Does financial compensation for living kidney donation change willingness to donate?

The general public's attitude towards accepting payment for kidney donation

Introduction

Kidney transplantation has become the most cost-effective treatment for patients with end-stage kidney disease (ESKD) and offers them the highest quality of life. Yet, kidney donation is often inaccessible due to cultural and traditional beliefs about organ donation. The goal of our study is to assess the value of kidney donation using the Willingness to Accept (WTA) technique. We also aim to understand the factors influencing an individual's willingness to donate an organ.

Methods

A self-administered survey was completed by 985 participants from the general public. The quantitative method and survey design that were chosen used descriptive, correlational, nonparametric, and multivariate statistical tests.

Results

Most of the respondents, 895 (90.9%) are not willing to donate a kidney while alive. Four hundred and five (41.1%) of the respondents are not willing to donate a kidney after their death, while the rest are willing to donate their kidney after their death without financial compensation. The same attitude applies to the donation of a kidney from their relatives. Significant predictors from the results of the logistic regression model in predicting the lowest (minimal) amount that will encourage donation of one kidney after death were: Marital status; Nationality; Adi card holder; Knowing people who need a kidney donation; confidence in the medical staff; and consideration of the family's opinions regarding organ donation.

Discussion

Using cost benefit analysis (CBA), with the aim of evaluating the willingness of individuals to accept payment for innovative medical procedures, such as kidney donation, allows an assessment of the perceived value of the medical procedure and enables policymakers to decide whether to allocate funds or offer subsidies for kidney donation, given the limited healthcare resources available. During our research, we found that most participants did not support the commercialization of organs. Our recommendation for policymakers and health professionals is to continue providing adequate funding for kidney donations and to implement educational programs aimed at improving attitudes towards organ donation.

A fair exchange: why living kidney donors in England should be financially compensated

Every year, hundreds of patients in England die whilst waiting for a kidney transplant, and this is evidence that the current system of altruistic-based donation is not sufficient to address the shortage of kidneys available for transplant. To address this problem, we propose a monopsony system whereby kidney donors can opt-in to receive financial compensation, whilst still preserving the right of individuals to donate without receiving any compensation. A monopsony system describes a market structure where there is only one 'buyer'-in this case the National Health Service. By doing so, several hundred lives could be saved each year in England, wait times for a kidney transplant could be significantly reduced, and it would lessen the burden on dialysis services. Furthermore, compensation would help alleviate the common disincentives to living kidney donation, such as its potential associated health and psychological costs, and it would also help to increase awareness of living kidney donation. The proposed system would also result in significant cost savings that could then be redirected towards preventing kidney disease and reducing health disparities. While concerns about exploitation, coercion, and the 'crowding out' of altruistic donors exist, we believe that careful implementation can mitigate these issues. Therefore, we recommend piloting financial compensation for living kidney donors at a transplant centre in England.

A regulated system of incentives for living kidney donation: Clearing the way for an informed assessment

The kidney shortage continues to be a crisis for our patients. Despite numerous attempts to increase living and deceased donation, annually in the United States, thousands of candidates are removed from the kidney transplant waiting list because of either death or becoming too sick to transplant. To increase living donation, trials of a regulated system of incentives for living donation have been proposed. Such trials may show: (1) a significant increase in donation, and (2) that informed, incentivized donors, making an autonomous decision to donate, have the same medical and psychosocial outcomes as our conventional donors. Given the stakes, the proposal warrants careful consideration. However, to date, much discussion of the proposal has been unproductive. Objections commonly leveled against it: fail to engage with it; conflate it with underground, unregulated markets; speculate without evidence; and reason fallaciously, favoring rhetorical impact over logic. The present paper is a corrective. It identifies these common errors so they are not repeated, thus allowing space for an assessment of the proposal on its merits.

Kidneys for Sale: Empirical Evidence From Iran

The kidney market in Iran is the only legal market of this sort globally. Yet, it has not been empirically studied based on real data. For the first time, we obtained data on donors and recipients from the Kidney Foundation in Mashhad, April 2011 up to March 2018, and assessed which individualistic characteristics contribute to a kidney’s price. Our findings indicate that each year of education for both donors and recipients increases the kidney price. Moreover, old patients are willing to make a higher payment to young vendors. We have also provided some policy implications to improve the efficiency of kidney allocations.

Knowledge, attitudes and willingness to organ donation among the general public: a cross-sectional survey in China

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this study is to assess the level of knowledge, attitudes, and willingness to organ donation among the general public in China.

