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Doekes HM, Hermsen R. Multiscale selection in spatially structured populations. Proc Biol Sci 2024; 291:20232559. [PMID: 38808450 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2023.2559] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/17/2023] [Accepted: 04/08/2024] [Indexed: 05/30/2024] Open
Abstract
The spatial structure of populations is key to many (eco-)evolutionary processes. In such cases, the strength and sign of selection on a trait may depend on the spatial scale considered. An example is the evolution of altruism: selection in local environments often favours cheaters over altruists, but this can be outweighed by selection at larger scales, favouring clusters of altruists over clusters of cheaters. For populations subdivided into distinct groups, this effect is described formally by multilevel selection theory. However, many populations do not consist of non-overlapping groups but rather (self-)organize into other ecological patterns. We therefore present a mathematical framework for multiscale selection. This framework decomposes natural selection into two parts: local selection, acting within environments of a certain size, and interlocal selection, acting among them. Varying the size of the local environments subsequently allows one to measure the contribution to selection of each spatial scale. To illustrate the use of this framework, we apply it to models of the evolution of altruism and pathogen transmissibility. The analysis identifies how and to what extent ecological processes at different spatial scales contribute to selection and compete, thus providing a rigorous underpinning to eco-evolutionary intuitions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hilje M Doekes
- Theoretical Biology Group, Department of Biology, Utrecht University, Padualaan 8, 3584 CH Utrecht, The Netherlands
- Laboratory of Genetics, Department of Plant Sciences, Wageningen University, Droevendaalsesteeg 1, 6708 PB Wageningen, The Netherlands
| | - Rutger Hermsen
- Theoretical Biology Group, Department of Biology, Utrecht University, Padualaan 8, 3584 CH Utrecht, The Netherlands
- Centre for Complex Systems Studies, Utrecht University, Leuvenlaan 4, 3584 CE Utrecht, The Netherlands
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2
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Wechsler D, Bascompte J. Cheating in mutualisms promotes diversity and complexity. Am Nat 2021; 199:393-405. [DOI: 10.1086/717865] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/03/2022]
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3
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Hauert C, Doebeli M. Spatial social dilemmas promote diversity. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2021; 118:e2105252118. [PMID: 34649992 PMCID: PMC8594579 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2105252118] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 07/19/2021] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Cooperative investments in social dilemmas can spontaneously diversify into stably coexisting high and low contributors in well-mixed populations. Here we extend the analysis to emerging diversity in (spatially) structured populations. Using pair approximation, we derive analytical expressions for the invasion fitness of rare mutants in structured populations, which then yields a spatial adaptive dynamics framework. This allows us to predict changes arising from population structures in terms of existence and location of singular strategies, as well as their convergence and evolutionary stability as compared to well-mixed populations. Based on spatial adaptive dynamics and extensive individual-based simulations, we find that spatial structure has significant and varied impacts on evolutionary diversification in continuous social dilemmas. More specifically, spatial adaptive dynamics suggests that spontaneous diversification through evolutionary branching is suppressed, but simulations show that spatial dimensions offer new modes of diversification that are driven by an interplay of finite-size mutations and population structures. Even though spatial adaptive dynamics is unable to capture these new modes, they can still be understood based on an invasion analysis. In particular, population structures alter invasion fitness and can open up new regions in trait space where mutants can invade, but that may not be accessible to small mutational steps. Instead, stochastically appearing larger mutations or sequences of smaller mutations in a particular direction are required to bridge regions of unfavorable traits. The net effect is that spatial structure tends to promote diversification, especially when selection is strong.
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Affiliation(s)
- Christoph Hauert
- Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2, Canada;
- Department of Zoology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4, Canada
| | - Michael Doebeli
- Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2, Canada
- Department of Zoology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4, Canada
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4
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Zhang H. A game-theoretical dynamic imitation model on networks. J Math Biol 2021; 82:30. [PMID: 33683438 DOI: 10.1007/s00285-021-01573-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/13/2020] [Revised: 01/09/2021] [Accepted: 02/08/2021] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
A game-theoretical model is constructed to capture the effect of imitation on the evolution of cooperation. This imitation describes the case where successful individuals are more likely to be imitated by newcomers who will employ their strategies and social networks. Two classical repeated strategies 'always defect (ALLD)' and 'tit-for-tat (TFT)' are adopted. Mathematical analyses are mainly conducted by the method of coalescence theory. Under the assumption of a large population size and weak selection, the results show that the evolution of cooperation is promoted in this dynamic network. As we observed that the critical benefit-to-cost ratio is smaller compared to that in well-mixed populations. The critical benefit-to-cost ratio approaches a specific value which depends on three parameters, the repeated rounds of the game, the effective strategy mutation rate, and the effective link mutation rate. Specifically, for a very high value of the effective link mutation rate, the critical benefit-to-cost ratio approaches 1. Remarkably, for a low value of the effective link mutation rate, by letting the effective strategy mutation is nearly equal to zero, the critical benefit-to-cost ratio approaches [Formula: see text] for the resulting highly connected networks, which allows TFT to be evolutionary stable. It illustrates that dominance of TFTs is associated with more connected networks. This research can enrich the theory of the coevolution of game strategy and network structure with dynamic imitation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hui Zhang
- School of Mathematics and Statistics, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an, 710072, Shaanxi, China.
