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Shen C, He Z, Shi L, Wang Z, Tanimoto J. Prosocial punishment bots breed social punishment in human players. J R Soc Interface 2024; 21:20240019. [PMID: 38471533 PMCID: PMC10932715 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2024.0019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/10/2024] [Accepted: 02/14/2024] [Indexed: 03/14/2024] Open
Abstract
Prosocial punishment, an important factor to stabilize cooperation in social dilemma games, often faces challenges like second-order free-riders-who cooperate but avoid punishing to save costs-and antisocial punishers, who defect and retaliate against cooperators. Addressing these challenges, our study introduces prosocial punishment bots that consistently cooperate and punish free-riders. Our findings reveal that these bots significantly promote the emergence of prosocial punishment among normal players due to their 'sticky effect'-an unwavering commitment to cooperation and punishment that magnetically attracts their opponents to emulate this strategy. Additionally, we observe that the prevalence of prosocial punishment is greatly enhanced when normal players exhibit a tendency to follow a 'copying the majority' strategy, or when bots are strategically placed in high-degree nodes within scale-free networks. Conversely, bots designed for defection or antisocial punishment diminish overall cooperation levels. This stark contrast underscores the critical role of strategic bot design in enhancing cooperative behaviours in human/AI interactions. Our findings open new avenues in evolutionary game theory, demonstrating the potential of human-machine collaboration in solving the conundrum of punishment.
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Affiliation(s)
- Chen Shen
- Faculty of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, 816-8580, Japan
| | - Zhixue He
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, 816-8580, Japan
- School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, People’s Republic of China
| | - Lei Shi
- School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, People’s Republic of China
| | - Zhen Wang
- Center for OPTical IMagery Analysis and Learning (OPTIMAL), Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an 710072, People’s Republic of China
- School of Mechanical Engineering, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an 710072, People’s Republic of China
| | - Jun Tanimoto
- Faculty of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, 816-8580, Japan
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, 816-8580, Japan
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2
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Liu Y, Xing H, Gao Y, Bian X, Fu X, DiFabrizio B, Wang H. Disrupting the Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex Attenuates the Difference in Decision-Making for Altruistic Punishment Between the Gain and Loss Contexts. Brain Topogr 2024:10.1007/s10548-023-01029-9. [PMID: 38200358 DOI: 10.1007/s10548-023-01029-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/14/2023] [Accepted: 12/08/2023] [Indexed: 01/12/2024]
Abstract
Altruistic punishment is a primary response to social norms violations; its neural mechanism has also attracted extensive research attention. In the present studies, we applied a low-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to the bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) while participants engaged in a modified Ultimatum Game (Study 1) and third-party punishment game (Study 2) to explore how the bilateral DLPFC disruption affects people's perception of violation of fairness norms and altruistic punishment decision in the gain and loss contexts. Typically, punishers intervene more often against and show more social outrage towards Dictators/Proposers who unfairly distribute losses than those who unfairly share gains. We found that disrupting the function of the left DLPFC in the second-party punishment and the bilateral DLPFC in the third-party punishment with rTMS effectively obliterated this difference, making participants punish unfairly shared gains as often as they usually would punish unfairly shared losses. In the altruistic punishment of maintaining the social fairness norms, the inhibition of the right DLPFC function will affect the deviation of individual information integration ability; the inhibition of the left DLPFC function will affect the assessment of the degree of violation of fairness norms and weaken impulse control, leading to attenuate the moderating effect of gain and loss contexts on altruistic punishment. Our findings emphasize that DLPFC is closely related to altruistic punishment and provide causal neuroscientific evidence.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yingjie Liu
- School of Public Health, North China University of Science and Technology, 21 Bohai Avenue, Caofeidian District, Tangshan, Hebei, China
- School of Psychology and Mental Health, North China University of Science and Technology, 21 Bohai Avenue, Caofeidian District, Tangshan, Hebei, China
| | - Hongbo Xing
- School of Psychology and Mental Health, North China University of Science and Technology, 21 Bohai Avenue, Caofeidian District, Tangshan, Hebei, China
| | - Yuan Gao
- School of Psychology and Mental Health, North China University of Science and Technology, 21 Bohai Avenue, Caofeidian District, Tangshan, Hebei, China
| | - Xiaohua Bian
- School of Educational Science, International Joint Laboratory of Behavioral and Cognitive Sciences, Zhengzhou Normal University, No.16 Yingcai Street, Huiji District, Zhengzhou, Henan, China
| | - Xin Fu
- School of Psychology and Mental Health, North China University of Science and Technology, 21 Bohai Avenue, Caofeidian District, Tangshan, Hebei, China
| | | | - He Wang
- School of Public Health, North China University of Science and Technology, 21 Bohai Avenue, Caofeidian District, Tangshan, Hebei, China.
