The graded and dichotomous nature of visual awareness

Revealing the Causes of Dyslexia through a Differential Diagnosis, a Short-Term Effective Treatment and an Appropriate Conceptual Framework

Various different impairments and their interactions can cause reading problems referred to as "dyslexia". Since reading requires the interaction of many abilities, the impairment of each of these abilities can result in dyslexia. Therefore, the diagnosis must differentiate various kinds of dyslexia. The diagnosis of a certain kind of dyslexia cannot be delimited to the investigation and description of symptoms but must also include the investigation of the causes of each kind of dyslexia. For this purpose, a scientifically unequivocal concept of causation and appropriate methods are needed to distinguish them from co-existing impairments that have no causal influence on reading performance. The results of applying these methods cannot be adequately accounted for by a non-scientific, intuitive understanding of necessary and sufficient conditions and causation. The methods suitable for revealing the causes of dyslexia are described in detail, and the results of applying these methods in experiments, in which 356 children with developmental dyslexia participated, are reviewed. Since the concepts of "necessary" and "sufficient" conditions and "causation" proposed in the philosophy of science are not suitable for describing causes of dyslexia and their interaction, they are replaced by a more detailed, experimentally based conceptual framework that provides an accurate description of the conditions required for correct reading and the causes of dyslexia.

Physical effort modulates perceptual awareness judgment independent of level of processing

Recent studies have emphasized the association between action and perceptual awareness, suggesting that action-related information can contribute to perceptual awareness. Given that the Level of Processing (LoP) hypothesis proposes that the emergence of awareness depends on the level of stimulus processing, the current study examines whether action impacts perceptual awareness across different processing levels. In Experiment 1, participants identified target stimuli's color (low-level task) or category (high-level task) via mouse clicks, followed by visual awareness ratings. Experiment 2 replicated the tasks using hand-grip dynamometers. Results from Experiment 1 support the LoP theory, showing a more gradual emergence of awareness for low-level features and a more dichotomous emergence for high-level features. In Experiment 2, higher reported visual awareness ratings were observed at greater physical effort, regardless of task type. These results suggest that action-related information influences reported awareness of stimuli in the same way at low- and high-level stimulus processing.

Is auditory awareness graded or dichotomous: Electrophysiological correlates of consciousness at different depths of stimulus processing

The level-of-processing (LoP) hypothesis postulates that transition from unaware to aware visual stimuli is either graded or dichotomous depending on the depth of stimulus processing. Humans can be progressively aware of the low-level features, such as colors or shapes, while the high-level features, such as semantic category, enter consciousness in an all-or none fashion. Unlike in vision, sounds always unfold in time, which might require mechanisms dissimilar from visual processing. We tested the LoP hypothesis in hearing for the first time by presenting participants with words of different categories, spoken in different pitches near the perceptual threshold. We also assessed whether different electrophysiological correlates of consciousness, the auditory awareness negativity (AAN) and late positivity (LP), were associated with LoP. Our findings indicate that LoP also applies to the auditory modality. AAN is an early correlate of awareness independent of LoP, while LP was modulated by awareness, performance accuracy and the level of processing.

Ultrahigh Field fMRI Reveals Different Roles of the Temporal and Frontoparietal Cortices in Subjective Awareness

A central question in consciousness theories is whether one is dealing with a dichotomous ("all-or-none") or a gradual phenomenon. In this 7T fMRI study, we investigated whether dichotomy or gradualness in fact depends on the brain region associated with perceptual awareness reports. Both male and female human subjects performed an emotion discrimination task (fear vs neutral bodies) presented under continuous flash suppression with trial-based perceptual awareness measures. Behaviorally, recognition sensitivity increased linearly with increased stimuli awareness and was at chance level during perceptual unawareness. Physiologically, threat stimuli triggered a slower heart rate than neutral ones during "almost clear" stimulus experience, indicating freezing behavior. Brain results showed that activity in the occipitotemporal, parietal, and frontal regions as well as in the amygdala increased with increased stimulus awareness while early visual areas showed the opposite pattern. The relationship between temporal area activity and perceptual awareness best fitted a gradual model while the activity in frontoparietal areas fitted a dichotomous model. Furthermore, our findings illustrate that specific experimental decisions, such as stimulus type or the approach used to evaluate awareness, play pivotal roles in consciousness studies and warrant careful consideration.