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5
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Danet A, Schneider FD, Anthelme F, Kéfi S. Indirect facilitation drives species composition and stability in drylands. THEOR ECOL-NETH 2020. [DOI: 10.1007/s12080-020-00489-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/24/2022]
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6
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Joshi J, Brännström Å, Dieckmann U. Emergence of social inequality in the spatial harvesting of renewable public goods. PLoS Comput Biol 2020; 16:e1007483. [PMID: 31914166 PMCID: PMC6974303 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1007483] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/04/2018] [Revised: 01/21/2020] [Accepted: 10/10/2019] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
Spatially extended ecological public goods, such as forests, grasslands, and fish stocks, are at risk of being overexploited by selfish consumers–a phenomenon widely recognized as the ‘tragedy of the commons.’ The interplay of spatial and ecological dimensions introduces new features absent in non-spatial ecological contexts, such as consumer mobility, local information availability, and strategy evolution through social learning in neighborhoods. It is unclear how these features interact to influence the harvesting and dispersal strategies of consumers. To answer these questions, we develop and analyze an individual-based, spatially structured, eco-evolutionary model with explicit resource dynamics. We report the following findings. (1) When harvesting efficiency is low, consumers evolve a sedentary consumption strategy, through which the resource is harvested sustainably, but with harvesting rates far below their maximum sustainable value. (2) As harvesting efficiency increases, consumers adopt a mobile ‘consume-and-disperse’ strategy, which is sustainable, equitable, and gives maximum sustainable yield. (3) A further increase in harvesting efficiency leads to large-scale overexploitation. (4) If costs of dispersal are significant, increased harvesting efficiency also leads to social inequality between frugal sedentary consumers and overexploitative mobile consumers. Whereas overexploitation can occur without social inequality, social inequality always leads to overexploitation. Thus, we identify four conditions that–while being characteristic of technological progress in modern societies–risk social inequality and overexploitation: high harvesting efficiency, moderately low costs of dispersal, high consumer density, and the tendency of consumers to adopt new strategies rapidly. We also show how access to global information–another feature widespread in modern societies–helps mitigate these risks. Throughout history, humans have shaped ecological landscapes, which in turn have influenced human behavior. This mutual dependence is epitomized when human consumers harvest a spatially extended renewable resource. Simple models predict that, when multiple consumers harvest a shared resource, each is tempted to harvest faster than his/her peers, putting the resource at risk of overexploitation. It is unclear, however, how the interplay among resource productivity, consumer mobility, and social learning in spatial ecological public goods games influences evolved consumer behavior. Here, using an individual-based, spatially structured, eco-evolutionary model of consumers and a resource, we find that increasing resource productivity initially promotes efficient resource use by enabling mobile consumption strategies, but eventually leads to inequality and overexploitation, as overexploitative mobile consumers coexist with frugal sedentary consumers. When consumers are impatient (i.e., eager to imitate successful strategies) or myopic (i.e., unaware of conditions outside of their neighborhoods), inequality and overexploitation tend to aggravate.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jaideep Joshi
- Centre for Ecological Sciences, Indian Institute of Science, Bengaluru, India
- Evolution and Ecology Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria
- * E-mail:
| | - Åke Brännström
- Evolution and Ecology Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria
- Department of Mathematics and Mathematical Statistics, Umeå University, Umeå, Sweden
| | - Ulf Dieckmann
- Evolution and Ecology Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria
- Department of Evolutionary Studies of Biosystems, The Graduate University for Advanced Studies (Sokendai), Hayama, Kanagawa, Japan
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7
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Xiao Y, Wu B. Close spatial arrangement of mutants favors and disfavors fixation. PLoS Comput Biol 2019; 15:e1007212. [PMID: 31525178 PMCID: PMC6746358 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1007212] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/08/2019] [Accepted: 06/25/2019] [Indexed: 11/26/2022] Open
Abstract
Cooperation is ubiquitous across all levels of biological systems ranging from microbial communities to human societies. It, however, seemingly contradicts the evolutionary theory, since cooperators are exploited by free-riders and thus are disfavored by natural selection. Many studies based on evolutionary game theory have tried to solve the puzzle and figure out the reason why cooperation exists and how it emerges. Network reciprocity is one of the mechanisms to promote cooperation, where nodes refer to individuals and links refer to social relationships. The spatial arrangement of mutant individuals, which refers to the clustering of mutants, plays a key role in network reciprocity. Besides, many other mechanisms supporting cooperation suggest that the clustering of mutants plays an important role in the expansion of mutants. However, the clustering of mutants and the game dynamics are typically coupled. It is still unclear how the clustering of mutants alone alters the evolutionary dynamics. To this end, we employ a minimal model with frequency independent fitness on a circle. It disentangles the clustering of mutants from game dynamics. The distance between two mutants on the circle is adopted as a natural indicator for the clustering of mutants or assortment. We find that the assortment is an amplifier of the selection for the connected mutants compared with the separated ones. Nevertheless, as mutants are separated, the more dispersed mutants are, the greater the chance of invasion is. It gives rise to the non-monotonic effect of clustering, which is counterintuitive. On the other hand, we find that less assortative mutants speed up fixation. Our model shows that the clustering of mutants plays a non-trivial role in fixation, which has emerged even if the game interaction is absent. Evolutionary dynamics on networks are key for biological and social evolution. Typically, the clustering mutants on networks can dramatically alter the direction of selection. Previous studies on the assortment of mutants assume that individuals interact in a frequency-dependent way. It is hard to tell how assortment alone alters the evolutionary fate. We establish a minimal network model to disentangle the assortment from the game interaction. We find that for weak selection limit, the assortment of mutants plays little role in fixation probability. For strong selection limit, connected mutants, i.e., the maximum assortment, are best for fixation. When the mutants are separated by only one wild-type individual, it is worse off than that separated by more than one wild-type individual in fixation probability. Our results show the nontrivial yet fundamental effect of the clustering on fixation. Noteworthily, it has already arisen, even if the game interaction is absent.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yunming Xiao
- School of Sciences, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing, China
| | - Bin Wu
- School of Sciences, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing, China
- * E-mail:
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8
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Cayuela H, Boualit L, Laporte M, Prunier JG, Preiss F, Laurent A, Foletti F, Clobert J, Jacob G. Kin-dependent dispersal influences relatedness and genetic structuring in a lek system. Oecologia 2019; 191:97-112. [PMID: 31422471 DOI: 10.1007/s00442-019-04484-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/11/2019] [Accepted: 08/08/2019] [Indexed: 10/26/2022]
Abstract
Kin selection and dispersal play a critical role in the evolution of cooperative breeding systems. Limited dispersal increases relatedness in spatially structured populations (population viscosity), with the result that neighbours tend to be genealogical relatives. Yet the increase in neighbours' fitness-related performance through altruistic interaction may also result in habitat saturation and thus exacerbate local competition between kin. Our goal was to detect the footprint of kin selection and competition by examining the spatial structure of relatedness and by comparing non-effective and effective dispersal in a population of a lekking bird, Tetrao urogallus. For this purpose, we analysed capture-recapture and genetic data collected over a 6-year period on a spatially structured population of T. urogallus in France. Our findings revealed a strong spatial structure of relatedness in males. They also indicated that the population viscosity could allow male cooperation through two non-exclusive mechanisms. First, at their first lek attendance, males aggregate in a lek composed of relatives. Second, the distance corresponding to non-effective dispersal dramatically outweighed effective dispersal distance, which suggests that dispersers incur high post-settlement costs. These two mechanisms result in strong population genetic structuring in males. In females, our findings revealed a lower level of spatial structure of relatedness and genetic structure in respect to males. Additionally, non-effective dispersal and effective dispersal distances in females were highly similar, which suggests limited post-settlement costs. These results indicate that kin-dependent dispersal decisions and costs have a genetic footprint in wild populations and are factors that may be involved in the evolution of cooperative courtship.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hugo Cayuela
- Département de Biologie, Institut de Biologie Intégrative et des Systèmes (IBIS), Université Laval, Pavillon Charles-Eugène-Marchand, Québec, QC, G1V 0A6, Canada.
| | - Laurent Boualit
- Department of Biology, University of Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland
| | - Martin Laporte
- Département de Biologie, Institut de Biologie Intégrative et des Systèmes (IBIS), Université Laval, Pavillon Charles-Eugène-Marchand, Québec, QC, G1V 0A6, Canada
| | - Jérôme G Prunier
- Theoretical and Experimental Ecology Station (UMR 5371), National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS), Paul Sabatier University (UPS), Moulis, France
| | - Françoise Preiss
- Groupe Tétras Vosges, Maison du Parc, 1, cour de l'Abbaye, 68140, Munster, France
| | - Alain Laurent
- Groupe Tétras Vosges, Maison du Parc, 1, cour de l'Abbaye, 68140, Munster, France
| | - Francesco Foletti
- Department of Biology, University of Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland
| | - Jean Clobert
- Theoretical and Experimental Ecology Station (UMR 5371), National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS), Paul Sabatier University (UPS), Moulis, France
| | - Gwenaël Jacob
- Department of Biology, University of Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland
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9
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Abstract
To survive unpredictable environmental change, many organisms adopt bet-hedging strategies that are initially costly but provide a long-term fitness benefit. The temporal extent of these deferred fitness benefits determines whether bet-hedging organisms can survive long enough to realize them. In this article, we examine a model of microbial bet hedging in which there are two paths to extinction: unpredictable environmental change and demographic stochasticity. In temporally correlated environments, these drivers of extinction select for different switching strategies. Rapid phenotype switching ensures survival in the face of unpredictable environmental change, while slower-switching organisms become extinct. However, when both switching strategies are present in the same population, then demographic stochasticity-enforced by a limited population size-leads to extinction of the faster-switching organism. As a result, we find a novel form of evolutionary suicide whereby selection in a fluctuating environment can favor bet-hedging strategies that ultimately increase the risk of extinction. Population structures with multiple subpopulations and dispersal can reduce the risk of extinction from unpredictable environmental change and shift the balance so as to facilitate the evolution of slower-switching organisms.
