Episodic future thinking and delay of gratification in children: Is imagining reward pay-off helpful?

Previous studies have failed to show an effect of episodic future thinking (EFT) on children's delay of gratification (DoG), contrasting strikingly with adult findings. Recent findings from a sample of 8-11-year-old children by Canning et al. (J. Exp. Child Psychol., 228, 2023, 105618) indicate that EFT cueing is not effective compared to a no-cue control even when it is reward related. Canning et al. suggest children's DoG performance, unlike that of adults, may be negatively affected by the cognitive load of cueing, but this leaves unexplained why EFT reward-related cueing produced significantly better performance than cueing that did not involve EFT in their study. The current study attempted to further delineate the importance of linking future thinking cues to rewards. A reward-related EFT condition was compared to a reward-unrelated EFT condition and a no-cue control on a delay choice task. No significant differences were observed between the three conditions. This suggests that even reward-related future thinking is ineffective at improving children's delayed gratification. Further research is needed to determine why children struggle to benefit from EFT cues.

Do both anticipated relief and anticipated regret predict decisions about influenza vaccination?

OBJECTIVE

Anticipated regret has been found to predict vaccination intentions and behaviours. We examined whether anticipated relief also predicts seasonal influenza vaccination intentions and behaviour. Given claims about differences in their antecedents and function, we distinguished between counterfactual relief (relief that a worse outcome did not obtain) and temporal relief (relief that an unpleasant experience is over).

DESIGN

Cross-sectional.

METHODS

Unvaccinated participants (N = 295) were recruited online in November 2020. Participants completed measures of anticipated regret, anticipated counterfactual relief, and anticipated temporal relief and measures of theory of planned behaviour constructs (attitudes, norms, perceived control, and intentions). One month later, the same participants were re-surveyed and asked to report their vaccination status.

RESULTS

Although all anticipated emotion measures were associated with intentions and behaviour, only anticipated counterfactual relief and regret independently predicted vaccination intentions in regression analyses. Mediation analysis showed both anticipated counterfactual relief and regret were indirectly, via intentions, associated with behaviour.

CONCLUSIONS

Results suggest that, regardless of valence, counterfactual emotions predict vaccination intention and, indirectly, behaviour. Furthermore, participants may differ in their sensitivity to the anticipation of positive versus negative counterfactual emotions. These findings may permit more precise targeting of interventions to increase vaccine uptake.

Listen up, kids! How mind wandering affects immediate and delayed memory in children

Mind wandering occurs when attention becomes disengaged from the here-and-now and directed toward internally generated thoughts; this is often associated with poorer performance on educationally significant tasks. In this study, 8- to 9-year-old children (N = 60) listened to audio stories embedded with intermittent thought probes that were used to determine if participants' thoughts were on or off task. The key objective was to explore the impact of probe-caught mind wandering on both immediate and delayed memory retention. Children reported being off task approximately 24% of the time. Most inattention episodes were classified as task-unrelated thoughts (i.e., 'pure' instances of mind wandering, 9%) or attentional failures due to distractions (9%). Higher frequency of mind wandering was strongly associated with poorer memory recall, and task-unrelated thoughts strongly predicted how well children could recall components of the audio story both immediately after the task and after a 1-week delay. This study is the first to demonstrate the impact of mind wandering on delayed memory retention in children. Results suggest that exploring mind wandering in the foundational years of schooling could provide the necessary empirical foundation for the development of practical interventions geared toward detecting and refocusing lapses of attention in educational contexts.

Basic Symbolic Number Skills, but Not Formal Mathematics Performance, Longitudinally Predict Mathematics Anxiety in the First Years of Primary School

Mathematical anxiety (MA) and mathematics performance typically correlate negatively in studies of adolescents and adults, but not always amongst young children, with some theorists questioning the relevance of MA to mathematics performance in this age group. Evidence is also limited in relation to the developmental origins of MA and whether MA in young children can be linked to their earlier mathematics performance. To address these questions, the current study investigated whether basic and formal mathematics skills around 4 and 5 years of age were predictive of MA around the age of 7-8. Additionally, we also examined the cross-sectional relationships between MA and mathematics performance in 7-8-year-old children. Specifically, children in our study were assessed in their first (T1; aged 4-5), second (T2; aged 5-6), and fourth years of school (T3; aged 7-8). At T1 and T2, children completed measures of basic numerical skills, IQ, and working memory, as well as curriculum-based mathematics tests. At T3, children completed two self-reported MA questionnaires, together with a curriculum-based mathematics test. The results showed that MA could be reliably measured in a sample of 7-8-year-olds and demonstrated the typical negative correlation between MA and mathematical performance (although the strength of this relationship was dependent on the specific content domain). Importantly, although early formal mathematical skills were unrelated to later MA, there was evidence of a longitudinal relationship between basic early symbolic number skills and later MA, supporting the idea that poorer basic numerical skills relate to the development of MA.

