What We Argue About When We Argue About Death

The literature on the determination of death has often if not always assumed that the concept of human death should be defined in terms of the end of the human organism. I argue that this broadly biological conceptualization of human death cannot constitute a basis for agreement in a pluralistic society characterized by a variety of reasonable views on the nature of our existence as embodied beings. Rather, following Robert Veatch, I suggest that we must define death in moralized terms, as the loss of an especially significant sort of moral standing. Departing from Veatch, however, I argue that we should not understand death in terms of the loss of all moral status whatsoever. Rather, I argue, what we should argue about, when we argue about death, is when and why people lose their rights-claims to the protection and promotion of their basic bodily functioning.

The Place of Philosophy in Bioethics Today

In some views, philosophy's glory days in bioethics are over. While philosophers were especially important in the early days of the field, so the argument goes, the majority of the work in bioethics today involves the "simple" application of existing philosophical principles or concepts, as well as empirical work in bioethics. Here, we address this view head on and ask: What is the role of philosophy in bioethics today? This paper has three specific aims: (1) to respond to skeptics and make the case that philosophy and philosophers still have a very important and meaningful role to play in contemporary bioethics, (2) to discuss some of the current challenges to the meaningful integration of philosophy and bioethics, and (3) to make suggestions for what needs to happen in order for the two fields to stay richly connected. We outline how bioethics center directors, funders, and philosopher bioethicists can help.

What Justifies the Allocation of Health Care Resources to Patients with Disorders of Consciousness?

This paper critically engages ethical issues in the allocation of novel, and potentially costly, health care resources to patients with disorders of consciousness. First, we review potential benefits of novel health care resources for patients and their families and outline preliminary considerations to address concerns about cost. We then address two problems regarding the allocation of health care resources to patients with disorders of consciousness: (1) the problem of uncertain moral status; and (2) the problem of accurately measuring the welfare burdens these resources would relieve. We conclude by suggesting that opportunity-based frameworks might complement standard approaches for justifying resources allocation to patients with disorders of consciousness.

Vital prostheses: Killing, letting die, and the ethics of de-implantation

Disconnecting a patient from artificial life support, on their request, is often if not always a matter of letting them die, not killing them-and sometimes, permissibly doing so. Stopping a patient's heart on request, by contrast, is a kind of killing, and rarely if ever a permissible one. The difference seems to be that procedures of the first kind remove an unwanted external support for bodily functioning, rather than intervening in the body itself. What should we say, however, about cases at the boundary-procedures involving items that seem bodily in some respects, but not others? When, for instance, does deactivating an implanted device like a pacemaker count as killing, and when as letting die? Contra existing proposals, I argue that the boundaries of the body for this purpose are not drawn at the boundaries of the self, or (if this is different) the human organism. Nor should we determine when we are killing and when we are letting die by deferring to existing practices for distinguishing ongoing from completed treatment. Rather, I argue that whether something (organic or inorganic) counts as body part for purposes of this distinction depends on the results of a normative analysis of the particular character of our rights in it-particularly, whether and in what way these rights ought to be alienable. I conclude by arguing that there are likely good reasons to recognize distinctively "bodily" rights and restrictions in at least some implantable devices.

Some notes on the nature and limits of posthumous rights: a response to Persad

A person's body can, it seems, survive well after losing the capacity to support Lockean personhood. If our rights in our bodies are, basically, rights in our selves or persons, this seems to imply that we do not after all have a right to direct the disposition of our living remains via advance directive. Govind Persad argues that our rights over our bodies persist after the loss of our personhood; we have a right to insist that our bodies die after we are gone for much the same reason that we have a right to decide whether or not to donate organs, after our death. Persad's conclusion may be right; however, his arguments regarding body rights are insufficient. Persad's suggestion that our rights in our bodies come from a history of acting and sensing through them cannot, quite, be right, since we act and sense through tools, as well. Nor should we accept Persad's arguments, from intuitions in cases involving posthumous pregnancy, that our posthumous body rights (however acquired) are powerful enough to allow choices that will result in the death of beings that need our living remains to survive. Problems with these intuitions point to a more general concern for this sort of case-based intuitionistic method: it presupposes that what body rights we have is a matter of 'natural right', accessible to all, rather than a function of how social institutions do or should resolve conflicts about the proper way of defining our authority over our bodies.

Who Owns the Data in a Medical Information Commons?

In this paper, we explore the perspectives of expert stakeholders about who owns data in a medical information commons (MIC) and what rights and interests ought to be recognized when developing a governance structure for an MIC. We then examine the legitimacy of these claims based on legal and ethical analysis and explore an alternative framework for thinking about participants' rights and interests in an MIC.