- School of Psychology and Mental Health, North China University of Science and Technology, 21 Bohai Avenue, Caofeidian District, Tangshan, Hebei, China.
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3
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Abstract
Reputation and reciprocity are key mechanisms for cooperation in human societies, often going hand in hand to favor prosocial behavior over selfish actions. Here we review recent researches at the interface of physics and evolutionary game theory that explored these two mechanisms. We focus on image scoring as the bearer of reputation, as well as on various types of reciprocity, including direct, indirect, and network reciprocity. We review different definitions of reputation and reciprocity dynamics, and we show how these affect the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. We consider first-order, second-order, as well as higher-order models in well-mixed and structured populations, and we review experimental works that support and inform the results of mathematical modeling and simulations. We also provide a synthesis of the reviewed researches along with an outlook in terms of six directions that seem particularly promising to explore in the future.
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Affiliation(s)
- Chengyi Xia
- School of Artificial Intelligence, Tiangong University, Tianjin 300384, China
| | - Juan Wang
- School of Electrical Engineering and Automation, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, China.
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia; Department of Medical Research, China Medical University Hospital, China Medical University, Taichung 404332, Taiwan; Alma Mater Europaea, Slovenska ulica 17, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia; Complexity Science Hub Vienna, Josefstädterstraße 39, 1080 Vienna, Austria
| | - Zhen Wang
- Center for OPTical IMagery Analysis and Learning (OPTIMAL), Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xian 710072, China.
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4
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Durrheim K, Tredoux C, Theil J, Mlangeni L, Quayle M. Cooperating with the outgroup rather than the ingroup: The effects of status, individual mobility, and group mobility on resource allocation and trust in an interactional game. GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP RELATIONS 2022. [DOI: 10.1177/13684302221128234] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
Abstract
We describe a team game that implements a social dilemma between ingroup cooperation and defection by self-enriching outgroup exchange. We test hypotheses derived from social identity theory about how group status and belief about individual mobility and group mobility affect exchange behavior. We ran 60 experimental team games between rich and poor groups under one of four experiment conditions in a fully crossed design, manipulating the presence or absence of individual mobility and group mobility beliefs. Each game was played over 10 rounds in which participants generated wealth for self or group by allocating tokens to either the ingroup or outgroup bank or to outgroup individuals. We identify 10 exchange strategies via latent class analysis and show how class membership and resulting perceptions of group trust are predicted by the experimental conditions. The results show that rich status and individual mobility promote defecting exchanges with outgroup individuals, and that behavior under individual mobility beliefs weakens ingroup trust. In contrast, intergroup competition of the group mobility condition did not affect ingroup cooperation versus defection or trust.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | | | | | - Mike Quayle
- University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
- Limerick University, Ireland
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5
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dos Santos M, Knoch D. Explaining the evolution of parochial punishment in humans. EVOL HUM BEHAV 2021. [DOI: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2020.10.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
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6
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Abstract
Humans are an ultrasocial species. This sociality, however, cannot be fully explained by the canonical approaches found in evolutionary biology, psychology, or economics. Understanding our unique social psychology requires accounting not only for the breadth and intensity of human cooperation but also for the variation found across societies, over history, and among behavioral domains. Here, we introduce an expanded evolutionary approach that considers how genetic and cultural evolution, and their interaction, may have shaped both the reliably developing features of our minds and the well-documented differences in cultural psychologies around the globe. We review the major evolutionary mechanisms that have been proposed to explain human cooperation, including kinship, reciprocity, reputation, signaling, and punishment; we discuss key culture-gene coevolutionary hypotheses, such as those surrounding self-domestication and norm psychology; and we consider the role of religions and marriage systems. Empirically, we synthesize experimental and observational evidence from studies of children and adults from diverse societies with research among nonhuman primates.