METHODS

The study population consisted of 4274 participants from Eastern, Central and Western China. The participants' knowledge, attitudes and willingness to organ donation were collected by a self-designed questionnaire consisting of 30 items. Knowledge is measured by 10 items and presented as a 10 point score, attitudes is measured by 20 items using a 5-step Likert scale and total score ranged between 0 and 80; while the willingness to donate is assessed as binary variable (0 = No; 1 = Yes). A logistic regression model was used to assess the association of knowledge and attitudes with willingness to organ donation, controlling for demographic and socioeconomic confounders.

RESULTS

The questionnaire response rate was 94.98%. The mean score (± SD) of the general public's knowledge to organ donation was 6.84 ± 1.76, and the mean score (± SD) of attitudes to organ donation was 47.01 ± 9.07. The general public's knowledge and attitudes were the highest in Eastern China, followed by West and Central China. The logistic regression model indicated a positive association between knowledge and the willingness to organ donation (OR = 1.12, 95%CI: 1.08, 1.17; P < 0.001); attitudes were also positively potential determinant of more willingness to organ donation (OR = 1.08, 95%CI: 1.07, 1.09; P < 0.001).

CONCLUSIONS

Knowledge and attitudes were found to be positively associated with the Chinese general public's willingness to organ donation. Knowledge about the concept of brain death and the transplant procedure may help raise the rate of willingness to organ donation.

Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and unwillingness to donate organs post-mortem

Willingness to donate organs is contingent upon knowledge about and attitude toward organ donation. In order to explore differences between members of the three monotheistic religions: Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, a nation-wide survey was conducted in Israel. Members of all three religions expressed a very low willingness to donate organs postmortem. They had similar levels of knowledge regarding organ donation and similar negative attitudes toward organ donation. The public feels negative regarding the issue, therefore education campaigns should be designed and implemented in order to refute potential misconceptions and hence increase the number of people who sign donor cards.

Willingness for Solid-Organ Donation in Saudi Arabia: A Skyscape View

OBJECTIVES

The number of patients with organ failure in Saudi Arabia is increasing annually, and transplantation offers the best outcome for these patients. However, the number of donors does not meet these needs.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

A questionnaire was distributed to assess the behavior of participants in Saudi Arabia toward different types of organ donation. The questionnaire examined general willingness to donate, deceased donation, living donation, and refusal to donate, as well as paired-exchange donation and next-of-kin consenting.

RESULTS

Of the 1099 participants, most were men (64%) and middle-aged (46%, 31-45 years old), with 36% of participants currently willing to donate or already registered as donors. Although 592 participants (54%) were not yet willing to donate, they believed they could consider making donations in specific circumstances (eg, when a relative is in need). In all circumstances, 10% (n = 108) of the participants refused to donate. With regard to deceased donation, 74% of participants accepted this, but only 29% (n = 322) agreed to consent for donation as next of kin. Of 1099 participants, 143 (13%) were willing to accept altruistic donation. Paired-exchange donation was widely accepted in a cohort study (n = 725, 65%), as opposed to list exchange (n = 540, 49%). Religious beliefs were the main reason behind the refusal of donation in the study cohort (n = 37, 37%). Female participants were less likely to refuse organ donation (odds ratio: 0.562; 95% CI, 0.407-0.775; P < .001), whereas older participants (> 60 years) were more likely to refuse organ donation (odds ratio: 5.457; 95% CI, 1.894-15.722; P = .002).

CONCLUSIONS

This study described the willingness of the Saudi population to donate organs in general and under special conditions, such as deceased donation, living-unrelated donation, altruistic donation, paired-exchange donation, list exchange donation, and next-of-kin consent.

Characteristics of kidney donors and recipients in Iranian kidney market: Evidence from Mashhad

The Iranian model of kidney transplantation is an example of a regulated living unrelated renal donation. In this paper, we collected and analyzed a unique dataset of 436 paired kidney donors and recipients, including their characteristics and the realized price of a kidney in Mashhad. As opposed to the global picture of kidney donation, we find that women are less likely to donate and more likely to receive a kidney. Moreover, the average price of a kidney amounts less than 2 years of work with the minimum level of wage.

Dialysis Reimbursement: What Impact Do Different Models Have on Clinical Choices?

