How Financial and Reputational Incentives Can Be Used to Improve Medical Care

Financing the "Village": Establishing a Sustainable Financial System for Child Behavioral Health

An increased need for child and adolescent behavioral health services compounded by a long-standing professional workforce shortage frames our discussion on how behavioral health services can be sustainably delivered and financed. This article provides an overview of different payment models, such as traditional fee-for-service and alternatives like provider salary, global payments, and pay for performance models. It discusses the advantages and drawbacks of each model, emphasizing the need to transition toward value-based care to improve health care quality and control costs.

The role of pay-for-performance in reducing healthcare disparities: A narrative literature review

As American healthcare shifts to value-based payment, Pay-for-Performance (P4P) has become an important and controversial topic. One of the main controversies pertains to its potential to narrow or widen existing healthcare disparities depending on how the program is designed and implemented. It is thus imperative to understand which design features are most likely to reduce disparities. We conducted a systematic literature review from 2004 to 2021 of P4P's impact on disparities. Given the interdisciplinary nature of P4P research, multiple search strategies were combined, and many study designs were eligible for analysis. The literature was then qualitatively analyzed, with themes and major findings developed using Grounded Theory. Six major design features emerged as most promising in leveraging P4P to reduce disparities: 1) Risk/Case-Mix Adjustment; 2) Stratified Performance Measures/Stratification; 3) Disparity Reduction Metrics; 4) Exception Reporting; 5) Pay-for-Improvement; and 6) Population-Specific Metrics. Each design feature has its own mechanism, strengths, and weaknesses. We identify and define these features' direct and indirect effects on healthcare disparities. The interaction of each design feature with one another, with P4P as a whole, and within the larger reimbursement system can have considerable effects on disparities. Promising strategies exist to leverage P4P to narrow disparities for clinically and socially complex patients. The six design features discussed in this review help P4P programs address structural disadvantages faced by such patients and their providers. In regard to health equity, these design features can transform P4P from being part of the problem to being part of the solution.

Framework for identification and measurement of spillover effects in policy implementation: intended non-intended targeted non-targeted spillovers (INTENTS)

BACKGROUND

There is increasing awareness among researchers and policymakers of the potential for healthcare interventions to have consequences beyond those initially intended. These unintended consequences or "spillover effects" result from the complex features of healthcare organisation and delivery and can either increase or decrease overall effectiveness. Their potential influence has important consequences for the design and evaluation of implementation strategies and for decision-making. However, consideration of spillovers remains partial and unsystematic. We develop a comprehensive framework for the identification and measurement of spillover effects resulting from changes to the way in which healthcare services are organised and delivered.

METHODS

We conducted a scoping review to map the existing literature on spillover effects in health and healthcare interventions and used the findings of this review to develop a comprehensive framework to identify and measure spillover effects.

RESULTS

The scoping review identified a wide range of different spillover effects, either experienced by agents not intentionally targeted by an intervention or representing unintended effects for targeted agents. Our scoping review revealed that spillover effects tend to be discussed in papers only when they are found to be statistically significant or might account for unexpected findings, rather than as a pre-specified feature of evaluation studies. This hinders the ability to assess all potential implications of a given policy or intervention. We propose a taxonomy of spillover effects, classified based on the outcome and the unit experiencing the effect: within-unit, between-unit, and diagonal spillover effects. We then present the INTENTS framework: Intended Non-intended TargEted Non-Targeted Spillovers. The INTENTS framework considers the units and outcomes which may be affected by an intervention and the mechanisms by which spillover effects are generated.

CONCLUSIONS

The INTENTS framework provides a structured guide for researchers and policymakers when considering the potential effects that implementation strategies may generate, and the steps to take when designing and evaluating such interventions. Application of the INTENTS framework will enable spillover effects to be addressed appropriately in future evaluations and decision-making, ensuring that the full range of costs and benefits of interventions are correctly identified.

Association of Primary Care Physician Compensation Incentives and Quality of Care in the United States, 2012-2016

BACKGROUND

Physician compensation incentives may have positive or negative effects on clinical quality.

OBJECTIVE

To assess the association between various physician compensation incentives on technical indicators of primary care quality.

DESIGN

Cross-sectional, nationally representative retrospective analysis.

PARTICIPANTS

Visits by adults to primary care physicians in the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey from 2012-2016. We analyzed 49,580 sampled visits, representing 1.45 billion primary care visits.

