Uncovering cognitive similarities and differences, conservation and innovation

Living cognition and the nature of organisms

There is no consensus about what cognition is. Different perspectives conceptualize it in different ways. In the same vein, there is no agreement about which systems are truly cognitive. This begs the question, what makes a process or a system cognitive? One of the most conspicuous features of cognition is that it is a set of processes. Cognition, in the end, is a collection of processes such as perception, memory, learning, decision-making, problem-solving, goal-directedness, attention, anticipation, communication, and maybe emotion. There is a debate about what they mean, and which systems possess these processes. One aspect of this problem concerns the level at which cognition and the single processes are conceptualized. To make this scenario clear, evolutionary and self-maintenance arguments are taken. Given the evolutive landscape, one sees processes shared by all organisms and their derivations in specific taxa. No matter which side of the complexity spectrum one favors, the similarities of the simple processes with the complex ones cannot be ignored, and the differences of some complex processes with their simple versions cannot be blurred. A final cognitive framework must make sense of both sides of the spectrum, their differences and similarities. Here, we discuss from an evolutionary perspective the basic elements shared by all living beings and whether these may be necessary and sufficient for understanding the cognitive process. Following these considerations, cognition can be expanded to every living being. Cognition is the set of informational and dynamic processes an organism must interact with and grasp aspects of its world. Understood at their most basic level, perception, memory, learning, problem-solving, decision-making, action, and other cognitive processes are basic features of biological functioning.

Environmental complexity and regularity shape the evolution of cognition

The environmental complexity hypothesis suggests that cognition evolves to allow animals to negotiate a complex and changing environment. By contrast, signal detection theory suggests cognition exploits environmental regularities by containing biases (e.g. to avoid dangerous predators). Therefore, two significant bodies of theory on cognitive evolution may be in tension: one foregrounds environmental complexity, the other regularity. Difficulty in reconciling these theories stems from their focus on different aspects of cognition. The environmental complexity hypothesis focuses on the reliability of sensors in the origin of cognition, while signal detection theory focuses on decision making in cognitively sophisticated animals. Here, we extend the signal detection model to examine the joint evolution of mechanisms for detecting information (sensory systems) and those that process information to produce behaviour (decision-making systems). We find that the transition to cognition can only occur if processing compensates for unreliable sensors by trading-off errors. Further, we provide an explanation for why animals with sophisticated sensory systems nonetheless disregard the reliable information it provides, by having biases for particular behaviours. Our model suggests that there is greater nuance than has been previously appreciated, and that both complexity and regularity can promote cognition.

Self-Improvising Memory: A Perspective on Memories as Agential, Dynamically Reinterpreting Cognitive Glue

Many studies on memory emphasize the material substrate and mechanisms by which data can be stored and reliably read out. Here, I focus on complementary aspects: the need for agents to dynamically reinterpret and modify memories to suit their ever-changing selves and environment. Using examples from developmental biology, evolution, and synthetic bioengineering, in addition to neuroscience, I propose that a perspective on memory as preserving salience, not fidelity, is applicable to many phenomena on scales from cells to societies. Continuous commitment to creative, adaptive confabulation, from the molecular to the behavioral levels, is the answer to the persistence paradox as it applies to individuals and whole lineages. I also speculate that a substrate-independent, processual view of life and mind suggests that memories, as patterns in the excitable medium of cognitive systems, could be seen as active agents in the sense-making process. I explore a view of life as a diverse set of embodied perspectives-nested agents who interpret each other's and their own past messages and actions as best as they can (polycomputation). This synthesis suggests unifying symmetries across scales and disciplines, which is of relevance to research programs in Diverse Intelligence and the engineering of novel embodied minds.