Relief in everyday life

Despite being implicated in a wide range of psychological and behavioral phenomena, relief remains poorly understood from the perspective of psychological science. What complicates the study of relief is that people seem to use the term to describe an emotion that occurs in two distinct situations: when an unpleasant episode is over, or upon realizing that an outcome could have been worse. This study constitutes a detailed empirical investigation of people's reports of everyday episodes of relief. A set of four studies collected a large corpus (N = 1,835) of first-person reports of real-life episodes of relief and examined people's judgments about the antecedents of relief, its relation to counterfactual thoughts, and its subsequent effects on decision making. Some participants described relief experiences that had either purely temporal or purely counterfactual precursors. Nevertheless, the findings indicated that the prototypical instance of relief appears to be one in which both these elements are present. The results also suggest that, although relief is frequently experienced in situations in which people are not responsible for the relief-inducing event, nevertheless they typically report that the experience had a positive impact on subsequent decision making. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Toward an Account of Intuitive Time

People hold intuitive theories of the physical world, such as theories of matter, energy, and motion, in the sense that they have a coherent conceptual structure supporting a network of beliefs about the domain. It is not yet clear whether people can also be said to hold a shared intuitive theory of time. Yet, philosophical debates about the metaphysical nature of time often revolve around the idea that people hold one or more “common sense” assumptions about time: that there is an objective “now”; that the past, present, and future are fundamentally different in nature; and that time passes or flows. We empirically explored the question of whether people indeed share some or all of these assumptions by asking adults to what extent they agreed with a set of brief statements about time. Across two analyses, subsets of people's beliefs about time were found consistently to covary in ways that suggested stable underlying conceptual dimensions related to aspects of the “common sense” assumptions described by philosophers. However, distinct subsets of participants showed three mutually incompatible profiles of response, the most frequent of which did not closely match all of philosophers’ claims about common sense time. These exploratory studies provide a useful starting point in attempts to characterize intuitive theories of time.

Human Vision Reconstructs Time to Satisfy Causal Constraints

The goal of perception is to infer the most plausible source of sensory stimulation. Unisensory perception of temporal order, however, appears to require no inference, because the order of events can be uniquely determined from the order in which sensory signals arrive. Here, we demonstrate a novel perceptual illusion that casts doubt on this intuition: In three experiments (N = 607), the experienced event timings were determined by causality in real time. Adult participants viewed a simple three-item sequence, ACB, which is typically remembered as ABC in line with principles of causality. When asked to indicate the time at which events B and C occurred, participants' points of subjective simultaneity shifted so that the assumed cause B appeared earlier and the assumed effect C later, despite participants' full attention and repeated viewings. This first demonstration of causality reversing perceived temporal order cannot be explained by postperceptual distortion, lapsed attention, or saccades.

From Brexit to Biden: What Responses to National Outcomes Tell Us About the Nature of Relief

Recent claims contrast relief experienced because a period of unpleasant uncertainty has ended and an outcome has materialized (temporal relief)—regardless of whether it is one’s preferred outcome—with relief experienced because a particular outcome has occurred, when the alternative was unpalatable (counterfactual relief). Two studies ( N = 993), one run the day after the United Kingdom left the European Union and one the day after Joe Biden’s inauguration, confirmed these claims. “Leavers” and Biden voters experienced high levels of relief, and less regret and disappointment than “Remainers” and Trump voters. “Remainers” and Trump voters showed an effect of precursor, experiencing little relief about the outcome that had occurred but stronger relief that a decision had been implemented. Only Trump voters who believed the election was over showed this precursor effect. Results suggest at least two different triggering conditions for relief and indicate a role for anticipated relief in voting behavior.

