Many faces of dogmatism: Prejudice as a way of protecting certainty against value violators among dogmatic believers and atheists

Cultural threat perceptions predict violent extremism via need for cognitive closure

Understanding the psychological processes that drive violent extremism is a pressing global issue. Across six studies, we demonstrate that perceived cultural threats lead to violent extremism because they increase people's need for cognitive closure (NFC). In general population samples (from Denmark, Afghanistan, Pakistan, France, and an international sample) and a sample of former Mujahideen in Afghanistan, single-level and multilevel mediation analyses revealed that NFC mediated the association between perceived cultural threats and violent extremist outcomes. Further, in comparisons between the sample of former Afghan Mujahideen and the general population sample from Afghanistan following the known-group paradigm, the former Mujahideen scored significantly higher on cultural threat, NFC, and violent extremist outcomes. Moreover, the proposed model successfully differentiated former Afghan Mujahideen participants from the general Afghan participants. Next, two preregistered experiments provided causal support for the model. Experimentally manipulating the predictor (cultural threat) in Pakistan led to higher scores on the mediator (NFC) and dependent variables (violent extremist outcomes). Finally, an experiment conducted in France demonstrated the causal effect of the mediator (NFC) on violent extremist outcomes. Two internal meta-analyses using state-of-the-art methods (i.e., meta-analytic structural equation modeling and pooled indirect effects analyses) further demonstrated the robustness of our results across the different extremist outcomes, designs, populations, and settings. Cultural threat perceptions seem to drive violent extremism by eliciting a need for cognitive closure.

Hematogenous metastasis and tumor dormancy as concepts or dogma? The continuum of vessel co-option and angiotropic extravascular migratory metastasis as an alternative

It has been accepted for many years that tumor cells spread via the circulation to distant sites. The latency period between treatment and tumor recurrence has been attributed to dormant cells in distant organs that emerge and grow as metastatic tumors. These processes are accepted with an incomplete demonstration of their existence. Challenging such a well-established accepted paradigm is not easy as history as shown. An alternative or co-existing mechanism involving tumor cell migration along the outside of the vessels and co-option of the blood vessel has been studied for over 25 years and is presented. Several lines of data support this new mechanism of tumor spread and metastatic growth and is termed angiotropic extravascular migratory metastasis or EVMM. This slow migration along the outside of the vessel wall may explain the latency period between treatment and metastatic tumor growth. The reader is asked to be open to this possible new concept in how tumors spread and grow and the reason for this latency period. A full understanding of how tumors spread and grow is fundamental for the targeting of new therapeutics.

How Do You Speak about Immigrants? Taxonomy and StereoImmigrants Dataset for Identifying Stereotypes about Immigrants

Stereotype is a type of social bias massively present in texts that computational models use. There are stereotypes that present special difficulties because they do not rely on personal attributes. This is the case of stereotypes about immigrants, a social category that is a preferred target of hate speech and discrimination. We propose a new approach to detect stereotypes about immigrants in texts focusing not on the personal attributes assigned to the minority but in the frames, that is, the narrative scenarios, in which the group is placed in public speeches. We have proposed a fine-grained social psychology grounded taxonomy with six categories to capture the different dimensions of the stereotype (positive vs. negative) and annotated a novel StereoImmigrants dataset with sentences that Spanish politicians have stated in the Congress of Deputies. We aggregate these categories in two supracategories: one is Victims that expresses the positive stereotypes about immigrants and the other is Threat that expresses the negative stereotype. We carried out two preliminary experiments: first, to evaluate the automatic detection of stereotypes; and second, to distinguish between the two supracategories of immigrants’ stereotypes. In these experiments, we employed state-of-the-art transformer models (monolingual and multilingual) and four classical machine learning classifiers. We achieve above 0.83 of accuracy with the BETO model in both experiments, showing that transformers can capture stereotypes about immigrants with a high level of accuracy.

Feeling correct is feeling prejudiced: The differential effects of attitude correctness and attitude clarity on evaluations of outgroups

Global attitude certainty consists of two subconstructs: attitude clarity—certainty that one is aware of one’s true attitudes—and attitude correctness, certainty that one’s attitudes are morally correct and valid. Attitude correctness is more often associated with group-related psychological and behavioral outcomes than attitude clarity. As such, we expected that attitude correctness, but not attitude clarity, would be associated with more negative attitudes toward outgroups when group boundaries are defined by attitudes. Across four studies, greater attitude correctness related to more negative attitudes toward attitudinal outgroups regardless of context (e.g., political, religious); attitude clarity’s relationship to prejudice was inconsistent (Studies 1a and 2: positive or no relationship; Study 3: negative; Studies 1b and 4: no relationship). In Studies 2 and 3, mediational analyses showed that greater attitude correctness was associated with stronger beliefs that group boundaries are sharp and distinct (i.e., discreteness beliefs), which in turn was associated with greater prejudice. Finally, Study 4 demonstrated that the attitude correctness–prejudice link was associated with greater intention to engage in competitive behaviors in a conflict resolution scenario with an outgroup member.

