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Paredes J, Carré D. Looking for a broader mindset in psychometrics: the case for more participatory measurement practices. Front Psychol 2024; 15:1389640. [PMID: 38601828 PMCID: PMC11004427 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1389640] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/21/2024] [Accepted: 03/14/2024] [Indexed: 04/12/2024] Open
Abstract
Psychometrics and the consequences of its use as the method of quantitative empirical psychology has been continuously criticized by both psychologists and psychometrists. However, the scope of the possible solutions to these issues has been mostly focused on the establishment of methodological-statistical best practices for researchers, without any regard to the pitfalls of previous stages of measurement as well as theory development of the targeted phenomenon. Conversely, other researchers advance the idea that, since psychometrics is riddled with many issues, the best way forward is a complete rework of the discipline even if it leaves psychologists and other practitioners without any way to measure quantitatively for a long period of time. Given these tensions, we therefore advocate for an alternative path to consider while we work on making substantive change in measurement. We propose a set of research practices focusing on the inclusion and active participation of groups involved in measurement activities, such as psychometrists, researchers but most importantly practitioners and potential participants. Involving a wider community while measuring in psychology could tackle some key issues that would take us closer to a more authentic approach to our phenomenon of interest.
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Affiliation(s)
- Javiera Paredes
- Laboratorio de Lenguaje, Interacción y Fenomenología, Escuela de Psicología, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile
| | - David Carré
- Instituto de Ciencias de la Salud, Universidad de O’Higgins, Rancagua, Chile
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Delval I, Fernández-Bolaños M, Izar P. Towards an Integrated Concept of Personality in Human and Nonhuman Animals. Integr Psychol Behav Sci 2024; 58:271-302. [PMID: 37059965 PMCID: PMC10104772 DOI: 10.1007/s12124-023-09759-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 03/21/2023] [Indexed: 04/16/2023]
Abstract
Every individual has an idiosyncratic way of feeling, thinking and behaving, which is relatively stable across time and situations. Usually known as Personality, today this phenomenon is recognized in many species, including arthropods, fish, avian or mammals. From an evolutionary perspective, research has shown that personality differences are manifest in distinctive forms of dealing with selective pressures, with consequences for fitness. Despite these facts, the study of personality in animals other than humans is relatively new. Only two decades ago, consistent behavioral individual differences were considered 'noise' around an optimal strategy for behavioral ecologists. Also, psychologists were not interested in animal personality as a consequence of the fear of anthropomorphization and the erroneous belief that humans are unique in nature. Fortunately, this misconception seems already overcome but there are still conceptual issues preventing a unified concept of personality. Throughout this review, we first explore the etymological origins of personality and other terminological issues. We further revise the historical course of the study of personality in humans and other animals, from the perspectives of Psychology and Behavioral Ecology, on the basis of the most used approach, the trait theory. We present the study of nonhuman primates as a paradigmatic example in between both frameworks. Finally, we discuss about the necessity of a unified science of personality.
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Affiliation(s)
- Irene Delval
- Department of Experimental Psychology, Institute of Psychology, University of São Paulo (IP-USP). Av. Prof. Mello Moraes 1721, São Paulo, SP, CEP 05508-030, Brazil.
