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Cavaliere M, Yang G, De Dreu CKW, Gross J. Cooperation and social organization depend on weighing private and public reputations. Sci Rep 2024; 14:16443. [PMID: 39014019 PMCID: PMC11252375 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-024-67080-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/02/2024] [Accepted: 07/08/2024] [Indexed: 07/18/2024] Open
Abstract
To avoid exploitation by defectors, people can use past experiences with others when deciding to cooperate or not ('private information'). Alternatively, people can derive others' reputation from 'public' information provided by individuals within the social network. However, public information may be aligned or misaligned with one's own private experiences and different individuals, such as 'friends' and 'enemies', may have different opinions about the reputation of others. Using evolutionary agent-based simulations, we examine how cooperation and social organization is shaped when agents (1) prioritize private or public information about others' reputation, and (2) integrate others' opinions using a friend-focused or a friend-and-enemy focused heuristic (relying on reputation information from only friends or also enemies, respectively). When agents prioritize public information and rely on friend-and-enemy heuristics, we observe polarization cycles marked by high cooperation, invasion by defectors, and subsequent population fragmentation. Prioritizing private information diminishes polarization and defector invasions, but also results in limited cooperation. Only when using friend-focused heuristics and following past experiences or the recommendation of friends create prosperous and stable populations based on cooperation. These results show how combining one's own experiences and the opinions of friends can lead to stable and large-scale cooperation and highlight the important role of following the advice of friends in the evolution of group cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Matteo Cavaliere
- Department of Physics, Informatics and Mathematics, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Modena, Italy.
| | - Guoli Yang
- Department of Big Data Intelligence, Advanced Institute of Big Data, Beijing, 100195, China
| | - Carsten K W De Dreu
- Faculty of Behavioral and Social Sciences, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
- Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
- Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology Unit, German Primate Center, Leibniz Institute for Primate Research, Göttingen, Germany
| | - Jörg Gross
- Department of Psychology, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
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2
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Butterworth J, Smerdon D, Baumeister R, von Hippel W. Cooperation in the Time of COVID. PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2024; 19:640-651. [PMID: 37384624 PMCID: PMC10311366 DOI: 10.1177/17456916231178719] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 07/01/2023]
Abstract
Humans evolved to be hyper-cooperative, particularly when among people who are well known to them, when relationships involve reciprocal helping opportunities, and when the costs to the helper are substantially less than the benefits to the recipient. Because humans' cooperative nature evolved over many millennia when they lived exclusively in small groups, factors that cause cooperation to break down tend to be those associated with life in large, impersonal, modern societies: when people are not identifiable, when interactions are one-off, when self-interest is not tied to the interests of others, and when people are concerned that others might free ride. From this perspective, it becomes clear that policies for managing pandemics will be most effective when they highlight superordinate goals and connect people or institutions to one another over multiple identifiable interactions. When forging such connections is not possible, policies should mimic critical components of ancestral conditions by providing reputational markers for cooperators and reducing the systemic damage caused by free riding. In this article, we review policies implemented during the pandemic, highlighting spontaneous community efforts that leveraged these aspects of people's evolved psychology, and consider implications for future decision makers.