The psychology of nonbelievers

Contrary to some conceptualizations, nonbelievers are more than simply those scoring low on religiosity scales. They seem to be characterized by analytic, flexible, and open-minded social-cognitive attributes, although this may interact with sociocultural levels of religiosity. This paper demonstrates that nonbelief, at least in the West, tends to coincide with specific worldviews, namely valuing rationality and science, as well as humanistic and liberal values. Furthermore, nonbelievers seem to parallel believers in various indicators of health. Finally, as all ideologists, nonbelievers may hold prejudicial attitudes toward groups perceived as threatening their (secular) worldviews, although this has some limits. Global increases in secularity make the nascent psychological study of nonbelievers and nonreligious worldviews an important research programme.

Prejudice toward Christians and atheists among members of nonreligious groups: Attitudes, behaviors, and mechanisms

Much research demonstrates that people high in religiosity tend to be prejudiced against value-threatening groups. Therefore, some researchers have suggested that people who are not religious may be less prejudiced. Are nonreligious people characterized by general tolerance? If not, what are the bases of their prejudices? This research investigated prejudice toward Christians and atheists among people who identify as nonreligious (atheist, agnostic, and spiritual-but-not-religious), documented this prejudice in the form of exclusion behaviors (Study 1) and self-report of affect and social distance (Studies 2–3), and explored potential mechanisms of nonreligious prejudice toward Christians: individual differences in belief style and biases against Christians (Studies 2–3). Results showed the nonreligious are not generally tolerant and that differences among these groups in belief superiority, feelings of distrust, and fear of contamination by unpalatable ideas all explained differences in prejudice toward Christians. These findings help provide a more comprehensive picture of religious intergroup prejudice.

Unfairness and Radicalization

This article reviews the relationship between people's perceptions of unfairness and their tendencies to think, feel, and act in radicalizing ways. Various theories of radicalization processes are reviewed that examine key aspects of the psychology of perceived unfairness. The review shows that experienced group deprivation and perceived immorality are among the core judgments that can drive Muslim radicalization, right-wing radicalization, and left-wing radicalization. Symbols of injustice, the legitimization of revolutionary thought, and the experience of unfair treatment can also increase radicalization. The review also examines core moderators (e.g., uncertainty and insufficient self-correction) and mediators (e.g., externally oriented emotions) of the linkage between perceived unfairness and core components of radicalization (e.g., rigidity of thoughts, hot-cognitive defense of cultural worldviews, and violent rejection of democratic principles and the rule of law). The review discusses how the study of unfairness and radicalization contributes to a robust and meaningful science of psychology.

Distrust persists after subverting atheist stereotypes

Antiatheist prejudice appears to be common. This prejudice may stem from distrust. However, the factors influencing distrust are not fully understood. The current research identified common stereotypes about atheists, tested the intuitiveness of those stereotypes, and determined whether distrust toward atheists depends more on the label “atheist” or the attributes atheists are thought to possess. Study 1 ( N = 100) and Study 2 ( N = 149) identified several attributes thought to be most characteristic of atheists and least characteristic of Christians (or vice versa). Study 3 ( N = 219) demonstrated that atheists and Christians are intuitively associated with the respective traits identified in Studies 1 and 2. Study 4 ( N = 274) and Study 5 ( N = 259) used fake social media profiles to manipulate target religious identification (atheist, Christian, or unspecified) and attributes (stereotypically atheist or stereotypically Christian) to determine the effect on trust ratings. Overall, the results of these studies indicate that atheists and Christians are explicitly and implicitly associated with different attributes and that, even when atheists possess stereotypically Christian attributes, Christians trust atheists significantly less than other Christians. These findings suggest that antiatheist prejudice is relatively insensitive to individual differences of the target.

Studying a heterogeneous array of target groups can help us understand prejudice

Prejudice can be expressed towards a wide array of target groups, but it is often operationalized as expressed towards a narrower array of groups. By studying a heterogeneous array of target groups we can draw broader conclusions about prejudice writ large. We describe our research which seeks to understand constructs that consistently predict prejudice across a wide array of groups (consistent predictors), as well as those constructs that only predict prejudice for some types of groups (inconsistent predictors). For inconsistent predictors, we can also identify the perceived characteristics of the target groups (e.g., status, ideology) that are associated with expressed prejudice. Studying a heterogenous array of target groups opens up new questions related to morality, cognitive processing, and perceived discrimination, but also suggests that prejudice, depending on the group, can be a motivating force preserving the status quo or prompting social change.

From Threat to Relief: Expressing Prejudice toward Atheists as a Self-Regulatory Strategy Protecting the Religious Orthodox from Threat

We claim that religious orthodoxy is related to prejudice toward groups that violate important values, i.e., atheists. Moreover, we suggest that expressing prejudice may efficiently reduce the threat posed by this particular group among people who hold high levels, but not low levels, of orthodox belief. We tested these assumptions in an experimental study in which, after being exposed to atheistic worldviews (value-threat manipulation), high and low orthodox participants were allowed (experimental condition) or not (control condition) to express prejudice toward atheists. Threat was operationalized by cardiovascular reactivity, i.e., heart rate (HR); the higher the HR index, the higher the threat. The results found that people who hold high (vs. low) levels of orthodox belief responded with increased HR after the threat manipulation. However, we observed decreased HR after the expression of prejudice toward atheists among highly orthodox participants compared to the control condition. We did not find this effect among people holding low levels of orthodox belief. Thus, we conclude that expressing prejudice toward this particular group may be an efficient strategy to cope with the threat posed by this group for highly orthodox people. The results are discussed in light of previous findings on religious beliefs and the self-regulatory function of prejudice.