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Adams Z, Osman M, Bechlivanidis C, Meder B. (Why) Is Misinformation a Problem? Perspect Psychol Sci 2023; 18:1436-1463. [PMID: 36795592 PMCID: PMC10623619 DOI: 10.1177/17456916221141344] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/17/2023]
Abstract
In the last decade there has been a proliferation of research on misinformation. One important aspect of this work that receives less attention than it should is exactly why misinformation is a problem. To adequately address this question, we must first look to its speculated causes and effects. We examined different disciplines (computer science, economics, history, information science, journalism, law, media, politics, philosophy, psychology, sociology) that investigate misinformation. The consensus view points to advancements in information technology (e.g., the Internet, social media) as a main cause of the proliferation and increasing impact of misinformation, with a variety of illustrations of the effects. We critically analyzed both issues. As to the effects, misbehaviors are not yet reliably demonstrated empirically to be the outcome of misinformation; correlation as causation may have a hand in that perception. As to the cause, advancements in information technologies enable, as well as reveal, multitudes of interactions that represent significant deviations from ground truths through people's new way of knowing (intersubjectivity). This, we argue, is illusionary when understood in light of historical epistemology. Both doubts we raise are used to consider the cost to established norms of liberal democracy that come from efforts to target the problem of misinformation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Zoë Adams
- Department of Linguistics, School of Languages, Linguistics and Film, Queen Mary University London
| | - Magda Osman
- Centre for Science and Policy, University of Cambridge
- Judge Business School, University of Cambridge
- Leeds Business School, University of Leeds
| | | | - Björn Meder
- Department of Psychology, Health and Medical University, Potsdam, Germany
- Max Planck Research Group iSearch, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany
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Zemla JC, Sloman SA, Bechlivanidis C, Lagnado DA. Not so simple! Causal mechanisms increase preference for complex explanations. Cognition 2023; 239:105551. [PMID: 37478697 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105551] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/24/2022] [Revised: 06/23/2023] [Accepted: 07/07/2023] [Indexed: 07/23/2023]
Abstract
Mechanisms play a central role in how we think about causality, yet not all causal explanations describe mechanisms. Across five experiments, we find that people evaluate explanations differently depending on whether or not they include mechanisms. Despite common wisdom suggesting that explanations ought to be simple in the sense of appealing to as few causes as necessary to explain an effect, the literature is divided over whether people adhere to this principle. Our findings suggest that the presence of causal mechanisms in an explanation is one factor that reduces adherence. While competing explanations are often judged based on their probability of being correct, mechanisms afford a different way of evaluating explanations: They describe the underlying nature of causal relations. Complex explanations (appealing to multiple causes) contain more causal relations and thus allow for more mechanistic information, providing a fuller account of the causal network and promoting a greater sense of understanding.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jeffrey C Zemla
- Department of Psychology, Syracuse University, 430 Huntington Hall, Syracuse, NY 13244, United States of America.
| | - Steven A Sloman
- Department of Cognitive, Linguistic, and Psychological Sciences, Brown University, 190 Thayer St., Providence, RI 02912, United States of America
| | - Christos Bechlivanidis
- Department of Experiment Psychology, University College London, 26 Bedford Way, London WC1H 0AP, UK
| | - David A Lagnado
- Department of Experiment Psychology, University College London, 26 Bedford Way, London WC1H 0AP, UK
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Adams Z, Bechlivanidis C, Osman M, O'Hagan J, Naldzhiev D. Self-reported Side-effects of Ultraviolet-C Disinfection Devices. Photochem Photobiol 2023; 99:1299-1309. [PMID: 36533869 DOI: 10.1111/php.13766] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/04/2022] [Accepted: 12/15/2022] [Indexed: 12/23/2022]
Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic increased sales of portable UV-C devices as a means of inactivating the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Research suggests that excessive UV-C exposure to the eyes and skin can lead to side-effects, primarily photokeratitis and erythema, but these findings are limited to case studies. This study explores self-reported side-effects of UV-C devices by collating five waves of UK consumer survey data from April 2020-December 2021 (N = 26 864). 30%-46% of owners report a side-effect after using a device claiming to emit UV-C. However, detailed analysis of Wave 4 data (N = 309) highlights inconsistencies between reported and plausible side-effect(s) associated with skin or eye exposure from UV-C devices. Alternative explanations are considered, namely that the reported side-effect(s) were psychosomatic or misattributed to direct exposure of UV-C radiation. Data regarding awareness of warnings about device side-effect(s) supports the misattribution explanation. For risk assessment purposes, limited reliable information about specific irritation or injury to the eye and skin was found from self-reporting surveys. To optimize future data collection, we recommend addressing recall errors by: reducing the period under investigation, supplementing responses with empirical measures, and incentivizing respondents to provide accurate information about the make and model of the UV-C device.
