On the persuadability of memory: Is changing people's memories no more than changing their minds?

In Search of Dispersed Memories: Generative Diffusion Models Are Associative Memory Networks

Uncovering the mechanisms behind long-term memory is one of the most fascinating open problems in neuroscience and artificial intelligence. Artificial associative memory networks have been used to formalize important aspects of biological memory. Generative diffusion models are a type of generative machine learning techniques that have shown great performance in many tasks. Similar to associative memory systems, these networks define a dynamical system that converges to a set of target states. In this work, we show that generative diffusion models can be interpreted as energy-based models and that, when trained on discrete patterns, their energy function is (asymptotically) identical to that of modern Hopfield networks. This equivalence allows us to interpret the supervised training of diffusion models as a synaptic learning process that encodes the associative dynamics of a modern Hopfield network in the weight structure of a deep neural network. Leveraging this connection, we formulate a generalized framework for understanding the formation of long-term memory, where creative generation and memory recall can be seen as parts of a unified continuum.

False remembering in real life: James Ost's contributions to memory psychology

This special issue honours James Ost's (1973-2019) contributions to our understanding of false and distorted remembering. In our editorial, we introduce some of James' distinctive research themes including the experiences of people who retract "recovered" memories, social (e.g., co-witness and interviewer influence) and personality influences on false remembering, the nature of false remembering itself (e.g., different types of false memories; false memories vs. false beliefs), public understanding of (false) memory, and a historical link to the work of Frederic Bartlett. We illustrate these themes through a number of key publications. The unifying thread behind James' work is his core interest in false/distorted remembering in real-life (typically high-stake) situations, in line with his engagement with the British False Memory Society and his role as an expert witness in court trials. The articles included in this special issue elaborate on the research themes to which James devoted his career and his curiosity.

Sustainable Swine Manure Management: A Tale of Two Agreements

Intensification and concentration of swine farming has provided economic benefit to rural communities but also negative environmental and human health impacts, particularly from the use of the lagoon-sprayfield system for manure management. Although cost effective, this system is susceptible to poor management, unpleasant odor and other emissions, and inundation during extreme weather events. Competition for manure-spreading acres with other livestock or encroaching development can also pose a problem. This study examines two agreements between industry and government designed to develop and implement improved manure management technologies for swine farms: a voluntary agreement between the attorney general of North Carolina and Smithfield Foods and a consent judgment between the State of Missouri and Premium Standard Farms. Individuals involved in executing these agreements were interviewed to gain insight from their perspective on those processes and lessons they learned from their experience. Common themes among participant responses to support transition processes included the need to involve multiple stakeholder groups, clearly define goals, understand the system, allow time for incremental change, and provide adequate “protected space” for technology development and implementation. Viewing these themes through the lens of multi-level perspective theory identifies leverage points throughout the system to support transitioning farms to a more sustainable path of manure management.

Complexities of human memory: relevance to anaesthetic practice

Mechanisms of anaesthetic actions on memory have largely focused on easily definable aspects of episodic memory, with emphasis on particular drug interactions on specific memory processes. However, the memory landscape of the perioperative experience includes many facets that lie outside these conceptualisations. These include patient recall of preoperative conversations, patient beliefs regarding allergies and unusual/uncommon anaesthetic events, memories of awareness, and particularly vivid dreams during anaesthesia. In no small part, memories are influenced by a patient's interpretations of events in light of their own belief systems. From the practitioner's point of view, relating fully to the patient's experience requires some framework of understanding. The purpose of this review is to highlight research over the previous decades on belief systems and their interactions with autobiographical memory, which organises episodic memories into a personally relevant narrative. As a result, memory is a set of continuously malleable processes, and is best described as a (re)constructive rather than photographic instantiation. Belief systems are separate but closely interacting processes with autobiographical memory. The interaction of a constantly evolving set of memories with belief systems can explain phenomena such as illusions, distortions, and (re)constructions of factitious events. How anaesthetics and our patient interactions influence these behaviours, and vice versa, will be important questions to explore and define with future research.

