Reafference and the origin of the self in early nervous system evolution

Form, function, mind: What doesn't compute (and what might)

The applicability of computational and dynamical systems models to organisms is scrutinized, using examples from developmental biology and cognition. Developmental morphogenesis is dependent on the inherent material properties of developing animal (metazoan) tissues, a non-computational modality, but cell differentiation, which utilizes chromatin-based revisable memory banks and program-like function-calling, via the developmental gene co-expression system unique to the metazoans, has a quasi-computational basis. Multi-attractor dynamical models are argued to be misapplied to global properties of development, and it is suggested that along with computationalism, classic forms of dynamicism are similarly unsuitable to accounting for cognitive phenomena. Proposals are made for treating brains and other nervous tissues as novel forms of excitable matter with inherent properties which enable the intensification of cell-based basal cognition capabilities present throughout the tree of life. Finally, some connections are drawn between the viewpoint described here and active inference models of cognition, such as the Free Energy Principle.

An embodied approach to fetal and newborn perceptual and sensorimotor development

The embodied approach argues that interaction with the environment plays a crucial role in brain development and that the presence of sensory effects generated by movements is fundamental. The movement of the fetus is initially random. Then, the repeated execution of the movement creates a link between it and its sensory effects, allowing the selection of movements that produce expected sensations. During fetal life, the brain develops from a transitory fetal circuit to the permanent cortical circuit, which completes development after birth. Accordingly, this process must concern the interaction of the fetus with the intrauterine environment and of the newborn with the new aerial environment, which provides a new sensory stimulation, light. The goal of the present review is to provide suggestions for neuroscientific research capable of shedding light on brain development process by describing from a functional point of view the relationship between the motor and sensory abilities of fetuses and newborns and the increasing complexity of their interaction with objects in the womb and outside of it.

An evaluation of the xenobotic cognitive project: Towards Stage 1 of xenobotic cognition

Xenobot, the world's first biological robot, puts numerous philosophical riddles before us. One among them pertains to the cognitive status of these entities. Are these biological robots cognitive? To evaluate the cognitive status of xenobots and to resolve the puzzle of a single mind emerging from smaller sub-units, in this article, I juxtapose the cognitive capacities of xenobots with that of two other minimal models of cognition, i.e., basal cognition and nonliving active matter cognition. Further, the article underlines the essential cognitive capabilities that xenobots need to achieve to enter what I call stage 1 of xenobotic cognition. Stage 1 is characterized by numerous cognitive mechanisms, which are integral for the survival and cognition of basal organisms. Finally, I suggest that developing xenobots that can reach Stage 1 can help us achieve sophistication in the areas of evolution of the human mind, robotics, biology and medicine, and artificial intelligence (AI).

Music performance as knowledge acquisition: a review and preliminary conceptual framework

To what extent does playing a musical instrument contribute to an individual's construction of knowledge? This paper aims to address this question by examining music performance from an embodied perspective and offering a narrative-style review of the main literature on the topic. Drawing from both older theoretical frameworks on motor learning and more recent theories on sensorimotor coupling and integration, this paper seeks to challenge and juxtapose established ideas with contemporary views inspired by recent work on embodied cognitive science. By doing so we advocate a centripetal approach to music performance, contrasting the prevalent centrifugal perspective: the sounds produced during performance not only originate from bodily action (centrifugal), but also cyclically return to it (centripetal). This perspective suggests that playing music involves a dynamic integration of both external and internal factors, transcending mere output-oriented actions and revealing music performance as a form of knowledge acquisition based on real-time sensorimotor experience.

Active oscillations in microscale navigation

Living organisms routinely navigate their surroundings in search of better conditions, more food, or to avoid predators. Typically, animals do so by integrating sensory cues from the environment with their locomotor apparatuses. For single cells or small organisms that possess motility, fundamental physical constraints imposed by their small size have led to alternative navigation strategies that are specific to the microscopic world. Intriguingly, underlying these myriad exploratory behaviours or sensory functions is the onset of periodic activity at multiple scales, such as the undulations of cilia and flagella, the vibrations of hair cells, or the oscillatory shape modes of migrating neutrophils. Here, I explore oscillatory dynamics in basal microeukaryotes and hypothesize that these active oscillations play a critical role in enhancing the fidelity of adaptive sensorimotor integration.