MAIN MEASURES

We assessed the association between 5 compensation incentives - quality measure performance, patient experience scores, individual productivity, practice financial performance, or practice efficiency - and 10 high-value and 7 low-value care measures as well as high-value and low-value care composites.

KEY RESULTS

Quality measure performance was an incentive in 22% of visits; patient experience scores, 17%; individual productivity, 57%; practice financial performance, 63%; and practice efficiency, 12%. In adjusted models, none of the compensation incentives were consistently associated with individual high- and low-value measures. None of the compensation incentives were associated with high- or low-value care composites. For example, quality measure performance compensation was not significantly associated with high-value care (visits with quality incentive, 47% of eligible measures met; without quality incentive, 43%; adjusted odds ratio [aOR], 1.02; 95% confidence interval [CI], 0.91 to 1.15) or low-value care (aOR, 0.99; 95% CI, 0.82-1.19). Physician compensation incentives that might be expected to increase low-value care did not: patient experience (aOR for low-value care composite, 0.83; 95% CI, 0.65-1.05), individual productivity (aOR, 1.03; 95% CI, 0.88-1.22), and practice financial performance (aOR, 1.05; 95% CI, 0.81-1.36).

CONCLUSION

In this retrospective, cross-sectional, nationally representative analysis of care in the United States, physician compensation incentives were not generally associated with more or less high- or low-value care.

Development of a model of medication review for use in clinical practice: Bristol medication review model

BACKGROUND

Medication review is a core aspect of medicine optimisation, yet existing models of review vary substantially in structure and content and are not necessarily easy to implement in clinical practice. This study aimed to use evidence from the existing literature to identify key medication review components and use this to inform the design of an improved review model.

METHODS

A systematic review was conducted (PROSPERO: CRD42018109788) to identify randomised control trials of stand-alone medication review in adults (18+ years). The review updated that by Huiskes et al. (BMC Fam Pract. 18:5, 2017), using the same search strategy implemented in MEDLINE and Embase. Studies were assessed using the Cochrane risk of bias tool. Key review components were identified, alongside relevant clinical and health service outcomes. A working group (patients, doctors and pharmacists) developed the model through an iterative consensus process (appraisal of documents plus group discussions), working from the systematic review findings, brief evidence summaries for core review components and examples of previous models, to agree on the main purpose of the review model, overarching model structure, review components and supporting material.

RESULTS

We identified 28 unique studies, with moderate bias overall. Consistent medication review components included reconciliation (26 studies), safety assessment (22), suboptimal treatment (19), patient knowledge/preferences (18), adherence (14), over-the-counter therapy (13) and drug monitoring (10). There was limited evidence from studies for improvement in key clinical outcomes. The review structure was underpinned by patient values and preferences, with parallel information gathering and evaluation stages, feeding into the final decision-making and implementation. Most key components identified in the literature were included. The final model was considered to benefit from a patient-centred, holistic approach, which captured both patient-orientated and medication-focused problems, and aligned with traditional consultation methods thus facilitating implementation in practice.

CONCLUSIONS

The Bristol Medication Review Model provides a framework for standardised delivery of structured reviews. The model has the potential for use by all healthcare professionals with relevant clinical experience and is designed to offer flexibility of implementation not limited to a particular healthcare setting.

Evaluating the Effectiveness of a Local Primary Care Incentive Scheme: A Difference-in-Differences Study

National financial incentive schemes for improving the quality of primary care have come under criticism in the United Kingdom, leading to calls for localized alternatives. This study investigated whether a local general practice incentive-based quality improvement scheme launched in 2011 in a city in the North West of England was associated with a reduction in all-cause emergency hospital admissions. Difference-in-differences analysis was used to compare the change in emergency admission rates in the intervention city, to the change in a matched comparison population. Emergency admissions rates fell by 19 per 1,000 people in the years following the intervention (95% confidence interval [17, 21]) in the intervention city, relative to the comparison population. This effect was greater among more disadvantaged populations, narrowing socioeconomic inequalities in emergency admissions. The findings suggest that similar approaches could be an effective component of strategies to reduce unplanned hospital admissions elsewhere.

