Perception-action dissociations of a walkable Müller-Lyer configuration

Measuring perceived self-location in virtual reality

Third-person perspective full-body illusions (3PP-FBI) enable the manipulation, through multisensory stimulation, of perceived self-location. Perceived self-location is classically measured by a locomotion task. Yet, as locomotion modulates various sensory signals, we developed in immersive virtual reality a measure of self-location without locomotion. Tactile stimulation was applied on the back of twenty-five participants and displayed synchronously or asynchronously on an avatar's back seen from behind. Participants completed the locomotion task and a novel mental imagery task, in which they self-located in relation to a virtual ball approaching them. Participants self-identified with the avatar more during synchronous than asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation in both tasks. This was accentuated for the mental imagery task, showing a larger self-relocation toward the avatar, together with higher reports of presence, bi-location and disembodiment in the synchronous condition only for the mental imagery task. In conclusion, the results suggest that avoiding multisensory updating during walking, and using a perceptual rather than a motor task, can improve measures of illusory self-location.

Are Different Actions Mediated by Distinct Systems of Knowledge in Infancy?

This chapter considers why studies of infant looking and reaching often suggest different patterns of cognitive and perceptual development. In some cases, convergent results have emerged from studies of infant looking and reaching, but differences are common. The most typical results suggest less adult-like perception and cognition in studies of reaching than in studies of looking. Several reaching studies, however, do not fit this pattern, suggesting that reaching actions may be mediated by distinct systems of knowledge and information processing. Comparisons of research on other behaviors, such as crawling and walking, also suggest that infant knowledge systems vary across actions. Research on how adult size perception differs between verbal and reaching response behaviors is considered and used as a template to interpret the developmental results. Like adults, when infants prepare to engage in particular actions, they seem to shift their sensitivity to particular sources of information and to process that information in action-relevant ways. These tendencies suggest that distinct knowledge systems mediate different actions in infancy.

Evaluation of a conceptual framework for predicting navigation performance in virtual reality

Previous research in spatial cognition has often relied on simple spatial tasks in static environments in order to draw inferences regarding navigation performance. These tasks are typically divided into categories (e.g., egocentric or allocentric) that reflect different two-systems theories. Unfortunately, this two-systems approach has been insufficient for reliably predicting navigation performance in virtual reality (VR). In the present experiment, participants were asked to learn and navigate towards goal locations in a virtual city and then perform eight simple spatial tasks in a separate environment. These eight tasks were organised along four orthogonal dimensions (static/dynamic, perceived/remembered, egocentric/allocentric, and distance/direction). We employed confirmatory and exploratory analyses in order to assess the relationship between navigation performance and performances on these simple tasks. We provide evidence that a dynamic task (i.e., intercepting a moving object) is capable of predicting navigation performance in a familiar virtual environment better than several categories of static tasks. These results have important implications for studies on navigation in VR that tend to over-emphasise the role of spatial memory. Given that our dynamic tasks required efficient interaction with the human interface device (HID), they were more closely aligned with the perceptuomotor processes associated with locomotion than wayfinding. In the future, researchers should consider training participants on HIDs using a dynamic task prior to conducting a navigation experiment. Performances on dynamic tasks should also be assessed in order to avoid confounding skill with an HID and spatial knowledge acquisition.

Fear Similarly Alters Perceptual Estimates of and Actions over Gaps

Previous research has demonstrated an influence of one's emotional state on estimates of spatial layout. For example, estimates of heights are larger when the viewer is someone typically afraid of heights (trait fear) or someone who, in the moment, is experiencing elevated levels of fear (state fear). Embodied perception theories have suggested that such a change in perception occurs in order to alter future actions in a manner that reduces the likelihood of injury. However, other work has argued that when acting, it is important to have access to an accurate perception of space and that a change in conscious perception does not necessitate a change in action. No one has yet investigated emotional state, perceptual estimates, and action performance in a single paradigm. The goal of the current paper was to investigate whether fear influences perceptual estimates and action measures similarly or in a dissociable manner. In the current work, participants either estimated gap widths (Experiment 1) or were asked to step over gaps (Experiment 2) in a virtual environment. To induce fear, the gaps were placed at various heights up to 15 meters. Results showed an increase in gap width estimates as participants indicated experiencing more fear. The increase in gap estimates was mirrored in participants' stepping behavior in Experiment 2; participants stepped over fewer gaps when experiencing higher state and trait fear and, when participants actually stepped, they stepped farther over gap widths when experiencing more fear. The magnitude of the influence of fear on both perception and action were also remarkably similar (5.3 and 3.9 cm, respectively). These results lend support to embodied perception claims by demonstrating an influence on action of a similar magnitude as seen on estimates of gap widths.