The effects of cueing episodic future thinking on delay discounting in children, adolescents, and adults

Discounting the value of delayed rewards such that even a relatively small, immediately available reward is preferred to a larger delayed reward is a commonly observed human trait. Children are particularly steep discounters of delayed rewards as evidenced by delay of gratification studies. In recent years, however, a growing literature indicates that cueing individuals to imagine personal future events attenuates their discounting of delayed rewards. The present studies extend this literature by examining whether cueing future thinking promotes patient choices in children and adolescents. In Experiment 1 we found that cueing future thinking had no effect on 8-11-year-olds' (n = 177) delay discounting of either real or hypothetical rewards. In Experiment 2 we found that cueing adolescents (12-14-year-olds, n = 126) and adults (n = 122) to think about personal future events decreased their discounting of delayed rewards relative to three other conditions: a no cue control, an episodic memory condition and a novel 'future other' condition in which individuals imagine future events that might happen to a significant other person in their life. Cueing adults and adolescents to think about personal future events did not however affect how connected they felt to their future selves or their subjective sense of how close future time points felt to them - two constructs that have previously been shown to be related to delay discounting.

Temporal Binding, Causation, and Agency: Developing a New Theoretical Framework

In temporal binding, the temporal interval between one event and another, occurring some time later, is subjectively compressed. We discuss two ways in which temporal binding has been conceptualized. In studies showing temporal binding between a voluntary action and its causal consequences, such binding is typically interpreted as providing a measure of an implicit or pre-reflective "sense of agency." However, temporal binding has also been observed in contexts not involving voluntary action, but only the passive observation of a cause-effect sequence. In those contexts, it has been interpreted as a top-down effect on perception reflecting a belief in causality. These two views need not be in conflict with one another, if one thinks of them as concerning two separate mechanisms through which temporal binding can occur. In this paper, we explore an alternative possibility: that there is a unitary way of explaining temporal binding both within and outside the context of voluntary action as a top-down effect on perception reflecting a belief in causality. Any such explanation needs to account for ways in which agency, and factors connected with agency, has been shown to affect the strength of temporal binding. We show that principles of causal inference and causal selection already familiar from the literature on causal learning have the potential to explain why the strength of people's causal beliefs can be affected by the extent to which they are themselves actively involved in bringing about events, thus in turn affecting binding.

The effect of episodic future thinking on young children's future-oriented decision making

We investigated whether the developmental emergence of episodic future thinking (EFT) is associated with performance on a type of delay of gratification task: a delay choice task that involved choosing between a small reward now or a larger reward the next day. In Study 1, 4- to 5-year-olds' (N = 99) EFT as measured by a tool saving task was significantly associated with performance on the delay choice task, but this was not the case for other EFT measures. Study 2 compared the performance of 4- to 5-year-olds (N = 130) on the delay choice task when cued to think about either a future, past, or habitual event versus a no-cue baseline. Overall, cuing impaired performance on the delay choice task. Although EFT does show a relation to performance in a delay choice task in preschoolers, deliberately engaging in thought about future events may be too taxing in young children to reliably enhance the ability to make future-oriented decisions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

127 A Student Pilot For A Feasibility Study of the Theoretical 3S Trial (SPFT3S): Patient Questionnaire and Demographics

Introduction

There is conflicting evidence on the benefit of statins for primary prevention of cardiovascular disease (CVD) in non-diabetics over 75. Emerging evidence shows they may be ineffective, yet current guidance supports their use in those up to 85. The objectives of this study were to assess patients’ understanding of statins, willingness to participate in a theoretical randomised controlled trial (RCT), where they would be randomised to stop their statin and to compare the trial population with national data.

Methods

The survey took place in 8 GP practices with 4 students involved in questionnaire distribution. A patient search identified those over 75 and on a statin. Patients were excluded if they had a history of CVD or diabetes. 36 patients were identified and completed questionnaires, 5 were removed because they reported exclusion criteria. Demographic data was compared to the UK population from the 2011 census.

Results

Of 31 participants, 71% understood why they took statins, most were unconcerned about side effects and only 1 patient stopped statins due to the media. Opinions on the theoretical “stopping statins trial” were varied. 35% of people responded positively. 29% would not want to take part and 36% of people were unsure. Comparison of our trial population against the national population shows that 903,505 people would be eligible for a UK trial.

Conclusions

The purpose of this exercise was to see if patients would be willing to participate in a trial where 50% stopped taking their statin. Approximately a third said yes and only a third said no. As there are nearly a million people in this population, it suggests a fully funded, larger-scale feasibility study of this theoretical randomised control trial is warranted.