Stimulus awareness is necessary for both instrumental learning and instrumental responding to previously learned stimuli

Instrumental conditioning is a crucial part of adaptive behaviour, allowing agents to selectively interact with stimuli in their environment. Recent evidence suggests that instrumental conditioning cannot proceed without stimulus awareness. However, whether accurate unconscious instrumental responding can emerge from consciously acquired knowledge of the stimulus-action-outcome contingencies is unknown. We studied this question using instrumental trace conditioning, where participants learned to make approach/avoid decisions in two within-subject modes: conscious (stimuli in plain view) and unconscious (visually masked). Both tasks were followed by an unconscious-only instrumental performance task. We show that even when the contingencies are reliably learned in the conscious mode, participants fail to act upon them in the unconscious responding task. We also replicate the previous results that no instrumental learning occurs in the unconscious mode. Consequently, the absence of stimulus awareness not only precludes instrumental conditioning, but also precludes any kind of instrumental responding to already known stimuli. This suggests that instrumental behaviour is entirely supported by conscious awareness of the world, and corroborates the proposals that consciousness may be necessary for adaptive behaviours requiring selective action.

Neural electrophysiological correlates of detection and identification awareness

Humans have conscious experiences of the events in their environment. Previous research from electroencephalography (EEG) has shown visual awareness negativity (VAN) at about 200 ms to be a neural correlate of consciousness (NCC). However, when considering VAN as an NCC, it is important to explore which particular experiences are associated with VAN. Recent research proposes that VAN is an NCC of lower-level experiences (detection) rather than higher-level experiences (identification). However, previous results are mixed and have several limitations. In the present study, the stimulus was a ring with a Gabor patch tilting either left or right. On each trial, subjects rated their awareness on a three-level perceptual awareness scale that captured both detection (something vs. nothing) and identification (identification vs. something). Separate staircases were used to adjust stimulus opacity to the detection threshold and the identification threshold. Bayesian linear mixed models provided extreme evidence (BF10 = 131) that VAN was stronger at the detection threshold than at the identification threshold. Mean VAN decreased from [Formula: see text]2.12 microV [[Formula: see text]2.86, [Formula: see text]1.42] at detection to [Formula: see text]0.46 microV [[Formula: see text]0.79, [Formula: see text]0.11] at identification. These results strongly support the claim that VAN is an NCC of lower-level experiences of seeing something rather than of higher-level experiences of specific properties of the stimuli. Thus, results are consistent with recurrent processing theory in that phenomenal visual consciousness is reflected by VAN. Further, results emphasize that it is important to consider the level of experience when searching for NCC.

Dyslexia Due to Visual Impairments

Reading involves many different abilities that are necessary or sufficient conditions for fluent and flawless reading. The absence of one necessary or of all sufficient conditions is a cause of dyslexia. The present study investigates whether too short fixation times and an impaired ability to recognize a string of letters simultaneously are causes of dyslexia. The frequency and types of reading mistakes were investigated in a tachistoscopic pseudoword experiment with 100 children with dyslexia to test the impact of too short fixation times and the attempts of children with dyslexia to recognize more letters simultaneously than they can when reading pseudowords. The experiment demonstrates that all types of reading mistakes disappear when the fixation time increases and/or the number of letters that the children try to recognize simultaneously is reduced. The results cannot be interpreted as being due to altered visual crowding, impaired attention, or impaired phonological awareness, but can be regarded as an effect of impaired temporal summation and a dysfunction in the ventral stream of the visual system.

Dyslexia: Causes and Concomitant Impairments

In recent decades, theories have been presented to explain the nature of dyslexia, but the causes of dyslexia remained unclear. Although the investigation of the causes of dyslexia presupposes a clear understanding of the concept of cause, such an understanding is missing. The present paper proposes the absence of at least one necessary condition or the absence of all sufficient conditions as causes for impaired reading. The causes of impaired reading include: an incorrect fixation location, too short a fixation time, the attempt to recognize too many letters simultaneously, too large saccade amplitudes, and too short verbal reaction times. It is assumed that a longer required fixation time in dyslexic readers results from a functional impairment of areas V1, V2, and V3 that require more time to complete temporal summation. These areas and areas that receive input from them, such as the fusiform gyrus, are assumed to be impaired in their ability to simultaneously process a string of letters. When these impairments are compensated by a new reading strategy, reading ability improves immediately.

Early and late electrophysiological correlates of gradual perceptual awareness in- and outside the Attentional Blink window

There is an ongoing debate on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) in the attentional blink (AB). Theoretical accounts propose that NCC during the attentional blink occur late in the processing hierarchy and that this quality is specific to the AB. We investigated this question by recording event-related potentials during an AB experiment with faces as T2. We analyzed ERPs to T2 stimuli inside (short lag) and outside (long lag) the AB window after carefully calibrating T2 stimuli to ensure equal visibility ratings across lags. We found that the N170, the visual awareness negativity (VAN), and the P3b showed an increased amplitude for seen compared to unseen face stimuli regardless of stimulus lag and that all these components scale linearly with subjective visibility. These findings suggest similar early and late mechanisms of graded perceptual awareness within and outside the AB across perceptual (N170, VAN) and post-perceptual (P3b) processing stages.