Perceptual Space in the Dark Affected by the Intrinsic Bias of the Visual System

Correct judgment of egocentric/absolute distance in the intermediate distance range requires both the angular declination below the horizon and ground-surface information being represented accurately. This requirement can be met in the light environment but not in the dark, where the ground surface is invisible and hence cannot be represented accurately. We previously showed that a target in the dark is judged at the intersection of the projection line from the eye to the target that defines the angular declination below the horizon and an implicit surface. The implicit surface can be approximated as a slant surface with its far end slanted toward the frontoparallel plane. We hypothesize that the implicit slant surface reflects the intrinsic bias of the visual system and helps to define the perceptual space. Accordingly, we conducted two experiments in the dark to further elucidate the characteristics of the implicit slant surface. In the first experiment we measured the egocentric location of a dimly lit target on, or above, the ground, using the blind-walking-gesturing paradigm. Our results reveal that the judged target locations could be fitted by a line (surface), which indicates an intrinsic bias with a geographical slant of about 12.4°. In the second experiment, with an exocentric/relative-distance task, we measured the judged ratio of aspect ratio of a fluorescent L-shaped target. Using trigonometric analysis, we found that the judged ratio of aspect ratio can be accounted for by assuming that the L-shaped target was perceived on an implicit slant surface with an average geographical slant of 14.4° That the data from the two experiments with different tasks can be fitted by implicit slant surfaces suggests that the intrinsic bias has a role in determining perceived space in the dark. The possible contribution of the intrinsic bias to representing the ground surface and its impact on space perception in the light environment are also discussed.

Planning to Reach for an Object Changes How the Reacher Perceives It

Three experiments assessed the influence of the Ebbinghaus illusion on size judgments that preceded verbal, grasp, or touch responses. Prior studies have found reduced effects of the illusion for the grip-scaling component of grasping, and these findings are commonly interpreted as evidence that different visual systems are employed for perceptual judgment and visually guided action. In the current experiments, the magnitude of the illusion was reduced by comparable amounts for grasping and for judgments that preceded grasping (Experiment 1). A similar effect was obtained prior to reaching to touch the targets (Experiment 2). The effect on verbal responses was apparent even when participants were simply instructed that a target touch task would follow the verbal task. After participants had completed a grasping task, the reduction in the magnitude of the illusion remained for a subsequent verbal-response judgment task (Experiment 3). Overall, the studies demonstrate strong connections between action planning and perception.

Spatial reference frame of attention in a large outdoor environment

A central question about spatial attention is whether it is referenced relative to the external environment or to the viewer. This question has received great interest in recent psychological and neuroscience research, with many but not all, finding evidence for a viewer-centered representation. However, these previous findings were confined to computer-based tasks that involved stationary viewers. Because natural search behaviors differ from computer-based tasks in viewer mobility and spatial scale, it is important to understand how spatial attention is coded in the natural environment. To this end, we created an outdoor visual search task in which participants searched a large (690 square ft), concrete, outdoor space to report which side of a coin on the ground faced up. They began search in the middle of the space and were free to move around. Attentional cuing by statistical learning was examined by placing the coin in 1 quadrant of the search space on 50% of the trials. As in computer-based tasks, participants learned and used these regularities to guide search. However, cuing could be referenced to either the environment or the viewer. The spatial reference frame of attention shows greater flexibility in the natural environment than previously found in the lab.

Failure to see money on a tree: inattentional blindness for objects that guided behavior

How is it possible to drive home and have no awareness of the trip? We documented a new form of inattentional blindness in which people fail to become aware of obstacles that had guided their behavior. In our first study, we found that people talking on cell phones while walking waited longer to avoid an obstacle and were less likely to be aware that they had avoided an obstacle than other individual walkers. In our second study, cell phone talkers and texters were less likely to show awareness of money on a tree over the pathway they were traversing. Nonetheless, they managed to avoid walking into the money tree. Perceptual information may be processed in two distinct pathways - one guiding behavior and the other leading to awareness. We observed that people can appropriately use information to guide behavior without awareness.

