New Caledonian crows plan for specific future tool use

A sequence bottleneck for animal intelligence and language?

We discuss recent findings suggesting that non-human animals lack memory for stimulus sequences, and therefore do not represent the order of stimuli faithfully. These observations have far-reaching consequences for animal cognition, neuroscience, and studies of the evolution of language and culture. This is because, if non-human animals do not remember or process information about order faithfully, then it is unlikely that non-human animals perform mental simulations, construct mental world models, have episodic memory, or transmit culture faithfully. If this suggested sequence bottleneck proves to be a prevalent characteristic of animal memory systems, as suggested by recent work, it would require a re-examination of some influential concepts and ideas.

Mental time travel in animals: the 'when' of mental time travel

While many aspects of cognition have been shown to be shared between humans and non-human animals, there remains controversy regarding whether the capacity to mentally time travel is a uniquely human one. In this paper, we argue that there are four ways of representing when some event happened: four kinds of temporal representation. Distinguishing these four kinds of temporal representation has five benefits. First, it puts us in a position to determine the particular benefits these distinct temporal representations afford an organism. Second, it provides the conceptual resources to foster a discussion about which of these representations is necessary for an organism to count as having the capacity to mentally time travel. Third, it enables us to distinguish stricter from more liberal views of mental time travel that differ regarding which kind(s) of temporal representation is taken to be necessary for mental time travel. Fourth, it allows us to determine the benefits of taking a stricter or more liberal view of mental time travel. Finally, it ensures that disagreement about whether some species can mentally time travel is not merely the product of unrecognized disagreement about which temporal representation is necessary for mental time travel. We argue for a more liberal view, on the grounds that it allows us to view mental time travel as an evolutionarily continuous phenomenon and to recognize that differences in the ways that organisms mentally time travel might reflect different temporal representations, or combinations thereof, that they employ. Our ultimate aim, however, is to create a conceptual framework for further discussion regarding what sorts of temporal representations are required for mental time travel.This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

The function of episodic memory in animals

The best-known example of episodic memory in animals came from food-storing birds. One of the beauties of the food-storing system was that inherent in the behaviour were the elements that (at the time) made up episodic memory: what, where and when. While there were then already plenty of data on animals' ability to put together what and where, the addition of the time element in animals' memory and its testing was one that was both new and experimentally challenging. It has, however, led to an increasing variety of examples showing that animals can put together all three informational components. If episodic memories can be described as those memories that make any one of us who we are, why should non-human animals have such memories? Here, we argue that episodic memories play a significant functional role in the lives of real animals, in particular, enabling them to make decisions about how they might or should act in their future. We support our argument with data from a range of examples, focussing on data from the field.This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Is episodic-like memory like episodic memory?

Episodic memory involves the conscious recollection of personally experienced events and when absent, results in profound losses to the typical human conscious experience. Over the last 2.5 decades, the debate surrounding whether episodic memory is unique to humans has seen a lot of controversy and accordingly has received significant research attention. Various behavioural paradigms have been developed to test episodic-like memory; a term designed to reflect the behavioural characteristics of episodic memory in the absence of evidence for consciously experienced recall. In this review, we first outline the most influential paradigms that have been developed to assess episodic-like memory across a variety of non-human taxa (including mammals, birds and cephalopods), namely the what-where-when memory, incidental encoding and unexpected question, and source memory paradigms. Then, we examine whether various key features of human episodic memory are conceptually represented in episodic-like memory across phylogenetically and neurologically diverse taxa, identifying similarities, differences and gaps in the literature. We conclude that the evidence is mixed, and as episodic memory encompasses a variety of cognitive structures and processes, research on episodic-like memory in non-humans should follow this multifaceted approach and assess evidence across various behavioural paradigms that each target different aspects of human episodic memory.This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

[Human intelligence: is the human brain reasonable?]

The human brain is a remarkable organ which, in addition to many vital functions, is also extremely adaptable and capable of learning. As a result, the brain is a highly individual organ that is shaped by culture. This complicates the search for a universally valid reason that must be anchored in the brain.