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10
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Mullon C, Lehmann L. Eco-Evolutionary Dynamics in Metacommunities: Ecological Inheritance, Helping within Species, and Harming between Species. Am Nat 2018; 192:664-686. [DOI: 10.1086/700094] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/03/2022]
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11
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Spatial heterogeneity and evolution of fecundity-affecting traits. J Theor Biol 2018; 454:190-204. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.06.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/15/2018] [Revised: 06/01/2018] [Accepted: 06/04/2018] [Indexed: 11/23/2022]
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12
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Yamauchi A, van Baalen M, Sabelis MW. Spatial patterns generated by simultaneous cooperation and exploitation favour the evolution of altruism. J Theor Biol 2018; 441:58-67. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.12.027] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/19/2017] [Revised: 12/22/2017] [Accepted: 12/27/2017] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
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13
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Stable polymorphism of cooperators and punishers in a public goods game. J Theor Biol 2017; 419:243-253. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.11.012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/14/2016] [Revised: 09/09/2016] [Accepted: 11/16/2016] [Indexed: 11/21/2022]
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14
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Wickman J, Diehl S, Blasius B, Klausmeier CA, Ryabov AB, Brännström Å. Determining Selection across Heterogeneous Landscapes: A Perturbation-Based Method and Its Application to Modeling Evolution in Space. Am Nat 2017; 189:381-395. [DOI: 10.1086/690908] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/04/2022]
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15
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Lion S. Moment equations in spatial evolutionary ecology. J Theor Biol 2016; 405:46-57. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.10.014] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/30/2015] [Revised: 10/06/2015] [Accepted: 10/08/2015] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
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16
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van Veelen M, Allen B, Hoffman M, Simon B, Veller C. Hamilton's rule. J Theor Biol 2016; 414:176-230. [PMID: 27569292 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.08.019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 23] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/09/2015] [Revised: 07/20/2016] [Accepted: 08/13/2016] [Indexed: 10/21/2022]
Abstract
This paper reviews and addresses a variety of issues relating to inclusive fitness. The main question is: are there limits to the generality of inclusive fitness, and if so, what are the perimeters of the domain within which inclusive fitness works? This question is addressed using two well-known tools from evolutionary theory: the replicator dynamics, and adaptive dynamics. Both are combined with population structure. How generally Hamilton's rule applies depends on how costs and benefits are defined. We therefore consider costs and benefits following from Karlin and Matessi's (1983) "counterfactual method", and costs and benefits as defined by the "regression method" (Gardner et al., 2011). With the latter definition of costs and benefits, Hamilton's rule always indicates the direction of selection correctly, and with the former it does not. How these two definitions can meaningfully be interpreted is also discussed. We also consider cases where the qualitative claim that relatedness fosters cooperation holds, even if Hamilton's rule as a quantitative prediction does not. We furthermore find out what the relation is between Hamilton's rule and Fisher's Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection. We also consider cancellation effects - which is the most important deepening of our understanding of when altruism is selected for. Finally we also explore the remarkable (im)possibilities for empirical testing with either definition of costs and benefits in Hamilton's rule.
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Affiliation(s)
- Matthijs van Veelen
- Department of Economics and Business, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands; Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
| | - Benjamin Allen
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA; Department of Mathematics, Emmanuel College, MA 02115, USA; Center for Mathematical Sciences and Applications, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
| | - Moshe Hoffman
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA; Rady School of Management, UC San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093, USA; Department of Computer Science and Engineering, UC San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093, USA
| | - Burton Simon
- Department of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences, University of Colorado Denver, Denver, CO 80202, USA
| | - Carl Veller
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA; Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
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17
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Eco-evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas. Theor Popul Biol 2016; 111:28-42. [PMID: 27256794 DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2016.05.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 44] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/02/2015] [Revised: 05/10/2016] [Accepted: 05/23/2016] [Indexed: 01/28/2023]
Abstract
Social dilemmas are an integral part of social interactions. Cooperative actions, ranging from secreting extra-cellular products in microbial populations to donating blood in humans, are costly to the actor and hence create an incentive to shirk and avoid the costs. Nevertheless, cooperation is ubiquitous in nature. Both costs and benefits often depend non-linearly on the number and types of individuals involved-as captured by idioms such as 'too many cooks spoil the broth' where additional contributions are discounted, or 'two heads are better than one' where cooperators synergistically enhance the group benefit. Interaction group sizes may depend on the size of the population and hence on ecological processes. This results in feedback mechanisms between ecological and evolutionary processes, which jointly affect and determine the evolutionary trajectory. Only recently combined eco-evolutionary processes became experimentally tractable in microbial social dilemmas. Here we analyse the evolutionary dynamics of non-linear social dilemmas in settings where the population fluctuates in size and the environment changes over time. In particular, cooperation is often supported and maintained at high densities through ecological fluctuations. Moreover, we find that the combination of the two processes routinely reveals highly complex dynamics, which suggests common occurrence in nature.
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18
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Powers ST, Lehmann L. When is bigger better? The effects of group size on the evolution of helping behaviours. Biol Rev Camb Philos Soc 2016; 92:902-920. [PMID: 26989856 DOI: 10.1111/brv.12260] [Citation(s) in RCA: 22] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/03/2015] [Revised: 02/03/2016] [Accepted: 02/11/2016] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
Understanding the evolution of sociality in humans and other species requires understanding how selection on social behaviour varies with group size. However, the effects of group size are frequently obscured in the theoretical literature, which often makes assumptions that are at odds with empirical findings. In particular, mechanisms are suggested as supporting large-scale cooperation when they would in fact rapidly become ineffective with increasing group size. Here we review the literature on the evolution of helping behaviours (cooperation and altruism), and frame it using a simple synthetic model that allows us to delineate how the three main components of the selection pressure on helping must vary with increasing group size. The first component is the marginal benefit of helping to group members, which determines both direct fitness benefits to the actor and indirect fitness benefits to recipients. While this is often assumed to be independent of group size, marginal benefits are in practice likely to be maximal at intermediate group sizes for many types of collective action problems, and will eventually become very small in large groups due to the law of decreasing marginal returns. The second component is the response of social partners on the past play of an actor, which underlies conditional behaviour under repeated social interactions. We argue that under realistic conditions on the transmission of information in a population, this response on past play decreases rapidly with increasing group size so that reciprocity alone (whether direct, indirect, or generalised) cannot sustain cooperation in very large groups. The final component is the relatedness between actor and recipient, which, according to the rules of inheritance, again decreases rapidly with increasing group size. These results explain why helping behaviours in very large social groups are limited to cases where the number of reproducing individuals is small, as in social insects, or where there are social institutions that can promote (possibly through sanctioning) large-scale cooperation, as in human societies. Finally, we discuss how individually devised institutions can foster the transition from small-scale to large-scale cooperative groups in human evolution.