Agency, Goal-Directed Behavior, and Part-Whole Relationships in Biological Systems

In this essay we aim to present some considerations regarding a minimal but concrete notion of agency and goal-directed behavior that are useful for characterizing biological systems at different scales. These considerations are a particular perspective, bringing together concepts from dynamical systems, combinatorial problem-solving, and connectionist learning with an emphasis on the relationship between parts and wholes. This perspective affords some ways to think about agents that are concrete and quantifiable, and relevant to some important biological issues. Instead of advocating for a strict definition of minimally agential characteristics, we focus on how (even for a modest notion of agency) the agency of a system can be more than the sum of the agency of its parts. We quantify this in terms of the problem-solving competency of a system with respect to resolution of the frustrations between its parts. This requires goal-directed behavior in the sense of delayed gratification, i.e., taking dynamical trajectories that forego short-term gains (or sustain short-term stress or frustration) in favor of long-term gains. In order for this competency to belong to the system (rather than to its parts or given by its construction or design), it can involve distributed systemic knowledge that is acquired through experience, i.e., changes in the organization of the relationships among its parts (without presupposing a system-level reward function for such changes). This conception of agency helps us think about the ways in which cells, organisms, and perhaps other biological scales, can be agential (i.e., more agential than their parts) in a quantifiable sense, without denying that the behavior of the whole depends on the behaviors of the parts in their current organization.

Bioelectric networks: the cognitive glue enabling evolutionary scaling from physiology to mind

Each of us made the remarkable journey from mere matter to mind: starting life as a quiescent oocyte ("just chemistry and physics"), and slowly, gradually, becoming an adult human with complex metacognitive processes, hopes, and dreams. In addition, even though we feel ourselves to be a unified, single Self, distinct from the emergent dynamics of termite mounds and other swarms, the reality is that all intelligence is collective intelligence: each of us consists of a huge number of cells working together to generate a coherent cognitive being with goals, preferences, and memories that belong to the whole and not to its parts. Basal cognition is the quest to understand how Mind scales-how large numbers of competent subunits can work together to become intelligences that expand the scale of their possible goals. Crucially, the remarkable trick of turning homeostatic, cell-level physiological competencies into large-scale behavioral intelligences is not limited to the electrical dynamics of the brain. Evolution was using bioelectric signaling long before neurons and muscles appeared, to solve the problem of creating and repairing complex bodies. In this Perspective, I review the deep symmetry between the intelligence of developmental morphogenesis and that of classical behavior. I describe the highly conserved mechanisms that enable the collective intelligence of cells to implement regulative embryogenesis, regeneration, and cancer suppression. I sketch the story of an evolutionary pivot that repurposed the algorithms and cellular machinery that enable navigation of morphospace into the behavioral navigation of the 3D world which we so readily recognize as intelligence. Understanding the bioelectric dynamics that underlie construction of complex bodies and brains provides an essential path to understanding the natural evolution, and bioengineered design, of diverse intelligences within and beyond the phylogenetic history of Earth.

On the Proper Treatment of Dynamics in Cognitive Science

This essay examines the relevance of dynamical ideas for cognitive science. On its own, the mere mathematical idea of a dynamical system is too weak to serve as a scientific theory of anything, and dynamical approaches within cognitive science are too rich and varied to be subsumed under a single "dynamical hypothesis." Instead, after first attempting to dissect the different notions of "dynamics" and "cognition" at play, a more specific theoretical framework for cognitive science broadly construed is sketched. This framework draws upon not only dynamical ideas, but also such contemporaneous perspectives as situatedness, embodiment, ecological psychology, enaction, neuroethology/neuroscience, artificial life, and biogenic approaches. The paper ends with some methodological suggestions for pursuing this theoretical framework.

Cellular signaling pathways as plastic, proto-cognitive systems: Implications for biomedicine

Many aspects of health and disease are modeled using the abstraction of a "pathway"-a set of protein or other subcellular activities with specified functional linkages between them. This metaphor is a paradigmatic case of a deterministic, mechanistic framework that focuses biomedical intervention strategies on altering the members of this network or the up-/down-regulation links between them-rewiring the molecular hardware. However, protein pathways and transcriptional networks exhibit interesting and unexpected capabilities such as trainability (memory) and information processing in a context-sensitive manner. Specifically, they may be amenable to manipulation via their history of stimuli (equivalent to experiences in behavioral science). If true, this would enable a new class of biomedical interventions that target aspects of the dynamic physiological "software" implemented by pathways and gene-regulatory networks. Here, we briefly review clinical and laboratory data that show how high-level cognitive inputs and mechanistic pathway modulation interact to determine outcomes in vivo. Further, we propose an expanded view of pathways from the perspective of basal cognition and argue that a broader understanding of pathways and how they process contextual information across scales will catalyze progress in many areas of physiology and neurobiology. We argue that this fuller understanding of the functionality and tractability of pathways must go beyond a focus on the mechanistic details of protein and drug structure to encompass their physiological history as well as their embedding within higher levels of organization in the organism, with numerous implications for data science addressing health and disease. Exploiting tools and concepts from behavioral and cognitive sciences to explore a proto-cognitive metaphor for the pathways underlying health and disease is more than a philosophical stance on biochemical processes; at stake is a new roadmap for overcoming the limitations of today's pharmacological strategies and for inferring future therapeutic interventions for a wide range of disease states.