126 A Student Pilot for A Feasibility Study of the Theoretical 3S Trial (SPFT3S): GP and Ethics Committee Members Questionnaire

Introduction

Emerging research suggests that statin use for primary prevention in people without diabetes aged 75 and older has no benefit. This study aims to determine the feasibility of the theoretical Stop Statin Study (3S), a double-blind randomised controlled trial carried out in general practice, which would test this hypothesis. 50% of trial patients would stop taking statins for 5 years in an event driven study. The questionnaires aim to identify the attitudes of general practitioners (GPs) and ethics committee members (ECMs) regarding stopping statins for 5 years in patients aged 75 and older without diabetes or history of cardiovascular disease and their willingness to allow patients to participate in the 3S study.

Method

Questionnaires comprised of 6 questions were designed. 4 students distributed the questionnaire and it was completed by 19 GPs based at 8 practices in the North-East of England. 31 ECMs (12 expert and 19 lay) responded by email.

Results

95% of GPs who completed the survey would agree to their patients participating in the theoretical study with 47% of GPs indicating that their willingness to participate in the study is patient dependent. 95% of GPs would also consider stopping statins in this population group if sufficient research had been carried out or if the guidelines were changed. 42% of GPs have a negative attitude to prescribing statins in this population group. All the ECMs would approve the study, citing over-prescribing and polypharmacy as their reason.

Conclusions

The majority of GPs will participate in the theoretical 3S study, if their patients are willing to participate. There is already a negative perception amongst GPs towards the use of statins in elderly people without disease. The 3S study appears to be feasible from the GP and ethics perspective but would require a larger feasibility study.

More Later: Delay of Gratification and Thought About the Future in Children

We investigated whether individual differences in future time perception and the detail with which future events are imagined are related to children's delay of gratification. We administered a delay choice task (real rewards), a delay discounting task (hypothetical rewards), a novel future time perception measure, an episodic future thinking (EFT) interview and IQ measures to a sample of 7- to 11-year-olds (N = 132) drawn from a urban predominately white population in N. Ireland. We found a strong correlation between delay choice and delay discounting. Future time perception and EFT were related to delay discounting, however only the relation with future time perception survived controlling for age and IQ. Children who showed greater compression of future time periods were the steepest discounters.

When You Put It that Way: Framing Gender Equality Initiatives to Improve Engagement among STEM Academics

A number of high-profile gender equality initiatives (GEIs) are intended to address women's underrepresentation in science. However, attitudes toward such initiatives can be negative. In two experiments with STEM academics, we examined how GEIs can be best framed to improve attitudes toward them. In study 1 (N = 113), we manipulated the framing of GEI leadership (led by a man or woman) and GEI focus (benefitting men and women or benefitting women only). The men were more supportive of GEIs benefitting both men and women because of fewer concerns of unfair treatment and more internal motivations to engage with GEIs. The women's level of support was unaffected by framing. In study 2 (N = 151), we framed GEIs as either supported by university management or not and either internally or externally driven. Support was greater for internally driven GEIs. The impact of management support depended on the academics’ experience with GEIs. This research makes evidence-based recommendations for the implementation of GEIs to improve their effectiveness.

Pain in the Past and Pleasure in the Future: The Development of Past-Future Preferences for Hedonic Goods

It seems self-evident that people prefer painful experiences to be in the past and pleasurable experiences to lie in the future. Indeed, it has been claimed that, for hedonic goods, this preference is absolute (Sullivan, 2018). Yet very little is known about the extent to which people demonstrate explicit preferences regarding the temporal location of hedonic experiences, about the developmental trajectory of such preferences, and about whether such preferences are impervious to differences in the quantity of envisaged past and future pain or pleasure. We find consistent evidence that, all else being equal, adults and children aged 7 and over prefer pleasure to lie in the future and pain in the past and believe that other people will, too. They also predict that other people will be happier when pleasure is in the future rather than the past but sadder when pain is in the future rather than the past. Younger children have the same temporal preferences as adults for their own painful experiences, but they prefer their pleasure to lie in the past and do not predict that others' levels of happiness or sadness vary dependent on whether experiences lie in the past or the future. However, from the age of 7, temporal preferences were typically abandoned at the earliest opportunity when the quantity of past pain or pleasure was greater than the quantity located in the future. Past-future preferences for hedonic goods emerge early developmentally but are surprisingly flexible.

