Using the SIRDE model of social change to examine the vote of Scottish teenagers in the 2014 independence referendum

Activism in the time of COVID-19

In many countries, COVID-19 has amplified the health, economic and social inequities that motivate group-based collective action. We draw upon the SIRDE/IDEAS model of social change to explore how the pandemic might have affected complex reactions to social injustices. We argue that the virus elicits widespread negative emotions which are spread contagiously through social media due to increased social isolation caused by shelter-in-place directives. When an incident occurs which highlights systemic injustices, the prevailing negative emotional climate intensifies anger at these injustices as well as other emotions, which motivates participation in protest actions despite the obvious risk. We discuss how the pandemic might shape both normative and non-normative protests, including radical violent and destructive collective actions. We also discuss how separatism is being encouraged in some countries due to a lack of effective national leadership and speculate that this is partially the result of different patterns of social identification.

Favouring a disunited Kingdom? How negative perceptions of the EU-referendum relate to individual mobility and collective action considerations

One consequence of the EU-referendum’s pro-Brexit outcome was a renewed call for Scottish independence. Supporting this call can be construed as a form of collective action Scots may engage in. However, Scots may also consider individual mobility strategies including - in extreme cases - emigration. The current research investigated how identity-dynamics relate to these identity management strategies in post-referendum Scotland. We found a positive association between perceiving the EU-referendum as having violated expectations and considering individual mobility responses, mediated by identity subversion (i.e., the perception that the referendum results fundamentally changed the UK’s identity). Furthermore, we found that perceiving the EU-referendum as having violated expectations was related to higher collective action intentions, mediated by disidentification from UK citizens. Taken together, these findings underscore the pervasive role social identity processes play in shaping political decisions and individual behaviour.

Tweeting about sexism motivates further activism: A social identity perspective

Women, more so than men, are using social media activism to respond to sexism. However, when they do, they are also faced with gendered criticisms 'hashtag feminism' that may instead serve to silence them. Based on social identity theory, this research examined how women's social media activism, in response to sexism, may be a first step towards further activism. Two studies used a simulated Twitter paradigm to expose women to sexism and randomly assign them to either tweet in response, or to a no-tweet control condition. Both studies found support for a serial mediation model such that tweeting out after sexism strengthened social identity, which in turn increased collective action intentions, and in turn, behavioural collective actions. Study 2 further showed that validation from others increases the indirect effect of tweeting on behavioural collective action through collective action intentions, but group efficacy did not moderate any indirect effects. It was concluded that social media activism in response to sexism promotes an enactment of women's social identity, thereby mobilizing them to further action.

Mobilizing IDEAS in the Scottish Referendum: Predicting voting intention and well-being with the Identity-Deprivation-Efficacy-Action-Subjective well-being model

In the month approaching the 2014 Scottish Independence referendum, we tested the Identity‐Deprivation‐Efficacy‐Action‐Subjective Well‐Being model using an electorally representative survey of Scottish adults (N = 1,156) to predict voting for independence and subjective well‐being. Based on social identity theory, we hypothesized for voting intention that the effects of collective relative deprivation, group identification, and collective efficacy, but not personal relative deprivation (PRD), should be fully mediated by social change ideology. Well‐being was predicted to be associated with PRD (negatively) and group identification (positively and, indirectly, negatively). Unaffected by demographic variables and differences in political interest, nested structural equation model tests supported the model, accounting for 82% of the variance in voting intention and 31% of the variance in subjective well‐being. However, effects involving efficacy depended on its temporal framing. We consider different ways that social identification can simultaneously enhance and diminish well‐being and we discuss ramifications of the model for collective mobilization and separatist nationalism. Findings also suggest new directions for research on social identity, collective efficacy, and collective action.

Chicken or the egg? A cross-lagged panel analysis of group identification and group-based relative deprivation

Group identification and group-based relative deprivation (GRD) are critical predictors of numerous group-oriented attitudes and behaviours. While social-identity-based approaches suggest that salient group identities increase social comparisons, empirical data bearing on the causal direction of the relationship between group identification and GRD are mixed. To resolve this inconsistency, we examined the cross-lagged effects of group identification on GRD—as well as the potential reverse causal pathway—using three annual waves of data from a nationally representative sample of ethnic minorities in New Zealand ( N = 5,115). Although we found evidence of a reciprocal relationship between variables, ethnic group identification had a stronger positive cross-lagged effect on ethnic GRD than vice versa, suggesting that social identity is an important antecedent to invidious group-based comparisons. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings.

When nonactivists care: Group efficacy mediates the effect of social identification and perceived instability on the legitimacy of collective action

In recent years, multiple social movements have emerged around the world. In addition, public surveys indicate the highest recorded levels of support for protest. In this context of acceptance of collective action, we examine the role of nonactivists in the perceived legitimacy of social movements, as this “passive” support can contribute to social change. Given that antecedents of legitimacy have been neglected in the literature, we carried out a survey ( N = 605) among a general sample of the population in Chile to shed light on this issue. We found that social identification with movements and perceived instability predicted the perceived legitimacy of protests by social movements, and that both variables had only indirect effects through group efficacy. This suggests that perceiving social movements as able to achieve success can lead nonactivists to perceive their actions as legitimate, highlighting the importance to movements of being seen to be effective.

Immigration, political trust, and Brexit - Testing an aversion amplification hypothesis

A few weeks prior to the EU referendum (23rd June 2016) two broadly representative samples of the electorate were drawn in Kent (the south-east of England, N = 1,001) and Scotland (N = 1,088) for online surveys that measured their trust in politicians, concerns about acceptable levels of immigration, threat from immigration, European identification, and voting intention. We tested an aversion amplification hypothesis that the impact of immigration concerns on threat and identification would be amplified when political trust was low. We hypothesized that the effect of aversion amplification on voting intentions would be mediated first by perceived threat from immigration, and then by (dis) identification with Europe. Results in both samples were consistent with this hypothesis and suggest that voters were most likely to reject the political status quo (choose Brexit) when concerns that immigration levels were too high were combined with a low level of trust in politicians.