Discussion on the Relationship between Computation, Information, Cognition, and Their Embodiment

Three special issues of Entropy journal have been dedicated to the topics of "Information-Processing and Embodied, Embedded, Enactive Cognition". They addressed morphological computing, cognitive agency, and the evolution of cognition. The contributions show the diversity of views present in the research community on the topic of computation and its relation to cognition. This paper is an attempt to elucidate current debates on computation that are central to cognitive science. It is written in the form of a dialog between two authors representing two opposed positions regarding the issue of what computation is and could be, and how it can be related to cognition. Given the different backgrounds of the two researchers, which span physics, philosophy of computing and information, cognitive science, and philosophy, we found the discussions in the form of Socratic dialogue appropriate for this multidisciplinary/cross-disciplinary conceptual analysis. We proceed as follows. First, the proponent (GDC) introduces the info-computational framework as a naturalistic model of embodied, embedded, and enacted cognition. Next, objections are raised by the critic (MM) from the point of view of the new mechanistic approach to explanation. Subsequently, the proponent and the critic provide their replies. The conclusion is that there is a fundamental role for computation, understood as information processing, in the understanding of embodied cognition.

Cellular Competency during Development Alters Evolutionary Dynamics in an Artificial Embryogeny Model

Biological genotypes do not code directly for phenotypes; developmental physiology is the control layer that separates genomes from capacities ascertained by selection. A key aspect is cellular competency, since cells are not passive materials but descendants of unicellular organisms with complex context-sensitive behavioral capabilities. To probe the effects of different degrees of cellular competency on evolutionary dynamics, we used an evolutionary simulation in the context of minimal artificial embryogeny. Virtual embryos consisted of a single axis of positional information values provided by cells' 'structural genes', operated upon by an evolutionary cycle in which embryos' fitness was proportional to monotonicity of the axial gradient. Evolutionary dynamics were evaluated in two modes: hardwired development (genotype directly encodes phenotype), and a more realistic mode in which cells interact prior to evaluation by the fitness function ("regulative" development). We find that even minimal ability of cells with to improve their position in the embryo results in better performance of the evolutionary search. Crucially, we observed that increasing the behavioral competency masks the raw fitness encoded by structural genes, with selection favoring improvements to its developmental problem-solving capacities over improvements to its structural genome. This suggests the existence of a powerful ratchet mechanism: evolution progressively becomes locked in to improvements in the intelligence of its agential substrate, with reduced pressure on the structural genome. This kind of feedback loop in which evolution increasingly puts more effort into the developmental software than perfecting the hardware explains the very puzzling divergence of genome from anatomy in species like planaria. In addition, it identifies a possible driver for scaling intelligence over evolutionary time, and suggests strategies for engineering novel systems in silico and in bioengineering.

Inherency and agency in the origin and evolution of biological functions

Although discussed by 20th century philosophers in terms drawn from the sciences of non-living systems, in recent decades biological function has been considered in relationship to organismal capability and purpose. Bringing two phenomena generally neglected in evolutionary theory (i.e. inherency and agency) to bear on questions of function leads to a rejection of the adaptationist ‘selected effects’ notion of biological function. I review work showing that organisms such as the placozoans can thrive with almost no functional embellishments beyond those of their constituent cells and physical properties of their simple tissues. I also discuss work showing that individual tissue cells and their artificial aggregates exhibit agential behaviours that are unprecedented in the histories of their respective lineages. I review findings on the unique metazoan mechanism of developmental gene expression that has recruited, during evolution, inherent ancestral cellular functionalities into specialized cell types and organs of the different animal groups. I conclude that most essential functions in animal species are inherent to the cells from which they evolved, not selected effects, and that many of the others are optional ‘add-ons’, a status inimical to fitness-based models of evolution positing that traits emerge from stringent cycles of selection to meet external challenges.