Regret and Decision-Making: A Developmental Perspective

Regret is a common emotion that has important links with decision-making in adults. Recent research suggests that the ability to experience regret emerges relatively late in development. By around 6 years, most children will experience regret, but the likelihood of experiencing this emotion increases across childhood and into adolescence. The developmental emergence of regret seems to affect children’s decision-making: Children who experience regret about a choice are more likely to make a better choice next time, and regret also seems to help children learn to delay gratification and behave more prosocially.

The developmental profile of temporal binding: From childhood to adulthood

Temporal binding refers to a phenomenon whereby the time interval between a cause and its effect is perceived as shorter than the same interval separating two unrelated events. We examined the developmental profile of this phenomenon by comparing the performance of groups of children (aged 6–7, 7–8, and 9–10 years) and adults on a novel interval estimation task. In Experiment 1, participants made judgements about the time interval between (a) their button press and a rocket launch, and (b) a non-causal predictive signal and rocket launch. In Experiment 2, an additional causal condition was included in which participants made judgements about the interval between an experimenter’s button press and the launch of a rocket. Temporal binding was demonstrated consistently and did not change in magnitude with age: estimates of delay were shorter in causal contexts for both adults and children. In addition, the magnitude of the binding effect was greater when participants themselves were the cause of an outcome compared with when they were mere spectators. This suggests that although causality underlies the binding effect, intentional action may modulate its magnitude. Again, this was true of both adults and children. Taken together, these results are the first to suggest that the binding effect is present and developmentally constant from childhood into adulthood.

Causality influences children's and adults' experience of temporal order

Although it has long been known that time is a cue to causation, recent work with adults has demonstrated that causality can also influence the experience of time. In causal reordering (Bechlivanidis & Lagnado, 2013, 2016) adults tend to report the causally consistent order of events rather than the correct temporal order. However, the effect has yet to be demonstrated in children. Across four preregistered experiments, 4- to 10-year-old children (N = 813) and adults (N = 178) watched a 3-object Michotte-style "pseudocollision." While in the canonical version of the clip, object A collided with B, which then collided with object C (order: ABC), the pseudocollision involved the same spatial array of objects but featured object C moving before object B (order: ACB), with no collision between B and C. Participants were asked to judge the temporal order of events and whether object B collided with C. Across all age groups, participants were significantly more likely to judge that B collided with C in the 3-object pseudocollision than in a 2-object control clip (where clear causal direction was lacking), despite the spatiotemporal relations between B and C being identical in the two clips (Experiments 1-3). Collision judgments and temporal order judgments were not entirely consistent, with some participants-particularly in the younger age range-basing their temporal order judgments on spatial rather than temporal information (Experiment 4). We conclude that in both children and adults, rather than causal impressions being determined only by the basic spatial-temporal properties of object movement, schemata are used in a top-down manner when interpreting perceptual displays. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Time Points: A Gestural Study of the Development of Space-Time Mappings

Human languages typically employ a variety of spatial metaphors for time (e.g., “I'm looking forward to the weekend”). The metaphorical grounding of time in space is also evident in gesture. The gestures that are performed when talking about time bolster the view that people sometimes think about regions of time as if they were locations in space. However, almost nothing is known about the development of metaphorical gestures for time, despite keen interest in the origins of space–time metaphors. In this study, we examined the gestures that English‐speaking 6‐to‐7‐year‐olds, 9‐to‐11‐year‐olds, 13‐to‐15‐year‐olds, and adults produced when talking about time. Participants were asked to explain the difference between pairs of temporal adverbs (e.g., “tomorrow” versus “yesterday”) and to use their hands while doing so. There was a gradual increase across age groups in the propensity to produce spatial metaphorical gestures when talking about time. However, even a substantial majority of 6‐to‐7‐year‐old children produced a spatial gesture on at least one occasion. Overall, participants produced fewer gestures in the sagittal (front‐back) axis than in the lateral (left‐right) axis, and this was particularly true for the youngest children and adolescents. Gestures that were incongruent with the prevailing norms of space–time mappings among English speakers (leftward and backward for past; rightward and forward for future) gradually decreased with increasing age. This was true for both the lateral and sagittal axis. This study highlights the importance of metaphoricity in children's understanding of time. It also suggests that, by 6 to 7 years of age, culturally determined representations of time have a strong influence on children's spatial metaphorical gestures.

