Infants generate goal-based action predictions

Selective Action Prediction in Infancy Depending on Linguistic Cues: An EEG and Eyetracker Study

Humans' capacity to predict actions and to socially categorize individuals is at the basis of social cognition. Such capacities emerge in early infancy. By 6 months of age, infants predict others' reaching actions considering others' epistemic state. At a similar age, infants are biased to attend to and interact with more familiar individuals, considering adult-like social categories such as the language people speak. We report that these two core processes are interrelated early on in infancy. In a belief-based action prediction task, 6-month-old infants (males and females) presented with a native speaker generated online predictions about the agent's actions, as revealed by the activation of participants' sensorimotor areas before the agent's movement. However, infants who were presented with a foreign speaker did not recruit their motor system before the agent's action. The eyetracker analysis provided further evidence that linguistic group familiarity influences how infants predict others' actions, as only infants presented with a native speaker modified their attention to the stimuli as a function of the agent's forthcoming behavior. The current findings suggest that infants' emerging capacity to predict others' actions is modulated by social cues, such as others' linguistic group. A facilitation to predict and encode the actions of native speakers relative to foreign speakers may explain, in part, why infants preferentially attend to, imitate, and learn from the actions of native speakers.

Do dogs preferentially encode the identity of the target object or the location of others' actions?

The ability to make sense of and predict others' actions is foundational for many socio-cognitive abilities. Dogs (Canis familiaris) constitute interesting comparative models for the study of action perception due to their marked sensitivity to human actions. We tested companion dogs (N = 21) in two screen-based eye-tracking experiments, adopting a task previously used with human infants and apes, to assess which aspects of an agent's action dogs consider relevant to the agent's underlying intentions. An agent was shown repeatedly acting upon the same one of two objects, positioned in the same location. We then presented the objects in swapped locations and the agent approached the objects centrally (Experiment 1) or the old object in the new location or the new object in the old location (Experiment 2). Dogs' anticipatory fixations and looking times did not reflect an expectation that agents should have continued approaching the same object nor the same location as witnessed during the brief familiarization phase; this contrasts with some findings with infants and apes, but aligns with findings in younger infants before they have sufficient motor experience with the observed action. However, dogs' pupil dilation and latency to make an anticipatory fixation suggested that, if anything, dogs expected the agents to keep approaching the same location rather than the same object, and their looking times showed sensitivity to the animacy of the agents. We conclude that dogs, lacking motor experience with the observed actions of grasping or kicking performed by a human or inanimate agent, might interpret such actions as directed toward a specific location rather than a specific object. Future research will need to further probe the suitability of anticipatory looking as measure of dogs' socio-cognitive abilities given differences between the visual systems of dogs and primates.

The pupil collaboration: A multi-lab, multi-method analysis of goal attribution in infants

The rise of pupillometry in infant research over the last decade is associated with a variety of methods for data preprocessing and analysis. Although pupil diameter is increasingly recognized as an alternative measure of the popular cumulative looking time approach used in many studies (Jackson & Sirois, 2022), an open question is whether the many approaches used to analyse this variable converge. To this end, we proposed a crowdsourced approach to pupillometry analysis. A dataset from 30 9-month-old infants (15 girls; Mage = 282.9 days, SD = 8.10) was provided to 7 distinct teams for analysis. The data were obtained from infants watching video sequences showing a hand, initially resting between two toys, grabbing one of them (after Woodward, 1998). After habituation, infants were shown (in random order) a sequence of four test events that varied target position and target toy. Results show that looking times reflect primarily the familiar path of the hand, regardless of target toy. Gaze data similarly show this familiarity effect of path. The pupil dilation analyses show that features of pupil baseline measures (duration and temporal location) as well as data retention variation (trial and/or participant) due to different inclusion criteria from the various analysis methods are linked to divergences in findings. Two of the seven teams found no significant findings, whereas the remaining five teams differ in the pattern of findings for main and interaction effects. The discussion proposes guidelines for best practice in the analysis of pupillometry data.

Objects in a social world: Infants' object representational capacity limits are shaped by objects' social relevance

Several decades of research have revealed consistent signature limits on infants' ability to represent objects. However, these signature representational limits were established with methods that often removed objects from their most common context. In infants' everyday lives, objects are very often social artifacts: they are the targets of agents' goal-directed actions, communications, and beliefs, and may have social content or relevance themselves. In this chapter, we explore the relationship between infants' object representational capacity limits and their processing of the social world. We review evidence that the social content and context of objects can shift infants' object representational limits. We discuss how taking the social world into account can yield more robust and ecologically valid estimates of infants' early representational capacities.

Socially evaluative contexts facilitate mentalizing

Our ability to understand others' minds stands at the foundation of human learning, communication, cooperation, and social life more broadly. Although humans' ability to mentalize has been well-studied throughout the cognitive sciences, little attention has been paid to whether and how mentalizing differs across contexts. Classic developmental studies have examined mentalizing within minimally social contexts, in which a single agent seeks a neutral inanimate object. Such object-directed acts may be common, but they are typically consequential only to the object-seeking agent themselves. Here, we review a host of indirect evidence suggesting that contexts providing the opportunity to evaluate prospective social partners may facilitate mentalizing across development. Our article calls on cognitive scientists to study mentalizing in contexts where it counts.