Memory at the Sharp End: The Costs of Remembering With Others in Forensic Contexts

In many applied contexts where accurate and reliable information informs operational decision-making, emergency response resource allocation, efficient investigation, judicial process, and, ultimately, the delivery of justice, the costs of unfettered conversational remembering can be high. To date, research has demonstrated that conversations between co-witnesses in the immediate aftermath of witnessed events and co-witness retellings of witnessed events often impair both the quality and quantity of information reported subsequently. Given the largely negative impact of conversational remembering on the recall of both individual witnesses and groups of witnesses in this context, this review explores the reasons why these costs occur, the conditions under which costs are exacerbated, and how, in practical terms, the costs can be reduced in order to maximize the accuracy and completeness of witness accounts.

Defending and reducing belief in memories: An experimental laboratory analogue

When receiving disconfirmatory social feedback about recollected events, people sometimes defend and sometimes reduce their belief that the event genuinely occurred. To improve estimates of the rates of memory defense and reduction, and of the magnitude of the change in belief in occurrence that results, in the present studies we examined the effect of disconfirmatory social challenges made to correctly recalled memories for actions performed in the lab. Adult participants performed, imagined, or heard action statements and imagined some of the initial actions multiple times. One week later, they completed a source-monitoring test and rated the actions on belief in their occurrence, recollection, visual detail, vividness, and reexperiencing. Four of the correctly recalled performed actions were challenged either prior to making the ratings during the test (Study 1, N = 44) or after making initial ratings after completing the test, following which the ratings were taken again (Study 2, N = 85). Across both studies, challenges were associated with lower belief-in-occurrence and recollection ratings on average than for control items, and belief in occurrence was affected to a greater extent than recollective features. Challenges that occurred during the test produced more instances of defense, whereas challenges that occurred after the test produced more instances of reduction. A closer analysis showed that some participants always defended, some always reduced, and some both defended and reduced belief. Responses to the first challenge positively predicted the responses to subsequent challenges. In addition, the procedure in Study 2 produced a variety of types of nonbelieved memories.

False memories, nonbelieved memories, and the unresolved primacy of communication

Mahr & Csibra (M&C) make a compelling case for a communicative function of episodic remembering, but a less compelling case that this is its primary function. Questions arise on whether confirming their predictions would support their account sufficiently, on the communicative function of preserving rich, nonbelieved memories, and on the epistemic benefits of developing false memories via the acceptance of misinformation.

Why do we remember? The communicative function of episodic memory

Episodic memory has been analyzed in a number of different ways in both philosophy and psychology, and most controversy has centered on its self-referential, 'autonoetic' character. Here, we offer a comprehensive characterization of episodic memory in representational terms, and propose a novel functional account on this basis. We argue that episodic memory should be understood as a distinctive epistemic attitude taken towards an event simulation. On this view, episodic memory has a metarepresentational format and should not be equated with beliefs about the past. Instead, empirical findings suggest that the contents of human episodic memory are often constructed in the service of the explicit justification of such beliefs. Existing accounts of episodic memory function that have focused on explaining its constructive character through its role in 'future-oriented mental time travel' neither do justice to its capacity to ground veridical beliefs about the past nor to its representational format. We provide an account of the metarepresentational structure of episodic memory in terms of its role in communicative interaction. The generative nature of recollection allows us to represent and communicate the reasons for why we hold certain beliefs about the past. In this process, autonoesis corresponds to the capacity to determine when and how to assert epistemic authority in making claims about the past. A domain where such claims are indispensable are human social engagements. Such engagements commonly require the justification of entitlements and obligations, which is often possible only by explicit reference to specific past events.