The neural hierarchy of consciousness

The chief undertaking in the studies of consciousness is that of unravelling "the minimal set of neural processes that are together sufficient for the conscious experience of a particular content - the neural correlates of consciousness". To this day, this crusade remains at an impasse, with a clash of two main theories: consciousness may arise either in a graded and cortically-localised fashion, or in an all-or-none and widespread one. In spite of the long-lasting theoretical debates, neurophysiological theories of consciousness have been mostly dissociated from them. Herein, a theoretical review will be put forth with the aim to change that. In its first half, we will cover the hard available evidence on the neurophysiology of consciousness, whereas in its second half we will weave a series of considerations on both theories and substantiate a novel take on conscious awareness: the levels of processing approach, partitioning the conscious architecture into lower- and higher-order, graded and nonlinear.

Expanding the discussion: Revision of the fundamental assumptions framing the study of the neural correlates of consciousness

The way one asks a question is shaped by a-priori assumptions and constrains the range of possible answers. We identify and test the assumptions underlying contemporary debates, models, and methodology in the study of the neural correlates of consciousness, which was framed by Crick and Koch's seminal paper (1990). These premises create a sequential and passive conception of conscious perception: it is considered the product of resolved information processing by unconscious mechanisms, produced by a singular event in time and place representing the moment of entry. The conscious percept produced is then automatically retained to be utilized by post-conscious mechanisms. Major debates in the field, such as concern the moment of entry, the all-or-none vs graded nature, and report vs no-report paradigms, are driven by the consensus on these assumptions. We show how removing these assumptions can resolve some of the debates and challenges and prompt additional questions. The potential non-sequential nature of perception suggests new ways of thinking about consciousness as a dynamic and dispersed process, and in turn about the relationship between conscious and unconscious perception. Moreover, it allows us to present a parsimonious account for conscious perception while addressing more aspects of the phenomenon.

Is Developmental Dyslexia Due to a Visual and Not a Phonological Impairment?

It is a widely held belief that developmental dyslexia (DD) is a phonological disorder in which readers have difficulty associating graphemes with their corresponding phonemes. In contrast, the magnocellular theory of dyslexia assumes that DD is a visual disorder caused by dysfunctional magnocellular neural pathways. The review explores arguments for and against these theories. Recent results have shown that DD is caused by (1) a reduced ability to simultaneously recognize sequences of letters that make up words, (2) longer fixation times required to simultaneously recognize strings of letters, and (3) amplitudes of saccades that do not match the number of simultaneously recognized letters. It was shown that pseudowords that could not be recognized simultaneously were recognized almost without errors when the fixation time was extended. However, there is an individual maximum number of letters that each reader with DD can recognize simultaneously. Findings on the neurobiological basis of temporal summation have shown that a necessary prolongation of fixation times is due to impaired processing mechanisms of the visual system, presumably involving magnocells and parvocells. An area in the mid-fusiform gyrus also appears to play a significant role in the ability to simultaneously recognize words and pseudowords. The results also contradict the assumption that DD is due to a lack of eye movement control. The present research does not support the assumption that DD is caused by a phonological disorder but shows that DD is due to a visual processing dysfunction.

Gradedness of visual awareness depends on attentional scope: Global perception is more graded than local perception

The gradedness or discreteness of our visual awareness has been debated. Here, we investigate the influence of spatial scope of attention on the gradedness of visual awareness. We manipulated scope of attention using hierarchical letter-based tasks (global: broad scope; local: narrow scope). Participants reported the identity of a masked hierarchical letter either at the global level or at the local level. We measured subjective awareness using the perceptual awareness scale ratings and objective performance. The results indicate more graded visual awareness (lesser slope for the awareness rating curve) at the global level compared to the local level. Graded perception was also observed in visibility ratings usage with global level task showing higher usage of the middle PAS ratings. Our results are in line with the prediction of level of processing hypothesis and show that global/local attentional scope and contextual endogenous factors influence the graded nature of our visual awareness.

Modelling visibility judgments using models of decision confidence

How can we explain the regularities in subjective reports of human observers about their subjective visual experience of a stimulus? The present study tests whether a recent model of confidence in perceptual decisions, the weighted evidence and visibility model, can be generalized from confidence to subjective visibility. In a postmasked orientation identification task, observers reported the subjective visibility of the stimulus after each single identification response. Cognitive modelling revealed that the weighted evidence and visibility model provided a superior fit to the data compared with the standard signal detection model, the signal detection model with unsystematic noise superimposed on ratings, the postdecisional accumulation model, the two-channel model, the response-congruent evidence model, the two-dimensional Bayesian model, and the constant noise and decay model. A comparison between subjective visibility and decisional confidence revealed that visibility relied more on the strength of sensory evidence about features of the stimulus irrelevant to the identification judgment and less on evidence for the identification judgment. It is argued that at least two types of evidence are required to account for subjective visibility, one related to the identification judgment, and one related to the strength of stimulation.