Measured Performance and Vaccine Administration After Decision Support and Office Workflow Changes for Influenza Vaccination

Influenza vaccination is underused. We examined changes in vaccination following decision support and workflow changes in a cross-sectional analysis of three vaccination seasons among adult primary care patients from 21 practices. Interventions included clinical decision support changes to facilitate documentation; changes to rooming workflow for medical assistants and licensed practical nurses to promote vaccination, prepare orders, document care done elsewhere; and record patient refusals. We measured rates for a national vaccination performance measure and receipt of onsite vaccination. Approximately 120,000 patients were eligible each season. Performance on the quality measure increased each year (40.6% to 62.5% to 76.4%). Corresponding rates of onsite vaccination were 27.7%, 28.8%, and 31.5%. The adjusted odds ratio for onsite vaccination in the second season compared with the first was 0.94 (95% confidence interval [CI] 0.92, 0.96). Onsite vaccination was more likely in the third season compared with either previous season-adjusted odds ratio for third versus second 1.14 (95% CI, 1.12, 1.16) or adjusted odds ratio for third versus first 1.07 (95% CI 1.05-1.09). Sequential changes in decision support and patient rooming process workflows were associated with large improvements in measured performance and with a significant increase in clinic-administered influenza vaccination by the third season.

Association Between a National Insurer's Pay-for-Performance Program for Oncology and Changes in Prescribing of Evidence-Based Cancer Drugs and Spending

PURPOSE

Cancer drug prescribing by medical oncologists accounts for the greatest variation in practice and the largest portion of spending on cancer care. We evaluated the association between a national commercial insurer's ongoing pay-for-performance (P4P) program for oncology and changes in the prescribing of evidence-based cancer drugs and spending.

METHODS

We conducted an observational difference-in-differences study using administrative claims data covering 6.7% of US adults. We leveraged the geographically staggered, time-varying rollout of the P4P program to simulate a stepped-wedge study design. We included patients age 18 years or older with breast, colon, or lung cancer who were prescribed cancer drug regimens by 1,867 participating oncologists between 2013 and 2017. The exposure was a time-varying dichotomous variable equal to 1 for patients who were prescribed a cancer drug regimen after the P4P program was offered. The primary outcome was whether a patient's drug regimen was a program-endorsed, evidence-based regimen. We also evaluated spending over a 6-month episode period.

RESULTS

The P4P program was associated with an increase in evidence-based regimen prescribing from 57.1% of patients in the preintervention period to 62.2% in the intervention period, for a difference of +5.1 percentage point (95% CI, 3.0 percentage points to 7.2 percentage points; P < .001). The P4P program was also associated with a differential $3,339 (95% CI, $1,121 to $5,557; P = .003) increase in cancer drug spending and a differential $253 (95% CI, $100 to $406; P = .001) increase in patient out-of-pocket spending, but no significant changes in total health care spending ($2,772; 95% CI, -$181 to $5,725; P = .07) over the 6-month episode period.

CONCLUSION

P4P programs may be effective in increasing evidence-based cancer drug prescribing, but may not yield cost savings.

Post-discharge care following acute kidney injury: quality improvement in primary care

BACKGROUND

Over the past decade, targeting acute kidney injury (AKI) has become a priority to improve patient safety and health outcomes. Illness complicated by AKI is common and is associated with adverse outcomes including high rates of unplanned hospital readmission. Through national patient safety directives, NHS England has mandated the implementation of an AKI clinical decision support system in hospitals. In order to improve care following AKI, hospitals have also been incentivised to improve discharge summaries and general practices are recommended to establish registers of people who have had an episode of illness complicated by AKI. However, to date, there is limited evidence surrounding the development and impact of interventions following AKI.

DESIGN

We conducted a quality improvement project in primary care aiming to improve the management of patients following an episode of hospital care complicated by AKI. All 31 general practices within a single NHS Clinical Commissioning Group were incentivised by a locally commissioned service to engage in audit and feedback, education training and to develop an action plan at each practice to improve management of AKI.

RESULTS

AKI coding in general practice increased from 28% of cases in 2015/2016 to 50% in 2017/2018. Coding of AKI was associated with significant improvements in downstream patient management in terms of conducting a medication review within 1 month of hospital discharge, monitoring kidney function within 3 months and providing written information about AKI to patients. However, there was no effect on unplanned hospitalisation and mortality.

CONCLUSION

The findings suggest that the quality improvement intervention successfully engaged a primary care workforce in AKI-related care, but that a higher intensity intervention is likely to be required to improve health outcomes. Development of a real-time audit tool is necessary to better understand and minimise the impact of the high mortality rate following AKI.

Effects of Monetary Incentives in Physician Groups: A Systematic Review of Reviews

BACKGROUND

Reimbursement systems that contribute to the cooperation and integration of providers have become increasingly important within the healthcare sector. Reimbursement systems not only serve as payment mechanisms but also provide control and incentive functions. Thus, the design of reimbursement systems is extremely important.