| | - Marcelo Fernández-Bolaños
- Department of Experimental Psychology, Institute of Psychology, University of São Paulo (IP-USP). Av. Prof. Mello Moraes 1721, São Paulo, SP, CEP 05508-030, Brazil
| | - Patrícia Izar
- Department of Experimental Psychology, Institute of Psychology, University of São Paulo (IP-USP). Av. Prof. Mello Moraes 1721, São Paulo, SP, CEP 05508-030, Brazil
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3
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Uher J. What's wrong with rating scales? Psychology's replication and confidence crisis cannot be solved without transparency in data generation. SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY COMPASS 2023. [DOI: 10.1111/spc3.12740] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 03/12/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- Jana Uher
- School of Human Sciences University of Greenwich London UK
- London School of Economics and Political Science London UK
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4
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Uher J. Rating scales institutionalise a network of logical errors and conceptual problems in research practices: A rigorous analysis showing ways to tackle psychology's crises. Front Psychol 2022; 13:1009893. [PMID: 36643697 PMCID: PMC9833395 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1009893] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/02/2022] [Accepted: 10/14/2022] [Indexed: 12/29/2022] Open
Abstract
This article explores in-depth the metatheoretical and methodological foundations on which rating scales-by their very conception, design and application-are built and traces their historical origins. It brings together independent lines of critique from different scholars and disciplines to map out the problem landscape, which centres on the failed distinction between psychology's study phenomena (e.g., experiences, everyday constructs) and the means of their exploration (e.g., terms, data, scientific constructs)-psychologists' cardinal error. Rigorous analyses reveal a dense network of 12 complexes of problematic concepts, misconceived assumptions and fallacies that support each other, making it difficult to be identified and recognised by those (unwittingly) relying on them (e.g., various forms of reductionism, logical errors of operationalism, constructification, naïve use of language, quantificationism, statisticism, result-based data generation, misconceived nomotheticism). Through the popularity of rating scales for efficient quantitative data generation, uncritically interpreted as psychological measurement, these problems have become institutionalised in a wide range of research practices and perpetuate psychology's crises (e.g., replication, confidence, validation, generalizability). The article provides an in-depth understanding that is needed to get to the root of these problems, which preclude not just measurement but also the scientific exploration of psychology's study phenomena and thus its development as a science. From each of the 12 problem complexes; specific theoretical concepts, methodologies and methods are derived as well as key directions of development. The analyses-based on three central axioms for transdisciplinary research on individuals, (1) complexity, (2) complementarity and (3) anthropogenicity-highlight that psychologists must (further) develop an explicit metatheory and unambiguous terminology as well as concepts and theories that conceive individuals as living beings, open self-organising systems with complementary phenomena and dynamic interrelations across their multi-layered systemic contexts-thus, theories not simply of elemental properties and structures but of processes, relations, dynamicity, subjectivity, emergence, catalysis and transformation. Philosophical and theoretical foundations of approaches suited for exploring these phenomena must be developed together with methods of data generation and methods of data analysis that are appropriately adapted to the peculiarities of psychologists' study phenomena (e.g., intra-individual variation, momentariness, contextuality). Psychology can profit greatly from its unique position at the intersection of many other disciplines and can learn from their advancements to develop research practices that are suited to tackle its crises holistically.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jana Uher
- School of Human Sciences, University of Greenwich, London, United Kingdom
- London School of Economics, London, United Kingdom
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5
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Ward T, Hardy A, Holm R, Collett N, Rus‐Calafell M, Sacadura C, McGourty A, Vella C, East A, Rea M, Harding H, Emsley R, Greenwood K, Freeman D, Fowler D, Kuipers E, Bebbington P, Garety P. SlowMo therapy, a new digital blended therapy for fear of harm from others: An account of therapy personalisation within a targeted intervention. Psychol Psychother 2022; 95:423-446. [PMID: 35019210 PMCID: PMC9306634 DOI: 10.1111/papt.12377] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/08/2021] [Accepted: 12/06/2021] [Indexed: 12/18/2022]
Abstract
OBJECTIVES SlowMo therapy is a pioneering blended digital therapy for paranoia, augmenting face-to-face therapy with an interactive 'webapp' and a mobile app. A recent large-scale trial demonstrated small-moderate effects on paranoia alongside improvements in self-esteem, worry, well-being and quality of life. This paper provides a comprehensive account of therapy personalisation within this targeted approach. DESIGN Case examples illustrate therapy delivery and descriptive data are presented on personalised thought content. METHOD Thought content was extracted from the webapp (n = 140 participants) and coded using newly devised categories: Worries: (1) Persecutory, (2) Negative social evaluation, (3) Negative self-concept, (4) Loss/life stresses, (5) Sensory-perceptual experiences and (6) Health anxieties. Safer thoughts: (1) Safer alternative (specific alternatives to worries), (2) Second-wave (generalised) coping, (3) Positive self-concept, (4) Positive activities and (5) Third-wave (mindfulness-based) coping. Data on therapy fidelity are also presented. RESULTS Worries: 'Persecutory' (92.9% of people) and 'Negative social evaluation' (74.3%) were most common. 'General worries/ life stresses' (31.4%) and 'Negative self-concept' (22.1%) were present in a significant minority; 'Health anxieties' (10%) and 'Sensory-perceptual' (10%) were less common. Safer thoughts: 'Second-wave (general) coping' (85%), 'Safer alternatives' (76.4%), 'Positive self-concept' (65.7%) and 'Positive activities' (64.3%) were common with 'Third-wave' (mindfulness) coping observed for 30%. Fidelity: Only three therapy withdrawals were therapy related. Session adherence was excellent (mean = 15.2/16; SD = 0.9). Behavioural work was conducted with 71% of people (119/168). CONCLUSION SlowMo therapy delivers a targeted yet personalised approach. Potential mechanisms of action extend beyond reasoning. Implications for cognitive models of paranoia and causal interventionist approaches are discussed.