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Affiliation(s)
- Simon T Powers
- Department of Ecology and Evolution, University of Lausanne, CH-1015, Lausanne, Switzerland.,School of Computing, Edinburgh Napier University, Edinburgh, EH10 5DT, U.K
| | - Laurent Lehmann
- Department of Ecology and Evolution, University of Lausanne, CH-1015, Lausanne, Switzerland
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19
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Lee W, van Baalen M, Jansen VAA. Siderophore production and the evolution of investment in a public good: An adaptive dynamics approach to kin selection. J Theor Biol 2015; 388:61-71. [PMID: 26471069 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.09.038] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/16/2014] [Revised: 09/23/2015] [Accepted: 09/29/2015] [Indexed: 01/08/2023]
Abstract
Like many other bacteria, Pseudomonas aeruginosa sequesters iron from the environment through the secretion, and subsequent uptake, of iron-binding molecules. As these molecules can be taken up by other bacteria in the population than those who secreted them, this is a form of cooperation through a public good. Traditionally, this problem has been studied by comparing the relative fitnesses of siderophore-producing and non-producing strains, but this gives no information about the fate of strains that do produce intermediate amounts of siderophores. Here, we investigate theoretically how the amount invested in this form of cooperation evolves. We use a mechanistic description of the laboratory protocols used in experimental evolution studies to describe the competition and cooperation of the bacteria. From this dynamical model we derive the fitness following the adaptive dynamics method. The results show how selection is driven by local siderophore production and local competition. Because siderophore production reduces the growth rate, local competition decreases with the degree of relatedness (which is a dynamical variable in our model). Our model is not restricted to the analysis of small phenotypic differences and allows for theoretical exploration of the effects of large phenotypic differences between cooperators and cheats. We predict that an intermediate ESS level of cooperation (molecule production) should exist. The adaptive dynamics approach allows us to assess evolutionary stability, which is often not possible in other kin-selection models. We found that selection can lead to an intermediate strategy which in our model is always evolutionarily stable, yet can allow invasion of strategies that are much more cooperative. Our model describes the evolution of a public good in the context of the ecology of the microorganism, which allows us to relate the extent of production of the public good to the details of the interactions.
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Affiliation(s)
- William Lee
- School of Biological Sciences, Royal Holloway University of London, Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX, UK
| | - Minus van Baalen
- Eco-Evolutionary Mathematics, Institut Biologie de l׳ENS (UMR 8197), Ecole Normale Supérieure, 75005 Paris, France; Eco-Evolutionary Mathematics, Institut Biologie de l׳ENS (UMR 8197), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 75005 Paris, France
| | - Vincent A A Jansen
- School of Biological Sciences, Royal Holloway University of London, Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX, UK.
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20
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Zhang H, Gao M, Wang W, Liu Z. Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on graphs and social networks with external constraint. J Theor Biol 2014; 358:122-31. [PMID: 24909494 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.05.038] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/02/2013] [Revised: 05/23/2014] [Accepted: 05/27/2014] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
Abstract
A game-theoretical model is constructed to capture the effect of external constraint on the evolution of cooperation. External constraint describes the case where individuals are forced to cooperate with a given probability in a society. Mathematical analyses are conducted via pair approximation and diffusion approximation methods. The results show that the condition for cooperation to be favored on graphs with constraint is b¯/c¯>k/A¯ (A¯=1+kp/(1-p)), where b¯ and c¯ represent the altruistic benefit and cost, respectively, k is the average degree of the graph and p is the probability of compulsory cooperation by external enforcement. Moreover, numerical simulations are also performed on a repeated game with three strategies, always defect (ALLD), tit-for-tat (TFT) and always cooperate (ALLC). These simulations demonstrate that a slight enforcement of ALLC can only promote cooperation when there is weak network reciprocity, while the catalyst effect of TFT on cooperation is verified. In addition, the interesting phenomenon of stable coexistence of the three strategies can be observed. Our model can represent evolutionary dynamics on a network structure which is disturbed by a specified external constraint.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hui Zhang
- Department of Applied Mathematics, School of Natural and Applied Sciences, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi׳an, Shaanxi 710027, China.
| | - Meng Gao
- Yantai Institute of Coastal Zone Research, CAS, Yantai 264003, China
| | - Wenting Wang
- School of Mathematics and Computer Science Institute, Northwest University for Nationalities, Lanzhou, Gansu 730000, China
| | - Zhiguang Liu
- School of Mathematics and Information Sciences, Henan University, Kaifeng, Henan 475001, China
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21
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Mullon C, Lehmann L. The robustness of the weak selection approximation for the evolution of altruism against strong selection. J Evol Biol 2014; 27:2272-82. [DOI: 10.1111/jeb.12462] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/13/2014] [Revised: 05/29/2014] [Accepted: 07/07/2014] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- C. Mullon
- Department of Ecology and Evolution; University of Lausanne; Lausanne Switzerland
| | - L. Lehmann
- Department of Ecology and Evolution; University of Lausanne; Lausanne Switzerland
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22
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Taylor TB, Rodrigues AMM, Gardner A, Buckling A. The social evolution of dispersal with public goods cooperation. J Evol Biol 2013; 26:2644-53. [DOI: 10.1111/jeb.12259] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/05/2012] [Revised: 08/27/2013] [Accepted: 09/02/2013] [Indexed: 01/18/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- T. B. Taylor
- Department of Zoology; University of Oxford; Oxford UK
- School of Biological Sciences; University of Reading; Reading UK
| | | | - A. Gardner
- Department of Zoology; University of Oxford; Oxford UK
- Balliol College, University of Oxford; Oxford UK
- School of Biology; University of St Andrews; St Andrews UK
| | - A. Buckling
- Department of Zoology; University of Oxford; Oxford UK
- Biosciences; University of Exeter; Penryn UK
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23
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Abstract
Evolutionary dynamics depend critically on a population's interaction structure-the pattern of which individuals interact with which others, depending on the state of the population and the environment. Previous research has shown, for example, that cooperative behaviors disfavored in well-mixed populations can be favored when interactions occur only between spatial neighbors or group members. Combining the adaptive dynamics approach with recent advances in evolutionary game theory, we here introduce a general mathematical framework for analyzing the long-term evolution of continuous game strategies for a broad class of evolutionary models, encompassing many varieties of interaction structure. Our main result, the canonical equation of adaptive dynamics with interaction structure, characterizes expected evolutionary trajectories resulting from any such model, thereby generalizing a central tool of adaptive dynamics theory. Interestingly, the effects of different interaction structures and update rules on evolutionary trajectories are fully captured by just two real numbers associated with each model, which are independent of the considered game. The first, a structure coefficient, quantifies the effects on selection pressures and thus on the shapes of expected evolutionary trajectories. The second, an effective population size, quantifies the effects on selection responses and thus on the expected rates of adaptation. Applying our results to two social dilemmas, we show how the range of evolutionarily stable cooperative behaviors systematically varies with a model's structure coefficient.