OBJECTIVES

The aims of this systematic review were to describe and gain a better understanding of the effects of monetary incentives in the setting of physician groups.

METHODS

In January 2020, we searched the MEDLINE (PubMed), Cochrane Library, CINAHL, PsycINFO, EconLit, and ISI Web of Science databases as well as the gray literature and authors' personal collections.

RESULTS

We included 21 reviews containing seven different incentive schemes/initiatives. The study settings and outcome measures varied considerably, as did the results within the incentive schemes and initiatives. However, we found positive effects on process quality for two types of incentives: pay-for-performance and accountable care organizations. The main limitations of this review were the variations in study settings and outcome measures of the studies included.

CONCLUSIONS

Monetary incentives in healthcare are often implemented as a control measure and are supposed to increase quality of care and reduce costs. The heterogeneity of the study results indicates that this is not always successful. The results reveal a need for research into the effects of monetary incentives in healthcare.

Performance-based pharmacy payment models: the case for change

In response to rising healthcare costs, healthcare payers across the globe have been experimenting with performance-based payment models that link payments to providers with the quality of care that they provide. Community pharmacy in Australia has yet to be significantly affected by these changes. Initial steps have been taken to fund quality-linked interventions by pharmacists, such as the provision of medicines in dose administration aids, but funding for dispensing prescriptions remains solely based on a fee-for-service model. At the foundation of any performance-based payment model are measures that, in aggregate, reflect the quality of care that is provided. Patient adherence to prescription regimens can be correlated with the counselling provided by pharmacists and, as such, can serve as the measure on which a performance-based payment model for dispensing can be constructed. Experience in the US suggests per-prescription payments to a pharmacy can be increased or decreased by a small, yet meaningful, amount based on a measure of the level of adherence of patients of the pharmacy. The current dispensing payment model in the Australian Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme may be able to be modified in a similar manner to support provision by pharmacists of improved quality of care.

Motivators for medical staff with a high gap in healthcare efficiency: Comparative research from Poland and Ukraine

INTRODUCTION

This article examines different motivators for medical staff in countries with a high gap in healthcare efficiency by comparing them in two healthcare systems-Polish (ie efficient) and Ukrainian (ie inefficient).

METHOD

This survey-based study applies a six-stage conceptual framework to two Polish and two Ukrainian hospitals as well as medical faculties of one university from each country. Following ethical approval, data were collected in the first quarter of 2019, using the 'Evaluation of motivators questionnaire for medical staff'.

FINDINGS

Medical staff perceived their working conditions in the inefficient healthcare system much worse than in the efficient system; however, they generally had a more optimistic outlook. Medical staff in efficient and inefficient healthcare systems has different motivational targets, including sizable differences from profession, gender, and age. These factors play an important role in developing a high-performance healthcare system. Results are illustrated in terms of motivators for medical staff.

CONCLUSION

Optimising a healthcare system requires useful reform of enablers, especially in countries with inefficient systems, including policymaking and regulatory action. Best practices must incorporate all stakeholders interested in high healthcare performance-usage of suitable practices from abroad can act as an important resource.

Provider Perspectives on Quality Payment Programs Targeting Diabetes in Primary Care Settings

Public and private insurers increasingly use quality payment programs as a tool to improve quality of care in primary care settings. However, little is known about primary care providers' perspectives on whether and how quality payment programs improve diabetes quality of care. In this qualitative study, the authors conducted semi-structured interviews and focus groups with 23 providers from March to June 2015. Transcripts were analyzed to identify key themes using the immersion-crystallization method. Almost all of the providers believed that insurers play a meaningful role in improving quality of care for diabetes patients. Most thought that insurers' efforts are more effective when channeled through providers and delivery systems rather than directed at patients. Providers generally believed that quality payment programs have had a positive impact on quality of diabetes care, although provider views were not evidence based. Providers in practices in which quality payment programs were believed to have had a positive impact stated that the programs provided financial incentives and resources for improved population health management systems and additional staff. Conversely, most providers did not believe that quality payment programs have had any impact via direct financial incentives to individual physicians. A few providers were skeptical about the impact of quality payment programs and noted negative consequences that they had observed. Providers recommended strategies to improve quality payment programs (eg, refine quality measures, provide regular feedback on quality and costs) and additional strategies that insurers could consider to address provider- and patient-level barriers to high-quality diabetes care.

