count (next to the Like count) reduced participants' reported likelihood to share inaccurate information about partisan issues by 25% (compared with a control condition). The Misleading count was also more effective when it reflected in-group norms (from fellow Democrats/Republicans) compared with the norms of general users, though this effect was absent in a less politically polarized context (UK). Moreover, the normative intervention was roughly five times as effective as another popular misinformation intervention (i.e. the accuracy nudge reduced sharing misinformation by 5%). Extreme partisanship did not undermine the effectiveness of the intervention. Our results suggest that identity-based interventions based on the science of social norms can be more effective than identity-neutral alternatives to counter partisan misinformation in politically polarized contexts (e.g. the US). This article is part of the theme issue 'Social norm change: drivers and consequences'.

Transcultural pathways to the will to fight

In 2022, the "Will to Fight Act" was referred to the US Congress urging attention to measuring and assessing will to fight. That Bill was not enacted, and evaluation efforts within the political and military establishment remain contentious, fragmented, and meager. This likely will persist, along with attendant policy failures and grievous costs, without awareness of research that the social and psychological sciences reveal on the will to fight [S. Atran, Science 373, 1063 (2021)]. We illustrate such research using converging data from a multimethod and multicultural approach, including field and online studies from the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe. These studies reveal specific psychosocial pathways, within a general causal framework, that predict willingness to make costly sacrifices, including to cooperate, fight, and die in war and sustained conflict. From the continuing strife in Iraq to embattled Ukraine, 31 studies were conducted in 9 countries with nearly 12,000 participants. These include people in longstanding conflicts, refugees, imprisoned jihadists and gangs, US military, studies in Ukraine before and during the current war, and rolling studies with a European ally of Ukraine. Results provide evidence for a mediation model of transcultural pathways to the will to fight. Building on our previous behavioral and brain research, on the battlefield in Iraq, with violent extremists, and with US military, the linear mediation yielding the will to fight involves identity fusion, perceived spiritual formidability, and trust. The model, a variation on "The Devoted Actor Framework," applies to primary reference groups, core cultural values, and leaders.

Why Is It so Difficult to Investigate Violent Radicalization?

Imagine that you are a researcher interested in disentangling the underlying mechanisms that motivate certain individuals to self-sacrifice for a group or an ideology. Now, visualize that you are one of a few privileged that have the possibility of interviewing people who have been involved in some of the most dramatic terrorist attacks in history. What should you do? Most investigations focused on terrorism do not include empirical data and just a handful of fortunate have made face-to-face interviews with these individuals. Therefore, we might conclude that most experts in the field have not directly met the challenge of experiencing studying violent radicalization in person. As members of a research team who have talked with individuals under risk of radicalization, current, and former terrorists, our main goal with this manuscript is to synopsize a series of ten potential barriers that those interested in the subject might find when making fieldwork, and alternatives to solve them. If all the efforts made by investigators could save the life of a potential victim, prevent an individual from becoming radicalized, or make him/her decide to abandon the violence associated with terrorism, all our work will have been worthwhile.

Paramilitaries, parochialism, and peace: The moral foundations and personality traits of Slovenskí Branci

Paramilitary organizations have increasingly become a cause for concern among policy makers and the media in recent years, in part because the former are often seen as a potential threat to peace (or at least to the status quo of the current political systems) in the countries in which they emerge. Organizations such as the Oathkeepers and 3 Percenters (also known as III%ers) in the United States have grown significantly in the last two decades, while paramilitary organizations playing a key role in both offensive and defensive actions in Crimea and the Donbas Region have become a focus of discussion in the Russian war on Ukraine. Although they have not always garnered as much attention, paramilitary organizations in Central and Eastern Europe have a long history. While most are relatively inactive, others play a wide variety of active roles, sometimes even running operations in parallel with a state's official armed forces (e.g., the PMO serving the state in Poland, or the Night Wolves helping Russia capture Crimea). Despite the increase in the number and activity of these paramilitary organizations, little is known about the personal, social, moral, and psychological background of the individuals who join them. After reviewing the history and ideology of the largest paramilitary organization in the Slovak Republic, this article presents and discusses the results of a survey administered to the group. This survey used different measures of personality, morality, and identity, as well as information about respondents' personal background, family history, socio-economic status, and political ideology. We find significant relationships between certain individual personality traits and the importance of certain moral foundations among members of these organizations in relation to their broader social community.