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Affiliation(s)
- Thomas Ward
- Department of PsychologyInstitute of Psychiatry, Psychology and NeuroscienceKing’s College LondonLondonUK,South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation TrustLondonUK
| | - Amy Hardy
- Department of PsychologyInstitute of Psychiatry, Psychology and NeuroscienceKing’s College LondonLondonUK,South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation TrustLondonUK
| | - Rebecca Holm
- Department of PsychologyInstitute of Psychiatry, Psychology and NeuroscienceKing’s College LondonLondonUK
| | - Nicola Collett
- Department of PsychiatryOxford UniversityOxfordUK,Oxford Health NHS Foundation TrustOxfordUK,Oxford Institute of Clinical Psychology Training and ResearchOxford UniversityOxfordUK
| | - Mar Rus‐Calafell
- Department of PsychiatryOxford UniversityOxfordUK,Oxford Health NHS Foundation TrustOxfordUK,Mental Health Research and Treatment CenterFaculty of PsychologyRuhr‐Universität BochumBochumGermany
| | | | | | - Claire Vella
- Sussex Partnership NHS Foundation TrustWorthingUK,School of PsychologyUniversity of SussexBrightonUK
| | - Anna East
- Department of PsychiatryOxford UniversityOxfordUK,Oxford Health NHS Foundation TrustOxfordUK
| | - Michaela Rea
- Department of PsychologyInstitute of Psychiatry, Psychology and NeuroscienceKing’s College LondonLondonUK
| | - Helen Harding
- South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation TrustLondonUK
| | - Richard Emsley
- Department of Biostatistics and Health InformaticsInstitute of Psychiatry, Psychology and NeuroscienceKing’s College LondonLondonUK
| | | | - Daniel Freeman
- Department of PsychiatryOxford UniversityOxfordUK,Oxford Health NHS Foundation TrustOxfordUK
| | - David Fowler
- Sussex Partnership NHS Foundation TrustWorthingUK,School of PsychologyUniversity of SussexBrightonUK
| | - Elizabeth Kuipers
- Department of PsychologyInstitute of Psychiatry, Psychology and NeuroscienceKing’s College LondonLondonUK
| | | | - Philippa Garety
- Department of PsychologyInstitute of Psychiatry, Psychology and NeuroscienceKing’s College LondonLondonUK,South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation TrustLondonUK
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Abstract
Ideological behavior has traditionally been viewed as a product of social forces. Nonetheless, an emerging science suggests that ideological worldviews can also be understood in terms of neural and cognitive principles. The article proposes a neurocognitive model of ideological thinking, arguing that ideological worldviews may be manifestations of individuals' perceptual and cognitive systems. This model makes two claims. First, there are neurocognitive antecedents to ideological thinking: the brain's low-level neurocognitive dispositions influence its receptivity to ideological doctrines. Second, there are neurocognitive consequences to ideological engagement: strong exposure and adherence to ideological doctrines can shape perceptual and cognitive systems. This article details the neurocognitive model of ideological thinking and synthesizes the empirical evidence in support of its claims. The model postulates that there are bidirectional processes between the brain and the ideological environment, and so it can address the roles of situational and motivational factors in ideologically motivated action. This endeavor highlights that an interdisciplinary neurocognitive approach to ideologies can facilitate biologically informed accounts of the ideological brain and thus reveal who is most susceptible to extreme and authoritarian ideologies. By investigating the relationships between low-level perceptual processes and high-level ideological attitudes, we can develop a better grasp of our collective history as well as the mechanisms that may structure our political futures.