Dyslexic Readers Improve without Training When Using a Computer-Guided Reading Strategy

Background: Flawless reading presupposes the ability to simultaneously recognize a sequence of letters, to fixate words at a given location for a given time, to exert eye movements of a given amplitude, and to retrieve phonems rapidly from memory. Poor reading performance may be due to an impairment of at least one of these abilities. Objectives: It was investigated whether reading performance of dyslexic children can be improved by changing the reading strategy without any previous training. Methods: 60 dyslexic German children read a text without and with the help of a computer. A tailored computer program subdivided the text into segments that consisted of no more letters than the children could simultaneously recognize, indicated the location in the segments to which the gaze should be directed, indicated how long the gaze should be directed to each segment, which reading saccades the children should execute, and when the children should pronounce the segments. The computer aided reading was not preceded by any training. Results: It was shown that the rate of reading mistakes dropped immediately by 69.97% if a computer determined the reading process. Computer aided reading reached the highest effect size of Cohen d = 2.649. Conclusions: The results show which abilities are indispensable for reading, that the impairment of at least one of the abilities leads to reading deficiencies that are diagnosed as dyslexia, and that a computer-guided, altered reading strategy immediately reduces the rate of reading mistakes. There was no evidence that dyslexia is due to a lack of eye movement control or reduced visual attention.

Partial awareness can be induced by independent cognitive access to different spatial frequencies

Partial awareness-an intermediate state between complete consciousness and unconsciousness-has been explained by independent cognitive access to different levels of representation in hierarchical visual processing. This account, however, cannot explain graded visual experiences in low levels. We aimed to explain partial awareness in low levels of visual processing by independent cognitive access to different spatial frequencies. To observe partial awareness stably, we used a novel method. Stimuli were presented briefly (12 ms) and repeatedly with a specific inter-stimulus interval, ranging from 0 to 235 ms. By using various stimuli containing high and low spatial frequencies (superimposed sinusoidal gratings, Navon letters, and scenes), we found that conscious percept was degraded with increasing inter-stimulus intervals. However, the degree of degradation was smaller for low spatial frequency than for high spatial frequency information. Our results reveal that cognitive access to different spatial frequencies can occur independently and this can explain partial awareness in low levels of visual processing.

Bifurcation in brain dynamics reveals a signature of conscious processing independent of report

An outstanding challenge for consciousness research is to characterize the neural signature of conscious access independently of any decisional processes. Here we present a model-based approach that uses inter-trial variability to identify the brain dynamics associated with stimulus processing. We demonstrate that, even in the absence of any task or behavior, the electroencephalographic response to auditory stimuli shows bifurcation dynamics around 250–300 milliseconds post-stimulus. Namely, the same stimulus gives rise to late sustained activity on some trials, and not on others. This late neural activity is predictive of task-related reports, and also of reports of conscious contents that are randomly sampled during task-free listening. Source localization further suggests that task-free conscious access recruits the same neural networks as those associated with explicit report, except for frontal executive components. Studying brain dynamics through variability could thus play a key role for identifying the core signatures of conscious access, independent of report.

Current knowledge on the neural basis of consciousness mostly relies on situations where people report their perception. Here, the authors provide evidence for the idea that bifurcation in brain dynamics reflects conscious perception independent of report.

Visual awareness and the levels of processing hypothesis: A critical review

Does a visual percept emerge to consciousness in a graded manner (i.e. evolving through increasing degrees of clarity), or according to a dichotomous, "all-or-none" pattern (i.e. abruptly transitioning from unawareness to awareness)? The level of processing hypothesis (LoP; B. Windey and A. Cleeremans, 2015) recently proposed a theoretical framework where the transition from unaware to aware visual experience is graded for low-level stimulus representations (i.e. stimulus "energy" or "feature" levels) whereas it is dichotomous for high-level (i.e. the perception of "letters", "words" or "meaning") stimulus perception. Here, we will critically review current behavioral and brain-based evidence on the LoP hypothesis and discuss potential challenges (such as differences in LoP conceptualizations, awareness scale related issues, attentional confounds and divergences on experimental factors or statistical analyses) which might be of use for future research within the field. Overall, the LoP hypothesis is a recent and promising proposal that attempts to integrate divergent evidence on the graded vs. dichotomous emergence of awareness debate. Whereas current evidence validates some of the assumptions proposed by the LoP account, there is still much work to do on both methodological and experimental levels. Future neuroimaging studies might help to disentangle the current complex pattern of results found in LoP studies and, importantly, shed some light on the ongoing debate about the search for the Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC).