Grievance-fueled violence can be better understood using an enactive approach

Understanding lone actor grievance-fueled violence remains a challenge. We believe that the concept of grievance provides an opportunity to add an engaged, first-person perspective to the assessment of lone actor extreme violence. We propose an enactivist philosophical approach that can help to understand the why and how of the pathway from grievance to violent extremism. Enactivism sees grievance as a dynamic, interpersonal, and context-sensitive construct that indicates how (potential) offenders make sense of the world they live in and how under certain circumstances it fuels violent behavior. Hence, grievance should not be understood as a given thing, but as an unfolding experience that involves sense-making through (regulation of one’s) interaction with the (social) environment. This (self-)relational and ecological understanding requires another approach than looking at demographic factors or life histories, only from an outsider’s perspective. Enactivism invites us to look at such risk factors as external indices of an ongoing process of active self-regulation and sense-making, and in some cases spiraling toward extreme violence. To understand the mindset of the offender we need to look more in depth at the processes that shape this mindset: why does this person, with this history, in this context, and at this point in time, proceed to use violence? The enactivist approach to the mind offers a complementary framework that may help us to understand the dynamics of grievance as a possible precursor to violent extremism. It also helps to appreciate why the relative unpredictability of the pathway toward lone actor extreme violence is not necessarily a sign of empirical weakness but a matter of principle due to the non-linearity of the processes involved. We end by summarizing how enactivism could contribute to the prevention of extremist violence and research and how it can help to avoid reinforcing stigmas and re-establishing a confirmation bias.

Social norms (not threat) mediate willingness to sacrifice in individuals fused with the nation: Insights from the COVID-19 pandemic

Identity fusion with the community has been previously found to mediate altruism in post-disaster settings. However, whether this altruistic response is specifically triggered by ingroup threat, or whether it can also be triggered by global threats remains unclear. We evaluated willingness to sacrifice in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic across three survey waves. Against expectations, participants fused with the nation (vs. non-fused) did not differentially respond to a national versus global threat condition. Conversely, social norms decisively influenced willingness to sacrifice in this sample, with fused individuals with stronger norms about social distancing reporting the highest altruistic response during the first weeks of the pandemic. Longitudinally, after an initial peak in the altruistic response, deteriorating social norms mediated decreases in willingness to sacrifice in individuals fused with the nation (vs. non-fused). Implications of these results for the development of interventions aimed to address global challenges are discussed.

Willingness to sacrifice among convicted Islamist terrorists versus violent gang members and other criminals

Is terrorism just another form of criminal activity, as many nations' justice systems assume? We offer an initial answer using face-to-face interviews and structured surveys in thirty-five Spanish prisons. Recent theories of extreme sacrifice inform this direct observational and comparative study. Islamist terrorists display levels of self-sacrifice for their primary reference group similar to that of Latino gangs, but greater willingness to sacrifice for primary values than other inmates (non-radical Muslims, Latino gangs, and delinquent bands). This disposition is motivated by stronger perceived injustice, discrimination, and a visceral commitment to such values (risk/radicalization factors). Nevertheless, state authorities, prison staff, and families are (protective/de-radicalization) factors apt to reduce willingness to sacrifice and keep foreign fighters, now being released in large numbers, from returning to terrorism.