Context and prediction matter for the interpretation of social interactions across species

Predictions about others' future actions are crucial during social interactions, in order to react optimally. Another way to assess such interactions is to define the social context of the situations explicitly and categorize them according to their affective content. Here we investigate how humans assess aggressive, playful and neutral interactions between members of three species: human children, dogs and macaques. We presented human participants with short video clips of real-life interactions of dyads of the three species and asked them either to categorize the context of the situation or to predict the outcome of the observed interaction. Participants performed above chance level in assessing social situations in humans, in dogs and in monkeys. How accurately participants predicted and categorized the situations depended both on the species and on the context. Contrary to our hypothesis, participants were not better at assessing aggressive situations than playful or neutral situations. Importantly, participants performed particularly poorly when assessing aggressive behaviour for dogs. Also, participants were not better at assessing social interactions of humans compared to those of other species. We discuss what mechanism humans use to assess social situations and to what extent this skill can also be found in other social species.

The Origins of Theory of Mind in Infant Social Cognition: Investigating Longitudinal Pathways from Intention Understanding and Joint Attention to Preschool Theory of Mind

A growing body of literature has established longitudinal associations between key social cognitive capacities emerging in infancy and children's subsequent theory of mind. However, existing work is limited by modest sample sizes, narrow infant measures, and theory of mind assessments with restricted variability and generalizability. The current study aimed to extend this literature by (a) recruiting a large sample of participants (n = 116; 53 boys; 63 girls; all U.S. residents; 88 White, 8 Hispanic or Latino, 2 Black or African American, 14 two or more races/ethnicities, 4 unknown; median family income: $74-122,000), (b) examining multiple measures of infant social cognition (intentional action understanding, responding to joint attention, initiating joint attention) at Time 1 (8-12 months), and (c) using an ecologically valid theory of mind assessment designed to capture individual differences in preschoolers' mental state understanding (the Children's Social Understanding Scale; Tahiroglu et al., 2014) at Time 2 (37-45 months). Measured variable path analysis revealed a significant longitudinal association between infants' initiating joint attention and later theory of mind: infants who engaged in more attempts to initiate joint attention with experimenters through gaze alternation or gestures went on to show better parent-reported mental state understanding as preschoolers. Notably, the paths from infants' responding to joint attention and intentional action understanding to later theory of mind did not emerge as significant. These findings bolster and clarify existing claims about how mental state reasoning is rooted in foundational social-cognitive capacities emerging in infancy.

Infants’ Prediction of Humanoid Robot’s Goal-Directed Action

Several studies have shown that infants anticipate human goal-directed actions, but not robot’s ones. However, the studies focusing on the robot goal-directed actions have mainly analyzed the effect of mechanical arms on infant’s attention. To date, the prediction of goal-directed actions in infants has not yet been studied when the agent is a humanoid robot. Given this lack of evidence in infancy research, the present study aims at analyzing infants’ action anticipation of both a human’s and a humanoid robot’s goal-directed action. Data were acquired on thirty 17-month-old infants, watching four video clips, where either a human or a humanoid robot performed a goal-directed action, i.e. reaching a target. Infants looking behavior was measured through the eye-tracking technique. The results showed that infants anticipated the goal-directed action of both the human and the robot and there were no differences in the anticipatory gaze behavior between the two agents. Furthermore, the findings indicated different attentional patterns for the human and the robot, showing a greater attention paid to the robot's face than the human’s face. Overall, the results suggest that 17-month-old infants may infer also humanoid robot’ underlying action goals.

Visual attention for linguistic and non-linguistic body actions in non-signing and native signing children

Evidence from adult studies of deaf signers supports the dissociation between neural systems involved in processing visual linguistic and non-linguistic body actions. The question of how and when this specialization arises is poorly understood. Visual attention to these forms is likely to change with age and be affected by prior language experience. The present study used eye-tracking methodology with infants and children as they freely viewed alternating video sequences of lexical American sign language (ASL) signs and non-linguistic body actions (self-directed grooming action and object-directed pantomime). In Experiment 1, we quantified fixation patterns using an area of interest (AOI) approach and calculated face preference index (FPI) values to assess the developmental differences between 6 and 11-month-old hearing infants. Both groups were from monolingual English-speaking homes with no prior exposure to sign language. Six-month-olds attended the signer’s face for grooming; but for mimes and signs, they were drawn to attend to the “articulatory space” where the hands and arms primarily fall. Eleven-month-olds, on the other hand, showed a similar attention to the face for all body action types. We interpret this to reflect an early visual language sensitivity that diminishes with age, just before the child’s first birthday. In Experiment 2, we contrasted 18 hearing monolingual English-speaking children (mean age of 4.8 years) vs. 13 hearing children of deaf adults (CODAs; mean age of 5.7 years) whose primary language at home was ASL. Native signing children had a significantly greater face attentional bias than non-signing children for ASL signs, but not for grooming and mimes. The differences in the visual attention patterns that are contingent on age (in infants) and language experience (in children) may be related to both linguistic specialization over time and the emerging awareness of communicative gestural acts.