Toward a formal theory for computing machines made out of whatever physics offers

Approaching limitations of digital computing technologies have spurred research in neuromorphic and other unconventional approaches to computing. Here we argue that if we want to engineer unconventional computing systems in a systematic way, we need guidance from a formal theory that is different from the classical symbolic-algorithmic Turing machine theory. We propose a general strategy for developing such a theory, and within that general view, a specific approach that we call fluent computing. In contrast to Turing, who modeled computing processes from a top-down perspective as symbolic reasoning, we adopt the scientific paradigm of physics and model physical computing systems bottom-up by formalizing what can ultimately be measured in a physical computing system. This leads to an understanding of computing as the structuring of processes, while classical models of computing systems describe the processing of structures.

Why it hurts: with freedom comes the biological need for pain

We argue that pain is not needed to protect the body from damage unless the organism is able to make free choices in action selection. Then pain (including its affective and evaluative aspects) provides a necessary prioritising motivation to select actions expected to avoid it, whilst leaving the possibility of alternative actions to serve potentially higher priorities. Thus, on adaptive grounds, only organisms having free choice over action selection should experience pain. Free choice implies actions must be selected following appraisal of their effects, requiring a predictive model generating estimates of action outcomes. These features give organisms anticipatory behavioural autonomy (ABA), for which we propose a plausible system using an internal predictive model, integrated into a system able to produce the qualitative and affective aspects of pain. Our hypothesis can be tested using behavioural experiments designed to elicit trade-off responses to novel experiences for which algorithmic (automaton) responses might be inappropriate. We discuss the empirical evidence for our hypothesis among taxonomic groups, showing how testing for ABA guides thinking on which groups might experience pain. It is likely that all vertebrates do and plausible that some invertebrates do (decapods, cephalopods and at least some insects).

Entropy and Cross-Level Orderliness in Light of the Interconnection between the Neural System and Consciousness

Despite recent advances, the origin and utility of consciousness remains under debate. Using an evolutionary perspective on the origin of consciousness, this review elaborates on the promising theoretical background suggested in the temporospatial theory of consciousness, which outlines world-brain alignment as a critical predisposition for controlling behavior and adaptation. Such a system can be evolutionarily effective only if it can provide instant cohesion between the subsystems, which is possible only if it performs an intrinsic activity modified in light of the incoming stimulation. One can assume that the world-brain interaction results in a particular interference pattern predetermined by connectome complexity. This is what organisms experience as their exclusive subjective state, allowing the anticipation of regularities in the environment. Thus, an anticipative system can emerge only in a regular environment, which guides natural selection by reinforcing corresponding reactions and decreasing the system entropy. Subsequent evolution requires complicated, layered structures and can be traced from simple organisms to human consciousness and society. This allows us to consider the mode of entropy as a subject of natural evolution rather than an individual entity.

In search for consciousness in animals: Using working memory and voluntary attention as behavioral indicators

Whether animals have subjective experiences about the content of their sensory input, i.e., whether they are aware of stimuli, is a notoriously difficult question to answer. If consciousness is present in animals, it must share fundamental characteristics with human awareness. Working memory and voluntary/endogenous attention are suggested as diagnostic features of conscious awareness. Behavioral evidence shows clear signatures of both working memory and voluntary attention as minimal criterium for sensory consciousness in mammals and birds. In contrast, reptiles and amphibians show no sign of either working memory or volitional attention. Surprisingly, some species of teleost fishes exhibit elementary working memory and voluntary attention effects suggestive of possibly rudimentary forms of subjective experience. With the potential exception of honeybees, evidence for conscious processing is lacking in invertebrates. These findings suggest that consciousness is not ubiquitous in the animal kingdom but also not exclusive to humans. The phylogenetic gap between animal taxa argues that evolution does not rely on specific neural substrates to endow distantly related species with basic forms of consciousness.

Dynamic Interrogation of Stochastic Transcriptome Trajectories Using Disease Associated Genes Reveals Distinct Origins of Neurological and Psychiatric Disorders

The advent of open access to genomic data offers new opportunities to revisit old clinical debates while approaching them from a different angle. We examine anew the question of whether psychiatric and neurological disorders are different from each other by assessing the pool of genes associated with disorders that are understood as psychiatric or as neurological. We do so in the context of transcriptome data tracked as human embryonic stem cells differentiate and become neurons. Building upon probabilistic layers of increasing complexity, we describe the dynamics and stochastic trajectories of the full transcriptome and the embedded genes associated with psychiatric and/or neurological disorders. From marginal distributions of a gene’s expression across hundreds of cells, to joint interactions taken globally to determine degree of pairwise dependency, to networks derived from probabilistic graphs along maximal spanning trees, we have discovered two fundamentally different classes of genes underlying these disorders and differentiating them. One class of genes boasts higher variability in expression and lower dependencies (High Expression Variability-HEV genes); the other has lower variability and higher dependencies (Low Expression Variability-LEV genes). They give rise to different network architectures and different transitional states. HEV genes have large hubs and a fragile topology, whereas LEV genes show more distributed code during the maturation toward neuronal state. LEV genes boost differentiation between psychiatric and neurological disorders also at the level of tissue across the brain, spinal cord, and glands. These genes, with their low variability and asynchronous ON/OFF states that have been treated as gross data and excluded from traditional analyses, are helping us settle this old argument at more than one level of inquiry.