Cognitive-affective drivers of fixation in threat assessment

Pathological fixation - preoccupation with a person or a cause that is accompanied by deterioration in social and occupational functioning - has been found to precede most cases of targeted violence. It is clinically observed and theorized to have three different cognitive-affective drivers: delusion, obsession, or extreme overvalued belief. Each driver is explained, and case examples are provided in the context of threat assessment. Extreme overvalued belief as a new concept is discussed in detail, both its historical provenance and its demarcation from delusions and obsessions. Threat management for each separate cognitive-affective driver is briefly summarized, based upon current clinical findings and research. Emphasis is placed upon understanding both the categorical and dimensional nature (intensity) of these cognitive-affective drivers, and suggested guidelines are offered for the assessment of such in a clinical examination by a forensic psychiatrist or psychologist.

Why People Enter and Embrace Violent Groups

We distinguish two pathways people may follow when they join violent groups: compliance and internalization. Compliance occurs when individuals are coerced to join by powerful influence agents. Internalization occurs when individuals join due to a perceived convergence between the self and the group. We searched for evidence of each of these pathways in field investigations of former members of two renowned terrorist organizations: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (Study 1) and Islamist radical groups (Study 2). Results indicated that ex-fighters joined LTTE for reasons associated with both compliance and internalization but that ex-fighters joined Islamist radical groups primarily for reasons associated with internalization. When compliance occurred, it often took the form of coercion within LTTE but involved charismatic persuasion agents within Islamist groups. This evidence of systematic differences in the reasons why fighters enter violent groups suggests that strategies for preventing radicalization and fostering de-radicalization should be tailored to particular groups.

The fiqh of disaster: The mitigation of Covid-19 in the perspective of Islamic education-neuroscience

Fikih Kebencanaan (Coping with Disaster) is a product of Muhammadiyah's ijtihad to respond to contemporary problems, especially geological and non-geological disasters, which later become the normative foundation for the mitigation of health disasters such as the Covid-19 pandemic. The paradigm of the present research is a transdisciplinary qualitative type with a phenomenological approach. The research analyzed the reasoning of Fikih Kebencanaan and its actualization in Covid-19 mitigation, the medical health movement and the reconstruction of fiqh of worship during an emergency in particular, and how to deal with the disaster theologically in general. The results showed that the reasoning of Fikih Kebencanaan was expanded in terms of medical, theological, and educational movements. Medical movement is a health movement in the form of providing 74 Covid-19 Standby Hospitals capable of accommodating 3917 patients or 36.15% of the total number of cases in Indonesia, followed by the distribution of masks, gloves, and foods to 401,209 Covid-19 affected victims. The theological movement was in the form of religious provision in which Muhammadiyah attempted to reconstruct classical Islamic jurisprudence of the rule of worship to adapt to an emergency. In contrast, the Indonesian Council of Ulema (MUI) applied zoning. The educative movement was a preventive effort to counter narration stemming from micro-celebrity Da'i (Islamic preacher) & Influencers (religious preachers) tried to circumvent religious provisions with their viral statements on social media. This effort was realized by developing neuroscience Islamic education with learning media in visualization that combined modern comics and contemporary cartoons with cinematic narratives. The neuroscience Islamic education movement tried not to use the dogmatic-monolithic approach as in classical education.

EEG distinguishes heroic narratives in ISIS online video propaganda

The Islamic State (ISIS) was uniquely effective among extremist groups in the Middle East at recruiting Westerners. A major way ISIS accomplished this was by adopting Hollywood-style narrative structures for their propaganda videos. In particular, ISIS utilized a heroic martyr narrative, which focuses on an individual’s personal glory and empowerment, in addition to traditional social martyr narratives, which emphasize duty to kindred and religion. The current work presented adult participants (n = 238) video clips from ISIS propaganda which utilized either heroic or social martyr narratives and collected behavioral measures of appeal, narrative transportation, and psychological dispositions (egoism and empathy) associated with attraction to terrorism. Narrative transportation and the interaction between egoism and empathy predicted video recruitment appeal. A subset of adults (n = 80) underwent electroencephalographic (EEG) measurements while watching a subset of the video-clips. Complementary univariate and multivariate techniques characterized spectral power density differences when perceiving the different types of narratives. Heroic videos show increased beta power over frontal sites, and globally increased alpha. In contrast, social narratives showed greater frontal theta, an index of negative feedback and emotion regulation. The results provide strong evidence that ISIS heroic narratives are specifically processed, and appeal to psychological predispositions distinctly from other recruitment narratives.