The evolutionary origins of syntax: Event cognition in nonhuman primates

Languages tend to encode events from the perspective of agents, placing them first and in simpler forms than patients. This agent bias is mirrored by cognition: Agents are more quickly recognized than patients and generally attract more attention. This leads to the hypothesis that key aspects of language structure are fundamentally rooted in a cognition that decomposes events into agents, actions, and patients, privileging agents. Although this type of event representation is almost certainly universal across languages, it remains unclear whether the underlying cognition is uniquely human or more widespread in animals. Here, we review a range of evidence from primates and other animals, which suggests that agent-based event decomposition is phylogenetically older than humans. We propose a research program to test this hypothesis in great apes and human infants, with the goal to resolve one of the major questions in the evolution of language, the origins of syntax.

Eye-tracking as a window into primate social cognition

Over the past decade, noninvasive, restraint-free eye-tracking research with primates has transformed our understanding of primate social cognition. The use of this technology with many primate species allows for the exploration and comparison of how these species attend to and understand social agents and interactions. The ability to compare and contrast the cognitive capacities of various primate species, including humans, provides insight into the evolutionary mechanisms and selective pressures that have likely shaped social cognition in similar and divergent ways across the primate order. In this review, we begin by discussing noninvasive behavioral methods used to measure primate gaze and attention before the introduction of noninvasive, restraint-free eye-tracking methodologies. Next, we focus on findings from recent eye-tracking research on primate social cognition, beginning with simple visual and search mechanisms. We then discuss the results that have built on this basic understanding of how primates view images and videos, exploring discrimination and knowledge of social agents, following social cues, tracking perspectives and predicting behavior, and the combination of eye-tracking and other behavioral and physiological methods. Finally, we discuss some future directions of noninvasive eye-tracking research on primate social cognition and current eye-tracking work-in-progress that builds on these previous studies, investigating underexplored socio-cognitive capacities and utilizing new methodologies.

The Impact of Action Effects on Infants' Predictive Gaze Shifts for a Non-Human Grasping Action at 7, 11, and 18 Months

During the observation of goal-directed actions, infants usually predict the goal at an earlier age when the agent is familiar (e.g., human hand) compared to unfamiliar (e.g., mechanical claw). These findings implicate a crucial role of the developing agentive self for infants’ processing of others’ action goals. Recent theoretical accounts suggest that predictive gaze behavior relies on an interplay between infants’ agentive experience (top-down processes) and perceptual information about the agent and the action-event (bottom-up information; e.g., agency cues). The present study examined 7-, 11-, and 18-month-old infants’ predictive gaze behavior for a grasping action performed by an unfamiliar tool, depending on infants’ age-related action knowledge about tool-use and the display of the agency cue of producing a salient action effect. The results are in line with the notion of a systematic interplay between experience-based top-down processes and cue-based bottom-up information: Regardless of the salient action effect, predictive gaze shifts did not occur in the 7-month-olds (least experienced age group), but did occur in the 18-month-olds (most experienced age group). In the 11-month-olds, however, predictive gaze shifts occurred only when a salient action effect was presented. This sheds new light on how the developing agentive self, in interplay with available agency cues, supports infants’ action-goal prediction also for observed tool-use actions.

Emergent Goal-Anticipatory Gaze in Infants via Event-Predictive Learning and Inference

From about 7 months of age onward, infants start to reliably fixate the goal of an observed action, such as a grasp, before the action is complete. The available research has identified a variety of factors that influence such goal-anticipatory gaze shifts, including the experience with the shown action events and familiarity with the observed agents. However, the underlying cognitive processes are still heavily debated. We propose that our minds (i) tend to structure sensorimotor dynamics into probabilistic, generative event-predictive, and event boundary predictive models, and, meanwhile, (ii) choose actions with the objective to minimize predicted uncertainty. We implement this proposition by means of event-predictive learning and active inference. The implemented learning mechanism induces an inductive, event-predictive bias, thus developing schematic encodings of experienced events and event boundaries. The implemented active inference principle chooses actions by aiming at minimizing expected future uncertainty. We train our system on multiple object-manipulation events. As a result, the generation of goal-anticipatory gaze shifts emerges while learning about object manipulations: the model starts fixating the inferred goal already at the start of an observed event after having sampled some experience with possible events and when a familiar agent (i.e., a hand) is involved. Meanwhile, the model keeps reactively tracking an unfamiliar agent (i.e., a mechanical claw) that is performing the same movement. We qualitatively compare these modeling results to behavioral data of infants and conclude that event-predictive learning combined with active inference may be critical for eliciting goal-anticipatory gaze behavior in infants.

A two-lab direct replication attempt of Southgate, Senju and Csibra (2007)

The study by Southgate et al. (2007 Psychol. Sci. 18, 587-592. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01944.x)) has been widely cited as evidence for false-belief attribution in young children. Recent replication attempts of this paradigm have yielded mixed results: several studies did not replicate the original findings, raising doubts about the suitability of the paradigm to assess non-verbal action prediction and Theory of Mind. In a preregistered collaborative study including two of the original authors, we tested one hundred and sixty 24- to 26-month-olds across two locations using the original stimuli, procedure and analyses as closely as possible. We found no evidence for action anticipation: only roughly half of the infants looked to the location of an agent's impending action when action prediction did not require taking into account the agent's beliefs and a similar number when the agent held a false-belief. These results and other non-replications suggest that this paradigm does not reliably elicit action prediction and thus cannot assess false-belief understanding in 2-year-olds. While the present results do not support any claim regarding the presence or absence of Theory of Mind in infants, we conclude that an important piece of evidence that has to date supported arguments for the existence of this competence can no longer serve that function.

