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Gao Q, Hu J, Hua R, Hong H, Feng Z, Xu H, Yin J. Teenagers' but not young adults' beliefs about intrinsic interpersonal obligations for group members. Psych J 2023; 12:690-703. [PMID: 37434273 DOI: 10.1002/pchj.669] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/13/2022] [Accepted: 05/29/2023] [Indexed: 07/13/2023]
Abstract
Previous research has indicated that children perceive social category members as having intrinsic obligations toward each other, which shape their expectations for social interactions. However, it is unclear whether teenagers (aged 13 to 15) and young adults (aged 19 to 21) continue to hold such beliefs, given their increased experience with group dynamics and external social rules. To explore this question, three experiments were conducted with a total of 360 participants (N = 180 for each age group). Experiment 1 examined negative social interactions using different methods in two sub-experiments, while Experiment 2 focused on positive social interactions to examine whether participants viewed social category members as intrinsically obligated to avoid harming each other and to offer assistance. Results revealed that teenagers evaluated within-group harm and non-help as unacceptable, regardless of external rules, whereas they viewed between-group harm and non-help as both acceptable and unacceptable, depending on the presence of external rules. Conversely, young adults considered both within-group and between-group harm/non-help as more acceptable if an external rule permitted such behavior. These findings suggest that teenagers believe that members of a social category are intrinsically obligated to help and not harm each other, whereas young adults believe that individual social interactions are constrained mainly by external rules. That is, teenagers hold stronger beliefs than young adults about intrinsic interpersonal obligations to group members. Thus, in-group moral obligations and external rules contribute differently to the evaluation and interpretation of social interactions at different developmental stages.
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Affiliation(s)
- Qiyang Gao
- Center for Brain, Mind and Education, Shaoxing University, Shaoxing, China
| | - Jingjing Hu
- School of Education, Zhejiang International Studies University, Hangzhou, China
| | - Rui Hua
- Lanzhou Resources and Environment Voc-Tech College, Lanzhou, China
| | | | - Zhangwei Feng
- School for Business, Ningbo University, Ningbo, China
| | - Haokui Xu
- Department of Psychology and Behavioral Sciences, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China
| | - Jun Yin
- Department of Psychology, Ningbo University, Ningbo, China
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Interpersonal relationships modulate subjective ratings and electrophysiological responses of moral evaluations. COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE & BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 2023; 23:125-141. [PMID: 36253608 DOI: 10.3758/s13415-022-01041-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 10/02/2022] [Indexed: 02/15/2023]
Abstract
This study explored how interpersonal relationships modulate moral evaluations in moral dilemmas. Participants rated moral acceptability in response to altruistic (prescriptive) and selfish (proscriptive) behavior conducted by allocators (i.e., a friend or stranger), toward the participants themselves or another stranger in a modified Dictator Game (Experiments 1 and 2). Event-related potential (ERP) data were recorded as participants observed the allocators' behavior (Experiment 2). Moral acceptability ratings showed that when the allocator was a friend, participants evaluated the friend's altruistic and selfish behavior toward another stranger as being less morally acceptable than when their friend showed the respective behavior toward the participants themselves. The ERP results showed that participants exhibited more negative medial frontal negativity (MFN) amplitude whether observing a friend's altruistic or selfish behavior toward a stranger (vs. participant oneself), indicating that friends' altruistic and selfish behaviors toward strangers (vs. participants) were processed as being less acceptable at the earlier and semi-automatic processing stage in brains. However, this effect did not emerge when the allocator was a stranger in subjective ratings and MFN results. In the later-occurring P3 component, no interpersonal relationship modulation occurred in moral evaluations. These findings suggest that interpersonal relationships affect moral evaluations from the second-party perspective.
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Mari MA. How cues to social categorization impact children's inferences about social categories. Acta Psychol (Amst) 2022; 229:103707. [PMID: 35985155 DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2022.103707] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/14/2022] [Revised: 08/05/2022] [Accepted: 08/09/2022] [Indexed: 11/01/2022] Open
Abstract
Social categorization involves two crucial processes: First, children seek properties on which they can categorize individuals, i.e., they learn to form social categories; then children make inferences based on social category membership and might develop affective responses toward social categories. Over the last decade, a growing number of research in developmental psychology started to use novel social categories to investigate how children learn and reason about social categories. To date, three types of cues have been put forward as means to form social categories, namely linguistic, visual, and behavioral cues. Based on social category membership, children draw inferences about the shared properties of social category members and about how social category members ought to behave and interact with each other. With additional input, children might apply essentialist beliefs to social categories and develop affective responses toward social categories. This article aims to provide key insights on the development of stereotypes and intergroup biases by reviewing recent works that investigated how children learn to form novel social categories and the kind of inferences they make about these novel social categories.
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Affiliation(s)
- Magali A Mari
- Cognitive Science Center, Rue de la Pierre-à-Mazel 7, University of Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel, Switzerland.