Psychology of Transnational Terrorism and Extreme Political Conflict

Fear of transnational terrorism, along with a revitalization of sectarian nationalism, is sundering social and political consensus across the world. Can psychology help? The focus of this review is on the psychological and related social factors that instigate and sustain violent extremism and polarizing group conflict. I first describe the changing global landscape of transnational terrorism, encompassing mainly violent Islamist revivalism and resurgent racial and ethnic supremacism. Next, I explore the psychosocial nature of the devoted actor and rational actor frameworks, focusing on how sacred values, identity fusion, and social network dynamics motivate and maintain extreme violence. The psychology of the will to fight and die is illustrated in behavioral and brain studies with frontline combatants in Iraq, militant supporters in Morocco, and radicalizing populations in Spain. This is followed by a consideration of how to deal with value-driven conflicts and a discussion of how the Internet and social media encourage the propagation of polarized conflict.

Measures of devotion to ISIS and other fighting and radicalized groups

The aim and effect of transnational terrorism today - stemming from both Islamic revivalism and ethno-nationalist resurgence - are to fragment social consensus by forcing people into opposing camps, with no room for innocents. Governments and peoples wrestle with why this is happening and what to do. At issue here: Can social science, specifically psychology, be helpful? A partial answer focuses on recent contributions from behavioral and brain studies into how 'devoted actors', committed to non-negotiable 'sacred values' and the groups those values are embedded in, resort to extreme violence and resist rational-actor approaches to conflict resolution when opposing values are involved. Alternatives approaches emphasize reckoning with sacred values rather than disregarding them, and social counter-engagement instead of reliance on socially disembodied counter-narratives.

Ventromedial and dorsolateral prefrontal interactions underlie will to fight and die for a cause

Willingness to fight and die (WFD) has been developed as a measure to capture willingness to incur costly sacrifices for the sake of a greater cause in the context of entrenched conflict. WFD measures have been repeatedly used in field studies, including studies on the battlefield, although their neurofunctional correlates remain unexplored. Our aim was to identify the neural underpinnings of WFD, focusing on neural activity and interconnectivity of brain areas previously associated with value-based decision-making, such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). A sample of Pakistani participants supporting the Kashmiri cause was selected and invited to participate in an functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) paradigm where they were asked to convey their WFD for a series of values related to Islam and current politics. As predicted, higher compared to lower WFD was associated with increased ventromedial prefrontal activity and decreased dorsolateral activity, as well as lower connectivity between the vmPFC and the dlPFC. Our findings suggest that WFD more prominently relies on brain areas typically associated with subjective value (vmPFC) rather than integration of material costs (dlPFC) during decision-making, supporting the notion that decisions on costly sacrifices may not be mediated by cost-benefit computation.

Neuroimaging 'will to fight' for sacred values: an empirical case study with supporters of an Al Qaeda associate

Violent intergroup conflicts are often motivated by commitments to abstract ideals such as god or nation, so-called 'sacred' values that are insensitive to material trade-offs. There is scant knowledge of how the brain processes costly sacrifices for such cherished causes. We studied willingness to fight and die for sacred values using fMRI in Barcelona, Spain, among supporters of a radical Islamist group. We measured brain activity in radicalized individuals as they indicated their willingness to fight and die for sacred and non-sacred values, and as they reacted to peers' ratings for the same values. We observed diminished activity in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), inferior frontal gyrus, and parietal cortex while conveying willingness to fight and die for sacred relative to non-sacred values-regions that have previously been implicated in calculating costs and consequences. An overlapping region of the dlPFC was active when viewing conflicting ratings of sacred values from peers, to the extent participants were sensitive to peer influence, suggesting that it is possible to induce flexibility in the way people defend sacred values. Our results cohere with a view that 'devoted actors' motivated by an extreme commitment towards sacred values rely on distinctive neurocognitve processes that can be identified.