Turing's cascade instability supports the coordination of the mind, brain, and behavior

Turing inspired a computer metaphor of the mind and brain that has been handy and has spawned decades of empirical investigation, but he did much more and offered behavioral and cognitive sciences another metaphor-that of the cascade. The time has come to confront Turing's cascading instability, which suggests a geometrical framework driven by power laws and can be studied using multifractal formalism and multiscale probability density function analysis. Here, we review a rapidly growing body of scientific investigations revealing signatures of cascade instability and their consequences for a perceiving, acting, and thinking organism. We review work related to executive functioning (planning to act), postural control (bodily poise for turning plans into action), and effortful perception (action to gather information in a single modality and action to blend multimodal information). We also review findings on neuronal avalanches in the brain, specifically about neural participation in body-wide cascades. Turing's cascade instability blends the mind, brain, and behavior across space and time scales and provides an alternative to the dominant computer metaphor.

Application of deep learning methods: From molecular modelling to patient classification

We are now well into the information driven age with complex, heterogeneous, datasets in the biological sciences continuing to grow at a rapid pace. Moreover, distilling of such datasets, to find new governing principles, are underway. Leading the surge are new and exciting algorithmic developments in computer simulation and machine learning, most notably for the latter, those centred on deep learning. However, practical applications of cell centric computations within the biological sciences, even when carefully benchmarked against existing experimental datasets, remain challenging. Here we discuss the application of deep learning methodologies to support our understanding of cell functionality and as an aid to patient classification. Whilst comprehensive end-to-end deep learning approaches that utilise knowledge of the cell and its molecular components to aid human disease classification are yet to be implemented, important for opening the door to more effective molecular and cell-based therapies, we illustrate that many deep learning applications have been developed to tackle components of such an ambitious pipeline. We end our discussion on what the future may hold, especially how an integrated framework of computer simulations and deep learning, in conjunction with wet-bench experimentation, could enable to reveal the governing principles underlying cell functionalities within the tissue environments cells operate.

What Is It Like to Be a Bass? Red Herrings, Fish Pain and the Study of Animal Sentience

Debates around fishes' ability to feel pain concern sentience: do reactions to tissue damage indicate evaluative consciousness (conscious affect), or mere nociception? Thanks to Braithwaite's discovery of trout nociceptors, and concerns that current practices could compromise welfare in countless fish, this issue's importance is beyond dispute. However, nociceptors are merely necessary, not sufficient, for true pain, and many measures held to indicate sentience have the same problem. The question of whether fish feel pain - or indeed anything at all - therefore stimulates sometimes polarized debate. Here, we try to bridge the divide. After reviewing key consciousness concepts, we identify "red herring" measures that should not be used to infer sentience because also present in non-sentient organisms, notably those lacking nervous systems, like plants and protozoa (P); spines disconnected from brains (S); decerebrate mammals and birds (D); and humans in unaware states (U). These "S.P.U.D. subjects" can show approach/withdrawal; react with apparent emotion; change their reactivity with food deprivation or analgesia; discriminate between stimuli; display Pavlovian learning, including some forms of trace conditioning; and even learn simple instrumental responses. Consequently, none of these responses are good indicators of sentience. Potentially more valid are aspects of working memory, operant conditioning, the self-report of state, and forms of higher order cognition. We suggest new experiments on humans to test these hypotheses, as well as modifications to tests for "mental time travel" and self-awareness (e.g., mirror self-recognition) that could allow these to now probe sentience (since currently they reflect perceptual rather than evaluative, affective aspects of consciousness). Because "bullet-proof" neurological and behavioral indicators of sentience are thus still lacking, agnosticism about fish sentience remains widespread. To end, we address how to balance such doubts with welfare protection, discussing concerns raised by key skeptics in this debate. Overall, we celebrate the rigorous evidential standards required by those unconvinced that fish are sentient; laud the compassion and ethical rigor shown by those advocating for welfare protections; and seek to show how precautionary principles still support protecting fish from physical harm.