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Thomas AJ, Mitchell V, Sumner E, Terrizzi BF, Piff PK, Sarnecka BW. Intuitive Sociology: Children Recognize Decision-Making Structures and Prefer Groups With Less-Concentrated Power. Open Mind (Camb) 2022; 6:25-40. [PMID: 36439067 PMCID: PMC9692051 DOI: 10.1162/opmi_a_00053] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/20/2021] [Accepted: 03/08/2022] [Indexed: 10/17/2023] Open
Abstract
From an early age, children recognize that people belong to social groups. However, not all groups are structured in the same way. The current study asked whether children recognize and distinguish among different decision-making structures. If so, do they prefer some decision-making structures over others? In these studies, children were told stories about two groups that went camping. In the hierarchical group, one character made all the decisions; in the egalitarian group, each group member made one decision. Without being given explicit information about the group's structures, 6- to 8-year-old children, but not 4- and 5-year-old children, recognized that the two groups had different decision-making structures and preferred to interact with the group where decision-making was shared. Children also inferred that a new member of the egalitarian group would be more generous than a new member of the hierarchical group. Thus, from an early age, children's social reasoning includes the ability to compare social structures, which may be foundational for later complex political and moral reasoning.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ashley J. Thomas
- Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
| | - Vivian Mitchell
- Department of Psychological Science, University of California, Irvine
| | - Emily Sumner
- Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine
| | - Brandon F. Terrizzi
- Division of General and Community Pediatrics, Cincinnati Children’s Hospital Medical Center
| | - Paul K. Piff
- Department of Psychological Science, University of California, Irvine
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Powell LJ. Adopted Utility Calculus: Origins of a Concept of Social Affiliation. PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2022; 17:1215-1233. [PMID: 35549492 DOI: 10.1177/17456916211048487] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
To successfully navigate their social world, humans need to understand and map enduring relationships between people: Humans need a concept of social affiliation. Here I propose that the initial concept of social affiliation, available in infancy, is based on the extent to which one individual consistently takes on the goals and needs of another. This proposal grounds affiliation in intuitive psychology, as formalized in the naive-utility-calculus model. A concept of affiliation based on interpersonal utility adoption can account for findings from studies of infants' reasoning about imitation, similarity, helpful and fair individuals, "ritual" behaviors, and social groups without the need for additional innate mechanisms such as a coalitional psychology, moral sense, or general preference for similar others. I identify further tests of this proposal and also discuss how it is likely to be relevant to social reasoning and learning across the life span.
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McManus RM, Mason JE, Young L. Re-examining the role of family relationships in structuring perceived helping obligations, and their impact on moral evaluation. JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2021. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2021.104182] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/21/2022]
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Dunlea JP, Wolle RG, Heiphetz L. Enduring Positivity: Children Of Incarcerated Parents Report More Positive Than Negative Emotions When Thinking about Close Others. JOURNAL OF COGNITION AND DEVELOPMENT 2020. [DOI: 10.1080/15248372.2020.1797749] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
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Diesendruck G. Why do children essentialize social groups? ADVANCES IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR 2020; 59:31-64. [PMID: 32564795 DOI: 10.1016/bs.acdb.2020.05.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/24/2022]
Abstract
The tendency to essentialize social groups is universal, and arises early in development. This tendency is associated with negative intergroup attitudes and behaviors, and has thus encouraged the search for remedies for the emergence of essentialism. In this vein, great attention has been devoted to uncovering the cognitive foundations of essentialism. In this chapter, I suggest that attention should also be turned toward the motivational foundations of essentialism. I propose that considerations of power and group identity, but especially a "need to belong," may encourage children's essentialization of social groups. Namely, from a young age, children are keen to feel members of a group, and that their membership is secure and exclusive. Essentialism is the conceptual gadget that satisfies these feelings. And to the extent that groups are defined by what they do, this motivated essentialism also impels children to be adamant about the maintenance of unique group behaviors.
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McManus RM, Kleiman-Weiner M, Young L. What We Owe to Family: The Impact of Special Obligations on Moral Judgment. Psychol Sci 2020; 31:227-242. [DOI: 10.1177/0956797619900321] [Citation(s) in RCA: 28] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/15/2022] Open
Abstract
Although people often recognize the moral value of impartial behavior (i.e., not favoring specific individuals), it is unclear when, if ever, people recognize the moral value of partiality. The current studies investigated whether information about special obligations to specific individuals, particularly kin, is integrated into moral judgments. In Studies 1 and 2, agents who helped a stranger were judged as more morally good and trustworthy than those who helped kin, but agents who helped a stranger, instead of kin were judged as less morally good and trustworthy than those who did the opposite. In Studies 3 and 4, agents who simply neglected a stranger were judged as less morally bad and untrustworthy than those who neglected kin. Study 4 also demonstrated that the violation (vs. fulfillment) of perceived obligations underlaid all judgment patterns. Study 5 demonstrated boundary conditions: When occupying roles requiring impartiality, agents who helped a stranger instead of kin were judged as more morally good and trustworthy than agents who did the opposite. These findings illuminate the importance of obligations in structuring moral judgment.
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Intuitive theories inform children's beliefs about intergroup obligation. Behav Brain Sci 2020; 43:e65. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x19002516] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
Abstract
Abstract
In addition to emerging from children's direct experiences with collaborative partners and groups, children's beliefs about obligation also arise from a process of intuitive theory-building in early childhood. On this account, it is possible for at least some of children's beliefs to emerge in the absence of specific experiences where obligations are held among fellow members of a group “we.”
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Abstract
Social categorization is a universal mechanism for making sense of a vast social world with roots in perceptual, conceptual, and social systems. These systems emerge strikingly early in life and undergo important developmental changes across childhood. The development of social categorization entails identifying which ways of classifying people are culturally meaningful, how these categories might be used to predict, explain, and evaluate the behavior of other people, and how one's own identity relates to these systems of categorization and representation. Social categorization can help children simplify and understand their social environment but has detrimental consequences in the forms of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. Thus, understanding how social categorization develops is a central problem for the cognitive, social, and developmental sciences. This review details the multiple developmental processes that underlie this core psychological capacity.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marjorie Rhodes
- Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY 10003, USA
| | - Andrew Baron
- Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z4, Canada
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