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Affiliation(s)
- Benjamin Allen
- Department of Mathematics, Emmanuel College, Boston, MA 02115, USA.
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24
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Parvinen K. Joint evolution of altruistic cooperation and dispersal in a metapopulation of small local populations. Theor Popul Biol 2013; 85:12-9. [DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2013.01.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/09/2012] [Revised: 12/30/2012] [Accepted: 01/09/2013] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
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25
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Ferriere R, Legendre S. Eco-evolutionary feedbacks, adaptive dynamics and evolutionary rescue theory. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2013; 368:20120081. [PMID: 23209163 PMCID: PMC3538448 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2012.0081] [Citation(s) in RCA: 71] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Adaptive dynamics theory has been devised to account for feedbacks between ecological and evolutionary processes. Doing so opens new dimensions to and raises new challenges about evolutionary rescue. Adaptive dynamics theory predicts that successive trait substitutions driven by eco-evolutionary feedbacks can gradually erode population size or growth rate, thus potentially raising the extinction risk. Even a single trait substitution can suffice to degrade population viability drastically at once and cause 'evolutionary suicide'. In a changing environment, a population may track a viable evolutionary attractor that leads to evolutionary suicide, a phenomenon called 'evolutionary trapping'. Evolutionary trapping and suicide are commonly observed in adaptive dynamics models in which the smooth variation of traits causes catastrophic changes in ecological state. In the face of trapping and suicide, evolutionary rescue requires that the population overcome evolutionary threats generated by the adaptive process itself. Evolutionary repellors play an important role in determining how variation in environmental conditions correlates with the occurrence of evolutionary trapping and suicide, and what evolutionary pathways rescue may follow. In contrast with standard predictions of evolutionary rescue theory, low genetic variation may attenuate the threat of evolutionary suicide and small population sizes may facilitate escape from evolutionary traps.
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Affiliation(s)
- Regis Ferriere
- Ecole Normale Supérieure, Laboratoire Ecologie-Evolution, UMR 7625 UPMC-ENS-CNRS, 46 rue d'Ulm, 75005 Paris, France.
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26
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Mathias A, Chesson P. Coexistence and evolutionary dynamics mediated by seasonal environmental variation in annual plant communities. Theor Popul Biol 2012; 84:56-71. [PMID: 23287702 DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2012.11.009] [Citation(s) in RCA: 36] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/12/2011] [Revised: 11/22/2012] [Accepted: 11/28/2012] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
It is well established theoretically that competing species may coexist by having different responses to variation over time in the physical environment. Whereas previous theory has focused mostly on year-to-year environmental variation, we investigate how within-year variation can be the basis of species coexistence. We ask also the important but often neglected question of whether the species differences that allow coexistence are compatible with evolutionary processes. We seek the simplest circumstances that permit coexistence based on within-year environmental variation, and then evaluate the robustness of coexistence in the face of evolutionary forces. Our focus is on coexistence of annual plant species living in arid regions. We first consider environmental variation of a very simple structure where a single pulse of rain occurs, and different species have different patterns of growth activity following the rain pulse. We show that coexistence of two species is possible based on the storage effect coexistence mechanism in this simplest of varying environments. We find an exact expression for the magnitude of the storage effect that allows the functioning of the coexistence mechanism to be analyzed. However, in these simplest of circumstances, coexistence in our models is not evolutionarily stable. Increasing the complexity of the environment to two rain pulses leads to evolutionarily stable species coexistence, and a route to diversity via evolutionary branching. This demonstration of the compatibility of a coexistence mechanism with evolutionary processes is an important step in assessing the likely importance of a mechanism in nature.
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Affiliation(s)
- Andrea Mathias
- Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721, USA.
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27
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Messinger SM, Ostling A. The influence of host demography, pathogen virulence, and relationships with pathogen virulence on the evolution of pathogen transmission in a spatial context. Evol Ecol 2012. [DOI: 10.1007/s10682-012-9594-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/28/2022]
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28
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Van Dyken JD, Wade MJ. Origins of altruism diversity II: Runaway coevolution of altruistic strategies via "reciprocal niche construction". Evolution 2012; 66:2498-513. [PMID: 22834748 PMCID: PMC3408633 DOI: 10.1111/j.1558-5646.2012.01629.x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 29] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/28/2022]
Abstract
Understanding the evolution of altruism requires knowledge of both its constraints and its drivers. Here we show that, paradoxically, ecological constraints on altruism may ultimately be its strongest driver. We construct a two-trait, coevolutionary adaptive dynamics model of social evolution in a genetically structured population with local resource competition. The intensity of local resource competition, which influences the direction and strength of social selection and which is typically treated as a static parameter, is here allowed to be an evolvable trait. Evolution of survival/fecundity altruism, which requires weak local competition, increases local competition as it evolves, creating negative environmental feedback that ultimately inhibits its further evolutionary advance. Alternatively, evolution of resource-based altruism, which requires strong local competition, weakens local competition as it evolves, also ultimately causing its own evolution to stall. When evolving independently, these altruistic strategies are intrinsically self-limiting. However, the coexistence of these two altruism types transforms the negative ecoevolutionary feedback generated by each strategy on itself into positive feedback on the other, allowing the presence of one trait to drive the evolution of the other. We call this feedback conversion "reciprocal niche construction." In the absence of constraints, this process leads to runaway coevolution of altruism types. We discuss applications to the origins and evolution of eusociality, division of labor, the inordinate ecological success of eusocial species, and the interaction between technology and demography in human evolution. Our theory suggests that the evolution of extreme sociality may often be an autocatalytic process.
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29
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Allen B, Nowak MA. Evolutionary shift dynamics on a cycle. J Theor Biol 2012; 311:28-39. [PMID: 22814475 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.07.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/22/2011] [Revised: 06/26/2012] [Accepted: 07/06/2012] [Indexed: 01/06/2023]
Abstract
We present a new model of evolutionary dynamics in one-dimensional space. Individuals are arranged on a cycle. When a new offspring is born, another individual dies and the rest shift around the cycle to make room. This rule, which is inspired by spatial evolution in somatic tissue and microbial colonies, has the remarkable property that, in the limit of large population size, evolution acts to maximize the payoff of the whole population. Therefore, social dilemmas, in which some individuals benefit at the expense of others, are resolved. We demonstrate this principle for both discrete and continuous games. We also discuss extensions of our model to other one-dimensional spatial configurations. We conclude that shift dynamics in one dimension is an unusually strong promoter of cooperative behavior.