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Affiliation(s)
- Zoë Adams
- Queen Mary University of London, London, UK
| | | | | | | | - Dzhordzhio Naldzhiev
- Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Office for Product Safety and Standards, London, UK
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Osman M, Bechlivanidis C. Impact of personalizing experiences of manipulation outside of awareness on autonomy. Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 2022. [DOI: 10.1037/cns0000343] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/05/2022]
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Abstract
The goal of perception is to infer the most plausible source of sensory stimulation. Unisensory perception of temporal order, however, appears to require no inference, because the order of events can be uniquely determined from the order in which sensory signals arrive. Here, we demonstrate a novel perceptual illusion that casts doubt on this intuition: In three experiments (N = 607), the experienced event timings were determined by causality in real time. Adult participants viewed a simple three-item sequence, ACB, which is typically remembered as ABC in line with principles of causality. When asked to indicate the time at which events B and C occurred, participants' points of subjective simultaneity shifted so that the assumed cause B appeared earlier and the assumed effect C later, despite participants' full attention and repeated viewings. This first demonstration of causality reversing perceived temporal order cannot be explained by postperceptual distortion, lapsed attention, or saccades.
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Affiliation(s)
- Christos Bechlivanidis
- Department of Experimental Psychology, Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London
| | | | - Emma C Tecwyn
- School of Social Sciences, Birmingham City University
| | - David A Lagnado
- Department of Experimental Psychology, Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London
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Tecwyn EC, Bechlivanidis C, Lagnado DA, Hoerl C, Lorimer S, Blakey E, McCormack T, Buehner MJ. Causality influences children's and adults' experience of temporal order. Dev Psychol 2020; 56:739-755. [PMID: 31944800 DOI: 10.1037/dev0000889] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Although it has long been known that time is a cue to causation, recent work with adults has demonstrated that causality can also influence the experience of time. In causal reordering (Bechlivanidis & Lagnado, 2013, 2016) adults tend to report the causally consistent order of events rather than the correct temporal order. However, the effect has yet to be demonstrated in children. Across four preregistered experiments, 4- to 10-year-old children (N = 813) and adults (N = 178) watched a 3-object Michotte-style "pseudocollision." While in the canonical version of the clip, object A collided with B, which then collided with object C (order: ABC), the pseudocollision involved the same spatial array of objects but featured object C moving before object B (order: ACB), with no collision between B and C. Participants were asked to judge the temporal order of events and whether object B collided with C. Across all age groups, participants were significantly more likely to judge that B collided with C in the 3-object pseudocollision than in a 2-object control clip (where clear causal direction was lacking), despite the spatiotemporal relations between B and C being identical in the two clips (Experiments 1-3). Collision judgments and temporal order judgments were not entirely consistent, with some participants-particularly in the younger age range-basing their temporal order judgments on spatial rather than temporal information (Experiment 4). We conclude that in both children and adults, rather than causal impressions being determined only by the basic spatial-temporal properties of object movement, schemata are used in a top-down manner when interpreting perceptual displays. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | | | | | - Sara Lorimer
- School of Psychology, Queen's University Belfast
| | - Emma Blakey
- Department of Psychology, The University of Sheffield
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Abstract
Current theories of causality from visual input predict causal impressions only in the presence of realistic interactions, sequences of events that have been frequently encountered in the past of the individual or of the species. This strong requirement limits the capacity for 1-shot induction and, thus, does not sit well with our abilities for rapid creative causal learning, as illustrated, for example, by the effortless way we adapt to new technology. We present 4 experiments (N = 720) that reveal strong causal impressions upon first encounter with collision-like sequences that the literature typically labels "noncausal." Our stimuli include both the commonly used computer-based animations and edited video sequences. Besides direct reports, we present evidence based on goal-oriented behavior that makes sense only in the presence of strong causal assumptions. Finally, we document impressions of causality in highly unrealistic sequences involving, for example, instantaneous shape or size change. In the case of the more realistic clips used in the past, causal ratings abruptly decline and approach the findings of previous work, only after a canonical collision (launch event) is presented. We argue that previously used experimental procedures conceal order effects because of participants adapting to the task and reinterpreting its demands. We discuss ways to account for this adaptation whereby people either focus on experiences of perceptual causation or take realism into account even when asked for impressions of causality. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Anne Schlottmann
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London
| | - David A Lagnado
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London
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Abstract
Traditional approaches to human causal reasoning assume that the perception of temporal order informs judgments of causal structure. In this article, we present two experiments in which people followed the opposite inferential route: Perceptual judgments of temporal order were instead influenced by causal beliefs. By letting participants freely interact with a software-based "physics world," we induced stable causal beliefs that subsequently determined participants' reported temporal order of events, even when this led to a reversal of the objective temporal order. We argue that for short timescales, even when temporal-resolution capabilities suffice, the perception of temporal order is distorted to fit existing causal beliefs.
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