Sharing Experiences in Infancy: From Primary Intersubjectivity to Shared Intentionality

We contrast two theses that make different assumptions about the developmental onset of human-unique sociality. The primary intersubjectivity thesis (PIT) argues that humans relate to each other in distinct ways from the beginning of life, as is shown by newborns' participation in face-to-face encounters or "primary intersubjectivity." According to this thesis, humans' innate relational capacity is the seedbed from which all subsequent social-emotional and social-cognitive developments continuously emerge. The shared intentionality thesis (SIT) states that human-unique forms of interaction develop at 9-12 months of age, when infants put their heads together with others in acts of object-focused joint attention and simple collaborative activities. According to this thesis, human-unique cognition emerges rapidly with the advent of mind-reading capacities that evolved specifically for the purpose of coordination. In this paper, we first contrast the two theses and then sketch the outlines of an account that unifies their strengths. This unified account endorses the PIT's recognition of the fundamental importance of primary intersubjectivity. Any act of sharing experiences is founded on the communicative capacity that is already displayed by young infants in primary intersubjectivity. At the same time, we question the PIT's interpretation that dyadic encounters have the triadic structure of joint attention. Lastly, we draw on empirical work on the development of joint attention, imitation, and social referencing that serves as evidence that primary intersubjectivity continuously unfolds into the capacity for triadic joint attention.

The ability to predict actions of others from distributed cues is still developing in 6- to 8-year-old children

Adults use distributed cues in the bodies of others to predict and counter their actions. To investigate the development of this ability, we had adults and 6- to 8-year-old children play a competitive game with a confederate who reached toward one of two targets. Child and adult participants, who sat across from the confederate, attempted to beat the confederate to the target by touching it before the confederate did. Adults used cues distributed through the head, shoulders, torso, and arms to predict the reaching actions. Children, in contrast, used cues in the arms and torso, but we did not find any evidence that they could use cues in the head or shoulders to predict the actions. These results provide evidence for a change in the ability to respond rapidly to predictive cues to others’ actions from childhood to adulthood. Despite humans’ sensitivity to action goals even in infancy, the ability to read cues from the body for action prediction in rapid interactive settings is still developing in children as old as 6 to 8 years of age.

Stopping at nothing: Two-year-olds differentiate between interrupted and abandoned goals

Previous research has established that goal tracking emerges early in the first year of life and rapidly becomes increasingly sophisticated. However, it has not yet been shown whether young children continue to update their representations of others' goals over time. The current study investigated this by probing young children's (24- to 30-month-olds; N = 24) ability to differentiate between goal-directed actions that have been halted because the goal was interrupted and those that have been halted because the goal was abandoned. To test whether children are sensitive to this distinction, we manipulated the experimenter's reason for not completing a goal-directed action; his initial goal was either interrupted by an obstacle or abandoned in favor of an alternative. We measured whether children's helping behavior was sensitive to the experimenter's reason for not completing his goal-directed action by recording whether children completed the experimenter's initial goal or the alternative goal. The results showed that children helped to complete the experimenter's initial goal significantly more often after this goal had been interrupted than after it had been abandoned. These results support the hypothesis that children continue to update their representations of others' goals over time by 2 years of age and specifically that they differentiate between abandoned and interrupted goals.

Tea With Milk? A Hierarchical Generative Framework of Sequential Event Comprehension

To make sense of the world around us, we must be able to segment a continual stream of sensory inputs into discrete events. In this review, I propose that in order to comprehend events, we engage hierarchical generative models that "reverse engineer" the intentions of other agents as they produce sequential action in real time. By generating probabilistic predictions for upcoming events, generative models ensure that we are able to keep up with the rapid pace at which perceptual inputs unfold. By tracking our certainty about other agents' goals and the magnitude of prediction errors at multiple temporal scales, generative models enable us to detect event boundaries by inferring when a goal has changed. Moreover, by adapting flexibly to the broader dynamics of the environment and our own comprehension goals, generative models allow us to optimally allocate limited resources. Finally, I argue that we use generative models not only to comprehend events but also to produce events (carry out goal-relevant sequential action) and to continually learn about new events from our surroundings. Taken together, this hierarchical generative framework provides new insights into how the human brain processes events so effortlessly while highlighting the fundamental links between event comprehension, production, and learning.

Experience has a limited effect on humans' ability to predict the outcome of social interactions in children, dogs and macaques

The ability to predict others' behaviour represents a crucial mechanism which allows individuals to react faster and more appropriately. To date, several studies have investigated humans' ability to predict conspecifics' behaviour, but little is known on our ability to predict behaviour in other species. Here, we aimed to test humans' ability to predict social behaviour in dogs, macaques and humans, and assess the role played by experience and evolution on the emergence of this ability. For this purpose, we presented participants with short videoclips of real-life social interactions in dog, child and macaque dyads, and then asked them to predict the outcome of the observed interactions (i.e. aggressive, neutral or playful). Participants were selected according to their previous species-specific experience with dogs, children and non-human primates. Our results showed a limited effect of experience on the ability to predict the outcome of social interactions, which was mainly restricted to macaques. Moreover, we found no support to the co-domestication hypothesis, in that participants were not especially skilled at predicting dog behaviour. Finally, aggressive outcomes in dogs were predicted significantly worse than playful or neutral ones. Based on our findings, we suggest possible lines for future research, like the inclusion of other primate species and the assessment of cultural factors on the ability to predict behaviour across species.