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Affiliation(s)
- Joseph Henrich
- Department of Human Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA;
| | - Michael Muthukrishna
- Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom;
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7
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Abstract
Humans are outstanding in their ability to cooperate with unrelated individuals, and punishment - paying a cost to harm others - is thought to be a key supporting mechanism. According to this view, cooperators punish defectors, who respond by behaving more cooperatively in future interactions. However, a synthesis of the evidence from laboratory and real-world settings casts serious doubts on the assumption that the sole function of punishment is to convert cheating individuals into cooperators. Instead, punishment often prompts retaliation and punishment decisions frequently stem from competitive, rather than deterrent motives. Punishment decisions often reflect the desire to equalise or elevate payoffs relative to targets, rather than the desire to enact revenge for harm received or to deter cheats from reoffending in future. We therefore suggest that punishment also serves a competitive function, where what looks like spiteful behaviour actually allows punishers to equalise or elevate their own payoffs and/or status relative to targets independently of any change in the target's behaviour. Institutions that reduce or remove the possibility that punishers are motivated by relative payoff or status concerns might offer a way to harness these competitive motives and render punishment more effective at restoring cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Nichola J. Raihani
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, 26 Bedford Way, London WC1H 0AP, UK
| | - Redouan Bshary
- Institut de Biologie, Université de Neuchâtel, Rue Emilie-Argand 11, Neuchâtel, CH-2000, Switzerland
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8
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Lo Gerfo E, Gallucci A, Morese R, Vergallito A, Ottone S, Ponzano F, Locatelli G, Bosco F, Romero Lauro LJ. The role of ventromedial prefrontal cortex and temporo-parietal junction in third-party punishment behavior. Neuroimage 2019; 200:501-510. [DOI: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2019.06.047] [Citation(s) in RCA: 23] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/12/2018] [Revised: 05/13/2019] [Accepted: 06/19/2019] [Indexed: 11/29/2022] Open
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9
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Henrich J, Bauer M, Cassar A, Chytilová J, Purzycki BG. War increases religiosity. Nat Hum Behav 2019; 3:129-135. [PMID: 30944450 DOI: 10.1038/s41562-018-0512-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 28] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/07/2018] [Accepted: 12/06/2018] [Indexed: 11/09/2022]
Abstract
Does the experience of war increase people's religiosity? Much evidence supports the idea that particular religious beliefs and ritual forms can galvanize social solidarity and motivate in-group cooperation, thus facilitating a wide range of cooperative behaviours including-but not limited to-peaceful resistance and collective aggression. However, little work has focused on whether violent conflict, in turn, might fuel greater religious participation. Here, we analyse survey data from 1,709 individuals in three post-conflict societies-Uganda, Sierra Leone and Tajikistan. The nature of these conflicts allows us to infer, and statistically verify, that individuals were quasirandomly afflicted with different intensities of war experience-thus potentially providing a natural experiment. We then show that those with greater exposure to these wars were more likely to participate in Christian or Muslim religious groups and rituals, even several years after the conflict. The results are robust to a wide range of control variables and statistical checks and hold even when we compare only individuals from the same communities, ethnic groups and religions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Joseph Henrich
- Department of Human Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA. .,Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
| | - Michal Bauer
- Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic.,CERGE-EI, a joint workplace of Charles University and the Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague, Czech Republic
| | - Alessandra Cassar
- Department of Economics, University of San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, USA
| | - Julie Chytilová
- Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic.,CERGE-EI, a joint workplace of Charles University and the Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague, Czech Republic
| | - Benjamin Grant Purzycki
- Department of Human Behavior, Ecology, and Culture, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany
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10
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Abstract
The study of inequity aversion in animals debuted with a report of the behaviour in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). This report generated many debates following a number of criticisms. Ultimately, however, the finding stimulated widespread interest, and multiple studies have since attempted to demonstrate inequity aversion in various other non-human animal species, with many positive results in addition to many studies in which no response to inequity was found. Domestic dogs represent an interesting case as, unlike many primates, they do not respond negatively to inequity in reward quality but do, however, respond negatively to being unrewarded in the presence of a rewarded partner. Numerous studies have been published on inequity aversion in dogs in recent years. Combining three tasks and seven peer-reviewed publications, over 140 individual dogs have been tested in inequity experiments. Consequently, dogs are one of the best studied species in this field and could offer insights into inequity aversion in other non-human animal species. In this review, we summarise and critically evaluate the current evidence for inequity aversion in dogs. Additionally, we provide a comprehensive discussion of two understudied aspects of inequity aversion, the underlying mechanisms and the ultimate function, drawing on the latest findings on these topics in dogs while also placing these developments in the context of what is known, or thought to be the case, in other non-human animal species. Finally, we highlight gaps in our understanding of inequity aversion in dogs and thereby identify potential avenues for future research in this area.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jim McGetrick
- Comparative Cognition Unit, Messerli Research Institute, University of Veterinary Medicine, Vienna, Medical University of Vienna & University of Vienna, Veterinärplatz 1, 1210, Vienna, Austria.
- Konrad Lorenz Institute of Ethology, University of Veterinary Medicine, Vienna, Savoyenstraße 1a, 1160, Vienna, Austria.