Planning abilities of wild chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes troglodytes) in tool-using contexts

Planning is a type of problem solving in which a course of future action is devised via mental computation. Potential advantages of planning for tool use include reduced effort to gather tools, closer alignment to an efficient tool design, and increased foraging efficiency. Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes troglodytes) in the Goualougo Triangle use a variety of different types of tools. We hypothesized that procurement strategy (brought to the termite nest, manufactured or acquired at the termite nest, or borrowed from others) reflects planning for current needs, with tool transport behavior varying by tool type and by age and sex class. It is also possible that chimpanzees anticipate the need for tools at future times, which would be evidenced by transporting multiple tool types for a sequential task. One year of video recordings at termite nests were systematically screened for tool procurement; data comprised 299 tool procurement events across 66 chimpanzees. In addition, we screened video recordings of leaf sponging and honey gathering, which resulted in another 38 procurement events. Fishing probes, which are typically used during a single visit, were typically transported to termite nests, while puncturing tools, which are durable and remain on site, were more often acquired at termite nests. Most tools transported in multiples were fishing probes, perhaps in anticipation that a single probe might not last through an entire foraging bout or might be transferred to another chimpanzee. We further documented that chimpanzees transported tool sets, comprising multiple different tool types used in sequence. Mature chimpanzees transported tools more often than did immatures. These observations suggest that chimpanzees plan tool use flexibly, reflecting the availability of raw materials and the likelihood that specific tool types will be needed for particular tasks. Developmental studies and further integration of behavioral, spatial, and archaeological data will help to illuminate the decision making and time depth of planning associated with tool technologies in living primates and hominin ancestors.

Why might animals remember? A functional framework for episodic memory research in comparative psychology

One of Clayton's major contributions to our understanding of animal minds has been her work on episodic-like memory. A central reason for the success of this work was its focus on ecological validity: rather than looking for episodic memory for arbitrary stimuli in artificial contexts, focussing on contexts in which episodic memory would serve a biological function such as food caching. This review aims to deepen this insight by surveying the numerous functions that have been proposed for episodic memory, articulating a philosophically grounded framework for understanding what exactly functions are, and drawing on these to make suggestions for future directions in the comparative cognitive psychology of episodic memory. Our review suggests four key insights. First, episodic memory may have more than one function and may have different functions in different species. Second, cross-disciplinary work is key to developing a functional account of episodic memory. Third, there is scope for further theoretical elaboration of proposals relating episodic memory to food caching and, in particular, future-oriented cognition. Finally, learning-related functions suggested by AI (artificial intelligence)-based models are a fruitful avenue for future behavioural research.

Measuring spontaneous episodic future thinking in children: Challenges and opportunities

The "Spoon task" is a common measure of episodic future thinking (i.e., ability to imagine hypothetical future events) in children. However, by providing items and prompting children to choose one, this task might not require deliberate and goal-driven episodic future thinking. In contrast, "spontaneous" Spoon tasks may better reflect Tulving's original conception as they minimize environmental cues and verbal prompts. We identify challenges in designing such tasks, including removing the scaffolded intention to act and giving children permission and sufficient motivation to act. Drawing on the comparative literature, we propose methods to overcome these obstacles when designing spontaneous Spoon tasks. Furthermore, sampling from the work of Clayton and colleagues, we advocate for a multipronged approach including two or more of the following methods in order to capture spontaneous behavior: naturalistic observation, virtually administered tasks within the child's home, laboratory experiments, and questionnaires. Our review highlights the importance of spontaneous episodic future thinking and establishes a foundation for future methodologies to study this complex cognitive process.