Exploring the consequences of nonbelieved memories in the DRM paradigm

In the current experiments, we attempted to elicit nonbelieved memories (NBMs) using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) false memory paradigm. Furthermore, by using this approach, we explored the consequences of nonbelieved true and false memories. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants received several DRM wordlists and were presented with a recognition task. After the recognition task, participants' statements were contradicted by giving them feedback about true and false items. In this way, we succeeded in eliciting nonbelieved true and false memories. In Experiment 2, participants were also involved in a modified perceptual closure task after receiving belief-relevant feedback. In this task, participants received degraded visual representations of words (e.g., false and true) that became clearer over time. Participants had to identify them as fast as possible. We also measured dissociation, compliance, and social desirability. We found that undermining belief had contrasting consequences for true and false memories. That is, nonbelieved true memories were identified more slowly whereas nonbelieved false memories were identified more quickly. We did not find any relation between our individual differences measures and the formation of NBMs.

Recollection, belief and metacognition: a reality check

Non-believed autobiographical memories [e.g. Mazzoni, G., Scoboria, A., & Harvey, L. (2010). Nonbelieved memories. Psychological Science, 21, 1334-1340] are striking examples of divergences between recollective experiences and beliefs in their correspondence to real events. After reviewing a broader range of similar phenomena, I argue that recollection-belief divergences can arise from normal, "healthy" metacognitive monitoring and control processes that balance memory recollections and reality constraints. Such validating "reality checks" draw on general world knowledge and external/social information. Importantly, changes in (perceived) reality constraints can lead to changes in memory beliefs. More generally, both recollection and (external) reality are keys to the past. In many cases, more or less automatic (System 1-type) reliance on recollection is sufficient (or memory would be useless as a system), but sometimes more elaborate (System 2-type) reality checks are needed. I conclude with some ideas about memory-driven and reality-driven recollection-belief divergences.

Public Attitudes on the Ethics of Deceptively Planting False Memories to Motivate Healthy Behavior

Researchers have proposed that planting false memories could have positive behavioral consequences. The idea of deceptively planting ‘beneficial’ false memories outside of the laboratory raises important ethical questions, but how might the general public appraise this moral dilemma? In two studies, participants from the USA and UK read about a fictional ‘false‐memory therapy’ that led people to adopt healthy behaviors. Participants then reported their attitudes toward the acceptability of this therapy, via scale‐rating (both studies) and open‐text (study 2) responses. The data revealed highly divergent responses to this contentious issue, ranging from abject horror to unqualified enthusiasm. Moreover, the responses shed light on conditions that participants believed would make the therapy less or more ethical. Whether or not deceptively planting memories outside the lab could ever be justifiable, these studies add valuable evidence to scientific and societal debates on neuroethics, whose relevance to memory science is increasingly acute. Copyright © 2016 The Authors Applied Cognitive Psychology Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

A Postcolonial Feminist Critique of Harem Analogies in Psychological Science

Since the 1930s, psychologists have used the termharemas an analogy for social relations among animals. In doing so they draw upon gendered and racial stereotypes located in the history of colonialism. We present an experimental study on theharem analogyas a means of confronting and challenging colonial undercurrents in psychological science. We investigated whether the use of this colonialist image in studies of animal societies could subtly affect thinking about Middle Eastern Muslim people. Two-hundred and forty-nine participants read about animal societies; in the experimental condition these were described as “harems” and accompanied by the analogy of harems in Middle Eastern Muslim societies. In the two control conditions, animal societies were either described as “groups” or “harems”, with no mention of the analogy. In the experimental condition, participants falsely remembered descriptions of Muslim people of the Middle East as applying to animals. This finding replicates the “resistance is futile” effect (Blanchette & Dunbar, 2002; Perrott, Gentner, & Bodenhausen, 2005) by which false remembering of analogical statements as previously seen literal descriptions is taken as suggestive of analogical mapping between two disparate concepts. As such, the study contributes to debate between feminist and evolutionary psychology about the value-neutrality of psychology, and to postcolonial critique of the partiality of mainstream psychological accounts of the universality of nature and society.