Unconscious categorization of sub-millisecond complex images

Can people categorize complex visual scenes unconsciously? The possibility of unconscious perception remains controversial. Here, we addressed this question using psychophysical methods applied to unmasked visual stimuli presented for extremely short durations (in the μsec range) by means of a custom-built modern tachistoscope. Our experiment was composed of two phases. In the first phase, natural or urban scenes were either absent or present (for varying durations) on the tachistoscope screen, and participants were simply asked to evaluate their subjective perception using a 3-points scale (absence of stimulus, stimulus detection or stimulus identification). Participants’ responses were tracked by means of two staircases. The first psychometric function aimed at defining participants’ proportion of subjective detection responses (i.e., not having seen anything vs. having seen something without being able to identify it), while the second staircase tracked the proportion of subjective identification rates (i.e., being unaware of the stimulus’ category vs. being aware of it). In the second phase, the same participants performed an objective categorization task in which they had to decide, on each trial, whether the image was a natural vs. an urban scene. A third staircase was used in this phase so as to build a psychometric curve reflecting the objective categorization performance of each participant. In this second phase, participants also rated their subjective perception of each stimulus on every trial, exactly as in the first phase of the experiment. Our main result is that objective categorization performance, here assumed to reflect the contribution of both conscious and unconscious trials, cannot be explained based exclusively on conscious trials. This clearly suggests that the categorization of complex visual scenes is possible even when participants report being unable to consciously perceive the contents of the stimulus.

All-or-none face categorization in the human brain

Visual categorization is integral for our interaction with the natural environment. In this process, similar selective responses are produced to a class of variable visual inputs. Whether categorization is supported by partial (graded) or absolute (all-or-none) neural responses in high-level human brain regions is largely unknown. We address this issue with a novel frequency-sweep paradigm probing the evolution of face categorization responses between the minimal and optimal stimulus presentation times. In a first experiment, natural images of variable non-face objects were progressively swept from 120 to 3 ​Hz (8.33-333 ​ms duration) in rapid serial visual presentation sequences. Widely variable face exemplars appeared every 1 ​s, enabling an implicit frequency-tagged face-categorization electroencephalographic (EEG) response at 1 ​Hz. Face-categorization activity emerged with stimulus durations as brief as 17 ​ms (17-83 ​ms across individual participants) but was significant with 33 ​ms durations at the group level. The face categorization response amplitude increased until 83 ​ms stimulus duration (12 ​Hz), implying graded categorization responses. In a second EEG experiment, faces appeared non-periodically throughout such sequences at fixed presentation rates, while participants explicitly categorized faces. A strong correlation between response amplitude and behavioral accuracy across frequency rates suggested that dilution from missed categorizations, rather than a decreased response to each face stimulus, accounted for the graded categorization responses as found in Experiment 1. This was supported by (1) the absence of neural responses to faces that participants failed to categorize explicitly in Experiment 2 and (2) equivalent amplitudes and spatio-temporal signatures of neural responses to behaviorally categorized faces across presentation rates. Overall, these observations provide original evidence that high-level visual categorization of faces, starting at about 100 ​ms following stimulus onset in the human brain, is variable across observers tested under tight temporal constraints, but occurs in an all-or-none fashion.

Masked blindsight in normal observers: Measuring subjective and objective responses to two features of each stimulus

Recent visual masking studies that have measured visual awareness with graded subjective scales have often failed the show any evidence for unconscious visual processing in normal observers in a paradigm similar to that used in studies on blindsight patients. Without any reported awareness of the target, normal observers typically cannot discriminate target's features better than chance. The present study examined processing of color and orientation by measuring graded awareness and forced-choice discriminations for both features in each trial. When no awareness for either feature was reported, discrimination of each feature succeed better than expected by chance, even when the other feature was incorrectly discriminated in the same trial. However, the characteristics of the mask determined whether or not masked blindsight was observed. We conclude that when the processing channels are free from intra-channel interference, unbound or weakly bound features can guide behaviour without any reported awareness in normal observers.

ERP and MEG correlates of visual consciousness: The second decade

The first decade of event-related potential (ERP) research had established that the most consistent correlates of the onset of visual consciousness are the early visual awareness negativity (VAN), a posterior negative component in the N2 time range, and the late positivity (LP), an anterior positive component in the P3 time range. Two earlier extensive reviews ten years ago had concluded that VAN is the earliest and most reliable correlate of visual phenomenal consciousness, whereas LP probably reflects later processes associated with reflective/access consciousness. This article provides an update to those earlier reviews. ERP and MEG studies that have appeared since 2010 and directly compared ERPs between aware and unaware conditions are reviewed, and important new developments in the field are discussed. The result corroborates VAN as the earliest and most consistent signature of visual phenomenal consciousness, and casts further doubt on LP as an ERP correlate of phenomenal consciousness.