Allowing patients to live for decades without the function of a vital organ is a medical miracle, but one that is not without cost both in terms of morbidity and quality of life and in economic terms. Renal replacement therapy (RRT) consumes between 2% and 5% of the overall health care expenditure in countries where dialysis is available without restrictions. While transplantation is the preferred treatment in patients without contraindications, old age and comorbidity limit its indications, and low organ availability may result in long waiting times. As a consequence, 30–70% of the patients depend on dialysis, which remains the main determinant of the cost of RRT. Costs of dialysis are differently defined, and its reimbursement follows different rules. There are three main ways of establishing dialysis reimbursement. The first involves dividing dialysis into a series of elements and reimbursing each one separately (dialysis itself, medications, drugs, transportation, hospitalisation, etc.). The second, known as the capitation system, consists of merging these elements in a per capita reimbursement, while the third, usually called the bundle system, entails identifying a core of procedures intrinsically linked to treatment (e.g., dialysis sessions, tests, intradialyitc drugs). Each one has advantages and drawbacks, and impacts differently on the organization and delivery of care: payment per session may favour fragmentation and make a global appraisal difficult; a correct capitation system needs a careful correction for comorbidity, and may exacerbate competition between public and private settings, the latter aiming at selecting the least complex cases; a bundle system, in which the main elements linked to the dialysis sessions are considered together, may be a good compromise but risks penalising complex patients, and requires a rapid adaptation to treatment changes. Retarding dialysis is a clinical and economical goal, but the incentives for predialysis care are not established and its development may be unfavourable for the provider. A closer cooperation between policymakers, economists and nephrologists is needed to ensure a high quality of dialysis care.

Opinions of Health Care Personnel Regarding Disincentives and Incentives for Living Kidney Donation at a Single Center

BACKGROUND

Transplant societies continue to actively concentrate on increasing rates of living kidney donation (LKD) to bridge the gap between individuals awaiting transplantation and the number of kidneys available. A widely discussed strategy to increase living donation rates is the provision of incentives and removal of disincentives. Though opinions of the public regarding this strategy have been studied, the opinions of health care providers, including younger professionals, are less clear. We studied the opinions of medical students and other health care providers on strategies to increase LKD to determine if opinions were different among those < 25 or ≥ 25 years of age.

METHODS

A simple cross-sectional survey was conducted at an academic medical center. Participants included medical students and employees in Internal Medicine, General Surgery, and the Organ Transplantation Center. Pearson's χ² and Fisher's exact test were conducted on the responses regarding disincentives and incentives to determine whether opinions differed based on age.

RESULTS

Six hundred and twenty-four participants completed the survey. There was no statistical difference in opinions between groups on reimbursing transportation costs, loss of wages, or childcare costs, but those aged ≥ 25 were more agreeable with covering food/lodging costs compared to those < 25 (96.5% vs 90.7%, P = .009). Respondents < 25 years old were more willing to donate a kidney for a financial incentive (P = .0002) accepting a median amount of $25,000.

CONCLUSIONS

Health care personnel broadly support removing financial disincentives for living kidney donation, and those ≥ 25 were more in favor of covering food/lodging costs compared to those < 25. Those < 25 years old were more likely to accept financial incentives towards donating their kidney compared to those ≥ 25 years.

Would government compensation of living kidney donors exploit the poor? An empirical analysis

Government compensation of kidney donors would likely increase the supply of kidneys and prevent the premature deaths of tens of thousands of patients with kidney failure each year. The major argument against it is that it would exploit the poor who would be more likely to accept the offers of compensation. This overlooks the fact that many poor patients desperately need a kidney transplant and would greatly benefit from an increased supply of kidneys. The objective of this study is to empirically test the hypothesis that government compensation of kidney donors would exploit the poor. Exploitation is defined by economists and several noted ethicists as paying donors less than the fair market value of their kidney. Exploitation is expressed in monetary terms and compared with the economic benefit recipients receive from a transplant. Data are from the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients and the United States Renal Data System annual data reports. Educational attainment is used as a proxy for income. We estimate that if the government rewards living donors with a package of non-cash benefits worth $75,000 per kidney, donors would not be exploited. Much more important, this compensation would likely end the kidney shortage, enabling many more patients with kidney failure to obtain transplants and live longer and healthier lives. The value of kidney transplantation to a U.S. recipient is about $1,330,000, which is an order of magnitude greater than any purported exploitation of a living donor (zero to $75,000). Consequently, the aggregate net benefit to the poor alone from kidney transplantation would increase to about $12 billion per year from $1 billion per year currently. Most of the benefit would accrue to poor kidney recipients. But poor donors would receive the fair market value of their kidney, and hence would not be exploited. If the government wanted to ensure that donors also received a net benefit, it could easily do so by increasing the compensation above $75,000 per donor.