Dogs accurately track a moving object on a screen and anticipate its destination

The prediction of upcoming events is of importance not only to humans and non-human primates but also to other animals that live in complex environments with lurking threats or moving prey. In this study, we examined motion tracking and anticipatory looking in dogs in two eye-tracking experiments. In Experiment 1, we presented pet dogs (N = 14) with a video depicting how two players threw a Frisbee back and forth multiple times. The horizontal movement of the Frisbee explained a substantial amount of variance of the dogs' horizontal eye movements. With increasing duration of the video, the dogs looked at the catcher before the Frisbee arrived. In Experiment 2, we showed the dogs (N = 12) the same video recording. This time, however, we froze and rewound parts of the video to examine how the dogs would react to surprising events (i.e., the Frisbee hovering in midair and reversing its direction). The Frisbee again captured the dogs' attention, particularly when the video was frozen and rewound for the first time. Additionally, the dogs looked faster at the catcher when the video moved forward compared to when it was rewound. We conclude that motion tracking and anticipatory looking paradigms provide promising tools for future cognitive research with canids.

Action prediction during real-time parent-infant interactions

Social interactions provide a crucial context for early learning and cognitive development during infancy. Action prediction-the ability to anticipate an observed action-facilitates successful, coordinated interaction and is an important social-cognitive skill in early development. However, current knowledge about infant action prediction comes largely from screen-based laboratory tasks. We know little about what infants' action prediction skills look like during real-time, free-flowing interactions with a social partner. In the current study, we used head-mounted eyetracking to quantify 9-month-old infants' visual anticipations of their parents' actions during free-flowing parent-child play. Our findings reveal that infants do anticipate their parents' actions during dynamic interactions at rates significantly higher than would be expected by chance. In addition, the frequency with which they do so is associated with child-led joint attention and hand-eye coordination. These findings are the first to reveal infants' action prediction behaviors in a more naturalistic context than prior screen-based studies, and they support the idea that action prediction is inherently linked to motor development and plays an important role in infants' social-cognitive development. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9HrmcicfiqE.

Getting a grip on early intention understanding: The role of motor, cognitive, and social factors

This chapter considers various factors that facilitate infants' understanding of other people's intentions. As adults, we view the actions people perform around us as intentional, to achieve a goal, rather than idle movements. For example, when observing another person perform a simple grasping action, such as picking up a slice of pizza, we perceive this action as goal-directed. Due to our understanding of the person's intention, we focus more so on the relation between the person and their goal, rather than the motion involved in the action. Infants develop an understanding of intentional agents and their goals within the first year of life. This chapter reviews multiple factors that are at play in facilitating infants' learning about the intentions of others' actions. We consider this from various perspectives, including the role of active experience, sensitivity to behavioral cues, cognitive factors, and social factors. We first review evidence concerning infants' learning of intentional actions from active experience. We then go on to evaluate how this learning could also come about via comparison processes, statistical learning, and use of behavioral cues such as object labeling and action effects. We also review social factors such as infant-directed actions and triadic engagement within social interactions that emerging evidence suggests are helpful in facilitating infants' understanding of other people's actions. Finally, we consider the extent to which these factors interact with one another in different contexts, as well as implications and future directions.

Intentional action processing across the transition to crawling: Does the experience of self-locomotion impact infants' understanding of intentional actions?

Motor developmental milestones in infancy, such as the transition to self-locomotion, have cascading implications for infants' social and cognitive development. The current studies aimed to add to this literature by exploring whether and how crawling experience impacts a key social-cognitive milestone achieved in infancy: the development of intentional action understanding. Study 1 used a cross-sectional, age-held-constant design to examine whether locomotor (n = 36) and prelocomotor (n = 36) infants differ in their ability to process a failed intentional reaching action. Study 2 (n = 124) further probed this question by assessing how variability in locomotor infants' experience maps onto variability in their failed intentional action understanding. Both studies also assessed infants' tendency to engage in triadic interactions to shed light on whether self-locomotion impacts intentional action understanding directly or indirectly via changes in infants' interactions with social partners. Altogether, results showed no evidence for the role of self-locomotion in the development of intentional action understanding. Locomotor and prelocomotor infants did not differ in their failed action understanding or levels of triadic engagement (Study 1) and individual differences in days of crawling experience, propensity to crawl during play, and maximum crawling speed failed to predict infants' intentional action understanding or triadic engagement (Study 2). Explanations for these null findings and alternative influences on the development of intentional action understanding are considered.

14-Month-olds anticipate others' actions based on their belief about an object's identity

Past research has accumulated evidence regarding infants' false-belief understanding, measuring their gaze patterns or active helping behaviors. However, the underlying mechanisms are still debated, specifically, whether young infants can compute that others represent the world under a certain aspect. Such performance requires holding in mind two representations about the same object simultaneously and attributing only one to another person. While 14-month-olds can encode an object under different aspects when forming first-person representations, it is unclear whether infants at this very age could also predict others' behavior based on their beliefs about an object's identity. Here, we investigate this question in a novel eye-tracking-based unexpected-identity task. We measured 14-month-olds' anticipatory looks combined with their looking time, using a violation-of-expectation paradigm. Results show that 14-month-olds look longer to an actor's reach that is incongruent with her false belief about the identity of an object compared to a congruent reach. Furthermore, infants correctly anticipated the actor's reach based on her false belief. Thus, as soon as infants represent dual identities they can integrate them in belief attributions and use them for consequent behavioral predictions. Such data provide evidence for the flexibility of false-belief attributions and support proposals arguing for infants' rich theory-of-mind abilities.