| | - Friederike Range
- Comparative Cognition Unit, Messerli Research Institute, University of Veterinary Medicine, Vienna, Medical University of Vienna & University of Vienna, Veterinärplatz 1, 1210, Vienna, Austria
- Konrad Lorenz Institute of Ethology, University of Veterinary Medicine, Vienna, Savoyenstraße 1a, 1160, Vienna, Austria
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11
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Schaub M. Threat and parochialism in intergroup relations: lab-in-the-field evidence from rural Georgia. Proc Biol Sci 2018; 284:rspb.2017.1560. [PMID: 29070721 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2017.1560] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/11/2017] [Accepted: 09/26/2017] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Competition between groups is widely considered to foster cooperation within groups. Evidence from laboratory experiments hints at the existence of a proximate mechanism by which humans increase their level of cooperation with their ingroup when faced with an external threat. Further work suggests that ingroup cooperation should go along with aggressive behaviour towards the outgroup, although these theories are at odds with others that see high investments in outgroup relations as important means of stabilizing intergroup relations. Surprisingly, few of these arguments have been tested in the field, and existing studies are also limited by the lack of a direct measure of threat perception and aggressive behaviour. This study presents lab-in-the-field results from a rural context where exposure to an ethnic outgroup varies between villages. This context makes it possible to capture levels of threat perception, aggressive behaviour and cooperation without inducing intergroup competition artificially in the laboratory. All concepts are measured behaviourally. In- and outgroup cooperation was measured with a standard public goods game, and a novel experimental protocol was developed that measures perceived threat and aggressive behaviour: the threat game. The results show that levels of perceived threat, ingroup cooperation and aggressive behaviour are higher in regions more strongly exposed to ethnic outsiders. However, exposed regions also show high levels of outgroup cooperation and a concomitant lack of elevated ingroup bias. This pattern is explained by theorizing that communities show parochial altruism when faced with an ethnic outgroup, but balance aggressive behaviour with cooperative offers to diffuse tensions and to keep open channels of mutually beneficial exchange.
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Affiliation(s)
- Max Schaub
- Carlo F. Dondena Centre for Research on Social Dynamics and Public Policy, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy
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12
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Spoils division rules shape aggression between natural groups. Nat Hum Behav 2018; 2:322-326. [DOI: 10.1038/s41562-018-0338-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 22] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/26/2017] [Accepted: 03/16/2018] [Indexed: 01/27/2023]
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13
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Kurschilgen M, Morell A, Weisel O. Internal conflict, market uniformity, and transparency in price competition between teams. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION 2017; 144:121-132. [PMID: 29180831 PMCID: PMC5701742 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.009] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/07/2023]
Abstract
The way profits are divided within successful teams imposes different degrees of internal conflict. We experimentally examine how the level of internal conflict, and whether such conflict is transparent to other teams, affects teams' ability to compete vis-à-vis each other, and, consequently, market outcomes. Participants took part in a repeated Bertrand duopoly game between three-player teams which had either the same or different level of internal conflict (uniform vs. mixed). Profit division was either private-pay (high conflict; each member received her own asking price) or equal-pay (low conflict; profits were divided equally). We find that internal conflict leads to (tacit) coordination on high prices in uniform private-pay duopolies, but places private-pay teams at a competitive disadvantage in mixed duopolies. Competition is softened by transparency in uniform markets, but intensified in mixed markets. We propose an explanation of the results and discuss implications for managers and policy makers. (D43, L22, C92).
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Affiliation(s)
- Michael Kurschilgen
- School of Management, Technical University of Munich
- Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
| | | | - Ori Weisel
- Coller School of Management, Tel Aviv University
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14
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Hobson NM, Gino F, Norton MI, Inzlicht M. When Novel Rituals Lead to Intergroup Bias: Evidence From Economic Games and Neurophysiology. Psychol Sci 2017; 28:733-750. [PMID: 28447877 DOI: 10.1177/0956797617695099] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/31/2022] Open
Abstract
Long-established rituals in preexisting cultural groups have been linked to the cultural evolution of group cooperation. We tested the prediction that novel rituals-arbitrary hand and body gestures enacted in a stereotypical and repeated fashion-can inculcate intergroup bias in newly formed groups. In four experiments, participants practiced novel rituals at home for 1 week (Experiments 1, 2, and 4) or once in the lab (Experiment 3) and were divided into minimal in-groups and out-groups. Our results offer mixed support for the hypothesis that novel rituals promote intergroup bias. Specifically, we found a modest effect for daily repeated rituals but a null effect for rituals enacted only once. These results suggest that novel rituals can inculcate bias, but only when certain features are present: Rituals must be sufficiently elaborate and repeated to lead to bias. Taken together, our results offer modest support that novel rituals can promote intergroup bias.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | | | - Michael Inzlicht
- 1 Psychology Department, University of Toronto.,3 Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto
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15
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Majolo B, Maréchal L. Between-group competition elicits within-group cooperation in children. Sci Rep 2017; 7:43277. [PMID: 28233820 PMCID: PMC5324140 DOI: 10.1038/srep43277] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/04/2016] [Accepted: 01/19/2017] [Indexed: 11/08/2022] Open
Abstract
Aggressive interactions between groups are frequent in human societies and can bear significant fitness costs and benefits (e.g. death or access to resources). During between-group competitive interactions, more cohesive groups (i.e. groups formed by individuals who cooperate in group defence) should out-perform less cohesive groups, other factors being equal (e.g. group size). The cost/benefit of between-group competition are thought to have driven correlated evolution of traits that favour between-group aggression and within-group cooperation (e.g. parochial altruism). Our aim was to analyse whether the proximate relationship between between-group competition and within-group cooperation is found in 3-10 years old children and the developmental trajectory of such a relationship. We used a large cohort of children (n = 120) and tested whether simulated between-group competition increased within-group cooperation (i.e. how much of a resource children were giving to their group companions) in two experiments. We found greater within-group cooperation when groups of four children were competing with other groups then in the control condition (no between-group competition). Within-group cooperation increased with age. Our study suggests that parochial altruism and in-group/out-group biases emerge early during the course of human development.