Gesture-vocal coupling in Karnatak music performance: A neuro-bodily distributed aesthetic entanglement

In many musical styles, vocalists manually gesture while they sing. Coupling between gesture kinematics and vocalization has been examined in speech contexts, but it is an open question how these couple in music making. We examine this in a corpus of South Indian, Karnatak vocal music that includes motion-capture data. Through peak magnitude analysis (linear mixed regression) and continuous time-series analyses (generalized additive modeling), we assessed whether vocal trajectories around peaks in vertical velocity, speed, or acceleration were coupling with changes in vocal acoustics (namely, F0 and amplitude). Kinematic coupling was stronger for F0 change versus amplitude, pointing to F0's musical significance. Acceleration was the most predictive for F0 change and had the most reliable magnitude coupling, showing a one-third power relation. That acceleration, rather than other kinematics, is maximally predictive for vocalization is interesting because acceleration entails force transfers onto the body. As a theoretical contribution, we argue that gesturing in musical contexts should be understood in relation to the physical connections between gesturing and vocal production that are brought into harmony with the vocalists' (enculturated) performance goals. Gesture-vocal coupling should, therefore, be viewed as a neuro-bodily distributed aesthetic entanglement.

Musical Enjoyment and Reward: From Hedonic Pleasure to Eudaimonic Listening

This article is a hypothesis and theory paper. It elaborates on the possible relation between music as a stimulus and its possible effects, with a focus on the question of why listeners are experiencing pleasure and reward. Though it is tempting to seek for a causal relationship, this has proven to be elusive given the many intermediary variables that intervene between the actual impingement on the senses and the reactions/responses by the listener. A distinction can be made, however, between three elements: (i) an objective description of the acoustic features of the music and their possible role as elicitors; (ii) a description of the possible modulating factors—both external/exogenous and internal/endogenous ones; and (iii) a continuous and real-time description of the responses by the listener, both in terms of their psychological reactions and their physiological correlates. Music listening, in this broadened view, can be considered as a multivariate phenomenon of biological, psychological, and cultural factors that, together, shape the overall, full-fledged experience. In addition to an overview of the current and extant research on musical enjoyment and reward, we draw attention to some key methodological problems that still complicate a full description of the musical experience. We further elaborate on how listening may entail both adaptive and maladaptive ways of coping with the sounds, with the former allowing a gentle transition from mere hedonic pleasure to eudaimonic enjoyment.

Naturalising Agent Causation

The idea of agent causation—that a system such as a living organism can be a cause of things in the world—is often seen as mysterious and deemed to be at odds with the physicalist thesis that is now commonly embraced in science and philosophy. Instead, the causal power of organisms is attributed to mechanistic components within the system or derived from the causal activity at the lowest level of physical description. In either case, the ‘agent’ itself (i.e., the system as a whole) is left out of the picture entirely, and agent causation is explained away. We argue that this is not the right way to think about causation in biology or in systems more generally. We present a framework of eight criteria that we argue, collectively, describe a system that overcomes the challenges concerning agent causality in an entirely naturalistic and non-mysterious way. They are: (1) thermodynamic autonomy, (2) persistence, (3) endogenous activity, (4) holistic integration, (5) low-level indeterminacy, (6) multiple realisability, (7) historicity, (8) agent-level normativity. Each criterion is taken to be dimensional rather than categorical, and thus we conclude with a short discussion on how researchers working on quantifying agency may use this multidimensional framework to situate and guide their research.