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Affiliation(s)
- Benjamin Allen
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
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30
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Ohtsuki H. Does synergy rescue the evolution of cooperation? An analysis for homogeneous populations with non-overlapping generations. J Theor Biol 2012; 307:20-8. [PMID: 22579553 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.04.030] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/14/2011] [Revised: 04/19/2012] [Accepted: 04/23/2012] [Indexed: 10/28/2022]
Abstract
Recent developments of social evolution theory have revealed conditions under which cooperation is favored by natural selection. Effects of population structure on the evolution of cooperation have been one of the central questions in this issue, and inclusive fitness analyses have unveiled two different selective forces that favor cooperation; the direct fitness effect to the helper and the indirect fitness benefit to the helper via its kin. Although these theoretical frameworks have made a significant contribution to our understanding of cooperative traits, there is still one factor to be taken into account, synergy. Synergy means a nonlinear effect that arises when two individuals help each other. In other words, it represents deviation from additivity, to which inclusive fitness theory has paid relatively little attention. Here I provide a theoretical result on the possibility that synergy favors the evolution of cooperation. For homogeneously structured populations with non-overlapping generations, I show that incorporating synergistic effects does not rescue the evolution of cooperation. Potential factors that could enable synergy to rescue the evolution of cooperation are also discussed.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hisashi Ohtsuki
- Department of Evolutionary Studies of Biosystems, School of Advanced Sciences, The Graduate University for Advanced Studies, Shonan Village, Hayama, Kanagawa 240-0193, Japan.
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31
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Allen B, Traulsen A, Tarnita CE, Nowak MA. How mutation affects evolutionary games on graphs. J Theor Biol 2012; 299:97-105. [PMID: 21473871 PMCID: PMC3150603 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.03.034] [Citation(s) in RCA: 67] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/20/2011] [Revised: 03/27/2011] [Accepted: 03/29/2011] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
Evolutionary dynamics are affected by population structure, mutation rates and update rules. Spatial or network structure facilitates the clustering of strategies, which represents a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Mutation dilutes this effect. Here we analyze how mutation influences evolutionary clustering on graphs. We introduce new mathematical methods to evolutionary game theory, specifically the analysis of coalescing random walks via generating functions. These techniques allow us to derive exact identity-by-descent (IBD) probabilities, which characterize spatial assortment on lattices and Cayley trees. From these IBD probabilities we obtain exact conditions for the evolution of cooperation and other game strategies, showing the dual effects of graph topology and mutation rate. High mutation rates diminish the clustering of cooperators, hindering their evolutionary success. Our model can represent either genetic evolution with mutation, or social imitation processes with random strategy exploration.
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Affiliation(s)
- Benjamin Allen
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, MA 02138, United States.
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32
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Intense or spatially heterogeneous predation can select against prey dispersal. PLoS One 2012; 7:e28924. [PMID: 22247764 PMCID: PMC3256147 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0028924] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/21/2011] [Accepted: 11/17/2011] [Indexed: 11/30/2022] Open
Abstract
Dispersal theory generally predicts kin competition, inbreeding, and temporal variation in habitat quality should select for dispersal, whereas spatial variation in habitat quality should select against dispersal. The effect of predation on the evolution of dispersal is currently not well-known: because predation can be variable in both space and time, it is not clear whether or when predation will promote dispersal within prey. Moreover, the evolution of prey dispersal affects strongly the encounter rate of predator and prey individuals, which greatly determines the ecological dynamics, and in turn changes the selection pressures for prey dispersal, in an eco-evolutionary feedback loop. When taken all together the effect of predation on prey dispersal is rather difficult to predict. We analyze a spatially explicit, individual-based predator-prey model and its mathematical approximation to investigate the evolution of prey dispersal. Competition and predation depend on local, rather than landscape-scale densities, and the spatial pattern of predation corresponds well to that of predators using restricted home ranges (e.g. central-place foragers). Analyses show the balance between the level of competition and predation pressure an individual is expected to experience determines whether prey should disperse or stay close to their parents and siblings, and more predation selects for less prey dispersal. Predators with smaller home ranges also select for less prey dispersal; more prey dispersal is favoured if predators have large home ranges, are very mobile, and/or are evenly distributed across the landscape.
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33
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Zhang F, Hui C. Eco-evolutionary feedback and the invasion of cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games. PLoS One 2011; 6:e27523. [PMID: 22125615 PMCID: PMC3220694 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0027523] [Citation(s) in RCA: 25] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/27/2011] [Accepted: 10/18/2011] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
Unveiling the origin and forms of cooperation in nature poses profound challenges in evolutionary ecology. The prisoner's dilemma game is an important metaphor for studying the evolution of cooperation. We here classified potential mechanisms for cooperation evolution into schemes of frequency- and density-dependent selection, and focused on the density-dependent selection in the ecological prisoner's dilemma games. We found that, although assortative encounter is still the necessary condition in ecological games for cooperation evolution, a harsh environment, indicated by a high mortality, can foster the invasion of cooperation. The Hamilton rule provides a fundamental condition for the evolution of cooperation by ensuring an enhanced relatedness between players in low-density populations. Incorporating ecological dynamics into evolutionary games opens up a much wider window for the evolution of cooperation, and exhibits a variety of complex behaviors of dynamics, such as limit and heteroclinic cycles. An alternative evolutionary, or rather succession, sequence was proposed that cooperation first appears in harsh environments, followed by the invasion of defection, which leads to a common catastrophe. The rise of cooperation (and altruism), thus, could be much easier in the density-dependent ecological games than in the classic frequency-dependent evolutionary games.
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Affiliation(s)
- Feng Zhang
- Centre for Invasion Biology, Department of Botany and Zoology, Stellenbosch University, Matieland, South Africa.
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34
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Ferriere R, Michod RE. Inclusive fitness in evolution. Nature 2011; 471:E6-8; author reply E9-10. [PMID: 21430724 DOI: 10.1038/nature09834] [Citation(s) in RCA: 42] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/27/2010] [Accepted: 12/17/2010] [Indexed: 11/09/2022]
Abstract
Arising from M. A. Nowak, C. E. Tarnita & E. O. Wilson 466, 1057-1062 (2010); Nowak et al. reply. For over fifty years, the evolution of social behaviour has been guided by the concept of inclusive fitness as a measure of evolutionary success. Nowak et al. argue that inclusive fitness should be abandoned. In so doing, however, they misrepresent the role that inclusive fitness has played in the theory of social evolution by which understanding social behaviour in a variety of disciplines has developed and flourished. By discarding inclusive fitness on the basis of its limitations, they create a conceptual tension which, we argue, is unnecessary, and potentially dangerous for evolutionary biology.
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35
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Parvinen K. Adaptive dynamics of altruistic cooperation in a metapopulation: evolutionary emergence of cooperators and defectors or evolutionary suicide? Bull Math Biol 2011; 73:2605-26. [PMID: 21347812 DOI: 10.1007/s11538-011-9638-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/04/2010] [Accepted: 01/27/2011] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
We investigate the evolution of public goods cooperation in a metapopulation model with small local populations, where altruistic cooperation can evolve due to assortment and kin selection, and the evolutionary emergence of cooperators and defectors via evolutionary branching is possible. Although evolutionary branching of cooperation has recently been demonstrated in the continuous snowdrift game and in another model of public goods cooperation, the required conditions on the cost and benefit functions are rather restrictive, e.g., altruistic cooperation cannot evolve in a defector population. We also observe selection for too low cooperation, such that the whole metapopulation goes extinct and evolutionary suicide occurs. We observed intuitive effects of various parameters on the numerical value of the monomorphic singular strategy. Their effect on the final coexisting cooperator-defector pair is more complex: changes expected to increase cooperation decrease the strategy value of the cooperator. However, at the same time the population size of the cooperator increases enough such that the average strategy does increase. We also extend the theory of structured metapopulation models by presenting a method to calculate the fitness gradient in a general class of metapopulation models, and try to make a connection with the kin selection approach.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kalle Parvinen
- Department of Mathematics, University of Turku, Finland.