Outcomes versus intentions in fairness-related decision making: School-aged children's decisions are just like those of adults

The notion of what constitutes fairness has been assumed to change during childhood, in line with a marked shift from outcome-based to intention-based moral reasoning. However, the precise developmental profile of such a shift is still subject to debate. This study sought to determine the age at which the perceived intentions of others begin to influence fairness-related decision making in children (aged 6-8 and 9-11 years) and adolescents (aged 14 and 15 years) in the context of the mini-ultimatum game. The mini-ultimatum game has a forced-choice design, whereby a proposer needs to select one of two predetermined offers that a responder can either accept or reject. Due to these constraints, the procedure measures sensitivity to unfair intentions in addition to unfair outcomes. Participants needed to make judgments about how likely they would be to reject various offers, how fair they judged these offers to be, and the emotion they experienced when thinking about the offers. Contrary to previous published reports, we found that even 6- to 8-year-olds employed a sophisticated notion of fairness that took into account the alternatives the proposer had available. Crucially, decision making did not differ as a function of age. A further, and novel, aim was to trace the developmental origins of temporal asymmetries in judgments ab out fairness by testing the implications of adopting a past or future temporal perspective. Across all ages, we found no evidence that fairness-based decision making varies as a function of temporal location.

Experiencing regret about a choice helps children learn to delay gratification

Children (6- and 7-year-olds) decided whether to wait for a short delay to win a prize or for a longer period to win a different prize. Those who chose to take their prize after a short delay won two candies but were shown that they would have won four candies if they had waited longer. We measured whether children regretted their choice not to wait. The next day, children were faced with the same choice again. Children who regretted choosing the short delay on Day 1 were more likely to delay gratification on Day 2 than children who had not regretted their previous choice. In a second study, we replicated this finding while controlling for intellectual ability and children's preference for four candies over two candies. This suggests that experiencing regret about a choice not to wait assists children in delaying gratification when faced with the same choice again.

Do children and adolescents have a future-oriented bias? A developmental study of spontaneous and cued past and future thinking

Previous research has indicated that adults have a future-oriented cognitive bias, one illustration of which is their tendency to report more thoughts about the future than the past during mind-wandering. We examined whether children showed a similar bias, and whether there were any developmental changes in the magnitude of such a bias. Children aged 6–7 and 9–10 years, adolescents, and adults completed two tasks in which they could report either past or future thoughts: a mind-wandering task assessing spontaneous past and future thinking and a cued episodic thinking task in which they were free to describe either past or future events. Only adults showed a future-oriented bias in the mind-wandering task. Participants in all groups were much more likely to describe past events in the cue word task, and the proportion of future events described did not change developmentally. However, more than a third of the youngest age group produced no descriptions at all of future events, which was a significantly larger proportion than in any other age groups, and illustrates the difficulty that some children of this age have with future thinking. Our findings indicate that future-oriented bias and developmental changes in such bias may be task-specific.

The development of asymmetries in past and future thinking

A number of striking temporal asymmetries have been observed in the way that adults think about the past and the future: experiences in the future tend to be more valued than those in the past, feel closer in subjective time, and elicit stronger emotions. Three studies explored the development of these temporal asymmetries for the first time with children and adolescents. Evidence of past/future asymmetry in subjective time emerged from 4 to 5 years of age. Evidence of past/future asymmetry in emotion was clearly observable from 6 to 7 years of age. Evidence of past/future asymmetry in value emerged latest in development and was uncorrelated with judgments of emotion and subjective distance at all ages. We consider the underlying causes of these asymmetries, and discuss the potential relations among them. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

The prevalence of specific learning disorder in mathematics and comorbidity with other developmental disorders in primary school-age children

Mathematics difficulties are common in both children and adults, and they can have a great impact on people's lives. A specific learning disorder in mathematics (SLDM or developmental dyscalculia) is a special case of persistent mathematics difficulties, where the problems with maths cannot be attributed to environmental factors, intellectual disability, or mental, neurological or physical disorders. The aim of the current study was to estimate the prevalence rate of SLDM, any gender differences in SLDM, and the most common comorbid conditions. The DSM-5 provides details regarding these only for specific learning disorders in general, but not specifically for SLDM. We also compared the prevalence rates obtained on the basis of the DSM-IV and DSM-5 criteria. We investigated the performance of 2,421 primary school children on standardized tests of mathematics, English, and IQ, and several demographic factors over the primary school years. We applied the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria to identify children with a potential diagnosis of SLDM. Six per cent of our sample had persistent, severe difficulties with mathematics, and, after applying the exclusion criteria, 5.7% were identified as having an SLDM profile. Both persistent maths difficulties and consistently exceptionally high performance in maths were equally common in males and females. About half of the children with an SLDM profile had some form of language or communication difficulty. Some of these children also had a diagnosis of autism, social, emotional, and behavioural difficulties or attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder. Our findings have important implications for research and intervention purposes, which we discuss in the study.