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3
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Schnell E, Muthukrishna M. Indirect reciprocity undermines indirect reciprocity destabilizing large-scale cooperation. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2024; 121:e2322072121. [PMID: 38683991 PMCID: PMC11087788 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2322072121] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/14/2023] [Accepted: 04/01/2024] [Indexed: 05/02/2024] Open
Abstract
Previous models suggest that indirect reciprocity (reputation) can stabilize large-scale human cooperation [K. Panchanathan, R. Boyd, Nature 432, 499-502 (2004)]. The logic behind these models and experiments [J. Gross et al., Sci. Adv. 9, eadd8289 (2023) and O. P. Hauser, A. Hendriks, D. G. Rand, M. A. Nowak, Sci. Rep. 6, 36079 (2016)] is that a strategy in which individuals conditionally aid others based on their reputation for engaging in costly cooperative behavior serves as a punishment that incentivizes large-scale cooperation without the second-order free-rider problem. However, these models and experiments fail to account for individuals belonging to multiple groups with reputations that can be in conflict. Here, we extend these models such that individuals belong to a smaller, "local" group embedded within a larger, "global" group. This introduces competing strategies for conditionally aiding others based on their cooperative behavior in the local or global group. Our analyses reveal that the reputation for cooperation in the smaller local group can undermine cooperation in the larger global group, even when the theoretical maximum payoffs are higher in the larger global group. This model reveals that indirect reciprocity alone is insufficient for stabilizing large-scale human cooperation because cooperation at one scale can be considered defection at another. These results deepen the puzzle of large-scale human cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Eric Schnell
- Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, LondonWC2A 2AE, United Kingdom
| | - Michael Muthukrishna
- Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, LondonWC2A 2AE, United Kingdom
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4
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Simpson B, Montgomery B, Melamed D. Reputations for treatment of outgroup members can prevent the emergence of political segregation in cooperative networks. Nat Commun 2023; 14:7721. [PMID: 38001105 PMCID: PMC10674010 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-023-43486-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/14/2022] [Accepted: 11/09/2023] [Indexed: 11/26/2023] Open
Abstract
Reputation systems promote cooperation and tie formation in social networks. But how reputations affect cooperation and the evolution of networks is less clear when societies are characterized by fundamental, identity-based, social divisions like those centered on politics in the contemporary U.S. Using a large web-based experiment with participants (N = 1073) embedded in networks where each tie represents the opportunity to play a dyadic iterated prisoners' dilemma, we investigate how cooperation and network segregation varies with whether and how reputation systems track behavior toward members of the opposing political party (outgroup members). As predicted, when participants know others' political affiliation, early cooperation patterns show ingroup favoritism. As a result, networks become segregated based on politics. However, such ingroup favoritism and network-level political segregation is reduced in conditions in which participants know how others behave towards participants from both their own party and participants from the other party. These findings have implications for our understanding of reputation systems in polarized contexts.
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Affiliation(s)
- Brent Simpson
- Department of Sociology, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC, 29208, USA.
| | - Bradley Montgomery
- Department of Sociology, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, 43210, USA
| | - David Melamed
- Department of Sociology, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, 43210, USA.
- Translational Data Analytics Institute, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, 43210, USA.
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5
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Xie E, Li K, Gu R, Zhang D, Li X. Verbal information exchange enhances collective performance through increasing group identification. Neuroimage 2023; 279:120339. [PMID: 37611814 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2023.120339] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/22/2023] [Revised: 08/05/2023] [Accepted: 08/21/2023] [Indexed: 08/25/2023] Open
Abstract
Information exchange is a key factor in the attainment of collective outcomes and the navigation of social life. In the current study, we investigated whether and how information exchange enhanced collective performance by combining behavioral and neuroimaging approaches from the perspective of multiparticipant neuroscience. To evaluate collective performance, we measured the collaborative problem-solving abilities of triads working on a murder mystery case. We first found that verbal information exchange significantly enhanced collective performance compared to nonverbal exchange. Moreover, both group sharing and group discussion positively contributed to this effect, with group discussion being more essential. Importantly, group identification mediated the positive effect of verbal information exchange on collective performance. This mediation was supported by higher interactive frequency and enhanced within-group neural synchronization (GNS) in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). Taken together, we provided a multiparticipant theoretical model to explain how verbal information exchange enhanced collective performance. Our findings deepen the insight into the workings of group decision-making.
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Affiliation(s)
- Enhui Xie
- Shanghai Key Laboratory of Mental Health and Psychological Crisis Intervention, Affiliated Mental Health Center (ECNU), School of Psychology and Cognitive Science, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062, China
| | - Keshuang Li
- Shanghai Key Laboratory of Mental Health and Psychological Crisis Intervention, Affiliated Mental Health Center (ECNU), School of Psychology and Cognitive Science, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062, China
| | - Ruolei Gu
- CAS Key Laboratory of Behavioral Science, Institute of Psychology, Beijing 100101, China
| | - Dandan Zhang
- Institute of Brain and Psychological Sciences, Sichuan Normal University, Chengdu, China
| | - Xianchun Li
- Shanghai Key Laboratory of Mental Health and Psychological Crisis Intervention, Affiliated Mental Health Center (ECNU), School of Psychology and Cognitive Science, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062, China; Shanghai Changning Mental Health Center, Shanghai 200335, China; Institute of Wisdom in China, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062, China.