Identical and Nonidentical Twins: Risk and Factors Involved in Development of Islet Autoimmunity and Type 1 Diabetes

OBJECTIVE

There are variable reports of risk of concordance for progression to islet autoantibodies and type 1 diabetes in identical twins after one twin is diagnosed. We examined development of positive autoantibodies and type 1 diabetes and the effects of genetic factors and common environment on autoantibody positivity in identical twins, nonidentical twins, and full siblings.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

Subjects from the TrialNet Pathway to Prevention Study (N = 48,026) were screened from 2004 to 2015 for islet autoantibodies (GAD antibody [GADA], insulinoma-associated antigen 2 [IA-2A], and autoantibodies against insulin [IAA]). Of these subjects, 17,226 (157 identical twins, 283 nonidentical twins, and 16,786 full siblings) were followed for autoantibody positivity or type 1 diabetes for a median of 2.1 years.

RESULTS

At screening, identical twins were more likely to have positive GADA, IA-2A, and IAA than nonidentical twins or full siblings (all P < 0.0001). Younger age, male sex, and genetic factors were significant factors for expression of IA-2A, IAA, one or more positive autoantibodies, and two or more positive autoantibodies (all P ≤ 0.03). Initially autoantibody-positive identical twins had a 69% risk of diabetes by 3 years compared with 1.5% for initially autoantibody-negative identical twins. In nonidentical twins, type 1 diabetes risk by 3 years was 72% for initially multiple autoantibody-positive, 13% for single autoantibody-positive, and 0% for initially autoantibody-negative nonidentical twins. Full siblings had a 3-year type 1 diabetes risk of 47% for multiple autoantibody-positive, 12% for single autoantibody-positive, and 0.5% for initially autoantibody-negative subjects.

CONCLUSIONS

Risk of type 1 diabetes at 3 years is high for initially multiple and single autoantibody-positive identical twins and multiple autoantibody-positive nonidentical twins. Genetic predisposition, age, and male sex are significant risk factors for development of positive autoantibodies in twins.

The ethics of sexual reorientation: what should clinicians and researchers do?

Technological measures meant to change sexual orientation are, we have argued elsewhere, deeply alarming, even and indeed especially if they are safe and effective. Here we point out that this in part because they produce a distinctive kind of 'clinical collective action problem', a sort of dilemma for individual clinicians and researchers: a treatment which evidently relieves the suffering of particular patients, but in the process contributes to a practice that substantially worsens the conditions that produce this suffering in the first place. We argue that the role obligations of clinicians to relieve the suffering of their patients put them in a poor position to solve this problem, though they can take measures to avoid complicity in the harms that would result from widespread use of individually safe and effective reorientation biotechnology. But in the end the medical community as a whole still seems obligated to provide these measures, if they become technologically feasible. Medical researchers are in a better position to prevent the harms that would result if reorientation techniques were safe, effective and widely available. We argue that the harms attendant on the development of safe and effective re-orientation techniques give researchers reason to avoid 'applied' research aimed at developing these techniques, and to be careful in the conduct of basic orientation research which might be applied in this way.

Brain-computer interfaces and disability: extending embodiment, reducing stigma?

Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs) now enable an individual without limb function to "move" a detached mechanical arm to perform simple actions, such as feeding herself. This technology may eventually offer almost everyone a way to move objects at a distance, by exercising cognitive control of a mechanical device. At that point, BCIs may be seen less as an assistive technology for disabled people, and more as a tool, like the internet, which can benefit all users. We will argue that BCIs will have a significant but uncertain impact on attitudes toward disabilities and on norms of bodily form and function. It may be liberating, oppressive, or both. Its impact, we argue, will depend - though not in any simple way - on whether BCIs come to be seen as parts of the body itself or as external tools.

[Prediction of developmental problems and functional disabilities in infancy]

Methods to identify developmental problems in children have been requested for a long time. We wanted to find out whether high scores of cumulative non-optimality during infancy indicated disability or developmental problems. In a prospective study, a population of children (n = 1,217) was followed from pregnancy until the age of four. Medical, motor, and neurological data, as well as information about attention and social interaction were added in a cumulative non-optimality score. Information about family and environment was also included. When the children were four years of age, multiple methods were used to identify those with disability and developmental problems. Complete data were obtained for 926 children. The predictive values of the instrument were based on children diagnosed as functionally disabled at the age of four (n = 32). The sensitivity was 87.5%, specificity 93%, positive predictive value 30.8% and negative predictive value was 99.5%. These values are higher than those of comparable methods. The method could be implemented in the normal Norwegian "child health centre" without difficulty. The discussion in this article focuses on whether or not the method should be implemented in the ordinary health care system.