Episodic temporal generalization: A developmental study

Groups of 5-year-olds, 10-year-olds, and adults completed either an episodic temporal generalization task, in which no stimuli were repeated, or a repeated standard temporal generalization task, in which there was a fixed standard that was repeated on every trial. Significant developmental improvements were found on both tasks. In both tasks, gradients of performance over two different stimulus ranges superimposed well when plotted on the same relative scale. Performance was similar for the adults and 10-year-olds across tasks, but the 5-year-olds performed better on the repeated standard task. These findings suggest that perceptual processes are a source of scalar variability in timing, and that there are developmental changes in levels of such variability.

Distinctiveness models of memory and absolute identification: Evidence for local, not global, effects

Many models of memory assume that the probability of remembering an item is related to how distinctive that item is relative to all the other items in the set, with no distinction made between the contributions of near or far items. These “global” distinctiveness models do well in accounting for the ubiquitous serial position effects observed in numerous memory paradigms, including absolute identification. Here, we provide experimental confirmation of Bower's (1971) suggestion that, contrary to a fundamental prediction of global distinctiveness models, midseries items can be more discriminable than their immediate neighbours. We show that such data are consistent with a revised distinctiveness account in which the factor affecting discrimination performance is primarily the distinctiveness of an item relative to its close neighbours.

The Development of Temporal Concepts: Learning to Locate Events in Time

A new model of the development of temporal concepts is described that assumes that there are substantial changes in how children think about time in the early years. It is argued that there is a shift from understanding time in an event-dependent way to an event-independent understanding of time. Early in development, very young children are unable to think about locations in time independently of the events that occur at those locations. It is only with development that children begin to have a proper grasp of the distinction between past, present, and future, and represent time as linear and unidirectional. The model assumes that although children aged two to three years may categorize events differently depending on whether they lie in the past or the future, they may not be able to understand that whether an event is in the future or in the past is something that changes as time passes and varies with temporal perspective. Around four to five years, children understand how causality operates in time, and can grasp the systematic relations that obtain between different locations in time, which provides the basis for acquiring the conventional clock and calendar system.

Number comparison and number ordering as predictors of arithmetic performance in adults: Exploring the link between the two skills, and investigating the question of domain-specificity

Recent evidence has highlighted the important role that number-ordering skills play in arithmetic abilities, both in children and adults. In the current study, we demonstrated that number comparison and ordering skills were both significantly related to arithmetic performance in adults, and the effect size was greater in the case of ordering skills. Additionally, we found that the effect of number comparison skills on arithmetic performance was mediated by number-ordering skills. Moreover, performance on comparison and ordering tasks involving the months of the year was also strongly correlated with arithmetic skills, and participants displayed similar (canonical or reverse) distance effects on the comparison and ordering tasks involving months as when the tasks included numbers. This suggests that the processes responsible for the link between comparison and ordering skills and arithmetic performance are not specific to the domain of numbers. Finally, a factor analysis indicated that performance on comparison and ordering tasks loaded on a factor that included performance on a number line task and self-reported spatial thinking styles. These results substantially extend previous research on the role of order processing abilities in mental arithmetic.

Knowing when to hold 'em: regret and the relation between missed opportunities and risk taking in children, adolescents and adults

Regret over missed opportunities leads adults to take more risks. Given recent evidence that the ability to experience regret impacts decisions made by 6-year-olds, and pronounced interest in the antecedents to risk taking in adolescence, we investigated the age at which a relationship between missed opportunities and risky decision-making emerges, and whether that relationship changes at different points in development. Six- and 8-year-olds, adolescents and adults completed a sequential risky decision-making task on which information about missed opportunities was available. Children also completed a task designed to measure their ability to report regret when explicitly prompted to do so. The relationship between missed opportunities and risky decision-making did not emerge until 8 years, at which age it was associated with the ability to explicitly report regret, and was stronger in adults than in adolescents. These novel results highlight the potential importance of the ability to experience regret in children and adolescents' risky decision-making.