The nature of visual awareness at stimulus energy and feature levels: A backward masking study

The level of processing (LoP) hypothesis proposes that low-level stimulus perception (i.e., stimulus energy and features) is a graded process whereas high-level (i.e., letters, words, meaning) stimulus perception is all-or-none. In the present study, we set up a visual masking design in order to examine the nature of visual awareness at stimulus energy (i.e., detection task) and feature levels (identification task) at specific individual target durations (13, 27, 40, 53, and 80 ms). We manipulated the strength of the masking to produce different visibility conditions and gathered participants' subjective (across a 4-point awareness scale) and objective (accuracy levels) awareness performances. We found that intermediate ratings (i.e., ratings 2 and 3, which index graded awareness experiences) were used in more than 50% of the trials for target presentations of 27, 40, 53, and 80 ms. In addition, objective accuracy performances for target presentations of 27 and 80 ms produced linearly increasing detection and identification accuracies across the awareness scale categories, respectively. Overall, our results suggest that visual awareness at energy and feature levels of stimulus perception may be graded. Furthermore, we found a divergence in detection and identification performance results, which emphasizes the need for an adequate election of target durations when studying different perceptual processes such as detection versus more complex stimulus identification processes. Finally, "clarity" in the perceptual awareness scale should be exhaustively defined depending on the level of processing of the stimulus, as participants may recalibrate the meaning of the different awareness categories depending on task demands.

The signature of undetected change: an exploratory electrotomographic investigation of gradual change blindness

Neuroimaging-based investigations of change blindness, a phenomenon in which seemingly obvious changes in visual scenes fail to be detected, have significantly advanced our understanding of visual awareness. The vast majority of prior investigations, however, utilize paradigms involving visual disruptions (e.g., intervening blank screens, saccadic movements, "mudsplashes"), making it difficult to isolate neural responses toward visual changes cleanly. To address this issue in this present study, high-density EEG data (256 channel) were collected from 25 participants using a paradigm in which visual changes were progressively introduced into detailed real-world scenes without the use of visual disruption. Oscillatory activity associated with undetected changes was contrasted with activity linked to their absence using standardized low-resolution brain electromagnetic tomography (sLORETA). Although an insufficient number of detections were present to allow for analysis of actual change detection, increased beta-2 activity in the right inferior parietal lobule (rIPL), a region repeatedly associated with change blindness in disruption paradigms, followed by increased theta activity in the right superior temporal gyrus (rSTG) was noted in undetected visual change responses relative to the absence of change. We propose the rIPL beta-2 activity to be associated with orienting attention toward visual changes, with the subsequent rise in rSTG theta activity being potentially linked with updating preconscious perceptual memory representations. NEW & NOTEWORTHY This study represents the first neuroimaging-based investigation of gradual change blindness, a visual phenomenon that has significant potential to shed light on the processes underlying visual detection and conscious perception. The use of gradual change materials is reflective of real-world visual phenomena and allows for cleaner isolation of signals associated with the neural registration of change relative to the use of abrupt change transients.

Can false memory for critical lures occur without conscious awareness of list words?

We examined whether the DRM false memory effect can occur when list words are presented below the perceptual identification threshold. In four experiments, subjects showed robust veridical memory for studied words and false memory for critical lures when masked list words were presented at exposure durations of 43 ms per word. Shortening the exposure duration to 29 ms virtually eliminated veridical recognition of studied words and completely eliminated false recognition of critical lures. Subjective visibility ratings in Experiments 3a and 3b support the assumption that words presented at 29 ms were subliminal for most participants, but were occasionally experienced with partial awareness by participants with higher perceptual awareness. Our results indicate that a false memory effect does not occur in the absence of conscious awareness of list words, but it does occur when word stimuli are presented at an intermediate level of visibility.

Emotional priming depends on the degree of conscious experience

Most experiments in consciousness research assume that awareness is a dichotomous 'either/or' phenomenon. However, participants can distinguish multiple levels of subjective experience of simple features (colour, shape etc.), which correlate with their performance in different tasks. As experiments showing multiple levels of perceptual awareness question the widespread idea that many forms of perception can occur unconsciously, we investigated emotional priming combined with methods able to measure small variations in subjective experience.

We show awareness of emotional faces is gradual rather than dichotomous, and that the effects of emotional priming are predicted by the level of perceptual awareness of emotional faces, with no effects when reported unseen.

The results question how much unconscious perceptions can influence behaviour. As priming is one of the most well-established phenomena believed to occur unconsciously, the results expand the growing body of evidence that questions the contributions of unconscious processing on behaviour.

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Emotional priming is considered fundamental evidence for unconscious perception.

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Emotional priming strength is predicted by graded perceptual awareness levels.

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Emotional priming with faces is not effective when faces are reported as unseen.

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Facial expression recognition increases gradually with perceptual awareness levels.