Influence of financial and reputational incentives on primary care performance: a longitudinal study

BACKGROUND

The Quality and Outcomes Framework has generated reputational as well as financial rewards for general practices because the number of quality points a practice receives is publicly reported. These rewards vary across diseases and practices, and over time.

AIM

To determine the relative effects on performance of the financial and reputational rewards resulting from a pay-for-performance programme.

DESIGN AND SETTING

Observational study of the published performance on 42 indicators of 8929 practices in England between 2004 and 2013.

METHOD

The authors calculated the revenue offered (financial reward, measured in £100s) and the points offered (reputational reward) per additional patient treated for each indicator for each practice in each year. Fixed-effects multivariable regression models were used to estimate whether the percentage of eligible patients treated responded to changes in these financial and reputational rewards.

RESULTS

Both the offered financial rewards and reputational rewards had small but statistically significant associations with practice performance. The effect of the financial reward on performance decreased from 0.797 percentage points per £100 (95% confidence interval [CI] = 0.614 to 0.979) in 2004, to 0.092 (95% CI = 0.045 to 0.138) in 2013. The effect of the reputational reward increased from -0.121 percentage points per quality point (95% CI = -0.220 to -0.022) in 2004, to 0.209 (95% CI = 0.147 to 0.271) in 2013.

CONCLUSION

In the short term, general practices were more sensitive to revenue than reputational rewards. In the long term, general practices appeared to divert their focus towards the reputational reward, once benchmarks of performance became established.

Efficiency of HIV services in Nigeria: Determinants of unit cost variation of HIV counseling and testing and prevention of mother-to-child transmission interventions

Background

Like most countries with a substantial HIV burden, Nigeria continues to face challenges in reaching coverage targets of HIV services. A fundamental problem is stagnated funding in recent years. Improving efficiency is therefore paramount to effectively scale-up HIV services. In this study, we estimated the facility-level average costs (or unit costs) of HIV Counseling and Testing (HCT) and Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission (PMTCT) services and characterized determinants of unit cost variation. We investigated the role of service delivery modalities and the link between facility-level management practices and unit cost variability along both services’ cascades.

Methods

We conducted a cross-sectional, observational, micro-costing study in Nigeria between December 2014 and May 2015 in 141 HCT, and 137 PMTCT facilities, respectively. We retrospectively collected relevant input quantities (personnel, supplies, utilities, capital, and training), input prices, and output data for the year 2013. Staff costs were adjusted using time-motion methods. We estimated the facility-level average cost per service along the HCT and PMTCT service cascades and analyzed their composition and variability. Through linear regressions analysis, we identified aspects of service delivery and management practices associated with unit costs variations.

Results

The weighted average cost per HIV-positive client diagnosed through HCT services was US$130. The weighted average cost per HIV-positive woman on prophylaxis in PMTCT services was US$858. These weighted values are estimates of nationally representative unit costs in Nigeria. For HCT, the facility-level unit costs per client tested and per HIV-positive client diagnosed were US$30 and US$1,364, respectively; and the median unit costs were US$17 and US$245 respectively. For PMTCT, the facility-level unit costs per woman tested, per HIV-positive woman diagnosed, and per HIV-positive woman on prophylaxis were US$46, US$2,932, and US$3,647, respectively, and the median unit costs were US$24, US$1,013 and US$1,448, respectively. Variability in costs across facilities was principally explained by the number of patients, integration of HIV services, task shifting, and the level of care.

Discussion

Our findings demonstrate variability in unit costs across facilities. We found evidence consistent with economies of scale and scope, and efficiency gains in facilities implementing task-shifting. Our results could inform program design by suggesting ways to improve resource allocation and efficiently scale-up the HIV response in Nigeria. Some of our findings might also be relevant for other settings.

Quality of Care in the United Kingdom after Removal of Financial Incentives

BACKGROUND

The benefits of pay-for-performance schemes in improving the quality of care remain uncertain. There is little information on the effect of removing incentives from existing pay-for-performance schemes.

METHODS

We conducted interrupted time-series analyses of electronic medical record (EMR) data from 2010 to 2017 for 12 quality-of-care indicators in the United Kingdom's Quality and Outcomes Framework for which financial incentives were removed in 2014 and 6 indicators for which incentives were maintained. We estimated the effects of removing incentives on changes in performance on quality-of-care measures.

