When causality shapes the experience of time: Evidence for temporal binding in young children

Evaluating the Bayesian causal inference model of intentional binding through computational modeling

Intentional binding refers to the subjective compression of the time interval between an action and its consequence. While intentional binding has been widely used as a proxy for the sense of agency, its underlying mechanism has been largely veiled. Bayesian causal inference (BCI) has gained attention as a potential explanation, but currently lacks sufficient empirical support. Thus, this study implemented various computational models to describe the possible mechanisms of intentional binding, fitted them to individual observed data, and quantitatively evaluated their performance. The BCI models successfully isolated the parameters that potentially contributed to intentional binding (i.e., causal belief and temporal prediction) and generally better explained an observer's time estimation than traditional models such as maximum likelihood estimation. The estimated parameter values suggested that the time compression resulted from an expectation that the actions would immediately cause sensory outcomes. Furthermore, I investigated the algorithm that realized this BCI and found probability-matching to be a plausible candidate; people might heuristically reconstruct event timing depending on causal uncertainty rather than optimally integrating causal and temporal posteriors. The evidence demonstrated the utility of computational modeling to investigate how humans infer the causal and temporal structures of events and individual differences in that process.

Action-outcome Regularity Perceptual Sensitivity in Children with Developmental Coordination Disorder

PURPOSE

An internal model deficit is considered to underlie developmental coordination disorder (DCD); thus, children with DCD have an altered sense of agency (SoA), which is associated with depressive symptoms. Furthermore, the perception of action-outcome regularity is present in early development, is involved in the generation of SoA, and has roles in adaptive motor learning and coordinated motor skills. However, perceptual sensitivity to action-outcome regularity has not been examined in children with DCD.

METHODS

We investigated perceptual sensitivity to action-outcome regularity in 6-15-year-old children with DCD and age- and sex-matched typically developing (TD) children. Both groups were assessed for coordinated motor skills with the Movement Assessment Battery for Children-2nd Edition, while the DCD group was assessed with the DCD Questionnaire, Social Communication Questionnaire, Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder-Rating Scale, and Depression Self- Rating Scale for Children.

RESULTS

Perceptual sensitivity to action-outcome regularity was significantly reduced in children with DCD. However, there was a significant correlation between perceptual sensitivity to action-outcome regularity and age in DCD and TD children. Perceptual sensitivity to action-outcome regularity was significantly lower in younger children with DCD than in younger and older TD children, but there were no significant differences between older children with DCD and younger and older TD children.

CONCLUSION

The current results suggest that children with DCD have significantly reduced perceptual sensitivity to action-outcome regularity at younger ages, which may alter SoA and inhibit internal model development, thereby reducing motor skill coordination.

Age-related differences in temporal binding and the influence of action body parts

If voluntary action is followed by an effect with a short time delay, the time interval between action and effect is often perceived to be shorter than it actually is. This perceptual time compression is termed intentional binding or temporal binding. We investigated age-related changes in adulthood considering temporal binding and its dependence on action body parts (i.e., hand vs. foot). This experiment included 17 young adults (mean age: 21.71 ± 3.14 years) and 27 older adults (mean age: 74.41 ± 3.38 years). Participants performed a button press task using their index fingers (hand condition) or toes (foot condition). The results showed that older participants exhibited a strong time compression comparable to young participants in the voluntary condition. Older participants also showed a strong time compression in involuntary action, which was induced by a mechanical device, differently from young participants. In line with previous research, the present age-related differences in time compression considering involuntary action suggest that causal belief significantly influences event perception rather than the associated intention of action or sensory afferents. The present results also suggest that the nature of action body parts has no significant influence on temporal binding, independent of age group.

When did it happen? Verbal information about causal relations affects time estimation

Usually, the closer two events occur, the more likely people infer a causal relationship between them. Recent studies have shown that this relationship between time and causality is bidirectional. Participants also tend to judge events closer in time if they assume that they are causally related. We present six experiments showing causal binding, but unlike other experiments, participants do not emit any motor action, and no physical feedback is given. Rather, all stimuli and causal information are provided verbally. After reading a list of events, participants were asked to estimate the time elapsed between two of them. Those participants who were informed that there was a causal relationship between the two events estimated them as occurring closer to each other. These results support causality- and heuristic-based explanations of temporal binding, as opposed to other explanations such as sensory integration or intentionality of action.

Developmental changes in action-outcome regularity perceptual sensitivity and its relationship to hand motor function in 5-16-year-old children

Along with the comparator model, the perception of action-outcome regularity is involved in the generation of sense of agency. In addition, the perception of action-outcome regularity is related to motor performance. However, no studies have examined the developmental changes in the perception of action-outcome regularity. The current study measured perceptual sensitivity to action-outcome regularity and manual dexterity in 200 children aged between 5 and 16 years. The results showed that perceptual sensitivity to action-outcome regularity was significantly lower in 5-6-year-old children than in 9-16-year-old children, and that it was significantly lower in children with low manual dexterity than in children with medium to high manual dexterity. Correlation analyses revealed significant correlations of age and perceptual sensitivity to action-outcome regularity, but no significant correlation of manual dexterity and perceptual sensitivity to action-outcome regularity, either overall or in any age band. The present study suggests that perceptual sensitivity to action-outcome regularity is immature at 5-6 years of age and that it may be impaired in 5-16-year-old children with poor manual dexterity.

