The majority of Canadians likely behaved as myopic rationalists rather than success-based learners when deciding on their first dose of COVID-19 vaccine

Introduction

Successful vaccine promotion communication strategies require knowing how eligible recipients will respond to the opportunity to get vaccinated. Two main classes of recipients are myopic rationalists, those who receive a dose of vaccine only if it maximizes their own instant benefit and if so, do it as soon as possible, and success-based learners, those who learn from others that they perceive to be most successful.

Methods

A recent study models these two decision-making types, and estimates the population proportion of myopic rationalists in each U.S. state. In this report, we fit a similar model to data on COVID-19 vaccine uptake across the Canadian provinces and territories.

Results

We estimated that 64% of Canadians behaved as myopic rationalists in taking the first dose of a COVID-19 vaccine, compared to an estimated 47% in the United States. Among the provinces, the lowest proportion of myopic rationalists was 0.51 in Saskatchewan, while the highest was 0.74 in Prince Edward Island. The correlation analysis suggested a positive correlation between the proportion of myopic rationalists and the average age across the Canadian provinces (Pearson-r = 0.71).

Discussion

Canadian health management may benefit from these results in tailoring the vaccine promotion communication strategies.

Linking Spontaneous Behavioral Changes to Disease Transmission Dynamics: Behavior Change Includes Periodic Oscillation

Behavior change significantly influences the transmission of diseases during outbreaks. To incorporate spontaneous preventive measures, we propose a model that integrates behavior change with disease transmission. The model represents behavior change through an imitation process, wherein players exclusively adopt the behavior associated with higher payoff. We find that relying solely on spontaneous behavior change is insufficient for eradicating the disease. The dynamics of behavior change are contingent on the basic reproduction number R a corresponding to the scenario where all players adopt non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs). WhenR a < 1 , partial adherence to NPIs remains consistently feasible. We can ensure that the disease stays at a low level or maintains minor fluctuations around a lower value by increasing sensitivity to perceived infection. In cases where oscillations occur, a further reduction in the maximum prevalence of infection over a cycle can be achieved by increasing the rate of behavior change. WhenR a > 1 , almost all players consistently adopt NPIs if they are highly sensitive to perceived infection. Further consideration of saturated recovery leads to saddle-node homoclinic and Bogdanov-Takens bifurcations, emphasizing the adverse impact of limited medical resources on controlling the scale of infection. Finally, we parameterize our model with COVID-19 data and Tokyo subway ridership, enabling us to illustrate the disease spread co-evolving with behavior change dynamics. We further demonstrate that an increase in sensitivity to perceived infection can accelerate the peak time and reduce the peak size of infection prevalence in the initial wave.

Coevolution of vaccination behavior and perceived vaccination risk can lead to a stag-hunt-like game

Voluntary vaccination is effective to prevent infectious diseases from spreading. Both vaccination behavior and cognition of the vaccination risk play important roles in individual vaccination decision making. However, it is not clear how the coevolution of the two shapes population-wide vaccination behavior. We establish a coupled dynamics of epidemic, vaccination behavior, and perceived vaccination risk with three different time scales. We assume that the increase of vaccination level inhibits the rise of perceived vaccination risk, and the increase of perceived vaccination risk inhibits the rise of vaccination level. It is shown that the resulting vaccination behavior is similar to the stag-hunt game, provided that the basic reproductive ratio is moderate and that the epidemic dynamics evolves sufficiently fast. This is in contrast with the previous view that vaccination is a snowdriftlike game. And we find that epidemic breaks out repeatedly and eventually leads to vaccine scares if these three dynamics evolve on a similar time scale. Furthermore, we propose some ways to promote vaccination behavior, such as controlling side-effect bias and perceived vaccination costs. Our work sheds light on epidemic control via vaccination by taking into account the coevolutionary dynamics of cognition and behavior.