RESULTS

Complete longitudinal data were available for 2819 English primary care practices with more than 20 million registered patients. There were immediate reductions in documented quality of care for all 12 indicators in the first year after the removal of financial incentives. Reductions were greatest for indicators related to health advice, with a reduction of 62.3 percentage points (95% confidence interval [CI], -65.6 to -59.0) in EMR documentation of lifestyle counseling for patients with hypertension. Changes were smaller for indicators involving clinical actions that automatically update the EMR, such as laboratory testing, with a reduction of 10.7 percentage points (95% CI, -13.6 to -7.8) in control of cholesterol in patients with coronary heart disease and 12.1 percentage points (95% CI, -13.6 to -10.6) for thyroid-function testing in patients with hypothyroidism. There was little change in performance on the 6 quality measures for which incentives were maintained.

CONCLUSIONS

Removal of financial incentives was associated with an immediate decline in performance on quality measures. In part, the decline probably reflected changes in EMR documentation, but declines on measures involving laboratory testing suggest that incentive removal also changed the care delivered.

Exploring a motivation of medical staff

This paper aims to identify the true motivators (needs) of medical staff, compare them with the current labor incentives, and detect possible differences in motivators for main groups of medical staff. Observing personnel of 5 hospitals and students of the medical institute by special questionnaires, the author confirmed the hypothesis of different motivators for groups of medical staff with different ages, professions, and gender. The author used special questionnaires to collect the data. Study results confirmed the hypothesis of different motivators for groups of medical staff with different ages, professions, and gender. The author also found significant differences between the motivation of Ukrainian health workers and their colleagues from other countries. The main conclusion is that no matter how we would like to satisfy gender and age equality, all people are individual and what is good for an elderly male doctor cannot be acceptable for a young female nurse. Therefore, forming the motivation system for employees of medical institutions, it is necessary to take into account the age, gender, professions, and other characteristics of each employee. In this way, we can achieve the highest health-care performance.

Quality-of-Life Metrics Correlate With Disease Severity in Idiopathic Subglottic Stenosis

OBJECTIVES

Idiopathic subglottic stenosis (ISGS) can have significant impacts on quality of life (QOL), but it remains unclear how patients' subjective responses correlate with objective measurement of disease severity. Peak expiratory flow percentage (PEF%) has been shown to be an effective measure of disease severity in subglottic stenosis. This study aims to identify the key QOL questions correlated with PEF% and proposes a statistical model for prediction of disease severity.

METHODS

Patients with ISGS presenting to an academic laryngologist were included retrospectively from 2012 to 2016. Peak expiratory flow percentage (age, sex, and height adjusted) was recorded for each visit, along with four validated QOL instruments (European QOL-Five Dimensions; RAND 36-Item Health Survey; Clinical COPD [Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease] Questionnaire; and the Airway, Dyspnea, Voice, and Swallowing Summary Assessment). A stepwise multiple linear regression was used to identify statistically significant independent variables correlated with PEF%, and a model was built with these variables.

RESULTS

Thirty-two patients were included, with a total of 271 patient encounters. Overall scores from each of the four QOL instruments were correlated with PEF% values recorded each visit (P < 0.05). Question responses correlating most positively included overall breathlessness, difficulty catching breath, cough within the past week, dyspnea with moderate activity, perception that voice changes are restricting social life, and overall general health (all P < 0.01). A model constructed using six nonoverlapping questions yielded an adjusted R2 of 0.58.

CONCLUSION

Quality of life is correlated to PEF% in ISGS. Using a limited number of QOL questions, clinicians can predict objective worsening or improvement of disease severity, as measured by spirometry.

LEVEL OF EVIDENCE

2b. Laryngoscope, 2017.

Social preferences of future physicians

This paper advances scientific understanding of social preference—a topic of longstanding cross-disciplinary interest—by studying the preferences of future physicians. In making treatment decisions, physicians make fundamental tradeoffs between their own (financial) self-interest, patient benefit, and stewardship of social resources. These tradeoffs affect patient health, adoption of new scientific medical technologies, and the equity and efficiency of our health care system. Understanding physicians’ decisions about these tradeoffs requires understanding the social preferences that are behind them. Our main finding that future physicians are substantially less altruistic and more efficiency focused than the average American challenges notions of physician altruism, the fundamental feature of medical professionalism, and has potential implications for policy in a host of health care areas.

