Metacognition during unfamiliar face matching

Investigating people's metacognitive insight into their own face abilities

Within the domain of face processing, researchers have been interested in quantifying the relationship between objective (i.e., performance on laboratory tests of recognition and matching) and subjective measures of ability (typically, self-report questionnaires). Put simply, do people show high levels of metacognitive insight into their own abilities with faces? Although several studies have suggested that the association between these two types of measures may only be moderate, there remain several important issues that require consideration before this question can be sensibly investigated. First, specificity is needed regarding both objective and subjective measurements because both tend to span a wide range of potentially separable abilities. Second, experimental tasks appear to focus on different contexts to those tapped in self-report questionnaire items. Third, recent issues with statistical approaches and visualisation can result in numerical artefacts and misinterpretations. Finally, the sizes of population-level insights suggested by recent work provide only limited information regarding individuals within these populations, and so researchers aiming to identify people at the extremes of ability must be careful when drawing conclusions. Taken together, we argue that more attention to these issues is needed when attempting to investigate metacognitive insight within this domain.

Face matching and self-insight: A Registered Report investigating individual differences in metacognitive sensitivity, efficiency, and bias

Deciding whether two face photographs depict the same person or not can be a challenging task, and there are substantial individual differences in face matching ability. Far less is known about differences in metacognitive ability; that is, how well people can estimate the quality of their own face matching judgements. The purpose of this Registered Report was to determine the relationship between first-order performance in a face matching task, and three metacognitive measures: metacognitive sensitivity (the information exploited by metacognition), metacognitive efficiency (the quality of metacognitive processing itself), and metacognitive bias (the overall tendency towards high or low confidence). Participants completed a 200-trial unfamiliar face matching task, providing a second-order (metacognitive) confidence rating after each first-order (cognitive) response. Cognitive performance and metacognitive sensitivity showed a substantial positive association (rs = .60), suggesting that they were based on overlapping information, with poorer performers having lower quality information available. Once these differences in the information available to metacognition were accounted for, the quality of metacognitive processing itself (metacognitive efficiency) did not vary systematically with cognitive performance (rs = .00). Moreover, poor performers were not less or more confident overall than good performers, as cognitive performance and metacognitive bias did not correlate significantly (rs = .11). These findings allow us to move beyond consideration of group-level insight and inform regarding individual differences in cognitive and metacognitive abilities.

Unskilled, underperforming, or unaware? Testing three accounts of individual differences in metacognitive monitoring

Many studies show that competence (e.g., skill, expertise, natural ability) influences individuals' capabilities of monitoring their item-level performance. However, debate persists about how best to explain these individual differences in metacognition. The competence-based account ascribes differences in monitoring to individuals' objective ability level, arguing that the same skills necessary to perform a task are required to effectively monitor performance. The performance-based account attributes differences in monitoring to changes in overall task performance - no individual differences in competence required. Finally, the metacognitive awareness account proposes that alignment between an individuals' self-assessed and objective ability leads to differences in monitoring. In this study, 603 participants completed a self-assessment of face recognition ability, a lineup identification task, and an objective assessment of face recognition ability. We manipulated the number of encoding repetitions and delay between encoding and test to produce varying levels of task performance across objective face recognition ability. Following each lineup decision, participants provided both a numeric confidence rating and a written expression of verbal confidence. We transformed verbal confidence into a quantitative value using machine learning techniques. When matched on overall identification accuracy, objectively stronger face recognizers used numeric and verbal confidence that a) better discriminates between correct and filler lineup identifications than weaker recognizers, and b) shows better calibration to accuracy. Participants with greater self-assessed ability used higher levels of confidence, irrespective of trial accuracy. These results support the competence-based account.

A descriptive study on misidentifications of a person as a familiar person in an everyday situation

The purpose of this study is to show the characteristics of person misidentifications, that is, experiences in which persons are misidentified as known persons. A total of 121 participants were asked how many times they misidentified persons in the last year and details of a recent person misidentification were recorded through a traditional questionnaire. Additionally, they answered questions in a diary method questionnaire, about the details of person misidentification each time they experienced it, during the two-week survey period. The questionnaires revealed that the participants misidentified both known and unknown persons as familiar persons approximately six (traditional questionnaire) or 19 (diary method) times a year on average, regardless of whether they expected the persons to be there. They were more likely to misidentify a person as a familiar than as a less familiar person. It was also shown that the similarity of the faces of the person actually seen and the person they were mistaken for was not as high as the similarities of build and clothing. This study is expected to provide suggestions for models of person identification and enhance the research on errors.