Banking on Living Kidney Donors-A New Way to Facilitate Donation without Compromising on Ethical Values

Public surveys conducted in many countries report widespread willingness of individuals to donate a kidney while alive to a family member or close friend, yet thousands suffer and many die each year while waiting for a kidney transplant. Advocates of financial incentive programs or "regulated markets" in kidneys present the problem of the kidney shortage as one of insufficient public motivation to donate, arguing that incentives will increase the number of donors. Others believe the solutions lie-at least in part-in facilitating so-called "altruistic donation;" harnessing the willingness of relatives and friends to donate by addressing the many barriers which serve as disincentives to living donation. Strategies designed to minimize financial barriers to donation and the use of paired kidney exchange programs are increasingly enabling donation, and now, an innovative program designed to address what has been termed "chronologically incompatible donation" is being piloted at the University of California, Los Angeles, and elsewhere in the United States. In this program, a person whose kidney is not currently required for transplantation in a specific recipient may instead donate to the paired exchange program; in return, a commitment is made to the specified recipient that priority access for a living-donor transplant in a paired exchange program will be offered when or if the need arises in the future. We address here potential ethical concerns related to this form of organ "banking" from living donors, and argue that it offers significant benefits without undermining the well-established ethical principles and values currently underpinning living donation programs.

Kidney Sales and Market Regulation: A Reply to Semrau

Luke Semrau argues that the documented harms of existing organ markets do not undermine the case for establishing regulated systems of paid kidney donation. He offers two arguments in support of this conclusion. First, Semrau argues that the harms of kidney selling are straightforwardly amenable to regulatory solution. Second, Semrau argues that even in existing black markets, sellers would likely have experienced greater harm if the option of selling a kidney were not available. This commentary challenges both of Semrau's claims. I argue that there is no reason to believe that kidney sellers benefit from the current black market trade in organs, and highlight a number of potential issues regarding the effectiveness and feasibility of Semrau's proposed market regulations.

Past, present and future of kidney paired donation transplantation in India

One third of healthy willing living kidney donors are rejected due to ABO blood group incompatibility and donor specific antibody. This increases pre-transplant dialysis duration leading to increased morbidity and mortality on the kidney transplantation waiting list. Over the last decade kidney paired donation is most rapidly increased source of living kidney donors. In a kidney transplantation program dominated by living donor kidney transplantation, kidney paired donation is a legal and valid alternative strategy to increase living donor kidney transplantation. This is more useful in countries with limited resources where ABO incompatible kidney transplantation or desensitization protocol is not feasible because of costs/infectious complications and deceased donor kidney transplantation is in initial stages. The matching allocation, ABO blood type imbalance, reciprocity, simultaneity, geography were the limitation for the expansion of kidney paired donation. Here we describe different successful ways to increase living donor kidney transplantation through kidney paired donation. Compatible pairs, domino chain, combination of kidney paired donation with desensitization or ABO incompatible transplantation, international kidney paired donation, non-simultaneous, extended, altruistic donor chain and list exchange are different ways to expand the donor pool. In absence of national kidney paired donation program, a dedicated kidney paired donation team will increase access to living donor kidney transplantation in individual centres with team work. Use of social networking sites to expand donor pool, HLA based national kidney paired donation program will increase quality and quantity of kidney paired donation transplantation. Transplant centres should remove the barriers to a broader implementation of multicentre, national kidney paired donation program to further optimize potential of kidney paired donation to increase transplantation of O group and sensitized patients. This review assists in the development of similar programs in other developing countries.

Patterns of Personality in Living Kidney Donors

BACKGROUND

The decision to undergo living donor transplantation determines a particular condition characterized by strong mental and emotional anguish, both for the patient and his family. Many recent studies showed the concern of living donors who, rather than being driven by altruistic reasons, meet the decision to donate with ambivalence, liabilities, and/or in response to family pressures. The aim of this study was to analyze the more frequently encountered personality variables in a sample of potential kidney living donors, together with any psychological variables that can express possible risks of an impulsive decision and/or poorly processed from a cognitive and emotional point of view.