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Affiliation(s)
- Bonaventura Majolo
- School of Psychology, University of Lincoln, Lincoln LN6 7TS, United Kingdom
| | - Laëtitia Maréchal
- School of Psychology, University of Lincoln, Lincoln LN6 7TS, United Kingdom
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16
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Jordan MR, Jordan JJ, Rand DG. No unique effect of intergroup competition on cooperation: non-competitive thresholds are as effective as competitions between groups for increasing human cooperative behavior. EVOL HUM BEHAV 2017. [DOI: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2016.07.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/21/2022]
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17
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Morese R, Rabellino D, Sambataro F, Perussia F, Valentini MC, Bara BG, Bosco FM. Group Membership Modulates the Neural Circuitry Underlying Third Party Punishment. PLoS One 2016; 11:e0166357. [PMID: 27835675 PMCID: PMC5106004 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0166357] [Citation(s) in RCA: 22] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/17/2015] [Accepted: 10/27/2016] [Indexed: 11/26/2022] Open
Abstract
This research aims to explore the neural correlates involved in altruistic punishment, parochial altruism and anti-social punishment, using the Third-Party Punishment (TPP) game. In particular, this study considered these punishment behaviors in in-group vs. out-group game settings, to compare how people behave with members of their own national group and with members of another national group. The results showed that participants act altruistically to protect in-group members. This study indicates that norm violation in in-group (but not in out-group) settings results in increased activity in the medial prefrontal cortex and temporo-parietal junction, brain regions involved in the mentalizing network, as the third-party attempts to understand or justify in-group members' behavior. Finally, exploratory analysis during anti-social punishment behavior showed brain activation recruitment of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, an area associated with altered regulation of emotions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Rosalba Morese
- Department of Psychology, Center for Cognitive Science, University of Turin, Turin, Italy
- Faculty of Communication Sciences, Università della Svizzera Italiana, Lugano, Switzerland
| | - Daniela Rabellino
- Department of Psychiatry, Schulich School of Medicine and Dentistry, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada
| | - Fabio Sambataro
- Department of Experimental and Clinical Medical Sciences (DISM), University of Udine, Udine, Italy
| | - Felice Perussia
- Department of Psychology, Center for Cognitive Science, University of Turin, Turin, Italy
| | - Maria Consuelo Valentini
- Department of Neuroradiology, Hospital-Città della Salute e della Scienza di Torino, Turin, Italy
| | - Bruno G. Bara
- Department of Psychology, Center for Cognitive Science, University of Turin, Turin, Italy
- Neuroscience Institute of Turin, University of Turin, Turin, Italy
| | - Francesca M. Bosco
- Department of Psychology, Center for Cognitive Science, University of Turin, Turin, Italy
- Neuroscience Institute of Turin, University of Turin, Turin, Italy
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18
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Rabellino D, Morese R, Ciaramidaro A, Bara BG, Bosco FM. Third-party punishment: altruistic and anti-social behaviours in in-group and out-group settings. JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 2016. [DOI: 10.1080/20445911.2016.1138961] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/22/2022]
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19
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Rusch H. The two sides of warfare: an extended model of altruistic behavior in ancestral human intergroup conflict. HUMAN NATURE-AN INTERDISCIPLINARY BIOSOCIAL PERSPECTIVE 2015; 25:359-77. [PMID: 24928285 DOI: 10.1007/s12110-014-9199-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 36] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/06/2023]
Abstract
Building on and partially refining previous theoretical work, this paper presents an extended simulation model of ancestral warfare. This model (1) disentangles attack and defense, (2) tries to differentiate more strictly between selfish and altruistic efforts during war, (3) incorporates risk aversion and deterrence, and (4) pays special attention to the role of brutality. Modeling refinements and simulation results yield a differentiated picture of possible evolutionary dynamics. The main observations are: (a) Altruism in this model is more likely to evolve for defenses than for attacks. (b) Risk aversion, deterrence, and the interplay of migration levels and brutality can change evolutionary dynamics substantially. (c) Unexpectedly, one occasional simulation outcome is a dynamically stable state of "tolerated intergroup theft," raising the question as to whether corresponding patterns also exist in real intergroup conflicts. Finally, possible implications for theories of the coevolution of bellicosity and altruism in humans are discussed.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hannes Rusch
- Behavioral and Institutional Economics, JLU Giessen, Licher Strasse 66, 35394, Giessen, Germany,
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20
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Rusch H, Leunissen JM, van Vugt M. Historical and experimental evidence of sexual selection for war heroism. EVOL HUM BEHAV 2015. [DOI: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.02.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 32] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