Temporal Binding, Causation, and Agency: Developing a New Theoretical Framework

In temporal binding, the temporal interval between one event and another, occurring some time later, is subjectively compressed. We discuss two ways in which temporal binding has been conceptualized. In studies showing temporal binding between a voluntary action and its causal consequences, such binding is typically interpreted as providing a measure of an implicit or pre-reflective "sense of agency." However, temporal binding has also been observed in contexts not involving voluntary action, but only the passive observation of a cause-effect sequence. In those contexts, it has been interpreted as a top-down effect on perception reflecting a belief in causality. These two views need not be in conflict with one another, if one thinks of them as concerning two separate mechanisms through which temporal binding can occur. In this paper, we explore an alternative possibility: that there is a unitary way of explaining temporal binding both within and outside the context of voluntary action as a top-down effect on perception reflecting a belief in causality. Any such explanation needs to account for ways in which agency, and factors connected with agency, has been shown to affect the strength of temporal binding. We show that principles of causal inference and causal selection already familiar from the literature on causal learning have the potential to explain why the strength of people's causal beliefs can be affected by the extent to which they are themselves actively involved in bringing about events, thus in turn affecting binding.

Temporal binding past the Libet clock: testing design factors for an auditory timer

Voluntary actions and causally linked sensory stimuli are perceived to be shifted towards each other in time. This so-called temporal binding is commonly assessed in paradigms using the Libet Clock. In such experiments, participants have to estimate the timing of actions performed or ensuing sensory stimuli (usually tones) by means of a rotating clock hand presented on a screen. The aforementioned task setup is however ill-suited for many conceivable setups, especially when they involve visual effects. To address this shortcoming, the line of research presented here establishes an alternative measure for temporal binding by using a sequence of timed sounds. This method uses an auditory timer, a sequence of letters presented during task execution, which serve as anchors for temporal judgments. In four experiments, we manipulated four design factors of this auditory timer, namely interval length, interval filling, sequence predictability, and sequence length, to determine the most effective and economic method for measuring temporal binding with an auditory timer.

The role of spatial and spatial-temporal analysis in children's causal cognition of continuous processes

Past research has largely ignored children's ability to conjointly manipulate spatial and temporal information, but there are indications that the capacity to do so may provide important support for reasoning about causal processes. We hypothesised that spatial-temporal thinking is central to children's ability to identify the invisible mechanisms that tie cause and effect together in continuous casual processes, which are focal in primary school science and crucial to understanding of the natural world. We investigated this in two studies (N = 107, N = 124), employing two methodologies, one shorter, the other more in depth. Further tasks assessed spatial-temporal (flow of liquid, extrapolation of relative speed, distance-time-velocity), spatial (two mental rotation, paper folding), verbal (expressive vocabulary), and nonverbal (block design) ability. Age dependent patterns were detected for both causal and predictor tasks. Two spatial-temporal tasks were unique and central predictors of children's causal reasoning, especially inference of mechanism. Nonverbal ability predicted the simpler components of causal reasoning. One mental rotation task predicted only young children's causal thinking. Verbal ability became significant when the sample included children from a wide range of socioeconomic backgrounds. Causal reasoning about continuous processes, including inferences of causal mechanism, appears to be within the reach of children from school entry age, but mechanism inference is uncommon. Analytic forms of spatial-temporal capacity seem to be important requirements for children to progress to this rather than merely perceptual forms.

The developmental profile of temporal binding: From childhood to adulthood

Temporal binding refers to a phenomenon whereby the time interval between a cause and its effect is perceived as shorter than the same interval separating two unrelated events. We examined the developmental profile of this phenomenon by comparing the performance of groups of children (aged 6–7, 7–8, and 9–10 years) and adults on a novel interval estimation task. In Experiment 1, participants made judgements about the time interval between (a) their button press and a rocket launch, and (b) a non-causal predictive signal and rocket launch. In Experiment 2, an additional causal condition was included in which participants made judgements about the interval between an experimenter’s button press and the launch of a rocket. Temporal binding was demonstrated consistently and did not change in magnitude with age: estimates of delay were shorter in causal contexts for both adults and children. In addition, the magnitude of the binding effect was greater when participants themselves were the cause of an outcome compared with when they were mere spectators. This suggests that although causality underlies the binding effect, intentional action may modulate its magnitude. Again, this was true of both adults and children. Taken together, these results are the first to suggest that the binding effect is present and developmentally constant from childhood into adulthood.

From Freedom From to Freedom To: New Perspectives on Intentional Action

There are few concepts as relevant as that of intentional action in shaping our sense of self and the interaction with the environment. At the same time, few concepts are so elusive. Indeed, both conceptual and neuroscientific accounts of intentional agency have proven to be problematic. On the one hand, most conceptual views struggle in defining how agents can adequately exert control over their actions. On the other hand, neuroscience settles for definitions by exclusion whereby key features of human intentional actions, including goal-directness, remain underspecified. This paper reviews the existing literature and sketches how this gap might be filled. In particular, we defend a gradualist notion of intentional behavior, which revolves around the following key features: autonomy, flexibility in the integration of causal vectors, and control.