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6
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Goodman JR, Caines A, Foley RA. Shibboleth: An agent-based model of signalling mimicry. PLoS One 2023; 18:e0289333. [PMID: 37523380 PMCID: PMC10389733 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0289333] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/02/2022] [Accepted: 07/17/2023] [Indexed: 08/02/2023] Open
Abstract
Mimicry is an essential strategy for exploiting competitors in competitive co-evolutionary relationships. Protection against mimicry may, furthermore, be a driving force in human linguistic diversity: the potential harm caused by failing to detect mimicked group-identity signals may select for high sensitivity to mimicry of honest group members. Here we describe the results of five agent-based models that simulate multi-generational interactions between two groups of individuals: original members of a group with an honest identity signal, and members of an outsider group who mimic that signal, aiming to pass as members of the in-group. The models correspond to the Biblical story of Shibboleth, where a tribe in conflict with another determines tribe affiliation by asking individuals to pronounce the word, 'Shibboleth.' In the story, failure to reproduce the word phonetically resulted in death. Here, we run five different versions of a 'Shibboleth' model: a first, simple version, which evaluates whether a composite variable of mimicry quality and detection quality is a superior predictor to the model's outcome than is cost of detection. The models thereafter evaluate variations on the simple model, incorporating group-level behaviours such as altruistic punishment. Our results suggest that group members' sensitivity to mimicry of the Shibboleth-signal is a better predictor of whether any signal of group identity goes into fixation in the overall population than is the cost of mimicry detection. Thus, the likelihood of being detected as a mimic may be more important than the costs imposed on mimics who are detected. This suggests that theoretical models in biology should place greater emphasis on the likelihood of detection, which does not explicitly entail costs, rather than on the costs to individuals who are detected. From a language learning perspective, the results suggest that admission to group membership through linguistic signals is powered by the ability to imitate and evade detection as an outsider by existing group members.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jonathan R Goodman
- Leverhulme Centre for Human Evolutionary Studies, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom
- Darwin College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom
| | - Andrew Caines
- ALTA Institute, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom
| | - Robert A Foley
- Leverhulme Centre for Human Evolutionary Studies, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom
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7
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Garfield ZH, Ringen EJ, Buckner W, Medupe D, Wrangham RW, Glowacki L. Norm violations and punishments across human societies. EVOLUTIONARY HUMAN SCIENCES 2023; 5:e11. [PMID: 37587937 PMCID: PMC10426015 DOI: 10.1017/ehs.2023.7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/18/2022] [Revised: 03/17/2023] [Accepted: 04/01/2023] [Indexed: 08/18/2023] Open
Abstract
Punishments for norm violations are hypothesised to be a crucial component of the maintenance of cooperation in humans but are rarely studied from a comparative perspective. We investigated the degree to which punishment systems were correlated with socioecology and cultural history. We took data from the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample database and coded ethnographic documents from a sample of 131 largely non-industrial societies. We recorded whether punishment for norm violations concerned adultery, religion, food, rape or war cowardice and whether sanctions were reputational, physical, material or execution. We used Bayesian phylogenetic regression modelling to test for culture-level covariation. We found little evidence of phylogenetic signals in evidence for punishment types, suggesting that punishment systems change relatively quickly over cultural evolutionary history. We found evidence that reputational punishment was associated with egalitarianism and the absence of food storage; material punishment was associated with the presence of food storage; physical punishment was moderately associated with greater dependence on hunting; and execution punishment was moderately associated with social stratification. Taken together, our results suggest that the role and kind of punishment vary both by the severity of the norm violation, but also by the specific socio-economic system of the society.