Slant perception for stairs and screens: effects of sex and fatigue in a laboratory environment

The apparent slope of a hill or staircase, termed geographical slant perception, is exaggerated in explicit awareness. Across two experiments this paper tests the use of a laboratory environment to study geographical slant perception. First, using a student-aged sample (N = 166), we examine the similarity of slant estimates in the field with those made in the laboratory using life-sized images of the built environment as stimuli. Results reveal no differences in slant estimates between the two test environments. Furthermore, three traditional measures of perceived geographical slant (verbal, visual, and haptic) appear sensitive to a difference in slant of only 3.4 degrees in both the field and laboratory environments. In a follow-up experiment we test the effect of fatigue on slant estimates in the laboratory. In line with previous research with outdoor stimuli, fatigued participants provided more exaggerated explicit reports of slant relative to those in a control group, and females gave more exaggerated slant estimates than males across both experiments. The current set of findings open the door to future studies of geographical slant perception that may be more suited to laboratory conditions.

The visual system's intrinsic bias influences space perception in the impoverished environment

A dimly lit target in the intermediate distance in the dark is judged at the intersection between the target's projection line from the eye to its physical location and an implicit slanted surface, which is the visual system's intrinsic bias. We hypothesize that the intrinsic bias also contributes to perceptual space in the impoverished environment. We first showed that a target viewed against sparse texture elements delineating the horizontal ground surface in the dark is localized along an implicit slanted surface that is less slanted than that of the intrinsic bias, reflecting the weighted integration of the weak texture information and intrinsic bias. We also showed that while the judged egocentric locations are similar between 0.15- to 5-s exposure durations, the judged precision improves with duration. Furthermore, the precision for the judged target angular declination does not vary with the physical angular declination and is better than the precision of the eye-to-target distance. Second, we used both action and perceptual tasks to directly reveal the perceived surface slant. Confirming our hypothesis, we found that an L-shaped target on the horizontal ground with sparse texture information is perceived with a slant that is less than that of the intrinsic bias.

The visual system's intrinsic bias and knowledge of size mediate perceived size and location in the dark

Dimly lit targets in the dark are perceived as located about an implicit slanted surface that delineates the visual system's intrinsic bias (Ooi, Wu, & He, 2001). If the intrinsic bias reflects the internal model of visual space-as proposed here-its influence should extend beyond target localization. Our first 2 experiments demonstrated that the intrinsic bias also influences perceived target size. We employed a size-matching task and an action task to measure the perceived size of a dimly lit target at various locations in the dark. Then using the size distance invariance hypothesis along with the accurately perceived target angular declination, we converted the perceived sizes to locations. We found that the derived locations from the size judgment tasks can be fitted by slanted curves that resemble the intrinsic bias profile from judged target locations. Our third experiment revealed that armed with the explicit knowledge of target size, an observer perceives target locations in the dark following an intrinsic bias-like profile that is shifted slightly farther from the observer than the profile obtained without knowledge of target size (i.e., slightly more veridical). Altogether, we showed that the intrinsic bias serves as an internal model, or memory, of ground surface layouts when the visual system cannot rely on external depth information. This memory/model can also be weakly influenced by top-down knowledge.

Dissociations between vision for perception and vision for action depend on the relative availability of egocentric and allocentric information

In three experiments, we scrutinized the dissociation between perception and action, as reflected by the contributions of egocentric and allocentric information. In Experiment 1, participants stood at the base of a large-scale one-tailed version of a Müller-Lyer illusion (with a hoop) and either threw a beanbag to the endpoint of the shaft or verbally estimated the egocentric distance to that location. The results confirmed an effect of the illusion on verbal estimates, but not on throwing, providing evidence for a dissociation between perception and action. In Experiment 2, participants observed a two-tailed version of the Müller-Lyer illusion from a distance of 1.5 m and performed the same tasks as in Experiment 1, yet neither the typical illusion effects nor a dissociation became apparent. Experiment 3 was a replication of Experiment 1, with the difference that participants stood at a distance of 1.5 m from the base of the one-tailed illusion. The results indicated an illusion effect on both the verbal estimate task and the throwing task; hence, there was no dissociation between perception and action. The presence (Exp. 1) and absence (Exp. 3) of a dissociation between perception and action may indicate that dissociations are a function of the relative availability of egocentric and allocentric information. When distance estimates are purely egocentric, dissociations between perception and action occur. However, when egocentric distance estimates have a (complementary) exocentric component, the use of allocentric information is promoted, and dissociations between perception and action are reduced or absent.

Distinct task-independent visual thresholds for egocentric and allocentric information pick up

The dominant view of the ventral and dorsal visual systems is that they subserve perception and action. De Wit, Van der Kamp, and Masters (2011) suggested that a more fundamental distinction might exist between the nature of information exploited by the systems. The present study distinguished between these accounts by asking participants to perform delayed matching (perception), pointing (action) and perceptual judgment responses to masked Müller-Lyer stimuli of varying length. Matching and pointing responses of participants who could not perceptually judge stimulus length at brief durations remained sensitive to veridical stimulus length (egocentric information), but not the illusion (allocentric, context-dependent information), which was effective at long durations. Distinct thresholds for egocentric and allocentric information pick up were thus evident irrespective of whether perception (matching) or action (pointing) responses were required. It was concluded that the dorsal and ventral systems may be delineated fundamentally by fast egocentric- and slower allocentric information pick up, respectively.