Learning From Others: The Effects of Agency on Event Memory in Young Children

Little is known about the influence of social context on children's event memory. Across four studies, we examined whether learning that could occur in the absence of a person was more robust when a person was present. Three-year-old children (N = 125) viewed sequential events that either included or excluded an acting agent. In Experiment 1, children who viewed an agent recalled more than children who did not. Experiments 2a and 2b utilized an eye tracker to demonstrate this effect was not due to differences in attention. Experiment 3 used a combined behavioral and event-related potential paradigm to show that condition effects were present in memory-related components. These converging results indicate a particular role for social knowledge in supporting memory for events.

Early warning signals in motion inference

The ability to infer intention lies at the basis of many social interactions played out via motor actions. We consider a simple paradigm of this ability in humans using data from experiments simulating an antagonistic game between an Attacker and a Blocker. Evidence shows early inference of an Attacker move by as much as 100ms but the nature of the informational cues signaling the impending move remains unknown. We show that the transition to action has the hallmark of a critical transition that is accompanied by early warning signals. These early warning signals occur as much as 130 ms before motion ensues-showing a sharp rise in motion autocorrelation at lag-1 and a sharp rise in the autocorrelation decay time. The early warning signals further correlate strongly with Blocker response times. We analyze the variance of the motion near the point of transition and find that it diverges in a manner consistent with the dynamics of a fold-transition. To test if humans can recognize and act upon these early warning signals, we simulate the dynamics of fold-transition events and ask people to recognize the onset of directional motion: participants react faster to fold-transition dynamics than to its uncorrelated counterpart. Together, our findings suggest that people can recognize the intent and onset of motion by inferring its early warning signals.

Let's get it together: Infants generate visual predictions based on collaborative goals

Infants engage in social interactions that include multiple partners from very early in development. A growing body of research shows that infants visually predict the outcomes of an individual's intentional actions, such as a person reaching towards an object (e.g., Krogh-Jespersen & Woodward, 2014), and even show sophistication in their predictions regarding failed actions (e.g., Brandone, Horwitz, Aslin, & Wellman, 2014). Less is known about infants' understanding of actions involving more than one individual (e.g., collaborative actions), which require representing each partners' actions in light of the shared goal. Using eye-tracking, Study 1 examined whether 14-month-old infants visually predict the actions of an individual based on her previously shared goal. Infants viewed videos of two women engaged in either a collaborative or noncollaborative interaction. At test, only one woman was present and infants' visual predictions regarding her future actions were measured. Fourteen-month-olds anticipated an individual's future actions based on her past collaborative behavior. Study 2 revealed that 11-month-old infants only visually predict higher-order shared goals after engaging in a collaborative intervention. Together, our results indicate that by the second year after birth, infants perceive others' collaborative actions as structured by shared goals and that active engagement in collaboration strengthens this understanding in young infants.

Two systems for thinking about others' thoughts in the developing brain

The ability to reason about other people’s thoughts and beliefs characterizes the complex social interaction among humans. This ability, called Theory of Mind (ToM), has long been argued to develop around 4 y when children start explicitly reasoning about others' beliefs. However, when tested nonverbally, infants already show action expectations congruent with others’ beliefs before the age of 2 y. Do these behaviors reflect different systems for understanding others’ minds—an early and a later developing one—or when does ToM develop? We show that these abilities are supported by the maturation of independent brain networks, suggesting different systems for explicit verbal ToM and early nonverbal action expectations.

Human social interaction crucially relies on the ability to infer what other people think. Referred to as Theory of Mind (ToM), this ability has long been argued to emerge around 4 y of age when children start passing traditional verbal ToM tasks. This developmental dogma has recently been questioned by nonverbal ToM tasks passed by infants younger than 2 y of age. How do young children solve these tests, and what is their relation to the later-developing verbal ToM reasoning? Are there two different systems for nonverbal and verbal ToM, and when is the developmental onset of mature adult ToM? To address these questions, we related markers of cortical brain structure (i.e., cortical thickness and surface area) of 3- and 4-y-old children to their performance in novel nonverbal and traditional verbal TM tasks. We showed that verbal ToM reasoning was supported by cortical surface area and thickness of the precuneus and temporoparietal junction, classically involved in ToM in adults. Nonverbal ToM reasoning, in contrast, was supported by the cortical structure of a distinct and independent neural network including the supramarginal gyrus also involved in emotional and visual perspective taking, action observation, and social attention or encoding biases. This neural dissociation suggests two systems for reasoning about others’ minds—mature verbal ToM that emerges around 4 y of age, whereas nonverbal ToM tasks rely on different earlier-developing possibly social-cognitive processes.