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Affiliation(s)
- Zachary H. Garfield
- Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, Université de Toulouse 1 Capitole, Toulouse, France
| | - Erik J. Ringen
- Department of Anthropology, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - William Buckner
- Department of Anthropology, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA
| | - Dithapelo Medupe
- Department of Anthropology, Pennsylvania State University, PA, USA
| | | | - Luke Glowacki
- Department of Anthropology, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA
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8
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David-Barrett T. Clustering drives cooperation on reputation networks, all else fixed. ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2023; 10:230046. [PMID: 37122944 PMCID: PMC10130726 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.230046] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/16/2023] [Accepted: 04/03/2023] [Indexed: 05/03/2023]
Abstract
Reputation-based cooperation on social networks offers a causal mechanism between graph properties and social trust. Using a simple model, this paper demonstrates the underlying mechanism in a way that is accessible to scientists not specializing in networks or mathematics. The paper shows that when the size and degree of the network is fixed (i.e. all graphs have the same number of agents, who all have the same number of connections), it is the clustering coefficient that drives differences in how cooperative social networks are.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tamas David-Barrett
- Trinity College, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 3BH, UK
- Population Studies Institute, Helsinki 00101, Finland
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9
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Tan H, Jiang T, Ma N. Why do people gossip? Reputation promotes honest reputational information sharing. BRITISH JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2022; 62:708-724. [PMID: 36239240 DOI: 10.1111/bjso.12589] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/22/2021] [Revised: 09/09/2022] [Accepted: 10/02/2022] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
Gossip, sharing information about an absent person, is an important way of spreading reputational information, crucial in fostering human cooperation. However, why should information possessors engage in gossip, and why should they be honest? We addressed this question based on a reputational account. In study 1, we found that when observed by potential investors, people were willing to pay more to share reputational information with those in need. Moreover, engaging in gossip did confer reputational benefits for gossipers by receiving more trust from investors, and gossipers' willingness to gossip predicted their subsequent trustworthiness. Study 2 further verified that observability promoted only honest information sharing and deterred dishonest gossiping. Consistently, only honest gossipers were trusted more, while dishonest gossipers were perceived to be even less trustworthy than non-gossipers, and only the motivation for honest gossiping could reflect gossipers' trustworthiness. These findings suggest that reputation can provide a solution to encourage gossiping and secure honesty.
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Affiliation(s)
- Huibang Tan
- Philosophy and Social Science Laboratory of Reading and Development in Children and Adolescents (South China Normal University), Ministry of Education, Center for Studies of Psychological Application, Guangdong Key Laboratory of Mental Health & Cognitive Science, School of Psychology, South China Normal University, Guangzhou, China.,State Key Laboratory of Brain and Cognitive Science, Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China.,Department of Psychology, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
| | - Tianxiang Jiang
- Philosophy and Social Science Laboratory of Reading and Development in Children and Adolescents (South China Normal University), Ministry of Education, Center for Studies of Psychological Application, Guangdong Key Laboratory of Mental Health & Cognitive Science, School of Psychology, South China Normal University, Guangzhou, China
| | - Ning Ma
- Philosophy and Social Science Laboratory of Reading and Development in Children and Adolescents (South China Normal University), Ministry of Education, Center for Studies of Psychological Application, Guangdong Key Laboratory of Mental Health & Cognitive Science, School of Psychology, South China Normal University, Guangzhou, China
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10
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Qian J, Sun X, Zhang T, Chai Y. Authority or Autonomy? Exploring Interactions between Central and Peer Punishments in Risk-Resistant Scenarios. ENTROPY (BASEL, SWITZERLAND) 2022; 24:1289. [PMID: 36141176 PMCID: PMC9497953 DOI: 10.3390/e24091289] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/29/2022] [Revised: 09/05/2022] [Accepted: 09/09/2022] [Indexed: 06/16/2023]
Abstract
