Rawlsian Justice and Palliative Care

What We Argue About When We Argue About Death

The literature on the determination of death has often if not always assumed that the concept of human death should be defined in terms of the end of the human organism. I argue that this broadly biological conceptualization of human death cannot constitute a basis for agreement in a pluralistic society characterized by a variety of reasonable views on the nature of our existence as embodied beings. Rather, following Robert Veatch, I suggest that we must define death in moralized terms, as the loss of an especially significant sort of moral standing. Departing from Veatch, however, I argue that we should not understand death in terms of the loss of all moral status whatsoever. Rather, I argue, what we should argue about, when we argue about death, is when and why people lose their rights-claims to the protection and promotion of their basic bodily functioning.

Distributive Justice: An Ethical Priority in Global Palliative Care

Providing care to cancer patients in resource-poor settings often demands complex trade-offs regarding resource allocation. It is estimated that over 60% of all cancer deaths worldwide occur in low- and middle-income countries, where channels to care and appropriate symptom management interventions are overstressed or obsolete. Concepts of distributive justice underlie much of global health policy. As appetites for expanding global palliative care services increase, so do questions of fair and culturally appropriate distribution. The ethical principle of distributive justice underpins questions of resource allocation at a fundamental level. One of the most challenging concepts for health care workers immersing in cross-cultural contexts is the idea that ethics are somewhat malleable; they shape and are shaped by the unique sociopolitical, economic, intracultural, and power dynamics of a particular setting. In this article, we use the case of a young woman diagnosed with terminal cancer in an underserved community in rural Uganda to illustrate the conflicting concepts of fairness, which dictate distribution of scarce resources in low- and middle-income countries. Notions of distributive justice vary across cultural, societal, and even individual norms, with some definitions allowing for discrimination based on merit or need. Resource allocation in the absence of cultural humility or a genuine willingness to understand decision-making priorities in a given culture can contribute to inequity and may have harmful consequences.