Hooded crows (Corvus cornix) manufacture objects relative to a mental template

It was recently found that not only tool-specialized New Caledonian crows, but also Goffin cockatoos can manufacture physical objects in accordance with a mental template. That is, they can emulate features of existing objects when they manufacture new items. Both species spontaneously ripped pieces of card into large strips if they had previously learned that a large template was rewarded, and small strips when they previously learned that a small template was rewarded. Among New Caledonian crows, this cognitive ability was suggested as a potential mechanism underlying the transmission of natural tool designs. Here, we tested for the same ability in another non-specialised tool user-Hooded crows (Corvus cornix). Crows were exposed to pre-made template objects, varying first in colour and then in size, and were rewarded only if they chose pre-made objects that matched the template. In subsequent tests, birds were given the opportunity to manufacture versions of these objects. All three crows ripped paper pieces from the same colour material as the rewarded template, and, crucially, also manufactured objects that were more similar in size to previously rewarded, than unrewarded, templates, despite the birds being rewarded at random in both tests. Therefore, we found the ability to manufacture physical objects relative to a mental template in yet another bird species not specialized in using or making foraging tools in the wild, but with a high level of brain and cognitive development.

The prefrontal cortex: from monkey to man

The prefrontal cortex is so important to human beings that, if deprived of it, our behaviour is reduced to action-reactions and automatisms, with no ability to make deliberate decisions. Why does the prefrontal cortex hold such importance in humans? In answer, this review draws on the proximity between humans and other primates, which enables us, through comparative anatomical-functional analysis, to understand the cognitive functions we have in common and specify those that distinguish humans from their closest cousins. First, a focus on the lateral region of the prefrontal cortex illustrates the existence of a continuum between rhesus monkeys (the most studied primates in neuroscience) and humans for most of the major cognitive functions in which this region of the brain plays a central role. This continuum involves the presence of elementary mental operations in the rhesus monkey (e.g. working memory or response inhibition) that are constitutive of 'macro-functions' such as planning, problem-solving and even language production. Second, the human prefrontal cortex has developed dramatically compared to that of other primates. This increase seems to concern the most anterior part (the frontopolar cortex). In humans, the development of the most anterior prefrontal cortex is associated with three major and interrelated cognitive changes: (i) a greater working memory capacity, allowing for greater integration of past experiences and prospective futures; (ii) a greater capacity to link discontinuous or distant data, whether temporal or semantic; and (iii) a greater capacity for abstraction, allowing humans to classify knowledge in different ways, to engage in analogical reasoning or to acquire abstract values that give rise to our beliefs and morals. Together, these new skills enable us, among other things, to develop highly sophisticated social interactions based on language, enabling us to conceive beliefs and moral judgements and to conceptualize, create and extend our vision of our environment beyond what we can physically grasp. Finally, a model of the transition of prefrontal functions between humans and non-human primates concludes this review.

Why are ravens smart? Exploring the social intelligence hypothesis

Ravens and other corvids are renowned for their 'intelligence'. For long, this reputation has been based primarily on anecdotes but in the last decades experimental evidence for impressive cognitive skills has accumulated within and across species. While we begin to understand the building blocks of corvid cognition, the question remains why these birds have evolved such skills. Focusing on Northern Ravens Corvus corax, I here try to tackle this question by relating current hypotheses on brain evolution to recent empirical data on challenges faced in the birds' daily life. Results show that foraging ravens meet several assumptions for applying social intelligence: (1) they meet repeatedly at foraging sites, albeit individuals have different site preferences and vary in grouping dynamics; (1) foraging groups are structured by dominance rank hierarchies and social bonds; (3) individual ravens memorize former group members and their relationship valence over years, deduce third-party relationships and use their social knowledge in daily life by supporting others in conflicts and intervening in others' affiliations. Hence, ravens' socio-cognitive skills may be strongly shaped by the 'complex' social environment experienced as non-breeders.

Moving beyond "Spoon" tasks: When do children autocue their episodic future thought?

