1
|
Smith TR, Southern R, Kirkpatrick K. Mechanisms of impulsive choice: Experiments to explore and models to map the empirical terrain. Learn Behav 2023; 51:355-391. [PMID: 36913144 PMCID: PMC10497727 DOI: 10.3758/s13420-023-00577-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 02/16/2023] [Indexed: 03/14/2023]
Abstract
Impulsive choice is preference for a smaller-sooner (SS) outcome over a larger-later (LL) outcome when LL choices result in greater reinforcement maximization. Delay discounting is a model of impulsive choice that describes the decaying value of a reinforcer over time, with impulsive choice evident when the empirical choice-delay function is steep. Steep discounting is correlated with multiple diseases and disorders. Thus, understanding the processes underlying impulsive choice is a popular topic for investigation. Experimental research has explored the conditions that moderate impulsive choice, and quantitative models of impulsive choice have been developed that elegantly represent the underlying processes. This review spotlights experimental research in impulsive choice covering human and nonhuman animals across the domains of learning, motivation, and cognition. Contemporary models of delay discounting designed to explain the underlying mechanisms of impulsive choice are discussed. These models focus on potential candidate mechanisms, which include perception, delay and/or reinforcer sensitivity, reinforcement maximization, motivation, and cognitive systems. Although the models collectively explain multiple mechanistic phenomena, there are several cognitive processes, such as attention and working memory, that are overlooked. Future research and model development should focus on bridging the gap between quantitative models and empirical phenomena.
Collapse
|
2
|
Bourgeois-Gironde S, Addessi E, Boraud T. Economic behaviours among non-human primates. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2021; 376:20190676. [PMID: 33423625 PMCID: PMC7815433 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2019.0676] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 10/12/2020] [Indexed: 12/24/2022] Open
Abstract
Do we have any valid reasons to affirm that non-human primates display economic behaviour in a sufficiently rich and precise sense of the phrase? To address this question, we have to develop a set of criteria to assess the vast array of experimental studies and field observations on individual cognitive and behavioural competences as well as the collective organization of non-human primates. We review a sample of these studies and assess how they answer to the following four main challenges. (i) Do we see any economic organization or institutions emerge among groups of non-human primates? (ii) Are the cognitive abilities, and often biases, that have been evidenced as underlying typical economic decision-making among humans, also present among non-human primates? (iii) Can we draw positive lessons from performance comparisons among primate species, humans and non-humans but also across non-human primate species, as elicited by canonical game-theoretical experimental paradigms, especially as far as economic cooperation and coordination are concerned? And (iv) in which way should we improve models and paradigms to obtain more ecological data and conclusions? Articles discussed in this paper most often bring about positive answers and promising perspectives to support the existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates. This article is part of the theme issue 'Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates'.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde
- Institut Jean Nicod, Département d’études cognitives, ENS, EHESS, CNRS, PSLUniversity, France
| | - Elsa Addessi
- Unità di Primatologia Cognitiva e Centro Primati, Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, 00197 Rome, Italy
| | - Thomas Boraud
- CNRS, UMR 5293, IMN, 33000 Bordeaux, France
- University of Bordeaux, UMR 5293, IMN, 33000, Bordeaux, France
- CHU de Bordeaux, IMN Clinique, 33000 Bordeaux, France
| |
Collapse
|
3
|
Addessi E, Tierno V, Focaroli V, Rossi F, Gastaldi S, De Petrillo F, Paglieri F, Stevens JR. Are capuchin monkeys ( Sapajus spp.) sensitive to lost opportunities? The role of opportunity costs in intertemporal choice. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2021; 376:20190674. [PMID: 33423635 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2019.0674] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Principles of economics predict that the costs associated with obtaining rewards can influence choice. When individuals face choices between a smaller, immediate option and a larger, later option, they often experience opportunity costs associated with waiting for delayed rewards because they must forego the opportunity to make other choices. We evaluated how reducing opportunity costs affects delay tolerance in capuchin monkeys. After choosing the larger option, in the High cost condition, subjects had to wait for the delay to expire, whereas in the Low cost different and Low cost same conditions, they could perform a new choice during the delay. To control for the effect of intake rate on choices, the Low cost same condition had the same intake rate ratio as the High cost condition. We found that capuchins attended both to intake rates and to opportunity costs. They chose the larger option more often in the Low cost different and Low cost same conditions than in the High cost condition, and more often in the Low cost different condition than in the Low cost same condition. Understanding how non-human primates represent and use costs in making decisions not only helps to develop theoretical frameworks to explain their choices but also addresses similarities with and differences from human decision-making. These outcomes provide insights into the origins of human economic behaviour. This article is part of the theme issue 'Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates'.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Elsa Addessi
- Unità di Primatologia Cognitiva e Centro Primati, Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Rome, Italy
| | - Valeria Tierno
- Unità di Primatologia Cognitiva e Centro Primati, Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Rome, Italy.,Department of Psychology, Sapienza Università di Roma, Rome, Italy
| | - Valentina Focaroli
- Unità di Primatologia Cognitiva e Centro Primati, Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Rome, Italy.,Laboratory of Developmental Neuroscience, Università Campus Biomedico, Rome, Italy
| | - Federica Rossi
- Unità di Primatologia Cognitiva e Centro Primati, Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Rome, Italy
| | - Serena Gastaldi
- Unità di Primatologia Cognitiva e Centro Primati, Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Rome, Italy
| | - Francesca De Petrillo
- Unità di Primatologia Cognitiva e Centro Primati, Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Rome, Italy.,Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, Toulouse, France.,Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
| | - Fabio Paglieri
- Goal-Oriented Agents Lab, Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Rome, Italy
| | - Jeffrey R Stevens
- Department of Psychology, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Lincoln, NE, USA
| |
Collapse
|
4
|
Brosnan SF. What behaviour in economic games tells us about the evolution of non-human species' economic decision-making behaviour. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2021; 376:20190670. [PMID: 33423638 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2019.0670] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/17/2023] Open
Abstract
In the past decade, there has been a surge of interest in using games derived from experimental economics to test decision-making behaviour across species. In most cases, researchers are using the games as a tool, for instance, to understand what factors influence decision-making, how decision-making differs across species or contexts, or to ask broader questions about species' propensities to cooperate or compete. These games have been quite successful in this regard. To what degree, however, do these games tap into species' economic decision-making? For the purpose of understanding the evolution of economic systems in humans, this is the key question. To study this, we can break economic decision-making down into smaller components, each of which is a potential step in the evolution of human economic behaviour. We can then use data from economic games, which are simplified, highly structured models of decision-making and therefore ideal for the comparative approach, to directly compare these components across species and contexts, as well as in relation to more naturalistic behaviours, to better understand the evolution of economic behaviour and the social and ecological contexts that influenced it. The comparative approach has successfully informed us about the evolution of other complex traits, such as language and morality, and should help us more deeply understand why and how human economic systems evolved. This article is part of the theme issue 'Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates'.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Sarah F Brosnan
- Departments of Psychology & Philosophy, Neuroscience Institute, Center for Behavioral Neuroscience, Language Research Center, Georgia State University, PO Box 5010, Atlanta, GA 30302-5010, USA
| |
Collapse
|