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Perceptual awareness of faces increases gradually with duration of face stimuli.

A Multi-Factor Account of Degrees of Awareness

In this paper we argue that awareness comes in degrees, and we propose a novel multi-factor account that spans both subjective experiences and perceptual representations. At the subjective level, we argue that conscious experiences can be degraded by being fragmented, less salient, too generic, or flash-like. At the representational level, we identify corresponding features of perceptual representations-their availability for working memory, intensity, precision, and stability-and argue that the mechanisms that affect these features are what ultimately modulate the degree of awareness. We conclude the paper by demonstrating why the original interpretations of certain empirical findings that apparently pose problems for our account are, in fact, flawed.

The Emergence of Explicit Knowledge in a Serial Reaction Time Task: The Role of Experienced Fluency and Strength of Representation

The Serial Reaction Time Task (SRTT) is an important paradigm to study the properties of unconscious learning processes. One specifically interesting and still controversially discussed topic are the conditions under which unconsciously acquired knowledge becomes conscious knowledge. The different assumptions about the underlying mechanisms can contrastively be separated into two accounts: single system views in which the strengthening of associative weights throughout training gradually turns implicit knowledge into explicit knowledge, and dual system views in which implicit knowledge itself does not become conscious. Rather, it requires a second process which detects changes in performance and is able to acquire conscious knowledge. In a series of three experiments, we manipulated the arrangement of sequential and deviant trials. In an SRTT training, participants either received mini-blocks of sequential trials followed by mini-blocks of deviant trials (22 trials each) or they received sequential and deviant trials mixed randomly. Importantly the number of correct and deviant transitions was the same for both conditions. Experiment 1 showed that both conditions acquired a comparable amount of implicit knowledge, expressed in different test tasks. Experiment 2 further demonstrated that both conditions differed in their subjectively experienced fluency of the task, with more fluency experienced when trained with mini-blocks. Lastly, Experiment 3 revealed that the participants trained with longer mini-blocks of sequential and deviant material developed more explicit knowledge. Results are discussed regarding their compatibility with different assumptions about the emergence of explicit knowledge in an implicit learning situation, especially with respect to the role of metacognitive judgements and more specifically the Unexpected-Event Hypothesis.

Four-Dimensional Graded Consciousness

Both the multidimensional phenomenon and the polysemous notion of consciousness continue to prove resistant to consistent measurement and unambiguous definition. This is hardly surprising, given that there is no agreement even as regards the most fundamental issues they involve. One of the basic disagreements present in the continuing debate about consciousness pertains to its gradational nature. The general aim of this article is to show how consciousness might be graded and multidimensional at the same time. We therefore focus on the question of what it is, exactly, that is or could be graded in cases of consciousness, and how we can measure it. Ultimately, four different gradable aspects of consciousness will be described: quality, abstractness, complexity and usefulness, which belong to four different dimensions, these being understood, respectively, as phenomenal, semantic, physiological, and functional. Consequently, consciousness may be said to vary with respect to phenomenal quality, semantic abstraction, physiological complexity, and functional usefulness. It is hoped that such a four-dimensional approach will help to clarify and justify claims about the hierarchical nature of consciousness. The approach also proves explanatorily advantageous, as it enables us not only to draw attention to certain new and important differences in respect of subjective measures of awareness and to justify how a given creature may be ranked higher in one dimension of consciousness and lower in terms of another, but also allows for innovative explanations of a variety of well-known phenomena (amongst these, the interpretations of blindsight and locked-in syndrome will be briefly outlined here). Moreover, a 4D framework makes possible many predictions and hypotheses that may be experimentally tested (We point out a few such possibilities pertaining to interdimensional dependencies).

Is conscious awareness needed for all working memory processes?

Stein and colleagues argue there is no yet conclusive evidence for nonconscious working memory (WM) and that is critical to probe WM while ensuring null sensitivity to memory cues. While this stringent approach reduces the likelihood of nonconscious signaling for WM, we discuss existing work meeting this null sensitivity criteria, and, related work on nonconscious cognition in keeping with WM/awareness dissociations on the basis of a functional operational definition of WM. Further, because it is likely that WM is a nonunitary functional construct and visual awareness a gradual phenomenon, we propose that delineating the neural mechanisms for distinct WM types across different levels of awareness may prove the most fruitful approach for understanding the interplay between WM and consciousness.

