Computational and behavioral markers of model-based decision making in childhood

Adolescents flexibly adapt action selection based on controllability inferences

From early in life, we encounter both controllable environments, in which our actions can causally influence the reward outcomes we experience, and uncontrollable environments, in which they cannot. Environmental controllability is theoretically proposed to organize our behavior. In controllable contexts, we can learn to proactively select instrumental actions that bring about desired outcomes. In uncontrollable environments, Pavlovian learning enables hard-wired, reflexive reactions to anticipated, motivationally salient events, providing "default" behavioral responses. Previous studies characterizing the balance between Pavlovian and instrumental learning systems across development have yielded divergent findings, with some studies observing heightened expression of Pavlovian learning during adolescence and others observing a reduced influence of Pavlovian learning during this developmental stage. In this study, we aimed to investigate whether a theoretical model of controllability-dependent arbitration between learning systems might explain these seemingly divergent findings in the developmental literature, with the specific hypothesis that adolescents' action selection might be particularly sensitive to environmental controllability. To test this hypothesis, 90 participants, aged 8-27, performed a probabilistic-learning task that enables estimation of Pavlovian influence on instrumental learning, across both controllable and uncontrollable conditions. We fit participants' data with a reinforcement-learning model in which controllability inferences adaptively modulate the dominance of Pavlovian versus instrumental control. Relative to children and adults, adolescents exhibited greater flexibility in calibrating the expression of Pavlovian bias to the degree of environmental controllability. These findings suggest that sensitivity to environmental reward statistics that organize motivated behavior may be heightened during adolescence.

Goal-directed learning in adolescence: neurocognitive development and contextual influences

Adolescence is a time during which we transition to independence, explore new activities and begin pursuit of major life goals. Goal-directed learning, in which we learn to perform actions that enable us to obtain desired outcomes, is central to many of these processes. Currently, our understanding of goal-directed learning in adolescence is itself in a state of transition, with the scientific community grappling with inconsistent results. When we examine metrics of goal-directed learning through the second decade of life, we find that many studies agree there are steady gains in performance in the teenage years, but others report that adolescent goal-directed learning is already adult-like, and some find adolescents can outperform adults. To explain the current variability in results, sophisticated experimental designs are being applied to test learning in different contexts. There is also increasing recognition that individuals of different ages and in different states will draw on different neurocognitive systems to support goal-directed learning. Through adoption of more nuanced approaches, we can be better prepared to recognize and harness adolescent strengths and to decipher the purpose (or goals) of adolescence itself.

Evidence for shallow cognitive maps in schizophrenia

Individuals with schizophrenia can have marked deficits in goal-directed decision making. Prominent theories differ in whether schizophrenia (SZ) affects the ability to exert cognitive control, or the motivation to exert control. An alternative explanation is that schizophrenia negatively impacts the formation of cognitive maps, the internal representations of the way the world is structured, necessary for the formation of effective action plans. That is, deficits in decision-making could also arise when goal-directed control and motivation are intact, but used to plan over ill-formed maps. Here, we test the hypothesis that individuals with SZ are impaired in the construction of cognitive maps. We combine a behavioral representational similarity analysis technique with a sequential decision-making task. This enables us to examine how relationships between choice options change when individuals with SZ and healthy age-matched controls build a cognitive map of the task structure. Our results indicate that SZ affects how people represent the structure of the task, focusing more on simpler visual features and less on abstract, higher-order, planning-relevant features. At the same time, we find that SZ were able to display similar performance on this task compared to controls, emphasizing the need for a distinction between cognitive map formation and changes in goal-directed control in understanding cognitive deficits in schizophrenia.