Neural correlates of infant action processing relate to theory of mind in early childhood

The mechanisms that support infant action processing are thought to be involved in the development of later social cognition. While a growing body of research demonstrates longitudinal links between action processing and explicit theory of mind (TOM), it remains unclear why this link emerges in some measures of action encoding and not others. In this paper, we recruit neural measures as a unique lens into which aspects of human infant action processing (i.e., action encoding and action execution; age 7 months) are related to preschool TOM (age 3 years; n = 31). We test whether individual differences in recruiting the sensorimotor system or attention processes during action encoding predict individual differences in TOM. Results indicate that reduced occipital alpha during action encoding predicts TOM at age 3. This finding converges with behavioral work and suggests that attentional processes involved in action encoding may support TOM. We also test whether neural processing during action execution draws on the proto-substrates of effortful control (EC). Results indicate that frontal alpha oscillatory activity during action execution predicted EC at age 3-providing strong novel evidence that infant brain activity is longitudinally linked to EC. Further, we demonstrate that EC mediates the link between the frontal alpha response and TOM. This indirect effect is specific in terms of direction, neural response, and behavior. Together, these findings converge with behavioral research and demonstrate that domain general processes show strong links to early infant action processing and TOM.

The Pervasive Role of Pragmatics in Early Language

Language is a fundamentally social endeavor. Pragmatics is the study of how speakers and listeners use social reasoning to go beyond the literal meanings of words to interpret language in context. In this article, we take a pragmatic perspective on language development and argue for developmental continuity between early nonverbal communication, language learning, and linguistic pragmatics. We link phenomena from these different literatures by relating them to a computational framework (the rational speech act framework), which conceptualizes communication as fundamentally inferential and grounded in social cognition. The model specifies how different information sources (linguistic utterances, social cues, common ground) are combined when making pragmatic inferences. We present evidence in favor of this inferential view and review how pragmatic reasoning supports children's learning, comprehension, and use of language.

Great apes use self-experience to anticipate an agent's action in a false-belief test

Human social life depends on theory of mind, the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others. A signature of theory of mind, false belief understanding, requires representing others' views of the world, even when they conflict with one's own. After decades of research, it remains controversial whether any nonhuman species possess a theory of mind. One challenge to positive evidence of animal theory of mind, the behavior-rule account, holds that animals solve such tasks by responding to others' behavioral cues rather than their mental states. We distinguish these hypotheses by implementing a version of the "goggles" test, which asks whether, in the absence of any additional behavioral cues, animals can use their own self-experience of a novel barrier being translucent or opaque to determine whether another agent can see through the same barrier. We incorporated this paradigm into an established anticipatory-looking false-belief test for great apes. In a between-subjects design, apes experienced a novel barrier as either translucent or opaque, although both looked identical from afar. While being eye tracked, all apes then watched a video in which an actor saw an object hidden under 1 of 2 identical boxes. The actor then scuttled behind the novel barrier, at which point the object was relocated and then removed. Only apes who experienced the barrier as opaque visually anticipated that the actor would mistakenly search for the object in its previous location. Great apes, therefore, appeared to attribute differential visual access based specifically on their own past perceptual experience to anticipate an agent's actions in a false-belief test.

Observation of the point-light animation of a grasping hand activates sensorimotor cortex in nine-month-old infants

Measuring changes in sensorimotor alpha band activity in nine-month-old infants we sought to understand the involvement of the sensorimotor cortex during observation of the Point-Light (PL) animation of a grasping hand. Attenuation of alpha activity was found both when the PL display moved towards the to-be-grasped object and when the object was deleted from the video. Before the beginning of the movement of the PL stimuli, only in the presence of the object evoked attenuation of sensorimotor alpha activity was documented, possibly interpreted either as movement prediction or as graspable object perception. Our main findings demonstrate that, during observation of stimuli moving with biological kinematics, the infants' sensorimotor system is activated when the pictorial information is absent or highly reduced, and independently of the presence of the goal-directed object. The possible compensatory function of the sensorimotor system during observation of highly degraded moving stimuli is discussed.

Triadic interactions support infants' emerging understanding of intentional actions

Infants' understanding of the intentional nature of human action develops gradually across the first year of life. A key question is what mechanisms drive changes in this foundational social-cognitive ability. The current studies explored the hypothesis that triadic interactions in which infants coordinate attention between a social partner and an object of mutual interest promote infants' developing understanding of others as intentional agents. Infants' spontaneous tendency to participate in triadic engagement was assessed in a semi-structured play session with a researcher. Intentional action understanding was assessed by evaluating infants' ability to visually predict the goal of an intentional reaching action. Study 1 (N = 88) revealed that 8- to 9-month-olds who displayed more bouts of triadic engagement showed better concurrent reasoning about the goal of an intentional reaching action. Study 2 (N = 114) confirmed these findings using a longitudinal design and demonstrated that infants who displayed more bouts of triadic engagement at 6-7 months were better at prospectively reasoning about the goal of an intentional reaching action 3 months later. Cross-lagged path analyses revealed that intentional action understanding at 6-7 months did not predict later triadic engagement, suggesting that early triadic engagement supports later intentional action processing and not the other way around. Finally, evidence from both studies revealed the unique contribution of triadic over dyadic forms of engagement. These results highlight the importance of social interaction as a developmental mechanism and suggest that infants enrich their understanding of intentionality through triadic interactions with social partners.