Frames of reference and categorical and coordinate spatial relations: a hierarchical organisation

This research is about the role of categorical and coordinate spatial relations and allocentric and egocentric frames of reference in processing spatial information. To this end, we asked whether spatial information is firstly encoded with respect to a frame of reference or with respect to categorical/coordinate spatial relations. Participants had to judge whether two vertical bars appeared on the same side (categorical) or at the same distance (coordinate) with respect to the centre of a horizontal bar (allocentric) or with respect to their body midline (egocentric). The key manipulation was the timing of the instructions: one instruction (reference frame or spatial relation) was given before stimulus presentation, the other one after. If spatial processing requires egocentric/allocentric encoding before coordinate/categorical encoding, then spatial judgements should be facilitated when the frame of reference is specified in advance. In contrast, if categorical and coordinate dimensions are primary, then a facilitation should appear when the spatial relation is specified in advance. Results showed that participants were more accurate and faster when the reference frame rather than the type of spatial relation was provided before stimulus presentation. Furthermore, a selective facilitation was found for coordinate and categorical judgements after egocentric and allocentric cues, respectively. These results suggest a hierarchical structure of spatial information processing where reference frames play a primary role and selectively interact with subsequent processing of spatial relations.

How do illusions constrain goal-directed movement: perceptual and visuomotor influences on speed/accuracy trade-off

Recent research shows that visual processing influences the speed/accuracy trade-off people use when performing goal-directed movement. This raises the question of how this influence is produced in visual cognition. Visual influences on speed/accuracy trade-off could be produced in conscious visual perception, in non-conscious visuomotor transformation, or by some interaction of conscious perceptual and non-conscious visuomotor processes. There is independent evidence showing that both perceptual and visuomotor processes are involved in trading off speed and accuracy; however, the interaction between these processes has yet to be investigated. We present an experiment in which we show that a change in visual consciousness induced by a perceptual illusion affects the speed and accuracy of goal-directed movements, suggesting that perceptual and visuomotor processes do interact in speed/accuracy trade-off. We discuss the consequences of these results for theories of visual function more generally.

Do we have independent visual streams for perception and action?

The perception-action model proposes that vision-for-perception and vision-for-action are based on anatomically distinct and functionally independent streams within the visual cortex. This idea can account for diverse experimental findings, and has been hugely influential over the past two decades. The model itself comprises a set of core contrasts between the functional properties of the two visual streams. We critically review the evidence for these contrasts, arguing that each of them has either been refuted or found limited empirical support. We suggest that the perception-action model captures some broad patterns of functional localization, but that the specializations of the two streams are relative, not absolute. The ubiquity and extent of inter-stream interactions suggest that we should reject the idea that the ventral and dorsal streams are functionally independent processing pathways.

Does my step look big in this? A visual illusion leads to safer stepping behaviour

Background

Tripping is a common factor in falls and a typical safety strategy to avoid tripping on steps or stairs is to increase foot clearance over the step edge. In the present study we asked whether the perceived height of a step could be increased using a visual illusion and whether this would lead to the adoption of a safer stepping strategy, in terms of greater foot clearance over the step edge. The study also addressed the controversial question of whether motor actions are dissociated from visual perception.

Methodology/Principal Findings

21 young, healthy subjects perceived the step to be higher in a configuration of the horizontal-vertical illusion compared to a reverse configuration (p = 0.01). During a simple stepping task, maximum toe elevation changed by an amount corresponding to the size of the visual illusion (p<0.001). Linear regression analyses showed highly significant associations between perceived step height and maximum toe elevation for all conditions.

Conclusions/Significance

The perceived height of a step can be manipulated using a simple visual illusion, leading to the adoption of a safer stepping strategy in terms of greater foot clearance over a step edge. In addition, the strong link found between perception of a visual illusion and visuomotor action provides additional support to the view that the original, controversial proposal by Goodale and Milner (1992) of two separate and distinct visual streams for perception and visuomotor action should be re-evaluated.