The measurement of adult blood pressure and management of hypertension before elective surgery: Joint Guidelines from the Association of Anaesthetists of Great Britain and Ireland and the British Hypertension Society

This guideline aims to ensure that patients admitted to hospital for elective surgery are known to have blood pressures below 160 mmHg systolic and 100 mmHg diastolic in primary care. The objective for primary care is to fulfil this criterion before referral to secondary care for elective surgery. The objective for secondary care is to avoid spurious hypertensive measurements. Secondary care should not attempt to diagnose hypertension in patients who are normotensive in primary care. Patients who present to pre-operative assessment clinics without documented primary care blood pressures should proceed to elective surgery if clinic blood pressures are below 180 mmHg systolic and 110 mmHg diastolic.

Regret and adaptive decision making in young children

In line with the claim that regret plays a role in decision making, O'Connor, McCormack, and Feeney (Child Development, 85 (2014) 1995-2010) found that children who reported feeling sadder on discovering they had made a non-optimal choice were more likely to make a different choice the next time around. We examined two issues of interpretation regarding this finding: whether the emotion measured was indeed regret and whether it was the experience of this emotion, rather than the ability to anticipate it, that affected decision making. To address the first issue, we varied the degree to which children aged 6 or 7 years were responsible for an outcome, assuming that responsibility is a necessary condition for regret. The second issue was addressed by examining whether children could accurately anticipate that they would feel worse on discovering they had made a non-optimal choice. Children were more likely to feel sad if they were responsible for the outcome; however, even if they were not responsible, children were more likely than chance to report feeling sadder. Moreover, across all conditions, feeling sadder was associated with making a better subsequent choice. In a separate task, we demonstrated that children of this age cannot accurately anticipate feeling sadder on discovering that they had not made the best choice. These findings suggest that although children may feel regret following a non-optimal choice, even if they were not responsible for an outcome, they may experience another negative emotion such as frustration. Experiencing either of these emotions seems to be sufficient to support better decision making.

Temporal and statistical information in causal structure learning

Three experiments examined children's and adults' abilities to use statistical and temporal information to distinguish between common cause and causal chain structures. In Experiment 1, participants were provided with conditional probability information and/or temporal information and asked to infer the causal structure of a 3-variable mechanical system that operated probabilistically. Participants of all ages preferentially relied on the temporal pattern of events in their inferences, even if this conflicted with statistical information. In Experiments 2 and 3, participants observed a series of interventions on the system, which in these experiments operated deterministically. In Experiment 2, participants found it easier to use temporal pattern information than statistical information provided as a result of interventions. In Experiment 3, in which no temporal pattern information was provided, children from 6- to 7-years-old, but not younger children, were able to use intervention information to make causal chain judgments, although they had difficulty when the structure was a common cause. The findings suggest that participants, and children in particular, may find it more difficult to use statistical information than temporal pattern information because of its demands on information processing resources. However, there may also be an inherent preference for temporal information.

Three types of temporal perspective: characterizing developmental changes in temporal thought

This paper provides an outline of the development of temporal thinking that is underpinned by the idea that temporal cognition shifts from being event dependent to event independent over the preschool period. I distinguish between three different ways in which it may be possible to have a perspective on time: (1) a perspective that is grounded in script-like representations of repeated events; (2) a more sophisticated perspective that brings in an fundamental categorical distinction between events that have already happened and events that are yet to come; and (3) a mature temporal perspective that involves orienting oneself in time using a linear temporal framework, with a grasp of the distinctions between past, present, and future. I propose that, with development, children possess each of these types of perspective in turn, and that only the last of these involves being able to represent time in an event-independent way.

Do children who experience regret make better decisions? A developmental study of the behavioral consequences of regret

Although regret is assumed to facilitate good decision making, there is little research directly addressing this assumption. Four experiments (N = 326) examined the relation between children's ability to experience regret and the quality of their subsequent decision making. In Experiment 1 regret and adaptive decision making showed the same developmental profile, with both first appearing at about 7 years. In Experiments 2a and 2b, children aged 6-7 who experienced regret decided adaptively more often than children who did not experience regret, and this held even when controlling for age and verbal ability. Experiment 3 ruled out a memory-based interpretation of these findings. These findings suggest that the experience of regret facilitates children's ability to learn rapidly from bad outcomes.