Face matching and metacognition: investigating individual differences and a training intervention

Background

Although researchers have begun to consider metacognitive insight during face matching, little is known about the underlying mechanism. Here, I investigated whether objective ability, as well as self-assessed ability, were able to predict metacognitive performance, that is, the ability to differentiate correct and incorrect responses in terms of confidence. In addition, I considered whether a training intervention resulted in improvements to both face matching performance and metacognitive insight.

Methods

In this experiment (N = 220), participants completed a face matching task, with either a diagnostic feature training course or a control course presented at the halfway point. In addition, a second face matching task, as well as a self-report questionnaire regarding ability, were completed to provide measures of objective and self-assessed ability respectively.

Results

Higher self-assessed ability with faces, as well as higher objective ability with face matching, predicted better metacognitive performance, i.e., greater confidence in correct, in comparison with incorrect, responses. This pattern of results was evident both when objective ability was measured through performance on the same task used to measure metacognitive insight and when a different task was used. Finally, the training intervention failed to produce improvements in face matching performance and showed no evidence of altering metacognitive ability.

Discussion

The current work begins to address the mechanism underlying individual differences in metacognitive insight during face matching. Although support was provided for a competence-based account, where better face matchers showed greater performance on the task and were more successful in monitoring their performance, further work might focus on decoupling task performance and competence in order to more conclusively explain why some people are more insightful than others.

Incomplete faces are completed using a more average face

Facial first impressions are known to influence how we behave towards others. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, we often view incomplete faces due to the commonplace wearing of face masks. Previous research has shown that perceptions of attractiveness are often increased due to these coverings, with initial evidence suggesting that this may be caused by viewers using a mental representation of the average face to complete any missing information. Here, we directly address this hypothesis by presenting participants with incomplete faces (either the lower or upper half removed) and asking them to decide how they thought the actual, full face looked. Participants were able to manipulate the missing half of the face onscreen by increasing or decreasing the averageness of its shape. Our results demonstrated that participants did not select the original versions of the faces but instead chose more average versions when manipulating both the lower and upper face. Further, the typicality of the original image influenced responses, with less typical faces (in comparison with more typical ones) being completed using an even more average version of the missing half of the faces. Taken together, these findings provide the first direct evidence that people utilise an average/typical internal representation when inferring information about incomplete faces. This result has theoretical importance in terms of visual perception, as well as real-world relevance in a time where face masks are commonplace due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

A Statistical Explanation of the Dunning-Kruger Effect

An explanation of the Dunning-Kruger effect is provided which does not require any psychological explanation, because it is derived as a statistical artifact. This is achieved by specifying a simple statistical model which explicitly takes the (random) boundary constraints into account. The model fits the data almost perfectly.

JEL Classification

A22; C24; C91; D84; D91; I21.

Forensic facial examiners versus super-recognizers: Evaluating behavior beyond accuracy

We evaluated the detailed, behavioral properties of face matching performance in two specialist groups: forensic facial examiners and super-recognizers. Both groups compare faces to determine identity with high accuracy and outperform the general population. Typically, facial examiners are highly trained; super-recognizers rely on natural ability. We found distinct behaviors between these two groups. Examiners used the full 7-point identity judgment scale (-3: "different"; +3: "same"). Super-recognizers' judgments clustered toward highly confident decisions. Examiners' judgments for same- and different-identities were symmetric across the scale midpoint (0); super-recognizers' judgments were not. Examiners showed higher identity judgment agreement than super-recognizers. Despite these qualitative differences, both groups showed insight into their own accuracy: more confident people and those who rated the task to be easier tended to be more accurate. Altogether, we show to better understand and interpret judgments according to the nature of someone's facial expertise, evaluations should assess more than accuracy.