Much developmental (and comparative) research has used Tulving's Spoon test (i.e., whether an individual will select an item needed to solve a future problem) as the basis for designing tasks to measure episodic future thinking, defined as the capacity to mentally pre-experience the future. There is, however, intense debate about whether these tasks successfully do so. Most notably, it has been argued that children may pass (i.e., select an item with future utility) by drawing on non-episodic, associative processes, rather than on the capacity to represent the future, per se. Although subsequent developmental tasks have sought to address this limitation, we highlight what we argue is a more fundamental shortcoming of Spoon tasks: they prompt future-directed action making it impossible to determine whether children have used their episodic future thinking to guide their behavior. Accordingly, we know little about children's thought about the future that is independently generated (i.e., without prompting), or autocued, and is subsequently reflected (and measurable) by children's actions. We argue that this capacity is a critical, and heretofore overlooked, transition in future-oriented cognition that may not occur until middle childhood. We further hypothesize that it is reliant on children developing richer and more detailed future event representations, along with the necessary cognitive control to transform these representations into actions that serve to benefit their future selves. The time is ripe for researchers to explore this aspect of cognitive development and we suggest several novel approaches to do so. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Cognitive Development.

Wild gibbons plan their travel pattern according to food types of breakfast

Planning for the future is a complex skill that is often considered uniquely human. This cognitive ability has never been investigated in wild gibbons (Hylobatidae). Here we evaluated the movement patterns from sleeping trees to out-of-sight breakfast trees in two groups of endangered skywalker gibbons (Hoolock tianxing). These Asian apes inhabit a cold seasonal montane forest in southwestern China. After controlling for possible confounding variables including group size, sleeping pattern (sleep alone or huddle together), rainfall and temperature, we found that food type (fruits or leaves) of the breakfast tree was the most important factor affecting gibbon movement patterns. Fruit breakfast trees were more distant from sleeping trees compared with leaf trees. Gibbons left sleeping trees and arrived at breakfast trees earlier when they fed on fruits compared with leaves. They travelled fast when breakfast trees were located further away from the sleeping trees. Our study suggests that gibbons had foraging goals in mind and plan their departure times accordingly. This ability may reflect a capacity for route-planning, which would enable them to effectively exploit highly dispersed fruit resources in high-altitude montane forests.

Consciousness, Memory, and the Human Self: Commentary on "Consciousness as a Memory System" by Budson et al (2022)

Philosophical theories have attempted to shed light on the intricate relationships between consciousness and memory since long before this became a major theme in psychology and neuroscience. In the December 2022 issue of Cognitive and Behavioral Neurology , Budson, Richman, and Kensinger (2022) introduced a comprehensive theoretical framework pertaining to the origins of consciousness in relation to the memory system, its implications on our real-time perception of the world, and the neuroanatomical correlates underlying these phenomena. Throughout their paper, Budson et al (2022) focus on their theory's explanatory value regarding several clinical syndromes and experimental findings. In this commentary, we first summarize the theory presented by Budson and colleagues (2022). Then, we suggest a complementary approach of studying the relationships between consciousness and memory through the concept of the human self and its protracted representation through time (so-called mental time travel). Finally, we elaborate on Budson and colleagues' (2022) neuroanatomical explanation to their theory and suggest that adding the concepts of brain networks and cortical gradients may contribute to their theory's interpretability.

Recent developments in parrot cognition: a quadrennial update

Psittacines, along with corvids, are commonly referred to as 'feathered apes' due to their advanced cognitive abilities. Until rather recently, the research effort on parrot cognition was lagging behind that on corvids, however current developments show that the number of parrot studies is steadily increasing. In 2018, M. L. Lambert et al. provided a comprehensive review on the status of the most important work done so far in parrot and corvid cognition. Nevertheless, only a little more than 4 years after this publication, more than 50 new parrot studies have been published, some of them chartering completely new territory. On the 25th anniversary of Animal Cognition we think this warrants a detailed review of parrot cognition research over the last 4 years. We aim to capture recent developments and current trends in this rapidly expanding and diversifying field.