Evolutionary origin and the development of consciousness

This review seeks to combine advances in anthropology and neuroscience to investigate the adaptive value of human consciousness. It uses an interdisciplinary perspective on the origin of consciousness to refute the most common fallacies in considering consciousness, particularly, disregarding the evolutionary origin of the subjective reality in looking for the neural correlates of consciousness and divorcing studies in neuroscience and behavioural sciences. Various explanations linked to consciousness in the field of neuroscience, supplemented with the theoretical explanation of an experience as an ongoing process of overlap between intrinsic neural dynamics and stimulation can be summarised as the stochastic dynamics of one's control system experienced by the individual in the form of subjective reality. This framework elaborates on the world-brain research program and lays foundation for the quantitative description of one's qualitative feelings and naturalistic science of consciousness. Furthermore, this study highlights the philosophical perspective of the inseparability between the physical correlates and the subjective reality contributing to the realistic ontology of conscious processes.

The Efference Copy Signal as a Key Mechanism for Consciousness

Animals need to distinguish sensory input caused by their own movement from sensory input which is due to stimuli in the outside world. This can be done by an efference copy mechanism, a carbon copy of the movement-command that is routed to sensory structures. Here I tried to link the mechanism of the efference copy with the idea of the philosopher Thomas Reid that the senses would have a double province, to make us feel, and to make us perceive, and that, as argued by psychologist Nicholas Humphrey, the former would identify with the signals from bodily sense organs with an internalized evaluative response, i.e., with phenomenal consciousness. I discussed a possible departure from the classical implementation of the efference copy mechanism that can effectively provide the senses with such a double province, and possibly allow us some progress in understanding the nature of consciousness.

Back to square one: the bodily roots of conscious experiences in early life

Most theoretical and empirical discussions about the nature of consciousness are typically couched in a way that endorses a tacit adult-centric and vision-based perspective. This paper defends the idea that consciousness science may be put on a fruitful track for its next phase by examining the nature of subjective experiences through a bottom-up developmental lens. We draw attention to the intrinsic link between consciousness, experiences and experiencing subjects, which are first and foremost embodied and situated organisms essentially concerned with self-preservation within a precarious environment. Our paper suggests that in order to understand what consciousness 'is', one should first tackle the fundamental question: how do embodied experiences 'arise' from square one? We then highlight one key yet overlooked aspect of human consciousness studies, namely that the earliest and closest environment of an embodied experiencing subject is the body of another human experiencing subject. We present evidence speaking in favour of fairly sophisticated forms of early sensorimotor integration of bodily signals and self-generated actions already being established in utero. We conclude that these primitive and fundamentally relational and co-embodied roots of our early experiences may have a crucial impact on the way human beings consciously experience the self, body and the world across their lifespan.

Towards the Idea of Molecular Brains

How can single cells without nervous systems perform complex behaviours such as habituation, associative learning and decision making, which are considered the hallmark of animals with a brain? Are there molecular systems that underlie cognitive properties equivalent to those of the brain? This review follows the development of the idea of molecular brains from Darwin’s “root brain hypothesis”, through bacterial chemotaxis, to the recent discovery of neuron-like r-protein networks in the ribosome. By combining a structural biology view with a Bayesian brain approach, this review explores the evolutionary labyrinth of information processing systems across scales. Ribosomal protein networks open a window into what were probably the earliest signalling systems to emerge before the radiation of the three kingdoms. While ribosomal networks are characterised by long-lasting interactions between their protein nodes, cell signalling networks are essentially based on transient interactions. As a corollary, while signals propagated in persistent networks may be ephemeral, networks whose interactions are transient constrain signals diffusing into the cytoplasm to be durable in time, such as post-translational modifications of proteins or second messenger synthesis. The duration and nature of the signals, in turn, implies different mechanisms for the integration of multiple signals and decision making. Evolution then reinvented networks with persistent interactions with the development of nervous systems in metazoans. Ribosomal protein networks and simple nervous systems display architectural and functional analogies whose comparison could suggest scale invariance in information processing. At the molecular level, the significant complexification of eukaryotic ribosomal protein networks is associated with a burst in the acquisition of new conserved aromatic amino acids. Knowing that aromatic residues play a critical role in allosteric receptors and channels, this observation suggests a general role of π systems and their interactions with charged amino acids in multiple signal integration and information processing. We think that these findings may provide the molecular basis for designing future computers with organic processors.