Design for an Individual: Connectionist Approaches to the Evolutionary Transitions in Individuality

The truly surprising thing about evolution is not how it makes individuals better adapted to their environment, but how it makes individuals. All individuals are made of parts that used to be individuals themselves, e.g., multicellular organisms from unicellular organisms. In such evolutionary transitions in individuality, the organised structure of relationships between component parts causes them to work together, creating a new organismic entity and a new evolutionary unit on which selection can act. However, the principles of these transitions remain poorly understood. In particular, the process of transition must be explained by “bottom-up” selection, i.e., on the existing lower-level evolutionary units, without presupposing the higher-level evolutionary unit we are trying to explain. In this hypothesis and theory manuscript we address the conditions for evolutionary transitions in individuality by exploiting adaptive principles already known in learning systems. Connectionist learning models, well-studied in neural networks, demonstrate how networks of organised functional relationships between components, sufficient to exhibit information integration and collective action, can be produced via fully-distributed and unsupervised learning principles, i.e., without centralised control or an external teacher. Evolutionary connectionism translates these distributed learning principles into the domain of natural selection, and suggests how relationships among evolutionary units could become adaptively organised by selection from below without presupposing genetic relatedness or selection on collectives. In this manuscript, we address how connectionist models with a particular interaction structure might explain transitions in individuality. We explore the relationship between the interaction structures necessary for (a) evolutionary individuality (where the evolution of the whole is a non-decomposable function of the evolution of the parts), (b) organismic individuality (where the development and behaviour of the whole is a non-decomposable function of the behaviour of component parts) and (c) non-linearly separable functions, familiar in connectionist models (where the output of the network is a non-decomposable function of the inputs). Specifically, we hypothesise that the conditions necessary to evolve a new level of individuality are described by the conditions necessary to learn non-decomposable functions of this type (or deep model induction) familiar in connectionist models of cognition and learning.

Technological Approach to Mind Everywhere: An Experimentally-Grounded Framework for Understanding Diverse Bodies and Minds

Synthetic biology and bioengineering provide the opportunity to create novel embodied cognitive systems (otherwise known as minds) in a very wide variety of chimeric architectures combining evolved and designed material and software. These advances are disrupting familiar concepts in the philosophy of mind, and require new ways of thinking about and comparing truly diverse intelligences, whose composition and origin are not like any of the available natural model species. In this Perspective, I introduce TAME-Technological Approach to Mind Everywhere-a framework for understanding and manipulating cognition in unconventional substrates. TAME formalizes a non-binary (continuous), empirically-based approach to strongly embodied agency. TAME provides a natural way to think about animal sentience as an instance of collective intelligence of cell groups, arising from dynamics that manifest in similar ways in numerous other substrates. When applied to regenerating/developmental systems, TAME suggests a perspective on morphogenesis as an example of basal cognition. The deep symmetry between problem-solving in anatomical, physiological, transcriptional, and 3D (traditional behavioral) spaces drives specific hypotheses by which cognitive capacities can increase during evolution. An important medium exploited by evolution for joining active subunits into greater agents is developmental bioelectricity, implemented by pre-neural use of ion channels and gap junctions to scale up cell-level feedback loops into anatomical homeostasis. This architecture of multi-scale competency of biological systems has important implications for plasticity of bodies and minds, greatly potentiating evolvability. Considering classical and recent data from the perspectives of computational science, evolutionary biology, and basal cognition, reveals a rich research program with many implications for cognitive science, evolutionary biology, regenerative medicine, and artificial intelligence.

Behaviorist approaches to investigating memory and learning: A primer for synthetic biology and bioengineering

The fields of developmental biology, biomedicine, and artificial life are being revolutionized by advances in synthetic morphology. The next phase of synthetic biology and bioengineering is resulting in the construction of novel organisms (biobots), which exhibit not only morphogenesis and physiology but functional behavior. It is now essential to begin to characterize the behavioral capacity of novel living constructs in terms of their ability to make decisions, form memories, learn from experience, and anticipate future stimuli. These synthetic organisms are highly diverse, and often do not resemble familiar model systems used in behavioral science. Thus, they represent an important context in which to begin to unify and standardize vocabulary and techniques across developmental biology, behavioral ecology, and neuroscience. To facilitate the study of behavior in novel living systems, we present a primer on techniques from the behaviorist tradition that can be used to probe the functions of any organism – natural, chimeric, or synthetic – regardless of the details of their construction or origin. These techniques provide a rich toolkit for advancing the fields of synthetic bioengineering, evolutionary developmental biology, basal cognition, exobiology, and robotics.