The importance of thinking about the future in culture and cumulative cultural evolution

Thinking about possibilities plays a critical role in the choices humans make throughout their lives. Despite this, the influence of individuals' ability to consider what is possible on culture has been largely overlooked. We propose that the ability to reason about future possibilities or prospective cognition, has consequences for cultural change, possibly facilitating the process of cumulative cultural evolution. In particular, by considering potential future costs and benefits of specific behaviours, prospective cognition may lead to a more flexible use of cultural behaviours. In species with limited planning abilities, this may lead to the development of cultures that promote behaviours with future benefits, circumventing this limitation. Here, we examine these ideas from a comparative perspective, considering the relationship between human and nonhuman assessments of future possibilities and their cultural capacity to invent new solutions and improve them over time. Given the methodological difficulties of assessing prospective cognition across species, we focus on planning, for which we have the most data in other species. Elucidating the role of prospective cognition in culture will help us understand the variability in when and how we see culture expressed, informing ongoing debates, such as that surrounding which social learning mechanisms underlie culture. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'.

Archaeological evidence for thinking about possibilities in hominin evolution

The emergence of the ability to think about future possibilities must have played an influential role in human evolution, driving a range of foresightful behaviours, including preparation, communication and technological innovation. Here we review the archeological evidence for such behavioural indicators of foresight. We find the earliest signs of hominins retaining tools and transporting materials for repeated future use emerging from around 1.8 Ma. From about 0.5 Ma onwards, there are indications of technical and social changes reflecting advances in foresight. And in a third period, starting from around 140 000 years ago, hominins appear to have increasingly relied on material culture to shape the future and to exchange their ideas about possibilities. Visible signs of storytelling, even about entirely fictional scenarios, appear over the last 50 000 years. Although the current evidence suggests that there were distinct transitions in the evolution of our capacity to think about the future, we warn that issues of taphonomy and archaeological sampling are likely to skew our picture of human cognitive evolution. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'.

Waiting for a better possibility: delay of gratification in corvids and its relationship to other cognitive capacities

Self-control, the ability to resist temptation and wait for better but delayed possibilities, is an important cognitive skill that underpins decision-making and planning. The capacity to exert self-control has been linked to intelligence in humans, chimpanzees and most recently cuttlefish. Here, we presented 10 Eurasian jays, Garrulus glandarius, with a delayed maintenance task, which measured the ability to choose a preferred outcome as well as the ability to sustain the delay prior to that outcome. Jays were able to wait for better possibilities, but maximum wait times varied across the subjects. We also presented them with five cognitive tasks that assessed spatial memory, spatial relationships and learning capacity. These tasks are commonly used as measures of general intelligence within an ecological context. Individual performance was correlated across the cognitive tasks, which suggests that there was a general intelligence factor underlying their performance. Performance in these tasks was correlated significantly with the jays' capacity to wait for better possibilities. This study demonstrates that self-control and intelligence are correlated in jays. The fact that this correlation exists in diverse species suggests that self-control is a fundamental feature of cognition. Our results are discussed in the context of convergent evolution.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny’.

The signature-testing approach to mapping biological and artificial intelligences

Making inferences from behaviour to cognition is problematic due to a many-to-one mapping problem, in which any one behaviour can be generated by multiple possible cognitive processes. Attempts to cross this inferential gap when comparing human intelligence to that of animals or machines can generate great debate. Here, we discuss the challenges of making comparisons using 'success-testing' approaches and call attention to an alternate experimental framework, the 'signature-testing' approach. Signature testing places the search for information-processing errors, biases, and other patterns centre stage, rather than focussing predominantly on problem-solving success. We highlight current research on both biological and artificial intelligence that fits within this framework and is creating proactive research programs that make strong inferences about the similarities and differences between the content of human, animal, and machine minds.

Relevance, Impartiality, Welfare and Consent: Principles of an Animal-Centered Research Ethics