Six-Month-Old Infants Predict Agents' Goal-Directed Actions on Occluded Objects

Infants can infer agents' goals after observing agents' goal-directed actions on objects and can subsequently make predictions about how agents will act on objects in the future. We investigated the representations supporting these predictions. We familiarized 6-month-old infants to an agent who preferentially reached for one of two featurally distinct objects following a cue. At test, the objects were sequentially occluded from the infant in the agent's presence. We asked whether infants could generate action predictions without visual access to the relevant objects by measuring whether infants shifted their gaze to the location of the agent's hidden goal object following the cue. We also examined what infants represented about the hidden objects by removing one of the occluders to reveal either the original hidden object or the unexpected other object and measuring infants' looking time. We found that, even without visual access to the objects, infants made predictive gazes to the location of the agent's occluded goal object, but failed to represent the features of either hidden object. These results suggest that infants make goal-based action predictions when the relevant objects in the scene are occluded, but doing so may come at the expense of maintaining representations of the objects.

Are sensorimotor experiences the key for successful early intervention in infants with congenital brain lesion?

Living with a congenital brain lesion may have detrimental effects on the ability to do everyday activities, but contrary to acquired brain lesions, people and in particular children, with congenital brain lesions may have limited or no experience of how their bodies work. This absence of experience gives rise to challenges for habilitation of sensorimotor abilities and derived cognitive abilities. How can motor and cognitive abilities be achieved and trained in an individual with no experience of potential abilities? In this article, we aim to review the existing knowledge about the development of sensorimotor integration. Further, we will discuss this knowledge in the light of two neurocognitive theories: embodied cognition and predictive coding. Moreover, using developmental knowledge and theory in combination, we will argue that early sensorimotor development serves as a foundation for later cognitive development. Finally, we try to use these elements in a strategy to make interventions as early as possible, with the purpose of improving sensorimotor and cognitive abilities in children with congenital brain lesions.

Cortical signatures of vicarious tactile experience in four-month-old infants

The human brain recruits similar brain regions when a state is experienced (e.g., touch, pain, actions) and when that state is passively observed in other individuals. In adults, seeing other people being touched activates similar brain areas as when we experience touch ourselves. Here we show that already by four months of age, cortical responses to tactile stimulation are modulated by visual information specifying another person being touched. We recorded somatosensory evoked potentials (SEPs) in 4-month-old infants while they were presented with brief vibrotactile stimuli to the hands. At the same time that the tactile stimuli were presented the infants observed another person's hand being touched by a soft paintbrush or approached by the paintbrush which then touched the surface next to their hand. A prominent positive peak in SEPs contralateral to the site of tactile stimulation around 130 ms after the tactile stimulus onset was of a significantly larger amplitude for the "Surface" trials than for the "Hand" trials. These findings indicate that, even at four months of age, somatosensory cortex is not only involved in the personal experience of touch but can also be vicariously recruited by seeing other people being touched.

Do Great Minds Prefer Alike? Thirteen-Month-Old Infants Generalize Personal Preferences Across Objects of Like Kind but Not Across People

Human preferences are person specific because different individuals do not necessarily have the same preference. Although existing empirical evidence demonstrates that infants have a basic understanding about people's preferences, there remained one question as to whether infants appreciate that a person's preference can be generalized to objects that belong to the same kind. This study addressed this gap with 13-month-old Chinese infants. In Experiment 1, infants were first habituated to an actor preferring a target object over a different shaped distractor object. Next, the objects' position and colors were changed and infants watched the actor from habituation and a new actor each alternated preference between the two objects. Results revealed that infants looked longer at the event when the old actor preferred the distractor object. Throughout the experiment, infants were also presented with additional tests in which each actor requested them to visually identify his or her preferred object. Results showed that infants identified the different colored target object for the old actor but not for the new actor. Experiment 2 removed the additional tests and replicated the results of Experiment 1. Experiment 3 confirmed that 13-month olds could differentiate the two different colored target objects. Together, the present findings provide the first known evidence that 13-month olds expect object preferences to be generalized across objects of like kind but not necessarily across individuals. Such sensitivity to the rules guiding preference generalization could help infants predict people' behaviors and facilitate more successful social interactions.

Maternal discourse continuity and infants' actions organize 12-month-olds' language exposure during object play

Infant language learning depends on the distribution of co-occurrences within language-between words and other words-and between language content and events in the world. Yet infant-directed speech is not limited to words that refer to perceivable objects and actions. Rather, caregivers' utterances contain a range of syntactic forms and expressions with diverse attentional, regulatory, social, and referential functions. We conducted a distributional analysis of linguistic content types at the utterance level, and demonstrated that a wide range of content types in maternal speech can be distinguished by their distribution in sequences of utterances and by their patterns of co-occurrence with infants' actions. We observed free-play sessions of 38 12-month-old infants and their mothers, annotated maternal utterances for 10 content types, and coded infants' gaze target and object handling. Results show that all content types tended to repeat in consecutive utterances, whereas preferred transitions between different content types reflected sequences from attention-capturing to directing and then descriptive utterances. Specific content types were associated with infants' engagement with objects (declaratives, descriptions, object names), with disengagement from objects (talk about attention, infant's name), and with infants' gaze at the mother (affirmations). We discuss how structured discourse might facilitate language acquisition by making speech input more predictable and/or by providing clues about high-level form-function mappings.