Epistemic in/justice in patient participation. A discourse analysis of the Dutch ME/CFS Health Council advisory process

Health Controversies: Long-Term Disagreement Management Challenges

Health controversies involve complex exchanges of disagreements over health and medicine. They unfold differently in different parts of the world, and they often extend over long periods of time. In contemporary argumentation theory, proposals have recently been emerging for "disagreement management at large scale" and for an explicit focus on design of disagreement management methods. Lewiński and Aakhus characterize large-scale disagreement as polylogic: formed of complex networks of players holding contrasting positions that are attacked and defended in multiple places. Large-scale disagreements such as health controversies are important sites for emergence of new disagreement management methods, including new ways of arriving at conclusions about questions of fact (affecting positions) and new formats for coming to decisions about questions of policy (affecting places). The controversy over myalgic encephalomyelitis/chronic fatigue syndrome (ME/CFS), spanning a period of very rapid change in reasoning about health, has been deeply entangled with the design of new institutional places for managing disagreements about health. It serves well to illustrate both the large, multi-scale structure of health controversies and the importance of long-term disagreement management strategies.

Focus on post-exertional malaise when approaching ME/CFS in specialist healthcare improves satisfaction and reduces deterioration

Background

Post-exertional malaise (PEM) is considered a hallmark characteristic of myalgic encephalomyelitis/chronic fatigue syndrome (ME/CFS). This may also apply to subgroups of patients with long COVID-induced ME/CFS. However, it is uncertain to what extent PEM is acknowledged in routine specialist healthcare for ME/CFS patients, and how this affects patient outcomes.

Objective

This study aims to evaluate to what extent ME/CFS patients experienced focus on PEM in specialist healthcare practice and its significance for outcome and care quality.

Methods

Data from two online cross-sectional surveys covering specialist healthcare services for ME/CFS patients at rehabilitation institutes in Norway and two regional hospitals, respectively, were analyzed. Evaluations of 788 rehabilitation stays, 86 hospital consultations, and 89 hospital interventions were included. Logistic regression models and Mann-Whitney U-tests were used to quantify the impact of addressing PEM on health and functioning, care satisfaction, or benefit. Spearman's rank correlation and Cronbach's alpha of focus on PEM with the respondents' perception of healthcare providers' knowledge, symptom acknowledgment, and suitability of intervention were assessed as measures for care quality and their internal consistency, respectively.

Results

PEM was addressed in 48% of the rehabilitation stays, 43% of the consultations, and 65% of the hospital interventions. Failure to address PEM roughly doubled the risk of health deterioration, following rehabilitation (OR = 0.39, 95% CI 0.29-0.52; 40.1% vs. 63.2% P = <0.001) and hospital intervention (OR = 0.34, 95% CI 0.13-0.89; 22.4% vs. 45.2%, p = 0.026). The focus on PEM (PEM-focus) during the clinical contact was associated with significantly higher scores on patients' rated care satisfaction and benefit of both consultation and intervention. Furthermore, addressing PEM was (inter)related to positive views about healthcare providers' level of knowledge of ME/CFS, their acknowledgment of symptoms, obtained knowledge, and the perceived suitability of intervention (Cronbach's alpha ≥0.80).

Discussion

PEM is still frequently not acknowledged in specialist healthcare practice for ME/CFS patients in Norway. Not addressing PEM substantially increased the probability of a decline in health and functioning following the intervention and was strongly associated with reduced perceived care quality, satisfaction, and benefit. These findings may be related to the applied explanatory models for ME/CFS and are most likely of relevance to long COVID.

Contesting misrecognition online: Experiences of epistemic in/justice by vloggers with contested illnesses

Contested illnesses, such as fibromyalgia, myalgic encephalomyelitis/chronic fatigue syndrome (ME/CFS), and chronic Lyme disease (CLD), are surrounded by polemic debates regarding their etiology, symptomology, treatment, and even their existence. People who suffer from these contested illnesses arguably also suffer from "epistemic injustice." This concept, coined by the philosopher Miranda Fricker, captures how people's knowledge may be discredited because of identity prejudices. In our paper, this concept is used to understand how seven Dutch women with contested illnesses experience the emancipatory potential of their vlogging practices. Our findings show how these women understood their vlogging as a means to break with epistemic smothering, understood as the propensity to cater ones testimony to one's audience (Dotson, 2011), and as a means to attain and enhance epistemic justice. However, our findings also show how vlogging about contested illnesses did not seem to allow these women to fully break with their epistemic smothering practices, and that the ableist design and gendered norms of YouTube were experienced as obstacles to attaining epistemic justice. We conclude that, even though social media do seem to hold emancipatory potential for these women, the experiences of individual users are diverse and ambiguous.

Psychiatrization, assertions of epistemic justice, and the question of agency

Thus far, the concept of epistemic injustice in the context of psychiatry has been discussed more widely by clinical academics than by authors with personal experience of psychiatrization. It is from the latter perspective that I critique the practice of attributing testimonial injustice solely to the "stigma against mental illness", and point to psychiatric diagnosing itself as a principal enabler and re-producer of this form of injustice. In relation to hermeneutical justice, I take a closer look at initiatives seeking to incorporate (collective) first-person knowledge into the epistemic systems that currently dominate mental-health service provision and research. Highlighting the incompatibility of psychiatric knowledge claims with first-person ways of knowing, I discuss some of the issues and challenges involved in achieving epistemic justice for psychiatrized people and advancing our collective knowledge base. Finally, I turn to the questions of identity and agency in these processes.