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Rusch H. The evolutionary interplay of intergroup conflict and altruism in humans: a review of parochial altruism theory and prospects for its extension. Proc Biol Sci 2015; 281:20141539. [PMID: 25253457 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2014.1539] [Citation(s) in RCA: 62] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Drawing on an idea proposed by Darwin, it has recently been hypothesized that violent intergroup conflict might have played a substantial role in the evolution of human cooperativeness and altruism. The central notion of this argument, dubbed 'parochial altruism', is that the two genetic or cultural traits, aggressiveness against the out-groups and cooperativeness towards the in-group, including self-sacrificial altruistic behaviour, might have coevolved in humans. This review assesses the explanatory power of current theories of 'parochial altruism'. After a brief synopsis of the existing literature, two pitfalls in the interpretation of the most widely used models are discussed: potential direct benefits and high relatedness between group members implicitly induced by assumptions about conflict structure and frequency. Then, a number of simplifying assumptions made in the construction of these models are pointed out which currently limit their explanatory power. Next, relevant empirical evidence from several disciplines which could guide future theoretical extensions is reviewed. Finally, selected alternative accounts of evolutionary links between intergroup conflict and intragroup cooperation are briefly discussed which could be integrated with parochial altruism in the future.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hannes Rusch
- Behavioural and Institutional Economics, JLU Giessen, Giessen, Germany Philosophy of Biology, JLU Giessen, Giessen, Germany Peter Löscher Chair of Business Ethics, TU München, Arcisstrasse 21, Munich 80333, Germany
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Abstract
AbstractWe develop a cultural evolutionary theory of the origins of prosocial religions and apply it to resolve two puzzles in human psychology and cultural history: (1) the rise of large-scale cooperation among strangers and, simultaneously, (2) the spread of prosocial religions in the last 10–12 millennia. We argue that these two developments were importantly linked and mutually energizing. We explain how a package of culturally evolved religious beliefs and practices characterized by increasingly potent, moralizing, supernatural agents, credible displays of faith, and other psychologically active elements conducive to social solidarity promoted high fertility rates and large-scale cooperation with co-religionists, often contributing to success in intergroup competition and conflict. In turn, prosocial religious beliefs and practices spread and aggregated as these successful groups expanded, or were copied by less successful groups. This synthesis is grounded in the idea that although religious beliefs and practices originally arose as nonadaptive by-products of innate cognitive functions, particular cultural variants were then selected for their prosocial effects in a long-term, cultural evolutionary process. This framework (1) reconciles key aspects of the adaptationist and by-product approaches to the origins of religion, (2) explains a variety of empirical observations that have not received adequate attention, and (3) generates novel predictions. Converging lines of evidence drawn from diverse disciplines provide empirical support while at the same time encouraging new research directions and opening up new questions for exploration and debate.
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Briffa M. What determines the duration of war? Insights from assessment strategies in animal contests. PLoS One 2014; 9:e108491. [PMID: 25247403 PMCID: PMC4172633 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0108491] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/11/2014] [Accepted: 08/28/2014] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Interstate wars and animal contests both involve disputed resources, restraint and giving up decisions. In both cases it seems illogical for the weaker side to persist in the conflict if it will eventually lose. In the case of animal contests analyses of the links between opponent power and contest duration have provided insights into what sources of information are available to fighting animals. I outline the theory of information use during animal contests and describe a statistical framework that has been used to distinguish between two strategies that individuals use to decide whether to persist or quit. I then apply this framework to the analysis of interstate wars. War duration increases with the power of winners and losers. These patterns provide no support for the idea that wars are settled on the basis of mutual assessment of capabilities but indicate that settlement is based on attrition. In contrast to most animal contests, war duration is as closely linked to the power of the winning side as to that of the losing side. Overall, this analysis highlights a number of similarities between animal contests and interstate war, indicating that both could be investigated using similar conceptual frameworks.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mark Briffa
- School of Marine Science & Engineering, Plymouth University, Plymouth, United Kingdom
- * E-mail:
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Diekhof EK, Wittmer S, Reimers L. Does competition really bring out the worst? Testosterone, social distance and inter-male competition shape parochial altruism in human males. PLoS One 2014; 9:e98977. [PMID: 25075516 PMCID: PMC4116333 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0098977] [Citation(s) in RCA: 34] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/10/2013] [Accepted: 05/08/2014] [Indexed: 01/21/2023] Open
Abstract
Parochial altruism, defined as increased ingroup favoritism and heightened outgroup hostility, is a widespread feature of human societies that affects altruistic cooperation and punishment behavior, particularly in intergroup conflicts. Humans tend to protect fellow group members and fight against outsiders, even at substantial costs for themselves. Testosterone modulates responses to competition and social threat, but its exact role in the context of parochial altruism remains controversial. Here, we investigated how testosterone influences altruistic punishment tendencies in the presence of an intergroup competition. Fifty male soccer fans played an ultimatum game (UG), in which they faced anonymous proposers that could either be a fan of the same soccer team (ingroup) or were fans of other teams (outgroups) that differed in the degree of social distance and enmity to the ingroup. The UG was played in two contexts with varying degrees of intergroup rivalry. Our data show that unfair offers were rejected more frequently than