Egocentric and allocentric localization during induced motion

This research examined motor measures of the apparent egocentric location and perceptual measures of the apparent allocentric location of a target that was being seen to undergo induced motion (IM). In Experiments 1 and 3, subjects fixated a stationary dot (IM target) while a rectangular surround stimulus (inducing stimulus) oscillated horizontally. The inducing stimulus motion caused the IM target to appear to move in the opposite direction. In Experiment 1, two dots (flashed targets) were flashed above and below the IM target when the surround had reached its leftmost or rightmost displacement from the subject's midline. Subjects pointed open-loop at either the apparent egocentric location of the IM target or at the bottom of the two flashed targets. On separate trials, subjects made judgments of the Vernier alignment of the IM target with the flashed targets at the endpoints of the surround's oscillation. The pointing responses were displaced in the direction of the previously seen IM for the IM target and to a lesser degree for the bottom flashed target. However, the allocentric Vernier judgments demonstrated no perceptual displacement of the IM target relative to the flashed targets. Thus, IM results in a dissociation of egocentric location measures from allocentric location measures. In Experiment 2, pointing and Vernier measures were obtained with stationary horizontally displaced surrounds and there was no dissociation of egocentric location measures from allocentric location measures. These results indicate that the Roelofs effect did not produce the pattern of results in Experiment 1. In Experiment 3, pointing and Vernier measures were obtained when the surround was at the midpoint of an oscillation. In this case, egocentric pointing responses were displaced in the direction of surround motion (opposite IM) for the IM target and to a greater degree for the bottom flashed target. However, there was no apparent displacement of the IM target relative to the flashed targets in the allocentric Vernier judgments. Therefore, in Experiment 3 egocentric location measures were again dissociated from allocentric location measures. The results of this experiment also demonstrate that IM does not generate an allocentric displacement illusion analogous to the "flash-lag" effect.

2-D tilt and 3-D slant illusions in perception and action tasks

There is now a well established dissociation between perception and action based primarily on neuropsychological evidence [Milner and Goodale, 1995 The Visual Brain in Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press)]. Although equivocal, an important source of evidence from normal observers is that 'perceptual illusions' may affect the systems differently. We investigated the relative effects of 2-D tilt and 3-D slant illusions in the two domains, using similar tasks to those employed originally by Milner and Goodale. Subjects were required to either post a card through, or set a paddle to match the orientation of, a plane that was presented in two conditions: surrounded by a striped surface tilted between +90 degrees and -90 degrees (2-D tilt contrast), or surrounded by a disparity defined surface slanted in depth between +60 degrees and -60 degrees (3-D depth contrast). For 2-D tilt, action and perception were equally affected by the illusion, whereas in the 3-D condition they were not. Here, the illusion appeared greater in the posting than in the perceptual task. We conclude that, although no qualitative differences exist, there were quantitative differences between perception and action tasks in the binocular condition.

Dissociation between visual perception of allocentric distance and visually directed walking of its extent

Walking without vision to previously viewed targets was compared with visual perception of allocentric distance in two experiments. Experimental evidence had shown that physically equal distances in a sagittal plane on the ground were perceptually underestimated as compared with those in a frontoparallel plane, even under full-cue conditions. In spite of this perceptual anisotropy of space, Loomis et al (1992 Journal of Experimental Psychology. Human Perception and Performance 18 906-921) found that subjects could match both types of distances in a blind-walking task. In experiment 1 of the present study, subjects were required to reproduce the extent of allocentric distance between two targets by either walking towards the targets, or by walking in a direction incompatible with the locations of the targets. The latter condition required subjects to derive an accurate allocentric distance from information based on the perceived locations of the two targets. The walked distance in the two conditions was almost identical whether the two targets were presented in depth (depth-presentation condition) or in the frontoparallel plane (width-presentation condition). The results of a perceptual-matching task showed that the depth distances had to be much greater than the width distances in order to be judged to be equal in length (depth compression). In experiment 2, subjects were required to reproduce the extent of allocentric distance from the viewing point by blindly walking in a direction other than toward the targets. The walked distance in the depth-presentation condition was shorter than that in the width-presentation condition. This anisotropy in motor responses, however, was mainly caused by apparent overestimation of length oriented in width, not by depth compression. In addition, the walked distances were much better scaled than those in experiment 1. These results suggest that the perceptual and motor systems share a common representation of the location of targets, whereas a dissociation in allocentric distance exists between the two systems in full-cue conditions.