METHODS

We examined 32 potential kidney donors. The personality study was performed using The Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-III. The psychic symptoms were studied through the Symptom Checklist-90-R. The quality of life was studied through the Complete Form Health Survey (SF-36).

RESULTS

The study showed that the ability to express free and therefore invalid consent, in the role of donor, is an expression of specific personality patterns, cognitive, emotional aspects and interpersonal experiences.

CONCLUSIONS

The psychological-psychiatric evaluation of potential donors is fundamental to certify the state of mental health and psychological well-being, an indispensable prerequisite for the donation.

Deceased Donor Organs: What Can Be Done to Raise Donation Rates Using Evidence From Malaysia?

Organ donation rates have continued to fall seriously short of needs worldwide, with the lowest rates recorded among developing economies. This study seeks to analyze evidence from a developing economy to explore the usefulness of social psychological theory to solve the problem. The study deployed a large survey (n = 10 412) using a convenience sampling procedure targeted at increasing the number of Malaysians registered with the Ministry of Health, Malaysia who are willing to donate organs upon death. Structural equation modeling was deployed to estimate simultaneously the relative influence of cognitive and noncognitive variables on willingness to donate deceased organs. The cognitive factors of donation perception, socioeconomic status and financial incentives, and the noncognitive factors of demography and fear showed a high statistically significant (1%) relationship with willingness to donate organs after death. While financial incentives were significant, cash rewards showed the least impact. Donation perception showed the highest impact, which shows that the development of effective pedagogic programs with simultaneous improvements to the quality of services provided by medical personnel engaged in retrieving and transplanting deceased donor organs can help raise organ donation rates.

Paid Organ Donation: An Italian Perspective

The only countries that have allowed financial incentives for organ donation are Iran since 1988, and later on, Singapore and Saudi Arabia. In Europe, and of course in Italy, financial incentives for donors are prohibited. The author has completed extensive research via the Internet (PubMed) of worldwide scientific literature on paid organ donation, also researching studies concerning public opinion on organ commercialism and "regulated markets". Italian transplant laws also have been reported and analyzed.

A moral dilemma argument against clinical trials of incentives for kidney donation

Commercial transplant tourism results in significant harm to both kidney donors and recipients. However, proponents of incentives for kidney donation assert that proper oversight of the process prevents these harms and also that transplant numbers can be safely increased so that the moral burden of poor end-stage kidney disease outcomes can be alleviated. In a moral dilemma analysis, the principle of preventing donor harm can be dissociated from the principles of providing benefits to the recipient and to society. It is plausible that an incentivized donor is fundamentally different from an uncompensated donor. Incentivized donors can experience harms unrelated to lack of regulation because their characteristics are determined by the incentive superimposed upon a poverty circumstance. Moreover, creating a system of incentivized donation without established national registries for capturing all long-term donor outcomes would be morally inconsistent, since without prior demonstration that donor outcomes are not income or wealth-dependent, a population of incentivized donors cannot be morally created in a clinical trial. Socioeconomic factors adversely affect outcome in other surgical populations, and interventions on income or wealth in these populations have not been studied. Coercion will be increased in families not affected by kidney disease, where knowledge of a new income source and not of a potential recipient is the incentive. In the case of elective surgery such as kidney donation, donor non-maleficence trumps donor autonomy, recipient beneficence, and beneficence to society when there is a conflict among these principles. Yet, we are still faced with the total moral burden of end-stage kidney disease, which belongs to the society that cannot provide enough donor kidneys. Acting according to one arm of the dilemma to prevent donor harm does not erase obligations towards the other, to provide recipient benefit. To resolve the moral burden, as moral agents, we must rearrange our institutions by increasing available donor organs from other sources. The shortage of donor kidneys creates a moral burden for society, but incentives for donation will only increase the total moral burden of end-stage kidney disease.

Between Scylla and Charybdis: charting an ethical course for research into financial incentives for living kidney donation

New approaches to address the kidney scarcity in the United States are urgently needed. The greatest potential source of kidneys is from living donors. Proposals to offer financial incentives to increase living kidney donation rates remain highly controversial. Despite repeated calls for a pilot study to assess the impact of financial compensation on living kidney donation rates, many fear that financial incentives will exploit vulnerable individuals and cast the field of transplantation in a negative public light, ultimately reducing donation rates. This paper provides an ethical justification for conducting a pilot study of a federally regulated approach to providing financial incentives to living kidney donors, with the goal of assessing donors' perceptions.