The principles of Replacement, Reduction and Refinement (3Rs) were developed to address the ethical dilemma that arises from the use of animals, without their consent, in procedures that may harm them but that are deemed necessary to achieve a greater good. While aiming to protect animals, the 3Rs are underpinned by a process-centered ethical perspective which regards them as instruments in a scientific apparatus. This paper explores the applicability of an animal-centered ethics to animal research, whereby animals would be regarded as autonomous subjects, legitimate stakeholders in and contributors to a research process, with their own interests and capable of consenting and dissenting to their involvement. This perspective derives from the ethical stance taken within the field of Animal-Computer Interaction (ACI), where researchers acknowledge that an animal-centered approach is essential to ensuring the best research outcomes. We propose the ethical principles of relevance, impartiality, welfare and consent, and a scoring system to help researchers and delegated authorities assess the extent to which a research procedure aligns with them. This could help researchers determine when being involved in research is indeed in an animal's best interests, when a procedure could be adjusted to increase its ethical standard or when the use of non-animal methods is more urgently advisable. We argue that the proposed principles should complement the 3Rs within an integrated ethical framework that recognizes animals' autonomy, interests and role, for a more nuanced ethical approach and for supporting the best possible research for the benefit animal partakers and wider society.

No evidence for future planning in Canada jays (Perisoreus canadensis)

In the past 20 years, research in animal cognition has challenged the belief that complex cognitive processes are uniquely human. At the forefront of these challenges has been research on mental time travel and future planning in jays. We tested whether Canada jays (Perisoreus canadensis) demonstrated future planning, using a procedure that has produced evidence of future planning in California scrub-jays. Future planning in this procedure is caching in locations where the bird will predictably experience a lack of food in the future. Canada jays showed no evidence of future planning in this sense and instead cached in the location where food was usually available, opposite to the behaviour described for California scrub-jays. We provide potential explanations for these differing results adding to the recent debates about the role of complex cognition in corvid caching strategies.

"These pretzels are making me thirsty" so I'll have water tomorrow: A partial replication and extension of adults' induced-state episodic foresight

The ability to consider the future under the influence of an induced current state is known as induced-state episodic foresight. One study to date has examined adults' induced episodic foresight and found that adults' (like children's) preferences for the future are related to their current state such that they predicted wanting water (vs. pretzels) in the future when experiencing a current state of thirst [1]. We attempted to replicate these findings in adults. In Study 1, adults (N = 198) in a laboratory selected pretzels for tomorrow at the same rate (around 20%) in an experimental condition (thirst induced) and a control condition (thirst not induced). In a lecture, 32% of adults preferred pretzels for tomorrow without thirst induction (Study 2, N = 63). Partially replicating Kramer et al. [1], we found that a minority of adults preferred pretzels (vs. water) when experiencing a current state of thirst. However, in contrast to their findings, our results showed that when thirst was not induced, a minority of adults also preferred pretzels for tomorrow. Thus, adults' future preference was similar regardless of thirst induction. We also tested thirst as a mechanism for adults' preference for the future and found that across conditions adults' thirst predicted their choice of water (vs. pretzels) for the future. In sum, our results partially replicated Kramer et al. [1] by showing the current state, regardless of thirst induction, predicts adults' choices for the future.

The Ape That Lived to Tell the Tale. The Evolution of the Art of Storytelling and Its Relationship to Mental Time Travel and Theory of Mind

Engaging in the art of creating and telling stories is a defining behaviour of humankind. Humans have been sharing stories with each other, with and without words, since the dawn of recorded history, but the cognitive foundations of the behaviour can be traced deeper into our past. The emergence of stories can be strongly linked to Mental Time Travel (the ability to recall the past and imagine the future) and plays a key role in our ability to communicate past, present and future scenarios with other individuals, within and beyond our lifetimes. Stories are products engraved within the concept of time, constructed to elucidate the past experiences of the self, but designed with the future in mind, thus imparting lessons of such experiences to the receiver. By being privy to the experiences of others, humans can imagine themselves in a similar position to the protagonist of the story, thus mentally learning from an experience they might have never encountered other than in the mind's eye. Evolutionary Psychology investigates how the engagement in artistic endeavours by our ancestors in the Pleistocene granted them an advantage when confronted with obstacles that challenged their survival or reproductive fitness and questions whether art is an adaptation of the human mind or a spandrel of other cognitive adaptations. However, little attention has been placed on the cognitive abilities that might have been imperative for the development of art. Here, we examine the relationship between art, storytelling, Mental Time Travel and Theory of Mind (i.e., the ability to attribute mental states to others). We suggest that Mental Time Travel played a key role in the development of storytelling because through stories, humans can fundamentally transcend their present condition, by being able to imagine different times, separate realities, and place themselves and others anywhere within the time space continuum. We argue that the development of a Theory of Mind also sparked storytelling practises in humans as a method of diffusing the past experiences of the self to others whilst enabling the receiver to dissociate between the past experiences of others and their own, and to understand them as lessons for a possible future. We propose that when artistic products rely on storytelling in form and function, they ought to be considered separate from other forms of art whose appreciation capitalise on our aesthetic preferences.