The function of phenomenal states: supramodular interaction theory

Discovering the function of phenomenal states remains a formidable scientific challenge. Research on consciously penetrable conflicts (e.g., "pain-for-gain" scenarios) and impenetrable conflicts (as in the pupillary reflex, ventriloquism, and the McGurk effect [H. McGurk & J. MacDonald, 1976]) reveals that these states integrate diverse kinds of information to yield adaptive action. Supramodular interaction theory proposes that phenomenal states play an essential role in permitting interactions among supramodular response systems--agentic, independent, multimodal, information-processing structures defined by their concerns (e.g., instrumental action vs. certain bodily needs). Unlike unconscious processes (e.g., pupillary reflex), these processes may conflict with skeletal muscle plans, as described by the principle of parallel responses into skeletal muscle (PRISM). Without phenomenal states, these systems would be encapsulated and incapable of collectively influencing skeletomotor action.

The visual control of stepping operates in real time: Evidence from a pictorial illusion

Recent studies have suggested important similarities between the visual control of upper and lower limb actions despite the different effectors, time scales, and regions of space associated with the two types of actions. Drawing on previous findings from upper limb studies, we show here that the effect of a Muller-Lyer illusion on stepping amplitude is greatly increased when the target display is occluded as compared to when it is visible during the reaction time period (i.e., brief delay and 3-s delay conditions versus full vision and open-loop conditions). The present results suggest that the control of stepping is mediated by different systems when the target is visible as compared to when it is occluded immediately before movement initiation; when target vision is not available during the reaction time period, the control of stepping is more highly dependent upon a non-veridical, perceptual representation of the target environment. These findings are consistent with the idea that, much like grasping, vision during the reaction time period is critical for the optimal control of stepping; that is, the visual control of stepping operates in real time.

Studies of open-loop pointing in the presence of induced motion

In the present research, we examined the influence of induced motion (IM) on open-loop pointing responses and the possibility that IM alters the registration of either eye or trunk position. In two experiments, subjects tracked a dot that oscillated vertically while a rectangular stimulus oscillated horizontally. The pairing of frame and dot motion caused the dot to appear to move on a slant, due to IM. In the first experiment, the subjects made judgments of the apparent slant of the dot's motion and, on separate trials, pointed open loop at the apparent location of the dot at the endpoints of its motion. Both responses were influenced by IM, although the effect on dot localization was less than the amount predicted by the IM, as indicated by the slant responses. Results were similar immediately following IM and after a 5-sec delay. In the second experiment, the subjects pointed open loop either at the apparent location of the endpoints of the tracked dot's motion or at the apparent location of one of three other briefly flashed stationary dots. The pointing responses directed toward the fixated IM target were influenced by IM to a greater extent than the responses directed toward the stationary dots. The results of the two experiments are inconsistent with the hypothesis that the effect of IM on open-loop pointing at the IM target results completely from altered perception of either eye or trunk position, since misregistration of either would be expected to influence, in a similar fashion, pointing at both the tracked dot and the briefly flashed, stationary targets.

Bias in spatial memory: a categorical endorsement

Two experiments investigated how angular estimates reflect bias as a function of response mode, geometric plane of variation, number of implicit categories, memory load and intervening task conditions. In Experiment 1, participants made motor and verbal estimates of incline and azimuth from memory. Estimates in both response modes showed signs of bias predicted by a single-category adaptation of Huttenlocher et al. [Huttenlocher, J., Hedges, L. V., & Duncan, S. (1991). Categories and particulars: Prototype effects in estimating spatial location. Psychological Review, 98, 352-376] category-adjustment model. In Experiment 2, participants made motor estimates of azimuth from memory under a variety of conditions. Stimuli in this experiment were distributed along two contiguous spatial categories. Although increasing levels of cognitive load did not produce a graded effect, participants' estimates were biased and were well described by a multiple-category adaptation of the category-adjustment model. Results from both studies supported an implicit region-based model of bias in spatial memory. These findings were discussed with respect to accounts of spatial memory that propose multiple systems or formats for coding.

How does action resist visual illusion? Uncorrected oculomotor information does not account for accurate pointing in peripersonal space

Using spatially identical displays (variants of the Müller-Lyer illusion), we compared the accuracy of spatial verbal judgments with that of saccadic (eye) and pointing (hand) movements. Verbal judgments showed a clear effect of the illusion. The amplitude of the primary saccade from one endpoint of the pattern (at fixation) to the other also showed an effect of the illusion. Conversely, movement amplitudes when pointing from one endpoint (initial finger position) to the other were significantly more accurate than both saccades and verbal responses. In a control experiment in which the viewing conditions between the saccade and pointing experiments were equalized, saccade amplitude was again affected by the illusion. In several studies, systematic biases in conscious spatial judgments have been contrasted with accurate open-loop pointing in peripersonal space. It has been proposed that such seeming dissociations between vision-for-action and vision-for-consciousness might in fact be because of a simple oculomotor strategy: saccade to the target before it disappears, then use the efference copy of the (accurate) saccadic movement to drive pointing. The present data do not support the hypothesis in this simple form.