fair proposals and the frequency of altruistic punishment increased with increasing social distance to the outgroups. Adding an intergroup competition led to a further escalation of outgroup hostility and reduced punishment of unfair ingroup members. High testosterone levels were associated with a relatively increased ingroup favoritism and also a change towards enhanced outgroup hostility in the intergroup competition. High testosterone concentrations further predicted increased proposer generosity in interactions with the ingroup. Altogether, a significant relation between testosterone and parochial altruism could be demonstrated, but only in the presence of an intergroup competition. In human males, testosterone may promote group coherence in the face of external threat, even against the urge to selfishly maximize personal reward. In that way, our observation refutes the view that testosterone generally promotes antisocial behaviors and aggressive responses, but underlines its rather specific role in the fine-tuning of male social cognition.
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Affiliation(s)
- Esther Kristina Diekhof
- University of Hamburg, Biocenter Grindel and Zoological Museum, Institute for Human Biology, Neuroendocrinology Unit, Hamburg, Germany
- * E-mail:
| | - Susanne Wittmer
- University of Hamburg, Biocenter Grindel and Zoological Museum, Institute for Human Biology, Neuroendocrinology Unit, Hamburg, Germany
| | - Luise Reimers
- University of Hamburg, Biocenter Grindel and Zoological Museum, Institute for Human Biology, Neuroendocrinology Unit, Hamburg, Germany
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25
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Intergroup conflict, ostracism, and the evolution of cooperation under free migration. Behav Ecol Sociobiol 2014. [DOI: 10.1007/s00265-014-1741-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/25/2022]
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Gavrilets S, Fortunato L. A solution to the collective action problem in between-group conflict with within-group inequality. Nat Commun 2014; 5:3526. [PMID: 24667443 PMCID: PMC3974216 DOI: 10.1038/ncomms4526] [Citation(s) in RCA: 109] [Impact Index Per Article: 10.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/12/2013] [Accepted: 02/27/2014] [Indexed: 12/03/2022] Open
Abstract
Conflict with conspecifics from neighbouring groups over territory, mating opportunities and other resources is observed in many social organisms, including humans. Here we investigate the evolutionary origins of social instincts, as shaped by selection resulting from between-group conflict in the presence of a collective action problem. We focus on the effects of the differences between individuals on the evolutionary dynamics. Our theoretical models predict that high-rank individuals, who are able to usurp a disproportional share of resources in within-group interactions, will act seemingly altruistically in between-group conflict, expending more effort and often having lower reproductive success than their low-rank group-mates. Similar behaviour is expected for individuals with higher motivation, higher strengths or lower costs, or for individuals in a leadership position. Our theory also provides an evolutionary foundation for classical equity theory, and it has implications for the origin of coercive leadership and for reproductive skew theory.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sergey Gavrilets
- Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Department of Mathematics, National Institute for Mathematical and Biological Synthesis, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tennessee 37996, USA
| | - Laura Fortunato
- Institute of Cognitive and Evolutionary Anthropology, University of Oxford, 64 Banbury Road, Oxford OX2 6PN, UK
- Santa Fe Institute, 1399 Hyde Park Rd, Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501, USA
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Waring TM, Bell AV. Ethnic dominance damages cooperation more than ethnic diversity: results from multi-ethnic field experiments in India. EVOL HUM BEHAV 2013. [DOI: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2013.07.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
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Rand DG, Nowak MA. Human cooperation. Trends Cogn Sci 2013; 17:413-25. [DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2013.06.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 731] [Impact Index Per Article: 66.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/01/2013] [Revised: 06/04/2013] [Accepted: 06/06/2013] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
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Przepiorka W, Diekmann A. Individual heterogeneity and costly punishment: a volunteer's dilemma. Proc Biol Sci 2013; 280:20130247. [PMID: 23536599 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2013.0247] [Citation(s) in RCA: 32] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Social control and the enforcement of social norms glue a society together. It has been shown theoretically and empirically that informal punishment of wrongdoers fosters cooperation in human groups. Most of this research has focused on voluntary and uncoordinated punishment carried out by individual group members. However, as punishment is costly, it is an open question as to why humans engage in the punishment of wrongdoers even in one-time-only encounters. While evolved punitive preferences have been advocated as proximate explanations for such behaviour, the strategic nature of the punishment situation has remained underexplored. It has been suggested to conceive of the punishment situation as a volunteer's dilemma (VOD), where only one individual's action is necessary and sufficient to punish the wrongdoer. Here, we show experimentally that implementing the punishment situation as a VOD sustains cooperation in an environment where punishers and non-punishers coexist. Moreover, we show that punishment-cost heterogeneity allows individuals to tacitly agree on only the strongest group member carrying out the punishment, thereby increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of social norm enforcement. Our results corroborate that costly peer punishment can be explained without assuming punitive preferences and show that centralized sanctioning institutions can emerge from arbitrary individual differences.
