Philosophy, ethics, medicine and health care: the urgent need for critical practice

Philosophy and the clinic: Stigma, respect and shame

Since its foundation in 2010, the annual philosophy thematic edition of this journal has been a forum for authors from a wide range of disciplines and backgrounds, enabling contributors to raise questions of an urgent and fundamental nature regarding the most pressing problems facing the delivery and organization of healthcare. Authors have successfully exposed and challenged underlying assumptions that framed professional and policy discourse in diverse areas, generating productive and insightful dialogue regarding the relationship between evidence, value, clinical research and practice. These lively debates continue in this thematic edition, which includes a special section on stigma, shame and respect in healthcare. Authors address the problems with identifying and overcoming stigma in the clinic, interactional, structural and phenomenological accounts of stigma and the 'stigma-shame nexus'. Papers examine the lived experience of discreditation, discrimination and degradation in a range of contexts, from the labour room to mental healthcare and the treatment of 'deviancy' and 'looked-after children'. Authors raise challenging questions about the development of our uses of language in the context of care, and the relationship between stigma, disrespect and important analyses of power asymmetry and epistemic injustice. The relationship between respect, autonomy and personhood is explored with reference to contributions from an important conference series, which includes analyses of shame in the context of medically unexplained illness, humour, humiliation and obstetric violence.

Reasoning, evidence, and clinical decision-making: The great debate moves forward

When the editorial to the first philosophy thematic edition of this journal was published in 2010, critical questioning of underlying assumptions, regarding such crucial issues as clinical decision making, practical reasoning, and the nature of evidence in health care, was still derided by some prominent contributors to the literature on medical practice. Things have changed dramatically. Far from being derided or dismissed as a distraction from practical concerns, the discussion of such fundamental questions, and their implications for matters of practical import, is currently the preoccupation of some of the most influential and insightful contributors to the on-going evidence-based medicine debate. Discussions focus on practical wisdom, evidence, and value and the relationship between rationality and context. In the debate about clinical practice, we are going to have to be more explicit and rigorous in future in developing and defending our views about what is valuable in human life.

Teaching by (bad) example: what a confused attempt to "advance" EBM reveals about its underlying problems: commentary on Jenicek, M. (2015). Do we need another discipline in medicine? From epidemiology and evidence-based medicine to cognitive medicine and medical thinking. Journal of evaluation in clinical practice, 21:1028-1034

Professor Jenicek's paper is confused in that his proposal to 'integrate' what he means by 'evidence-based scientific theory and cognitive approaches to medical thinking' actually embodies a contradiction. But, although confused, he succeeds in teaching us more about the EBM debate than those who seem keen to forge ahead without addressing the underlying epistemological problems that Jenicek brings to our attention. Fundamental questions about the relationship between evidence, knowledge and reason still require resolution if we are to see a genuine advance in this debate.

Theory, experience and practice

Despite its potential hazards, the activity of questioning theoretical frameworks and proposing solutions is necessary if progress is even to be possible. Intellectual history has by no means ended, so we cannot expect to have all the answers, and from time to time the activity of critical questioning will be frustrating. But intellectual progress requires us to continue the process of asking fundamental questions. The alternative to thinking in this way is indeed unthinkable.

Diseases, patients and the epistemology of practice: mapping the borders of health, medicine and care

Last year saw the 20th anniversary edition of JECP, and in the introduction to the philosophy section of that landmark edition, we posed the question: apart from ethics, what is the role of philosophy 'at the bedside'? The purpose of this question was not to downplay the significance of ethics to clinical practice. Rather, we raised it as part of a broader argument to the effect that ethical questions - about what we should do in any given situation - are embedded within whole understandings of the situation, inseparable from our beliefs about what is the case (metaphysics), what it is that we feel we can claim to know (epistemology), as well as the meaning we ascribe to different aspects of the situation or to our perception of it. Philosophy concerns fundamental questions: it is a discipline requiring us to examine the underlying assumptions we bring with us to our thinking about practical problems. Traditional academic philosophers divide their discipline into distinct areas that typically include logic: questions about meaning, truth and validity; ontology: questions about the nature of reality, what exists; epistemology: concerning knowledge; and ethics: how we should live and practice, the nature of value. Any credible attempt to analyse clinical reasoning will require us to think carefully about these types of question and the relationships between them, as they influence our thinking about specific situations and problems. So, the answers to the question we posed, about the role of philosophy at the bedside, are numerous and diverse, and that diversity is illustrated in the contributions to this thematic edition.

Criticizing the data: some concerns about empirical approaches to ethics

There are strong arguments in favour of the need for more 'empirically informed philosophy'. Using papers in the current issue of JECP as case studies, I raise fundamental and unresolved methodological questions about the proper relationship between philosophy and empirical research, in particular concerning the relationship between 'data' in empirical research and the 'responses' people give in to questions in the process of philosophical dialogue. There are tensions between the role of data in empirical research and the critical stance required for philosophy that need to be addressed, if empirically informed philosophy is to make a serious and substantial contribution to our thinking about the matters of great import it addresses.

Medical humanities' challenge to medicine

Medicine is predicated on a view of human nature that is highly positivist and atomistic. This is apparent in the way in which its students are taught, clinical consultations are structured and medical evidence is generated. The field of medical humanities originally emerged as a challenge to this overly narrow view, but it has rarely progressed beyond tinkering around the edges of medical education. This is partly because its practitioners have largely been working from within a pervasive medical culture from which it is difficult to break free, and partly because the field has been insufficiently armed with scholarly thinking from the humanities. This is beginning to change and there is a sign that research in medical humanities has the potential to mount a persuasive challenge to medicine's ways of teaching, working and finding out. This article problematizes medicine's narrow viewpoint, grounding its critique in philosophical ideas from phenomenology and pragmatism. I will reflect upon the historical context within which medical humanities has emerged and briefly examine specific examples of how its interdisciplinary approach, involving humanities scholars with clinicians and medical scientists, may develop new research directions in medicine.