Large errors, but no depth compression, in walked indications of exocentric extent

Observers can sight a target 20 m away or more and then walk to it accurately without vision. In contrast to this good performance, this article shows that walked indications of the exocentric separation of two locations exceed the required values by over 70% when vision is obscured. Significantly, these large errors are coupled with a robust lack of depth foreshortening, even under conditions in which visual matches and verbal estimates of extent exhibit strong evidence of depth compression. This article presents evidence that the overshooting errors are due largely to recalibration of locomotor control produced by prolonged exposure to nonvisual walking. The robust lack of depth foreshortening, meanwhile, could reflect a corresponding isotropy in the spatial representation controlling the walking response. More research is needed to confirm this interpretation, however.

Grasping at sticks: pseudoneglect for perception but not action

A current question in theories of visual cognition is whether distinct cognitive processes subserve perceptual judgments and perception for action. This paper examines bisection tasks which have previously been used to demonstrate a dissociation between perception and action in brain injured patients. Forty neurologically intact participants completed a standard line bisection task and a variant of this task--rod bisection. A typical leftwards bias was observed for line bisection but when asked to locate the centre of wooden rods using perceptual judgments, a distinct rightwards bias was shown. By contrast, when participants were asked to pick the rods up by the centre, their judgments showed no bias. The results are in line with theories suggesting that perception and action are independent; however, alternative explanations are also considered.

The attentional repulsion effect in perception and action

The attentional repulsion effect refers to the perceived displacement of a Vernier stimulus in a direction that is opposite to a brief peripheral cue. The twofold purpose of the present study was to: (1) replicate the perceptual effect using a Vernier discrimination task, and (2) determine whether the effect would also affect action using a guided localization task. A perceptual attentional repulsion effect was found in experiment 1 and a similar effect was found in experiment 2, with a computer mouse localization task, and in experiment 3, with a guided limb localization task (in both cases pointing responses were biased in the direction opposite to that of the cue). These findings suggest that the attentional repulsion effect occurs early in visual processing, probably affecting the receptive fields of the position-coding units in primary visual cortex before "object-perception" and "object-action" information is segregated into separate pathways.

Updating space during imagined self- and array translations

Previous work has demonstrated superior spatial updating performance during imagined viewer rotation versus imagined object/array rotation. Studies have also suggested that rotations are more difficult to process than translations. In three studies, we examined whether the advantage seen for updating during imagined self-rotations would generalize to translations. The participants updated the positions of objects in a line extending either to the front and back of the viewer or to the right and left after imagining viewer or array translation. Experiments 1 and 2 replicated the effects seen in imagined rotation tasks. A response time and accuracy advantage was found for imagined viewer translation versus imagined array translation. In Experiment 3, we directly compared real and imagined self- and array translations and demonstrated an advantage for real versus imagined array translation. The results suggest that the advantage for imagined viewer transformations is not a function of the specific transformation, but rather of the ability to imagine and predict the outcome of a moving frame of reference.

When does action resist visual illusions? Effector position modulates illusory influences on motor responses

Actors viewed horizontal segments either in isolation or embedded in patterns that produce spatial illusory effects (Kanizsa's compression illusion and the "dumbbell" version of the Müller-Lyer compression-expansion illusion). They were asked to reproduce the apparent horizontal extent of these segments by the amplitude of open- or closed-loop motor responses (after having positioned a finger on position A, choose a position B on the right of A such that apparent width = B-A). A touchmonitor was used to present the displays and to record movement amplitudes and times. In open-loop motor responses, displays were turned off as soon as actors raised their finger from position A. In closed-loop responses, displays could be viewed continuously during the actions. Four conditions were investigated: (1). open-loop responses starting from A at the right endpoint of the segment; (2). closed-loop responses from A at the right endpoint of the segment; (3). open-loop responses from A at the left endpoint of the segment; and (4). open-loop responses from A aligned horizontally with the left endpoint of the segment but displaced vertically below that segment. With both kinds of display, results in conditions (1). and (2). demonstrated illusory effects comparable to those measured in standard visual matching experiments, whereas results in conditions (3). and (4). showed essentially no illusory effects. Implications for models of visuomotor transformations in peripersonal space are discussed.