Game theory provides a powerful means to study human cooperation and better understand cooperation-facilitating mechanisms in general. In classical game-theoretic models, an increase in group cooperation constantly increases people's gains, implying that individual gains are a continuously varying function of the cooperation rate. However, this is inconsistent with the increasing number of risk-resistant scenarios in reality. A risk-resistant scenario means once a group does not successfully resist the risk, all individuals lose their resources, such as a community coping with COVID-19 and a village resisting a flood. In other words, individuals' gains are segmented about the collaboration rate. This paper builds a risk-resistant model to explore whether punishment still promotes collaboration when people resist risk. The results show that central and peer punishments can both encourage collaboration but with different characteristics under different risk-resistant scenarios. Specifically, central punishment constrains the collaboration motivated by peer punishment regardless of risk, while peer punishment limits the collaboration induced by central punishment only when the risk is high. Our findings provide insights into the balance between peer punishment from public autonomy and central punishment from central governance, and the proposed model paves the way for the development of richer risk-resistant models.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jun Qian
- National Engineering Laboratory for E-Commerce Technologies, Department of Automation, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
| | - Xiao Sun
- National Engineering Laboratory for E-Commerce Technologies, Department of Automation, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
| | - Tongda Zhang
- Department of Mechanical and Energy Engineering, Southern University of Science and Technology, Shenzhen 518055, China
| | - Yueting Chai
- National Engineering Laboratory for E-Commerce Technologies, Department of Automation, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
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11
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Estévez JL, Takács K. Brokering or Sitting Between Two Chairs? A Group Perspective on Workplace Gossip. Front Psychol 2022; 13:815383. [PMID: 35898991 PMCID: PMC9309222 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.815383] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/15/2021] [Accepted: 05/27/2022] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
Abstract
Brokerage is a central concept in the organization literature. It has been argued that individuals in broker positions—i.e., connecting otherwise disconnected parts within a firm’s social network—can control the flow of information. It would imply their increased relevance in workplace gossip. This allegation, however, has not been addressed empirically yet. To fill this gap, we apply social network analysis techniques to relational data from six organizations in Hungary. First, we identify informal groups and individuals in broker positions. Then, we use this information to predict the likelihood with which positive or negative gossip is reported. We find more gossip when the sender and receiver are part of the same group and more positive gossip about in-group rather than out-group targets. Individuals in broker positions are more likely the senders and targets of negative gossip. Finally, even if both the brokers and the boss(es) are the targets of their colleagues’ negative gossip, the combination of the two categories (bosses in broker positions) does not predict more negative gossip anymore. Results are discussed in relation to the theoretical accounts on brokerage that emphasize its power for information control but fail to recognize the pitfalls of being in such positions.
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Affiliation(s)
- José Luis Estévez
- Department of Management and Engineering, The Institute for Analytical Sociology, Linköping University, Norrköping, Sweden
- Department for the Study of Religions, Centre for the Digital Research of Religion, Masaryk University, Brno, Czechia
| | - Károly Takács
- Department of Management and Engineering, The Institute for Analytical Sociology, Linköping University, Norrköping, Sweden
- Computational Social Science – Research Center for Educational and Network Studies (CSS-RECENS), Centre for Social Sciences, Budapest, Hungary
- *Correspondence: Károly Takács,
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12
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The Primacy of Honest Reputations. Curr Opin Psychol 2022; 46:101398. [DOI: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2022.101398] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/28/2022] [Revised: 05/29/2022] [Accepted: 06/08/2022] [Indexed: 11/23/2022]
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13
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Zaatri S, Aderka IM, Hertz U. Blend in or stand out: social anxiety levels shape information-sharing strategies. Proc Biol Sci 2022; 289:20220476. [PMID: 35611531 PMCID: PMC9130789 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2022.0476] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/04/2023] Open
Abstract
Although living in social groups provides many benefits for group members, such groups also serve as a setting for social competition over rank and influence. Evolutionary accounts suggest that social anxiety plays a role in regulating in-group conflict, as individuals who are concerned about social threat may choose to defer to others to maintain the hierarchical status quo. Here, we examine how social anxiety levels are related to the advice-giving style an individual adopts: a competitive influence-seeking strategy or a defensive blend-in strategy. We begin by demonstrating that similarity to others drives activity in the brain's valuation system, even during a competitive advice-taking task. Then, in three behavioural experiments, we show that social anxiety levels are related to the tendency to give advice resembling the advice given by rival advisers and to refrain from status-seeking behaviour. Social anxiety was also associated with negative social comparisons with rival advisers. Our findings highlight the role of competing social goals in shaping information sharing.