The Shared Origins of Embodiment and Development

As a domain of study centering on the nature of the body in the functioning of the individual organism, embodiment encompasses a diverse array of topics and questions. One useful organizing framework places embodiment as a bridge construct connecting three standpoints on the body: the form of the body, the body as actively engaged in and with the world, and the body as lived experience. Through connecting these standpoints, the construct of embodiment shows that they are not mutually exclusive: inherent in form is the capacity for engagement, and inherent in engagement is a lived perspective that confers agency and meaning. Here, we employ this framework to underscore the deep connections between embodiment and development. We begin with a discussion of the origins of multicellularity, highlighting how the evolution of bodies was the evolution of development itself. The evolution of the metazoan (animal) body is of particular interest, because most animals possess complex bodies with sensorimotor capacities for perceiving and acting that bring forth a particular sort of embodiment. However, we also emphasize that the thread of embodiment runs through all living things, which share an organizational property of self-determination that endows them with a specific kind of autonomy. This realization moves us away from a Cartesian machine metaphor and instead puts an emphasis on the lived perspective that arises from being embodied. This broad view of embodiment presents opportunities to transcend the boundaries of individual disciplines to create a novel integrative vision for the scientific study of development.

Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution

Predictive processing approaches to brain function are increasingly delivering promise for illuminating the computational underpinnings of a wide range of phenomenological states. It remains unclear, however, whether predictive processing is equipped to accommodate a theory of consciousness itself. Furthermore, objectors have argued that without specification of the core computational mechanisms of consciousness, predictive processing is unable to inform the attribution of consciousness to other non-human (biological and artificial) systems. In this paper, I argue that an account of consciousness in the predictive brain is within reach via recent accounts of phenomenal self-modelling in the active inference framework. The central claim here is that phenomenal consciousness is underpinned by 'subjective valuation'-a deep inference about the precision or 'predictability' of the self-evidencing ('fitness-promoting') outcomes of action. Based on this account, I argue that this approach can critically inform the distribution of experience in other systems, paying particular attention to the complex sensory attenuation mechanisms associated with deep self-models. I then consider an objection to the account: several recent papers argue that theories of consciousness that invoke self-consciousness as constitutive or necessary for consciousness are undermined by states (or traits) of 'selflessness'; in particular the 'totally selfless' states of ego-dissolution occasioned by psychedelic drugs. Drawing on existing work that accounts for psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution in the active inference framework, I argue that these states do not threaten to undermine an active inference theory of consciousness. Instead, these accounts corroborate the view that subjective valuation is the constitutive facet of experience, and they highlight the potential of psychedelic research to inform consciousness science, computational psychiatry and computational phenomenology.

Elementary nervous systems

The evolutionary origin of the nervous system has been a matter of long-standing debate. This is due to the different perspectives taken. Earlier studies addressed nervous system origins at the cellular level. They focused on the selective advantage of the first neuron in its local context, and considered vertical sensory-motor reflex arcs the first nervous system. Later studies emphasized the value of the nervous system at the tissue level. Rather than acting locally, early neurons were seen as part of an elementary nerve net that enabled the horizontal coordination of tissue movements. Opinions have also differed on the nature of effector cells. While most authors have favoured contractile systems, others see the key output of the incipient nervous system in the coordination of motile cilia, or the secretion of antimicrobial peptides. I will discuss these divergent views and explore how they can be validated by molecular and single-cell data. From this survey, possible consensus emerges: (i) the first manifestation of the nervous system likely was a nerve net, whereas specialized local circuits evolved later; (ii) different nerve nets may have evolved for the coordination of contractile or cilia-driven movements; (iii) all evolving nerve nets facilitated new forms of animal behaviour with increasing body size. This article is part of the theme issue 'Basal cognition: multicellularity, neurons and the cognitive lens'.

Uncovering cognitive similarities and differences, conservation and innovation

This article is part of the theme issue 'Basal cognition: multicellularity, neurons and the cognitive lens'.

Evolutionary transitions in learning and cognition

We define a cognitive system as a system that can learn, and adopt an evolutionary-transition-oriented framework for analysing different types of neural cognition. This enables us to classify types of cognition and point to the continuities and discontinuities among them. The framework we use for studying evolutionary transitions in learning capacities focuses on qualitative changes in the integration, storage and use of neurally processed information. Although there are always grey areas around evolutionary transitions, we recognize five major neural transitions, the first two of which involve animals at the base of the phylogenetic tree: (i) the evolutionary transition from learning in non-neural animals to learning in the first neural animals; (ii) the transition to animals showing limited, elemental associative learning, entailing neural centralization and primary brain differentiation; (iii) the transition to animals capable of unlimited associative learning, which, on our account, constitutes sentience and entails hierarchical brain organization and dedicated memory and value networks; (iv) the transition to imaginative animals that can plan and learn through selection among virtual events; and (v) the transition to human symbol-based cognition and cultural learning. The focus on learning provides a unifying framework for experimental and theoretical studies of cognition in the living world. This article is part of the theme issue 'Basal cognition: multicellularity, neurons and the cognitive lens'.