Information and the single cell

Understanding the evolution of cognition requires an understanding of the costs and benefits of neural computation. This requires analysis of neuronal circuitry in terms of information-processing efficiency, ultimately cashed out in terms of ATP expenditures relative to adaptive problem-solving abilities. Despite a preoccupation in neuroscience with the synapse as the source of stored neural information, it is clear that, along with synaptic weights and electrochemical dynamics, neurons have multiple mechanisms which store and process information, including 'wetware' (protein phosphorylation, gene transcription, and so on) and cell morphology (dendritic form). Insights into non-synaptic information-processing can be gained by examining the surprisingly complex abilities of single-celled organisms ('cellular cognition') because neurons share many of the same abilities. Cells provide the fundamental level at which information processing interfaces with gene expression, and cell-internal information-processing mechanisms are both powerful and energetically efficient. Understanding cellular computation should be a central goal of research on cognitive evolution.

The Shared Origins of Embodiment and Development

As a domain of study centering on the nature of the body in the functioning of the individual organism, embodiment encompasses a diverse array of topics and questions. One useful organizing framework places embodiment as a bridge construct connecting three standpoints on the body: the form of the body, the body as actively engaged in and with the world, and the body as lived experience. Through connecting these standpoints, the construct of embodiment shows that they are not mutually exclusive: inherent in form is the capacity for engagement, and inherent in engagement is a lived perspective that confers agency and meaning. Here, we employ this framework to underscore the deep connections between embodiment and development. We begin with a discussion of the origins of multicellularity, highlighting how the evolution of bodies was the evolution of development itself. The evolution of the metazoan (animal) body is of particular interest, because most animals possess complex bodies with sensorimotor capacities for perceiving and acting that bring forth a particular sort of embodiment. However, we also emphasize that the thread of embodiment runs through all living things, which share an organizational property of self-determination that endows them with a specific kind of autonomy. This realization moves us away from a Cartesian machine metaphor and instead puts an emphasis on the lived perspective that arises from being embodied. This broad view of embodiment presents opportunities to transcend the boundaries of individual disciplines to create a novel integrative vision for the scientific study of development.

Crucial Development: Criticality Is Important to Cell-to-Cell Communication and Information Transfer in Living Systems

In the fourth paper of this Special Issue, we bridge the theoretical debate on the role of memory and criticality discussed in the three earlier manuscripts, with a review of key concepts in biology and focus on cell-to-cell communication in organismal development. While all living organisms are dynamic complex networks of organization and disorder, most studies in biology have used energy and biochemical exchange to explain cell differentiation without considering the importance of information (entropy) transfer. While all complex networks are mixtures of patterns of complexity (non-crucial and crucial events), it is the crucial events that determine the efficiency of information transfer, especially during key transitions, such as in embryogenesis. With increasing multicellularity, emergent relationships from cell-to-cell communication create reaction-diffusion exchanges of different concentrations of biochemicals or morphogenetic gradients resulting in differential gene expression. We suggest that in conjunction with morphogenetic gradients, there exist gradients of information transfer creating cybernetic loops of stability and disorder, setting the stage for adaptive capability. We specifically reference results from the second paper in this Special Issue, which correlated biophotons with lentil seed germination to show that phase transitions accompany changes in complexity patterns during development. Criticality, therefore, appears to be an important factor in the transmission, transfer and coding of information for complex adaptive system development.

Fungal behaviour: a new frontier in behavioural ecology

As human beings, behaviours make up our everyday lives. What we do from the moment we wake up to the moment we go back to sleep at night can all be classified and studied through the concepts of behavioural ecology. The same applies to all vertebrates and, to some extent, invertebrates. Fungi are, in most people's eyes perhaps, the eukaryotic multicellular organisms with which we humans share the least commonalities. However, they still express behaviours, and we argue that we could obtain a better understanding of their lives - although they are very different from ours - through the lens of behavioural ecology. Moreover, insights from fungal behaviour may drive a better understanding of behavioural ecology in general.