Episodic-like memory is preserved with age in cuttlefish

Episodic memory, remembering past experiences based on unique what–where–when components, declines during ageing in humans, as does episodic-like memory in non-human mammals. By contrast, semantic memory, remembering learnt knowledge without recalling unique what–where–when features, remains relatively intact with advancing age. The age-related decline in episodic memory likely stems from the deteriorating function of the hippocampus in the brain. Whether episodic memory can deteriorate with age in species that lack a hippocampus is unknown. Cuttlefish are molluscs that lack a hippocampus. We test both semantic-like and episodic-like memory in sub-adults and aged-adults nearing senescence (n = 6 per cohort). In the semantic-like memory task, cuttlefish had to learn that the location of a food resource was dependent on the time of day. Performance, measured as proportion of correct trials, was comparable across age groups. In the episodic-like memory task, cuttlefish had to solve a foraging task by retrieving what–where–when information about a past event with unique spatio-temporal features. In this task, performance was comparable across age groups; however, aged-adults reached the success criterion (8/10 correct choices in consecutive trials) significantly faster than sub-adults. Contrary to other animals, episodic-like memory is preserved in aged cuttlefish, suggesting that memory deterioration is delayed in this species.

Novel neuroanatomical integration and scaling define avian brain shape evolution and development

How do large and unique brains evolve? Historically, comparative neuroanatomical studies have attributed the evolutionary genesis of highly encephalized brains to deviations along, as well as from, conserved scaling relationships among brain regions. However, the relative contributions of these concerted (integrated) and mosaic (modular) processes as drivers of brain evolution remain unclear, especially in non-mammalian groups. While proportional brain sizes have been the predominant metric used to characterize brain morphology to date, we perform a high-density geometric morphometric analysis on the encephalized brains of crown birds (Neornithes or Aves) compared to their stem taxa—the non-avialan coelurosaurian dinosaurs and Archaeopteryx. When analyzed together with developmental neuroanatomical data of model archosaurs (Gallus, Alligator), crown birds exhibit a distinct allometric relationship that dictates their brain evolution and development. Furthermore, analyses by neuroanatomical regions reveal that the acquisition of this derived shape-to-size scaling relationship occurred in a mosaic pattern, where the avian-grade optic lobe and cerebellum evolved first among non-avialan dinosaurs, followed by major changes to the evolutionary and developmental dynamics of cerebrum shape after the origin of Avialae. Notably, the brain of crown birds is a more integrated structure than non-avialan archosaurs, implying that diversification of brain morphologies within Neornithes proceeded in a more coordinated manner, perhaps due to spatial constraints and abbreviated growth period. Collectively, these patterns demonstrate a plurality in evolutionary processes that generate encephalized brains in archosaurs and across vertebrates.

New Caledonian crows plan for specific future tool use

The ability to plan for future events is one of the defining features of human intelligence. Whether non-human animals can plan for specific future situations remains contentious: despite a sustained research effort over the last two decades, there is still no consensus on this question. Here, we show that New Caledonian crows can use tools to plan for specific future events. Crows learned a temporal sequence where they were (a) shown a baited apparatus, (b) 5 min later given a choice of five objects and (c) 10 min later given access to the apparatus. At test, these crows were presented with one of two tool-apparatus combinations. For each combination, the crows chose the right tool for the right future task, while ignoring previously useful tools and a low-value food item. This study establishes that planning for specific future tool use can evolve via convergent evolution, given that corvids and humans shared a common ancestor over 300 million years ago, and offers a route to mapping the planning capacities of animals.