We measure the social preferences of a sample of US medical students and compare their preferences with those of the general population sampled in the American Life Panel (ALP). We also compare the medical students with a subsample of highly educated, wealthy ALP subjects as well as elite law school students and undergraduate students. We further associate the heterogeneity in social preferences within medical students to the tier ranking of their medical schools and their expected specialty choice. Our experimental design allows us to rigorously distinguish altruism from preferences regarding equality–efficiency tradeoffs and accurately measure both at the individual level rather than pooling data or assuming homogeneity across subjects. This is particularly informative, because the subjects in our sample display widely heterogeneous social preferences in terms of both their altruism and equality–efficiency tradeoffs. We find that medical students are substantially less altruistic and more efficiency focused than the average American. Furthermore, medical students attending the top-ranked medical schools are less altruistic than those attending lower-ranked schools. We further show that the social preferences of those attending top-ranked medical schools are statistically indistinguishable from the preferences of a sample of elite law school students. The key limitation of this study is that our experimental measures of social preferences have not yet been externally validated against actual physician practice behaviors. Pending this future research, we probed the predictive validity of our experimental measures of social preferences by showing that the medical students choosing higher-paying medical specialties are less altruistic than those choosing lower-paying specialties.

Effectiveness of UK provider financial incentives on quality of care: a systematic review

BACKGROUND

Provider financial incentives are being increasingly adopted to help improve standards of care while promoting efficiency.

AIM

To review the UK evidence on whether provider financial incentives are an effective way of improving the quality of health care.

DESIGN AND SETTING

Systematic review of UK evidence, undertaken in accordance with Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) recommendations.

METHOD

MEDLINE and Embase databases were searched in August 2016. Original articles that assessed the relationship between UK provider financial incentives and a quantitative measure of quality of health care were included. Studies showing improvement for all measures of quality of care were defined as 'positive', those that were 'intermediate' showed improvement in some measures, and those classified as 'negative' showed a worsening of measures. Studies showing no effect were documented as such. Quality was assessed using the Downs and Black quality checklist.

RESULTS

Of the 232 published articles identified by the systematic search, 28 were included. Of these, nine reported positive effects of incentives on quality of care, 16 reported intermediate effects, two reported no effect, and one reported a negative effect. Quality assessment scores for included articles ranged from 15 to 19, out of a maximum of 22 points.

CONCLUSION

The effects of UK provider financial incentives on healthcare quality are unclear. Owing to this uncertainty and their significant costs, use of them may be counterproductive to their goal of improving healthcare quality and efficiency. UK policymakers should be cautious when implementing these incentives - if used, they should be subject to careful long-term monitoring and evaluation. Further research is needed to assess whether provider financial incentives represent a cost-effective intervention to improve the quality of care delivered in the UK.

Reputational concerns with altruistic providers

We study a model of reputational concerns when doctors differ in their degree of altruism and they can signal their altruism by their (observable) quality. When reputational concerns are high, following the introduction or enhancement of public reporting, the less altruistic (bad) doctor mimics the more altruistic (good) doctor. Otherwise, either a separating or a semi-separating equilibrium arises: the bad doctor mimics the good doctor with probability less than one. Pay-for-performance incentive schemes are unlikely to induce crowding out, unless some dimensions of quality are unobservable. Under the pooling equilibrium a purchaser can implement the first-best quality by appropriately choosing a simple payment scheme with a fixed price per unit of quality provided. This is not the case under the separating equilibrium. Therefore, policies that enhance public reporting complement pay-for-performance schemes.

Financial Incentives and Physician Practice Participation in Medicare's Value-Based Reforms

OBJECTIVES

To evaluate whether greater experience and success with performance incentives among physician practices are related to increased participation in Medicare's voluntary value-based payment reforms.

DATA SOURCES/STUDY SETTING

Publicly available data from Medicare's Physician Compare (n = 1,278; January 2012 to November 2013) and nationally representative physician practice data from the National Survey of Physician Organizations 3 (NSPO3; n = 907,538; 2013).

STUDY DESIGN

We used regression analysis to examine practice-level relationships between prior exposure to performance incentives and participation in key Medicare value-based payment reforms: accountable care organization (ACO) programs, the Physician Quality Reporting System ("Physician Compare"), and the Meaningful Use of Health Information Technology program ("Meaningful Use"). Prior experience and success with financial incentives were measured as (1) the percentage of practices' revenue from financial incentives for quality or efficiency; and (2) practices' exposure to public reporting of quality measures.