Consciousness: individuated information in action

Within theoretical and empirical enquiries, many different meanings associated with consciousness have appeared, leaving the term itself quite vague. This makes formulating an abstract and unifying version of the concept of consciousness - the main aim of this article -into an urgent theoretical imperative. It is argued that consciousness, characterized as dually accessible (cognized from the inside and the outside), hierarchically referential (semantically ordered), bodily determined (embedded in the working structures of an organism or conscious system), and useful in action (pragmatically functional), is a graded rather than an all-or-none phenomenon. A gradational approach, however, despite its explanatory advantages, can lead to some counterintuitive consequences and theoretical problems. In most such conceptions consciousness is extended globally (attached to primitive organisms or artificial systems), but also locally (connected to certain lower-level neuronal and bodily processes). For example, according to information integration theory (as introduced recently by Tononi and Koch, 2014), even such simple artificial systems as photodiodes possess miniscule amounts of consciousness. The major challenge for this article, then, is to establish reasonable, empirically justified constraints on how extended the range of a graded consciousness could be. It is argued that conscious systems are limited globally by the ability to individuate information (where individuated information is understood as evolutionarily embedded, socially altered, and private), whereas local limitations should be determined on the basis of a hypothesis about the action-oriented nature of the processes that select states of consciousness. Using these constraints, an abstract concept of consciousness is arrived at, hopefully contributing to a more unified state of play within consciousness studies itself.

Making eye contact without awareness

Direct gaze is a potent non-verbal signal that establishes a communicative connection between two individuals, setting the course for further interactions. Although consciously perceived faces with direct gaze have been shown to capture attention, it is unknown whether an attentional preference for these socially meaningful stimuli exists even in the absence of awareness. In two experiments, we recorded participants' eye movements while they were exposed to faces with direct and averted gaze rendered invisible by interocular suppression. Participants' inability to correctly guess the occurrence of the faces in a manual forced-choice task demonstrated complete unawareness of the faces. However, eye movements were preferentially directed towards faces with direct compared to averted gaze, indicating a specific sensitivity to others' gaze directions even without awareness. This oculomotor preference suggests that a rapid and automatic establishment of mutual eye contact constitutes a biological advantage, which could be mediated by fast subcortical pathways in the human brain.

Consciousness as a graded and an all-or-none phenomenon: A conceptual analysis

The issue whether consciousness is a graded or an all-or-none phenomenon has been and continues to be a debate. Both contradictory accounts are supported by solid evidence. Starting from a level of processing framework allowing for states of partial awareness, here we further elaborate our view that visual experience, as it is most often investigated in the literature, is both graded and all-or-none. Low-level visual experience is graded, whereas high-level visual experience is all-or-none. We then present a conceptual analysis starting from the notion that consciousness is a general concept. We specify a number of different subconcepts present in the literature on consciousness, and outline how each of them may be seen as either graded, all-or-none, or both. We argue that such specifications are necessary to lead to a detailed and integrated understanding of how consciousness should be conceived of as graded and all-or-none.

Isolating neural correlates of conscious perception from neural correlates of reporting one's perception

To isolate neural correlates of conscious perception (NCCs), a standard approach has been to contrast neural activity elicited by identical stimuli of which subjects are aware vs. unaware. Because conscious experience is private, determining whether a stimulus was consciously perceived requires subjective report: e.g., button-presses indicating detection, visibility ratings, verbal reports, etc. This reporting requirement introduces a methodological confound when attempting to isolate NCCs: The neural processes responsible for accessing and reporting one's percept are difficult to distinguish from those underlying the conscious percept itself. Here, we review recent attempts to circumvent this issue via a modified inattentional blindness paradigm (Pitts et al., 2012) and present new data from a backward masking experiment in which task-relevance and visual awareness were manipulated in a 2 × 2 crossed design. In agreement with our previous inattentional blindness results, stimuli that were consciously perceived yet not immediately accessed for report (aware, task-irrelevant condition) elicited a mid-latency posterior ERP negativity (~200–240 ms), while stimuli that were accessed for report (aware, task-relevant condition) elicited additional components including a robust P3b (~380–480 ms) subsequent to the mid-latency negativity. Overall, these results suggest that some of the NCCs identified in previous studies may be more closely linked with accessing and maintaining perceptual information for reporting purposes than with encoding the conscious percept itself. An open question is whether the remaining NCC candidate (the ERP negativity at 200–240 ms) reflects visual awareness or object-based attention.

Perceptual awareness and its neural basis: bridging experimental and theoretical paradigms

Understanding consciousness is a major scientific challenge of our times, and perceptual awareness is an integral part of that challenge. This Theme Issue aims to provide a timely focus on crucial insights from leading scientists on perceptual awareness and its neural basis. The issue refers to key research questions and findings in perceptual awareness research and aims to be a catalyst for further research, by bringing together the state-of-the-art. It shows how bridges are being built between empirical and theoretical research and proposes new directions for the study of multisensory awareness and the role of the states of the body therein. In this introduction, we highlight crucial problems that have characterized the development of the study of perceptual awareness. We then provide an overview of major experimental and theoretical paradigms related to perceptual awareness and its neural basis. Finally, we present an overview of the Theme Issue, with reference to the contributed articles and their relationships.