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30
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The inter-group comparison-intra-group cooperation hypothesis: comparisons between groups increase efficiency in public goods provision. PLoS One 2013; 8:e56152. [PMID: 23405262 PMCID: PMC3566068 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0056152] [Citation(s) in RCA: 35] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/22/2012] [Accepted: 01/05/2013] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
Identifying methods to increase cooperation and efficiency in public goods provision is of vital interest for human societies. The methods that have been proposed often incur costs that (more than) destroy the efficiency gains through increased cooperation. It has for example been shown that inter-group conflict increases intra-group cooperation, however at the cost of collective efficiency. We propose a new method that makes use of the positive effects associated with inter-group competition but avoids the detrimental (cost) effects of a structural conflict. We show that the mere comparison to another structurally independent group increases both the level of intra-group cooperation and overall efficiency. The advantage of this new method is that it directly transfers the benefits from increased cooperation into increased efficiency. In repeated public goods provision we experimentally manipulated the participants’ level of contribution feedback (intra-group only vs. both intra- and inter-group) as well as the provision environment (smaller groups with higher individual benefits from cooperation vs. larger groups with lower individual benefits from cooperation). Irrespective of the provision environment groups with an inter-group comparison opportunity exhibited a significantly stronger cooperation than groups without this opportunity. Participants conditionally cooperated within their group and additionally acted to advance their group to not fall behind the other group. The individual efforts to advance the own group cushion the downward trend in the above average contributors and thus render contributions on a higher level. We discuss areas of practical application.
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Burton-Chellew MN, West SA. Pseudocompetition among groups increases human cooperation in a public-goods game. Anim Behav 2012. [DOI: 10.1016/j.anbehav.2012.07.019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 36] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
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Abstract
In many social animals, group-mates cooperate to defend their range against intrusion by neighboring groups. Because group size tends to be highly variable, such conflicts are often asymmetric. Although numerical superiority is assumed to provide a competitive advantage, small groups can generally defend their ranges, even when greatly outnumbered. The prevailing explanation for this puzzling phenomenon is that individuals in relatively large groups experience a greater temptation to flee from conflicts, in effect leveling the balance of power. Using playback experiments simulating territorial intrusions by wild capuchin monkey (Cebus capucinus) groups, we show that such a collective action problem does indeed undermine the competitive ability of large groups. Focal capuchins were more likely to run away from territorial intrusions when their group had a numeric advantage; each one-individual increase in relative group size raised the odds of flight by 25%. However, interaction location had a more important impact on individuals' reactions, creating a strong home-field advantage. After controlling for relative group size, the odds that a focal animal fled were 91% lower in experiments that occurred in the center compared with on the edge of its group's range, whereas the odds that it rushed toward the speaker were more than sixfold higher. These location-dependent patterns of defection and cooperation create a competitive advantage for residents over intruders across a wide range of relative group sizes, which may stabilize range boundaries and provide a general explanation for how groups of widely divergent sizes can coexist, even in the face of intense intergroup competition.
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Gneezy A, Fessler DMT. Conflict, sticks and carrots: war increases prosocial punishments and rewards. Proc Biol Sci 2011; 279:219-23. [PMID: 21653590 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2011.0805] [Citation(s) in RCA: 83] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Unlike most species, humans cooperate extensively with group members who are not closely related to them, a pattern sustained in part by punishing non-cooperators and rewarding cooperators. Because internally cooperative groups prevail over less cooperative rival groups, it is thought that violent intergroup conflict played a key role in the evolution of human cooperation. Consequently, it is plausible that propensities to punish and reward will be elevated during intergroup conflict. Using experiments conducted before, during and after the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, we show that, during wartime, people are more willing to pay costs to punish non-cooperative group members and reward cooperative group members. Rather than simply increasing within-group solidarity, violent intergroup conflict thus elicits behaviours that, writ large, enhance cooperation within the group, thereby making victory more likely.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ayelet Gneezy
- Rady School of Management, University of California, San Diego, CA 92093, USA.
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