DATA COLLECTION/EXTRACTION METHODS

We linked physician participation data from Medicare's Physician Compare to the NSPO3 survey.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

There was wide variation in practices' exposure to performance incentives, with 64 percent exposed to financial incentives, 45 percent exposed to public reporting, and 2.2 percent of practice revenue coming from financial incentives. For each percentage-point increase in financial incentives, there was a 0.9 percentage-point increase in the probability of participating in ACOs (standard error [SE], 0.1, p < .001) and a 0.8 percentage-point increase in the probability of participating in Meaningful Use (SE, 0.1, p < .001), controlling for practice characteristics. Financial incentives were not associated with participation in Physician Compare. Among ACO participants, a 1 percentage-point increase in incentives was associated with a 0.7 percentage-point increase in the probability of being "very well" prepared to utilize cost and quality data (SE, 0.1, p < .001).

CONCLUSIONS

Physicians organizations' prior experience and success with performance incentives were related to participation in Medicare ACO arrangements and participation in the meaningful use criteria but not to participation in Physician Compare. We conclude that Medicare must complement financial incentives with additional efforts to address the needs of practices with less experience with such incentives to promote value-based payment on a broader scale.

Impact of Provider Incentives on Quality and Value of Health Care

The use of financial incentives to improve quality in health care has become widespread. Yet evidence on the effectiveness of incentives suggests that they have generally had limited impact on the value of care and have not led to better patient outcomes. Lessons from social psychology and behavioral economics indicate that incentive programs in health care have not been effectively designed to achieve their intended impact. In the United States, Medicare's Hospital Readmission Reduction Program and Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program, created under the Affordable Care Act (ACA), provide evidence on how variations in the design of incentive programs correspond with differences in effect. As financial incentives continue to be used as a tool to increase the value and quality of health care, improving the design of programs will be crucial to ensure their success.

Multimethod study of a large-scale programme to improve patient safety using a harm-free care approach

OBJECTIVES

We aimed to evaluate whether a large-scale two-phase quality improvement programme achieved its aims and to characterise the influences on achievement.

SETTING

National Health Service (NHS) in England.

PARTICIPANTS

NHS staff.

INTERVENTIONS

The programme sought to (1) develop a shared national, regional and locally aligned safety focus for 4 high-cost, high volume harms; (2) establish a new measurement system based on a composite measure of 'harm-free' care and (3) deliver improved outcomes. Phase I involved a quality improvement collaborative intended to involve 100 organisations; phase II used financial incentives for data collection.

MEASURES

Multimethod evaluation of the programme. In phase I, analysis of regional plans and of rates of data submission and clinical outcomes reported to the programme. A concurrent process evaluation was conducted of phase I, but only data on submission rates and clinical outcomes were available for phase II.

RESULTS

A context of extreme policy-related structural turbulence impacted strongly on phase I. Most regions' plans did not demonstrate full alignment with the national programme; most fell short of recruitment targets and attrition in attendance at the collaborative meetings occurred over time. Though collaborative participants saw the principles underlying the programme as attractive, useful and innovative, they often struggled to convert enthusiasm into change. Developing the measurement system was arduous, yet continued to be met by controversy. Data submission rates remained patchy throughout phase I but improved in reach and consistency in phase II in response to financial incentives. Some evidence of improvement in clinical outcomes over time could be detected but was hard to interpret owing to variability in the denominators.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings offer important lessons for large-scale improvement programmes, particularly when they seek to develop novel concepts and measures. External contexts may exert far-reaching influence. The challenges of developing measurement systems should not be underestimated.

Can pay for performance improve the quality of primary care?

Martin Roland and Frede Olesen explore what other countries can learn from the UK’s experience with the Quality and Outcomes Framework

Policy-Oriented Research on Improved Physician Incentives for Higher Value Health Care

Policy makers (both public and private) are seeking ways to improve the value delivered within our health care system, that is, using fewer resources to provide the same benefit to patients, or using equivalent resources to provide more benefit. One strategy is to alter the predominant fee‐for‐service (FFS) economic incentives in the current system. To inform such policy changes, this paper identifies areas in which little is known about the effects of specific incentives (FFS, salary, etc.) on the two components of value: resource use and quality. Specific suggestions are offered regarding research that would be informative for policy makers, focusing on fundamental “building block” studies rather than overall evaluations of complex interventions, such as accountable care organizations. This research would better identify critical aspects of the FFS model and salary‐based payments that are particularly problematic, as well as situations in which FFS or salary may be less problematic. The research would also explore when alternatives, such as episode‐based payment might be feasible, or simply be hypothetical solutions. The availability of electronic health record‐based data in various delivery systems would allow many of these studies to be accomplished in 3–5 years with budgets manageable by public and private funding sources.