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Uher J. Quantitative psychology under scrutiny: Measurement requires not result-dependent but traceable data generation. PERSONALITY AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 2021. [DOI: 10.1016/j.paid.2020.110205] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
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8
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Psychology's Status as a Science: Peculiarities and Intrinsic Challenges. Moving Beyond its Current Deadlock Towards Conceptual Integration. Integr Psychol Behav Sci 2020; 55:212-224. [PMID: 32557115 PMCID: PMC7801307 DOI: 10.1007/s12124-020-09545-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/26/2022]
Abstract
Psychology holds an exceptional position among the sciences. Yet even after 140 years as an independent discipline, psychology is still struggling with its most basic foundations. Its key phenomena, mind and behaviour, are poorly defined (and their definition instead often delegated to neuroscience or philosophy) while specific terms and constructs proliferate. A unified theoretical framework has not been developed and its categorisation as a 'soft science' ascribes to psychology a lower level of scientificity. The article traces these problems to the peculiarities of psychology's study phenomena, their interrelations with and centrality to everyday knowledge and language (which may explain the proliferation and unclarity of terms and concepts), as well as to their complex relations with other study phenomena. It shows that adequate explorations of such diverse kinds of phenomena and their interrelations with the most elusive of all-immediate experience-inherently require a plurality of epistemologies, paradigms, theories, methodologies and methods that complement those developed for the natural sciences. Their systematic integration within just one discipline, made necessary by these phenomena's joint emergence in the single individual as the basic unit of analysis, makes psychology in fact the hardest science of all. But Galtonian nomothetic methodology has turned much of today's psychology into a science of populations rather than individuals, showing that blind adherence to natural-science principles has not advanced but impeded the development of psychology as a science. Finally, the article introduces paradigmatic frameworks that can provide solid foundations for conceptual integration and new developments.
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Uher J. Human uniqueness explored from the uniquely human perspective: Epistemological and methodological challenges. JOURNAL FOR THE THEORY OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 2020. [DOI: 10.1111/jtsb.12232] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/25/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Jana Uher
- School of Human SciencesUniversity of Greenwich United Kingdom
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Systema Temporis: A time-based dimensional framework for consciousness and cognition. Conscious Cogn 2019; 73:102766. [PMID: 31254738 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2019.102766] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/13/2019] [Revised: 06/07/2019] [Accepted: 06/12/2019] [Indexed: 12/11/2022]
Abstract
This study uses a combined categorical-dimensional approach to depict a hierarchical framework for consciousness similar to, and contiguous with, factorial models of cognition (cf., intelligence). On the basis of the longstanding definition of time consciousness, the analysis employs a dimension of temporal extension, in the same manner that psychology has temporally organised memory (i.e., short-term, long-term, and long-lasting memories). By defining temporal extension in terms of the structure of time perception at short timescales (<100 s), memory and time consciousness are proposed to fit along the same logarithmic dimension. This suggests that different forms of time consciousness (e.g., experience, wakefulness, and self-consciousness) are embedded within, or supported by, the ascending timescales of different modes of memory (i.e., short-term, long-term, etc.). A secondary dimension is also proposed to integrate higher-order forms of consciousness/emotion and memory/cognition. The resulting two-dimensional structure accords with existing theories of cognitive and emotional intelligence.
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Uher J, Trofimova I, Sulis W, Netter P, Pessoa L, Posner MI, Rothbart MK, Rusalov V, Peterson IT, Schmidt LA. Diversity in action: exchange of perspectives and reflections on taxonomies of individual differences. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2019; 373:rstb.2017.0172. [PMID: 29483355 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2017.0172] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 01/22/2018] [Indexed: 12/31/2022] Open
Abstract
Throughout the last 2500 years, the classification of individual differences in healthy people and their extreme expressions in mental disorders has remained one of the most difficult challenges in science that affects our ability to explore individuals' functioning, underlying psychobiological processes and pathways of development. To facilitate analyses of the principles required for studying individual differences, this theme issue brought together prominent scholars from diverse backgrounds of which many bring unique combinations of cross-disciplinary experiences and perspectives that help establish connections and promote exchange across disciplines. This final paper presents brief commentaries of some of our authors and further scholars exchanging perspectives and reflecting on the contributions of this theme issue.This article is part of the theme issue 'Diverse perspectives on diversity: multi-disciplinary approaches to taxonomies of individual differences'.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jana Uher
- University of Greenwich, Old Royal Naval College, Park Row, London SE10 9LS, United Kingdom .,London School of Economics, Houghton Street, WC2A 2AE London, United Kingdom
| | - Irina Trofimova
- Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Neurosciences, McMaster University, Canada
| | - William Sulis
- Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Neurosciences, McMaster University, Canada
| | - Petra Netter
- Department of Psychology, University of Giessen, Germany
| | - Luiz Pessoa
- Department of Psychology and Maryland Neuroimaging Center, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, USA
| | | | | | - Vladimir Rusalov
- Institute of Psychology, Russian Academy of Sciences, Druzhinin Laboratory of Abilities, Moscow, Russia
| | - Isaac T Peterson
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of Iowa, USA
| | - Louis A Schmidt
- Department of Psychology, Neuroscience & Behaviour, McMaster University, Canada
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12
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Uher J. Quantitative Data From Rating Scales: An Epistemological and Methodological Enquiry. Front Psychol 2018; 9:2599. [PMID: 30622493 PMCID: PMC6308206 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02599] [Citation(s) in RCA: 20] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/14/2018] [Accepted: 12/03/2018] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Rating scales are popular methods for generating quantitative data directly by persons rather than automated technologies. But scholars increasingly challenge their foundations. This article contributes epistemological and methodological analyses of the processes involved in person-generated quantification. They are crucial for measurement because data analyses can reveal information about study phenomena only if relevant properties were encoded systematically in the data. The Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals (TPS-Paradigm) is applied to explore psychological and social-science concepts of measurement and quantification, including representational measurement theory, psychometric theories and their precursors in psychophysics. These are compared to theories from metrology specifying object-dependence of measurement processes and subject-independence of outcomes as key criteria, which allow tracing data to the instances measured and the ways they were quantified. Separate histories notwithstanding, the article's basic premise is that general principles of scientific measurement and quantification should apply to all sciences. It elaborates principles by which these metrological criteria can be implemented also in psychology and social sciences, while considering their research objects' peculiarities. Application of these principles is illustrated by quantifications of individual-specific behaviors ('personality'). The demands rating methods impose on data-generating persons are deconstructed and compared with the demands involved in other quantitative methods (e.g., ethological observations). These analyses highlight problematic requirements for raters. Rating methods sufficiently specify neither the empirical study phenomena nor the symbolic systems used as data nor rules of assignment between them. Instead, pronounced individual differences in raters' interpretation and use of items and scales indicate considerable subjectivity in data generation. Together with recoding scale categories into numbers, this introduces a twofold break in the traceability of rating data, compromising interpretability of findings. These insights question common reliability and validity concepts for ratings and provide novel explanations for replicability problems. Specifically, rating methods standardize only data formats but not the actual data generation. Measurement requires data generation processes to be adapted to the study phenomena's properties and the measurement-executing persons' abilities and interpretations, rather than to numerical outcome formats facilitating statistical analyses. Researchers must finally investigate how people actually generate ratings to specify the representational systems underlying rating data.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jana Uher
- London School of Economics and Political Science, London, United Kingdom
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13
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Trofimova I, Robbins TW, Sulis WH, Uher J. Taxonomies of psychological individual differences: biological perspectives on millennia-long challenges. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2018; 373:20170152. [PMID: 29483338 PMCID: PMC5832678 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2017.0152] [Citation(s) in RCA: 26] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 12/19/2017] [Indexed: 12/14/2022] Open
Abstract
This Editorial highlights a unique focus of this theme issue on the biological perspectives in deriving psychological taxonomies coming from neurochemistry, neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, genetics, psychiatry, developmental and comparative psychology-as contrasted to more common discussions of socio-cultural concepts (personality) and methods (lexical approach). It points out the importance of the distinction between temperament and personality for studies in human and animal differential psychophysiology, psychiatry and psycho-pharmacology, sport and animal practices during the past century. It also highlights the inability of common statistical methods to handle nonlinear, feedback, contingent, dynamical and multi-level relationships between psychophysiological systems of consistent psychological traits discussed in this theme issue.This article is part of the theme issue 'Diverse perspectives on diversity: multi-disciplinary approaches to taxonomies of individual differences'.
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Affiliation(s)
- I Trofimova
- CILab, McMaster University, 92 Bowman St., Hamilton, ON, Canada, L8S 2T6
| | - T W Robbins
- University of Cambridge, Psychology and Behavioural and Clinical Neuroscience Institute, Cambridge CB2 3EB, UK
| | - W H Sulis
- CILab, McMaster University, 92 Bowman St., Hamilton, ON, Canada, L8S 2T6
| | - J Uher
- University of Greenwich, Old Royal Naval College, Park Row, London SE10 9LS, UK
- London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK
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