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36
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Boerlijst MC, van Ballegooijen WM. Spatial pattern switching enables cyclic evolution in spatial epidemics. PLoS Comput Biol 2010; 6:e1001030. [PMID: 21151577 PMCID: PMC3000349 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001030] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/08/2010] [Accepted: 11/11/2010] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Infectious diseases often spread as spatial epidemic outbreak waves. A number of model studies have shown that such spatial pattern formation can have important consequences for the evolution of pathogens. Here, we show that such spatial patterns can cause cyclic evolutionary dynamics in selection for the length of the infectious period. The necessary reversal in the direction of selection is enabled by a qualitative change in the spatial pattern from epidemic waves to irregular local outbreaks. The spatial patterns are an emergent property of the epidemic system, and they are robust against changes in specific model assumptions. Our results indicate that emergent spatial patterns can act as a rich source for complexity in pathogen evolution.
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Affiliation(s)
- Maarten Chris Boerlijst
- Theoretical Ecology, Institute for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Dynamics, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
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37
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Lehmann L, Rousset F. How life history and demography promote or inhibit the evolution of helping behaviours. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2010; 365:2599-617. [PMID: 20679105 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2010.0138] [Citation(s) in RCA: 154] [Impact Index Per Article: 11.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
In natural populations, dispersal tends to be limited so that individuals are in local competition with their neighbours. As a consequence, most behaviours tend to have a social component, e.g. they can be selfish, spiteful, cooperative or altruistic as usually considered in social evolutionary theory. How social behaviours translate into fitness costs and benefits depends considerably on life-history features, as well as on local demographic and ecological conditions. Over the last four decades, evolutionists have been able to explore many of the consequences of these factors for the evolution of social behaviours. In this paper, we first recall the main theoretical concepts required to understand social evolution. We then discuss how life history, demography and ecology promote or inhibit the evolution of helping behaviours, but the arguments developed for helping can be extended to essentially any social trait. The analysis suggests that, on a theoretical level, it is possible to contrast three critical benefit-to-cost ratios beyond which costly helping is selected for (three quantitative rules for the evolution of altruism). But comparison between theoretical results and empirical data has always been difficult in the literature, partly because of the perennial question of the scale at which relatedness should be measured under localized dispersal. We then provide three answers to this question.
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Affiliation(s)
- Laurent Lehmann
- Institute of Biology, University of Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel, Switzerland.
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38
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Bergmüller R, Schürch R, Hamilton IM. Evolutionary causes and consequences of consistent individual variation in cooperative behaviour. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2010; 365:2751-64. [PMID: 20679117 PMCID: PMC2936170 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2010.0124] [Citation(s) in RCA: 95] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Behaviour is typically regarded as among the most flexible of animal phenotypic traits. In particular, expression of cooperative behaviour is often assumed to be conditional upon the behaviours of others. This flexibility is a key component of many hypothesized mechanisms favouring the evolution of cooperative behaviour. However, evidence shows that cooperative behaviours are often less flexible than expected and that, in many species, individuals show consistent differences in the amount and type of cooperative and non-cooperative behaviours displayed. This phenomenon is known as 'animal personality' or a 'behavioural syndrome'. Animal personality is evolutionarily relevant, as it typically shows heritable variation and can entail fitness consequences, and hence, is subject to evolutionary change. Here, we review the empirical evidence for individual variation in cooperative behaviour across taxa, we examine the evolutionary processes that have been invoked to explain the existence of individual variation in cooperative behaviour and we discuss the consequences of consistent individual differences on the evolutionary stability of cooperation. We highlight that consistent individual variation in cooperativeness can both stabilize or disrupt cooperation in populations. We conclude that recognizing the existence of consistent individual differences in cooperativeness is essential for an understanding of the evolution and prevalence of cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ralph Bergmüller
- Department of Biology, University of Neuchâtel, 2009 Neuchâtel, Switzerland.
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39
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Asymmetric interaction will facilitate the evolution of cooperation. SCIENCE CHINA-LIFE SCIENCES 2010; 53:1041-6. [DOI: 10.1007/s11427-010-4016-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 21] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/14/2009] [Accepted: 04/01/2010] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
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40
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Fu F, Nowak MA, Hauert C. Invasion and expansion of cooperators in lattice populations: prisoner's dilemma vs. snowdrift games. J Theor Biol 2010; 266:358-66. [PMID: 20619271 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.06.042] [Citation(s) in RCA: 77] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/12/2010] [Revised: 04/23/2010] [Accepted: 06/30/2010] [Indexed: 10/19/2022]
Abstract
The evolution of cooperation is an enduring conundrum in biology and the social sciences. Two social dilemmas, the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game have emerged as the most promising mathematical metaphors to study cooperation. Spatial structure with limited local interactions has long been identified as a potent promoter of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma but in the spatial snowdrift game, space may actually enhance or inhibit cooperation. Here we investigate and link the microscopic interaction between individuals to the characteristics of the emerging macroscopic patterns generated by the spatial invasion process of cooperators in a world of defectors. In our simulations, individuals are located on a square lattice with Moore neighborhood and update their strategies by probabilistically imitating the strategies of better performing neighbors. Under sufficiently benign conditions, cooperators can survive in both games. After rapid local equilibration, cooperators expand quadratically until global saturation is reached. Under favorable conditions, cooperators expand as a large contiguous cluster in both games with minor differences concerning the shape of embedded defectors. Under less favorable conditions, however, distinct differences arise. In the prisoner's dilemma, cooperators break up into isolated, compact clusters. The compact clustering reduces exploitation and leads to positive assortment, such that cooperators interact more frequently with other cooperators than with defectors. In contrast, in the snowdrift game, cooperators form small, dendritic clusters, which results in negative assortment and cooperators interact more frequently with defectors than with other cooperators. In order to characterize and quantify the emerging spatial patterns, we introduce a measure for the cluster shape and demonstrate that the macroscopic patterns can be used to determine the characteristics of the underlying microscopic interactions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Feng Fu
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
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41
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Rudolf V, Kamo M, Boots M. Cannibals in Space: The Coevolution of Cannibalism and Dispersal in Spatially Structured Populations. Am Nat 2010; 175:513-24. [DOI: 10.1086/651616] [Citation(s) in RCA: 35] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/04/2022]
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Wang R, Shi L. The evolution of cooperation in asymmetric systems. SCIENCE CHINA-LIFE SCIENCES 2010; 53:139-149. [DOI: 10.1007/s11427-010-0007-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/20/2009] [Accepted: 06/28/2009] [Indexed: 10/19/2022]
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Brown SP, Taylor PD. Joint evolution of multiple social traits: a kin selection analysis. Proc Biol Sci 2010; 277:415-22. [PMID: 19828549 PMCID: PMC2842647 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2009.1480] [Citation(s) in RCA: 35] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/17/2009] [Accepted: 09/22/2009] [Indexed: 01/13/2023] Open
Abstract
General models of the evolution of cooperation, altruism and other social behaviours have focused almost entirely on single traits, whereas it is clear that social traits commonly interact. We develop a general kin-selection framework for the evolution of social behaviours in multiple dimensions. We show that whenever there are interactions among social traits new behaviours can emerge that are not predicted by one-dimensional analyses. For example, a prohibitively costly cooperative trait can ultimately be favoured owing to initial evolution in other (cheaper) social traits that in turn change the cost-benefit ratio of the original trait. To understand these behaviours, we use a two-dimensional stability criterion that can be viewed as an extension of Hamilton's rule. Our principal example is the social dilemma posed by, first, the construction and, second, the exploitation of a shared public good. We find that, contrary to the separate one-dimensional analyses, evolutionary feedback between the two traits can cause an increase in the equilibrium level of selfish exploitation with increasing relatedness, while both social (production plus exploitation) and asocial (neither) strategies can be locally stable. Our results demonstrate the importance of emergent stability properties of multidimensional social dilemmas, as one-dimensional stability in all component dimensions can conceal multidimensional instability.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sam P Brown
- Department of Zoology, University of Oxford, , South Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3PS, UK.