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Affiliation(s)
- Silina Zaatri
- Department of Cognitive Sciences, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
| | - Idan M. Aderka
- Department of Psychology, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
| | - Uri Hertz
- Department of Cognitive Sciences, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
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14
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Giardini F, Balliet D, Power EA, Számadó S, Takács K. Four Puzzles of Reputation-Based Cooperation : Content, Process, Honesty, and Structure. HUMAN NATURE (HAWTHORNE, N.Y.) 2022; 33:43-61. [PMID: 34961914 PMCID: PMC8964644 DOI: 10.1007/s12110-021-09419-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 11/13/2021] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
Abstract
Research in various disciplines has highlighted that humans are uniquely able to solve the problem of cooperation through the informal mechanisms of reputation and gossip. Reputation coordinates the evaluative judgments of individuals about one another. Direct observation of actions and communication are the essential routes that are used to establish and update reputations. In large groups, where opportunities for direct observation are limited, gossip becomes an important channel to share individual perceptions and evaluations of others that can be used to condition cooperative action. Although reputation and gossip might consequently support large-scale human cooperation, four puzzles need to be resolved to understand the operation of reputation-based mechanisms. First, we need empirical evidence of the processes and content that form reputations and how this may vary cross-culturally. Second, we lack an understanding of how reputation is determined from the muddle of imperfect, biased inputs people receive. Third, coordination between individuals is only possible if reputation sharing and signaling is to a large extent reliable and valid. Communication, however, is not necessarily honest and reliable, so theoretical and empirical work is needed to understand how gossip and reputation can effectively promote cooperation despite the circulation of dishonest gossip. Fourth, reputation is not constructed in a social vacuum; hence we need a better understanding of the way in which the structure of interactions affects the efficiency of gossip for establishing reputations and fostering cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Francesca Giardini
- Department of Sociology, University of Groningen, Grote Rozenstraat, 31 - 9712 TG, Groningen, Netherlands
| | - Daniel Balliet
- Department of Experimental and Applied Social Psychology, VU Amsterdam, Boechorststraat 1, 1081 BT, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
| | - Eleanor A Power
- London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Methodology, Houghton Street, WC2A 2AE, London, UK
| | - Szabolcs Számadó
- Department of Sociology and Communication, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Egry J. u. 1. Floor 7, 1111, Budapest, Hungary.,Centre for Social Sciences, CSS-RECENS, Tóth Kálmán u. 4, 1097, Budapest, Hungary
| | - Károly Takács
- The Institute for Analytical Sociology, Linköping University, 601 74, Norrköping, Sweden. .,Centre for Social Sciences, CSS-RECENS, Tóth Kálmán u. 4, 1097, Budapest, Hungary.
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15
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Podder S, Righi S, Pancotto F. Reputation and punishment sustain cooperation in the optional public goods game. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2021; 376:20200293. [PMID: 34601913 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2020.0293] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Cooperative behaviour has been extensively studied as a choice between cooperation and defection. However, the possibility to not participate is also frequently available. This type of problem can be studied through the optional public goods game. The introduction of the 'Loner' strategy' allows players to withdraw from the game, which leads to a cooperator-defector-loner cycle. While pro-social punishment can help increase cooperation, anti-social punishment-where defectors punish cooperators-causes its downfall in both experimental and theoretical studies. In this paper, we introduce social norms that allow agents to condition their behaviour to the reputation of their peers. We benchmark this with respect both to the standard optional public goods game and to the variant where all types of punishment are allowed. We find that a social norm imposing a more moderate reputational penalty for opting out than for defecting increases cooperation. When, besides reputation, punishment is also possible, the two mechanisms work synergically under all social norms that do not assign to loners a strictly worse reputation than to defectors. Under this latter set-up, the high levels of cooperation are sustained by conditional strategies, which largely reduce the use of pro-social punishment and almost completely eliminate anti-social punishment. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.
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Affiliation(s)
- Shirsendu Podder
- Department of Computer Science, University College London, London, UK
| | - Simone Righi
- Department of Economics, Ca'Foscari University of Venice, Venezia, Italy
| | - Francesca Pancotto
- Department of Communication and Economics, Università degli Studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia, Reggio Emilia, Italy
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