Investigating the efficiency of dynamic vaccination by consolidating detecting errors and vaccine efficacy

Vaccination, if available, is the best preventive measure against infectious diseases. It is, however, needed to prudently design vaccination strategies to successfully mitigate the disease spreading, especially in a time when vaccine scarcity is inevitable. Here we investigate a vaccination strategy on a scale-free network where susceptible individuals, who have social connections with infected people, are being detected and given vaccination before having any physical contact with the infected one. Nevertheless, detecting susceptible (also infected ones) may not be perfect due to the lack of information. Also, vaccines do not confer perfect immunity in reality. We incorporate these pragmatic hindrances in our analysis. We find that if vaccines are highly efficacious, and the detecting error is low, then it is possible to confine the disease spreading—by administering a less amount of vaccination—within a short period. In a situation where tracing susceptible seems difficult, then expanding the range for vaccination targets can be socially advantageous only if vaccines are effective enough. Our analysis further reveals that a more frequent screening for vaccination can reduce the effect of detecting errors. In the end, we present a link percolation-based analytic method to approximate the results of our simulation.

Effects of void nodes on epidemic spreads in networks

We present the pair approximation models for susceptible–infected–recovered (SIR) epidemic dynamics in a sparse network based on a regular network. Two processes are considered, namely, a Markovian process with a constant recovery rate and a non-Markovian process with a fixed recovery time. We derive the implicit analytical expression for the final epidemic size and explicitly show the epidemic threshold in both Markovian and non-Markovian processes. As the connection rate decreases from the original network connection, the epidemic threshold in which epidemic phase transits from disease-free to endemic increases, and the final epidemic size decreases. Additionally, for comparison with sparse and heterogeneous networks, the pair approximation models were applied to a heterogeneous network with a degree distribution. The obtained phase diagram reveals that, upon increasing the degree of the original random regular networks and decreasing the effective connections by introducing void nodes accordingly, the final epidemic size of the sparse network is close to that of the random network with average degree of 4. Thus, introducing the void nodes in the network leads to more heterogeneous network and reduces the final epidemic size.

Imitation and aspiration dynamics bring different evolutionary outcomes in feedback-evolving games

Feedback-evolving games characterize the interplay between the evolution of strategies and environments. Rich dynamics have been derived for such games under the premise of the replicator equation, which unveils persistent oscillations between cooperation and defection. Besides replicator dynamics, here we have employed aspiration dynamics, in which individuals, instead of comparing payoffs with opposite strategies, assess their payoffs by self-evaluation to update strategies. We start with a brief review of feedback-evolving games with replicator dynamics and then comprehensively discuss such games with aspiration dynamics. Interestingly, the tenacious cycles, as perceived in replicator dynamics, cannot be observed in aspiration dynamics. Our analysis reveals that a parameter θ —which depicts the strength of cooperation in enhancing the environment—plays a pivotal role in comprehending the dynamics. In particular, with the symmetric aspiration level, if replete and depleted states, respectively, experience Prisoner's Dilemma and Trivial games, the rich environment is achievable only when θ  > 1. The case θ  < 1 never allows us to reach the replete state, even with a higher cooperation level. Furthermore, if cooperators aspire less than defectors, then the enhanced state can be achieved with a relatively lower θ value compared with the opposite scenario because too much expectation from cooperation can be less beneficial.

When face masks signal social identity: Explaining the deep face-mask divide during the COVID-19 pandemic

With the COVID-19 pandemic still raging and the vaccination program still rolling out, there continues to be an immediate need for public health officials to better understand the mechanisms behind the deep and perpetual divide over face masks in America. Using a random sample of Americans (N = 615), following a pre-registered experimental design and analysis plan, we first demonstrated that mask wearers were not innately more cooperative as individuals than non-mask wearers in the Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) game when information about their own and the other person's mask usage was not salient. However, we found strong evidence of in-group favouritism among both mask and non-mask wearers when information about the other partner's mask usage was known. Non-mask wearers were 23 percentage points less likely to cooperate than mask wearers when facing a mask-wearing partner, and 26 percentage points more likely to cooperate than mask wearers when facing a non-mask-wearing partner. Our analysis suggests social identity effects as the primary reason behind people's decision whether to wear face masks during the pandemic.