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Lion S, Gandon S. Life history, habitat saturation and the evolution of fecundity and survival altruism. Evolution 2009; 64:1594-606. [PMID: 20050913 DOI: 10.1111/j.1558-5646.2009.00933.x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 31] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
Hamilton's rule provides a general description of the conditions for the evolution of altruism. But altruism can take different forms depending on which life-history trait is affected by the helping behavior (fecundity vs. survival helping). In particular, these different forms of helping may have very different demographic consequences, which may feed back on evolution. We examine the interplay between various forms of helping and demography in viscous populations with empty sites. A key component of our analysis is the local density of empty sites experienced by a focal individual, which provides a measure of habitat saturation. Habitat saturation is shown to have contrasting effects depending on (1) whether the physiological costs and benefits of helping affect fecundity, survival or both; and (2) whether the costs of helping are paid in a density-dependent or density-independent manner. For a given level of habitat saturation and with density-dependent reproduction, we find that the conditions for the evolution of helping should be more favorable in the survival altruism life cycle with a cost on fecundity, and more stringent in the fecundity altruism life cycle with a cost on survival. More generally, our analysis stresses the importance of taking into account the feedback between population demography, life history, and kin selection when investigating the selective pressures on altruism.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sébastien Lion
- Institute for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Dynamics, University of Amsterdam, P.O. Box 94084, 1090 GB Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
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Lion S. Relatedness in spatially structured populations with empty sites: An approach based on spatial moment equations. J Theor Biol 2009; 260:121-31. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.05.035] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/13/2009] [Revised: 04/10/2009] [Accepted: 05/18/2009] [Indexed: 10/20/2022]
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Lion S, van Baalen M. The evolution of juvenile-adult interactions in populations structured in age and space. Theor Popul Biol 2009; 76:132-45. [DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2009.05.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/29/2008] [Revised: 05/21/2009] [Accepted: 05/27/2009] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
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Kümmerli R, Griffin AS, West SA, Buckling A, Harrison F. Viscous medium promotes cooperation in the pathogenic bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa. Proc Biol Sci 2009; 276:3531-8. [PMID: 19605393 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2009.0861] [Citation(s) in RCA: 151] [Impact Index Per Article: 10.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/25/2022] Open
Abstract
There has been extensive theoretical debate over whether population viscosity (limited dispersal) can favour cooperation. While limited dispersal increases the probability of interactions occurring between relatives, which can favour cooperation, it can also lead to an increase in competition between relatives and this can reduce or completely negate selection for cooperation. Despite much theoretical attention, there is a lack of empirical research investigating these issues. We cultured Pseudomonas aeruginosa bacteria in medium with different degrees of viscosity and examined the fitness consequences for a cooperative trait-the production of iron-scavenging siderophore molecules. We found that increasing viscosity of the growth medium (i) significantly limited bacterial dispersal and the diffusion of siderophore molecules and (ii) increased the fitness of individuals that produced siderophores relative to mutants that did not. We propose that viscosity favours siderophore-producing individuals in this system, because the benefits of siderophore production are more likely to accrue to relatives (i.e. greater indirect benefits), and, at the same time, bacteria are more likely to gain direct fitness benefits by taking up siderophore molecules produced by themselves (i.e. the trait becomes less cooperative). Our results suggest that viscosity of the microbial growth environment is a crucial factor determining the dynamics of wild-type bacteria and siderophore-deficient mutants in natural habitats, such as the viscous mucus in cystic fibrosis lung.
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Affiliation(s)
- Rolf Kümmerli
- Institute of Evolutionary Biology, University of Edinburgh, West Mains Road, Edinburgh EH9 3JT, UK
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Voelkl B, Kasper C. Social structure of primate interaction networks facilitates the emergence of cooperation. Biol Lett 2009; 5:462-4. [PMID: 19443505 DOI: 10.1098/rsbl.2009.0204] [Citation(s) in RCA: 53] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Animal cooperation has puzzled biologists for a long time as its existence seems to contravene the basic notion of evolutionary biology that natural selection favours 'selfish' genes that promote only their own well-being. Evolutionary game theory has shown that cooperators can prosper in populations of selfish individuals if they occur in clusters, interacting more frequently with each other than with the selfish. Here we show that social networks of primates possess the necessary social structure to promote the emergence of cooperation. By simulating evolutionary dynamics of cooperative behaviour on interaction networks of 70 primate groups, we found that for most groups network reciprocity augmented the fixation probability for cooperation. The variation in the strength of this effect can be partly explained by the groups' community modularity-a network measure for the groups' heterogeneity. Thus, given selective update and partner choice mechanisms, network reciprocity has the potential to explain socially learned forms of cooperation in primate societies.
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Affiliation(s)
- Bernhard Voelkl
- Departement Ecologie, Physiologie et Ethologie, IPHC, CNRS, Strasbourg, France.
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50
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Lehmann L, Rousset F. Perturbation expansions of multilocus fixation probabilities for frequency-dependent selection with applications to the Hill-Robertson effect and to the joint evolution of helping and punishment. Theor Popul Biol 2009; 76:35-51. [PMID: 19486781 DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2009.03.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/16/2008] [Revised: 03/17/2009] [Accepted: 03/19/2009] [Indexed: 10/20/2022]
Abstract
Natural populations are of finite size and organisms carry multilocus genotypes. There are, nevertheless, few results on multilocus models when both random genetic drift and natural selection affect the evolutionary dynamics. In this paper we describe a formalism to calculate systematic perturbation expansions of moments of allelic states around neutrality in populations of constant size. This allows us to evaluate multilocus fixation probabilities (long-term limits of the moments) under arbitrary strength of selection and gene action. We show that such fixation probabilities can be expressed in terms of selection coefficients weighted by mean first passages times of ancestral gene lineages within a single ancestor. These passage times extend the coalescence times that weight selection coefficients in one-locus perturbation formulas for fixation probabilities. We then apply these results to investigate the Hill-Robertson effect and the coevolution of helping and punishment. Finally, we discuss limitations and strengths of the perturbation approach. In particular, it provides accurate approximations for fixation probabilities for weak selection regimes only (Ns < or = 1), but it provides generally good prediction for the direction of selection under frequency-dependent selection.
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Affiliation(s)
- Laurent Lehmann
- Department of Biological Sciences, Stanford University, USA.
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