Neural processing of auditory looming in the human brain

Acoustic intensity change, along with interaural, spectral, and reverberation information, is an important cue for the perception of auditory motion. Approaching sound sources produce increases in intensity, and receding sound sources produce corresponding decreases. Human listeners typically overestimate increasing compared to equivalent decreasing sound intensity and underestimate the time to contact of approaching sound sources. These characteristics could provide a selective advantage by increasing the margin of safety for response to looming objects. Here, we used dynamic intensity and functional magnetic resonance imaging to examine the neural underpinnings of the perceptual priority for rising intensity. We found that, consistent with activation by horizontal and vertical auditory apparent motion paradigms, rising and falling intensity activated the right temporal plane more than constant intensity. Rising compared to falling intensity activated a distributed neural network subserving space recognition, auditory motion perception, and attention and comprising the superior temporal sulci and the middle temporal gyri, the right temporoparietal junction, the right motor and premotor cortices, the left cerebellar cortex, and a circumscribed region in the midbrain. This anisotropic processing of acoustic intensity change may reflect the salience of rising intensity produced by looming sources in natural environments.

Dissociating perception and action in Kanizsa's compression illusion

When a horizontally elongated surface is occluded in the middle by a larger surface, it appears narrower than its true width (Kanizsa's compression illusion). We report that a similar compression effect occurs for closed-loop visuomotor matches of size, but not for otherwise comparable open-loop "mimed" reaching or size-matching visuomotor responses. Our study is the first in which a comparison of size perception in personal space with bilateral actions performed with both hands (instead of precision grips employing the thumb and the index finger) is used to investigate motor responses to Kanizsa's compression illusion. Implications for the current debate on the existence of dissociations between spatial perception and visually controlled actions in personal space are discussed.

A dissociation of perception and action in normal human observers: the effect of temporal-delay

Neuropsychological results support the proposal that the human visual system is organised into distinct processing pathways, one for conscious perception and one for the control of action. Here, we compare perceptual and action responses following a pre-response-delay. Experiment 1 required participants to reproduce remembered locations and found that although perceptual matches were unaffected by delays of up to 4 s, pointing responses were significantly biased after only 2 s. Experiment 2 examined whether both the transport and grasp components of a natural prehensile movement were similarly affected by delay. Both peak wrist velocities and peak grip-apertures were affected equivalently by delay, suggesting that the two components of a prehensile movement have similar temporal constraints. The results from both experiments are consistent with the general perception-action dichotomy as originally proposed by Milner and Goodale [The visual brain in action, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995].

When does action resist visual illusions?

Over the past decade, many studies of non-pathological individuals have reported functional dissociations between perceptual judgments and motor responses. These results suggested an interpretation of the ventral and dorsal streams in the primate visual system as independent modules for visual awareness and the visual guidance of actions. However, recent comparisons of perception and grasping responses in size-contrast displays have been widely reported to show that apparent dissociations are actually experimental artifacts. An overview of the literature suggests that the issue of visuomotor dissociations in healthy individuals is far from settled. Some results suggest that immunity from visual illusions might be found when task requirements emphasize observer-relative reference frames. These results suggest that the functional specialization of the two visual subsystems might be less rigid than originally posited.

Defining the cortical visual systems: "what", "where", and "how"

The visual system historically has been defined as consisting of at least two broad subsystems subserving object and spatial vision. These visual processing streams have been organized both structurally as two distinct pathways in the brain, and functionally for the types of tasks that they mediate. The classic definition by Ungerleider and Mishkin labeled a ventral "what" stream to process object information and a dorsal "where" stream to process spatial information. More recently, Goodale and Milner redefined the two visual systems with a focus on the different ways in which visual information is transformed for different goals. They relabeled the dorsal stream as a "how" system for transforming visual information using an egocentric frame of reference in preparation for direct action. This paper reviews recent research from psychophysics, neurophysiology, neuropsychology and neuroimaging to define the roles of the ventral and dorsal visual processing streams. We discuss a possible solution that allows for both "where" and "how" systems that are functionally and structurally organized within the posterior parietal lobe.

Grasping objects by their handles: a necessary interaction between cognition and action

Research has illustrated dissociations between "cognitive" and "action" systems, suggesting that different representations may underlie phenomenal experience and visuomotor behavior. However, these systems also interact. The present studies show a necessary interaction when semantic processing of an object is required for an appropriate action. Experiment 1 demonstrated that a semantic task interfered with grasping objects appropriately by their handles, but a visuospatial task did not. Experiment 2 assessed performance on a visuomotor task that had no semantic component and showed a reversal of the effects of the concurrent tasks. In Experiment 3, variations on concurrent word tasks suggested that retrieval of semantic information was necessary for appropriate grasping. In all, without semantic processing, the visuomotor system can direct the effective grasp of an object, but not in a manner that is appropriate for its use.