Free ticket, discount ticket or intermediate of the best of two worlds - Which subsidy policy is socially optimal to suppress the disease spreading?

With the aid of the evolutionary vaccination game on a scale-free network, we design a new subsidy policy, named degree dependent subsidy, where cooperative agents get incentives according to their connectivity or degree. That is, agents, having a greater degree, receive a higher incentive, and vice versa. Here we presume that vaccinators are cooperative agents. The new scheme can be said to an intermediate policy between two previously studies policies, namely free ticket and flat discount policies. The former policy distributes free tickets to cooperative hub agents as a priority, whereas the latter dispenses a fixed discount to every cooperator. We compare the efficiency of each policy in terms of having a less infectious state with a minimum social cost. While investigating the performance of the three policies in terms of average social payoff-which takes into account the cost of vaccination as well as infection-the free ticket scheme is found to be the most appealing policies among the three when the budget for subsidy is quite low. The degree dependent subsidy policy outperforms others for a moderate budget size, while the flat discount policy requires a higher budget to effectively suppress the disease. We further estimate threshold levels of the subsidy budget for each policy beyond which subsidizing results in excessive use of vaccination. As a whole, concerning vaccination coverage and final epidemic size, the degree-dependent subsidy scheme outperforms the flat discount scheme, but is dominated by the free ticket policy.

An epidemiological model with voluntary quarantine strategies governed by evolutionary game dynamics

During pandemic events, strategies such as social distancing can be fundamental to reduce simultaneous infections and mitigate the disease spreading, which is very relevant to the risk of a healthcare system collapse. Although these strategies can be recommended, or even imposed, their actual implementation may depend on the population perception of the risks associated with a potential infection. The current COVID-19 crisis, for instance, is showing that some individuals are much more prone than others to remain isolated. To better understand these dynamics, we propose an epidemiological SIR model that uses evolutionary game theory for combining in a single process social strategies, individual risk perception, and viral spreading. In particular, we consider a disease spreading through a population, whose agents can choose between self-isolation and a lifestyle careless of any epidemic risk. The strategy adoption is individual and depends on the perceived disease risk compared to the quarantine cost. The game payoff governs the strategy adoption, while the epidemic process governs the agent's health state. At the same time, the infection rate depends on the agent's strategy while the perceived disease risk depends on the fraction of infected agents. Our results show recurrent infection waves, which are usually seen in previous historic epidemic scenarios with voluntary quarantine. In particular, such waves re-occur as the population reduces disease awareness. Notably, the risk perception is found to be fundamental for controlling the magnitude of the infection peak, while the final infection size is mainly dictated by the infection rates. Low awareness leads to a single and strong infection peak, while a greater disease risk leads to shorter, although more frequent, peaks. The proposed model spontaneously captures relevant aspects of a pandemic event, highlighting the fundamental role of social strategies.

Oscillatory dynamics in the dilemma of social distancing

Social distancing as one of the main non-pharmaceutical interventions can help slow down the spread of diseases, like in the COVID-19 pandemic. Effective social distancing, unless enforced as drastic lockdowns and mandatory cordon sanitaire, requires consistent strict collective adherence. However, it remains unknown what the determinants for the resultant compliance of social distancing and their impact on disease mitigation are. Here, we incorporate into the epidemiological process with an evolutionary game theory model that governs the evolution of social distancing behaviour. In our model, we assume an individual acts in their best interest and their decisions are driven by adaptive social learning of the real-time risk of infection in comparison with the cost of social distancing. We find interesting oscillatory dynamics of social distancing accompanied with waves of infection. Moreover, the oscillatory dynamics are dampened with a non-trivial dependence on model parameters governing decision-makings and gradually cease when the cumulative infections exceed the herd immunity. Compared to the scenario without social distancing, we quantify the degree to which social distancing mitigates the epidemic and its dependence on individuals’ responsiveness and rationality in their behaviour changes. Our work offers new insights into leveraging human behaviour in support of pandemic response.