Zoti's Social Toolkit: Developing and piloting novel animated tasks to assess emotional understanding and conflict resolution skills in childhood

Current methods used to investigate emotional inference and conflict resolution knowledge are limited in their suitability for use with children with language disorders due to a reliance on language processing. This is problematic, as nearly 8% of the population are estimated to have developmental language disorder (DLD). In this paper, we present 'Zoti's Social Toolkit', a set of animated scenarios that can be used to assess emotion inferencing and conflict resolution knowledge. All animated scenarios contain interpersonal situations centred around a gender-neutral alien named Zoti. Four studies investigated the face and construct validity of the stimuli. The final stimulus set can be used with children, who may or may not have language difficulties and is openly available for use in research.

Social Understanding beyond the Familiar: Disparity in Visual Abilities Does Not Impede Empathy and Theory of Mind

Feeling with our conspecifics and understanding their sentiments and intentions is a crucial part of our lives. What is the basis for these forms of social understanding? If individuals ground their understanding of others' thoughts and feelings in their own perceptual and factual experiences, it could present a challenge to empathize and mentalize with those whose reality of life is significantly different. This preregistered study compared two groups of participants who differed in a central perceptual feature, their visual abilities (visually impaired vs. unimpaired; total N = 56), concerning their social understanding of others who were themselves either visually impaired or unimpaired. Employing an adjusted version of the EmpaToM task, participants heard short, autobiographic narrations by visually impaired or unimpaired individuals, and we assessed their empathic responding and mentalizing performance. Our findings did not reveal heightened empathy and mentalizing proclivities when the narrator's visual abilities aligned with those of the participant. However, in some circumstances, cognitive understanding of others' narrations benefitted from familiarity with the situation. Overall, our findings suggest that social understanding does not mainly rely on perceptual familiarity with concrete situations but is likely grounded in sharing emotions and experiences on a more fundamental level.

Interaction in acting training and its different manifestations in novice and professional actors

This study aimed to identify the characteristics of interactions during acting training and the underlying intrapersonal changes evoked by a training process that emphasizes paying attention to a partner (the Meisner technique). This was operationalized by conducting a post-hoc analysis and categorizing the utterances made by novice and professional actors during acting training based on video and audio recordings. In Study 1, novice participants tended to change their way of communication as the course progressed, decreasing the number of utterances that simply described the partner's behavior and increasing those that speculated about the partner's inner state. We then used a different focus placed on the interaction, as implied by the different kinds of utterances used, to describe the divergences between novice and professional actors regarding their interaction characteristics. In Study 2, results showed that while professional actors devoted themselves more to the connection with their partner and demonstrated more balanced communication, novice actors relied on general inference to speculate about others' affective states. By comparing the characteristics of the utterances between novice and professional actors as they played different roles or made switches (i.e., changing from passive to active utterance in communication), this study suggests that an important impact of acting training on social abilities relates to its potential to increase the levels of involvement in on-going interactions.

Autistic children who create imaginary companions: Evidence of social benefits

LAY ABSTRACT

Research on neurotypical children with imaginary friends has found that those with imaginary friends have better social skills and are more able to think about how other people's minds work compared to children without imaginary friends. Research shows that some autistic children also create imaginary friends. This article is the first to look at whether or not autistic children with imaginary friends have stronger social skills and an improved ability to think about others' minds than those without imaginary friends. We asked parents to report about their children aged 5 to 12. Finding almost half reported their child had an imaginary friend, a much larger number than previous research with younger children. Our findings also suggested that autistic children with imaginary friends were better able to understand others' minds and had stronger social skills than their peers without imaginary friends. The children's language ability did not influence this. The findings of this study add to the evidence that with respect to the creation imaginary friends and their potential benefits, the play profiles of autistic children are similar to the general population. It also provides more evidence that the understanding of others' minds is not all or nothing in autism and gives reason for researchers to investigate whether the causes of these differences are the same or different for autistic children.

Doll play prompts social thinking and social talking: Representations of internal state language in the brain

Doll play provides opportunities for children to practice social skills by creating imaginary worlds, taking others' perspectives, and talking about others' internal states. Previous research using functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) found a region over the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) was more active during solo doll play than solo tablet play, implying that doll play might present opportunities for rehearsing theory of mind and empathy skills, even when playing alone. In this research, we addressed this more directly by investigating 4-8-year-old children's (N = 33) use of internal state language (ISL; i.e., references to emotions, desires, and cognitions) when playing with dolls and on tablets, both by themselves and with a social partner, and their associated brain activity in the pSTS using fNIRS. We found that children used more ISL about others when playing with dolls than when playing on tablets, particularly when they were playing alone. This mirrored the patterns seen in pSTS activity in previous research. When individual variability in ISL about others was considered, more ISL about others was linked to stronger pSTS activation. Thus, variability in pSTS activity during play is not about the perceptual or physical differences between toys (e.g., dolls are more human-like) but about what children think about when they engage in different kinds of play. This is the first research to investigate brain activity during spontaneously occurring ISL and indicates that children have a tendency to take and discuss others' perspectives during doll play, with implications for social processing in the brain. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at https://youtu.be/58HgxbuhBzU.

Sharing Experiences in Infancy: From Primary Intersubjectivity to Shared Intentionality

We contrast two theses that make different assumptions about the developmental onset of human-unique sociality. The primary intersubjectivity thesis (PIT) argues that humans relate to each other in distinct ways from the beginning of life, as is shown by newborns' participation in face-to-face encounters or "primary intersubjectivity." According to this thesis, humans' innate relational capacity is the seedbed from which all subsequent social-emotional and social-cognitive developments continuously emerge. The shared intentionality thesis (SIT) states that human-unique forms of interaction develop at 9-12 months of age, when infants put their heads together with others in acts of object-focused joint attention and simple collaborative activities. According to this thesis, human-unique cognition emerges rapidly with the advent of mind-reading capacities that evolved specifically for the purpose of coordination. In this paper, we first contrast the two theses and then sketch the outlines of an account that unifies their strengths. This unified account endorses the PIT's recognition of the fundamental importance of primary intersubjectivity. Any act of sharing experiences is founded on the communicative capacity that is already displayed by young infants in primary intersubjectivity. At the same time, we question the PIT's interpretation that dyadic encounters have the triadic structure of joint attention. Lastly, we draw on empirical work on the development of joint attention, imitation, and social referencing that serves as evidence that primary intersubjectivity continuously unfolds into the capacity for triadic joint attention.

Seven-year-olds' references to internal states when playing with toy figures and a video game

References to internal states (e.g., thoughts, feelings, and desires) indicate children's appreciation of people's inner worlds. Many children spend time playing video games; however, the nature of children's speech when doing so has received little attention. We investigated the use of internal state language (ISL) as 251 seven-year-olds played with toy figures and a video game designed for the study. Although children used ISL more when playing with toy figures, children used ISL in both contexts, highlighting video game play as a context where children demonstrate their appreciation of inner worlds. Children's speech in the two contexts differed in how ISL was used: references to children's own internal states were more common when playing the video game, and the characters' internal states more common when playing with the toy figures. These findings are discussed with reference to the format of the play activities affording different opportunities to discuss internal states.

HIGHLIGHTS

In traditional play children refer to internal states, however, it is unclear whether this occurs when they play video games.Children referred to internal states when playing with toy figures and a video game, but did so more with the toys.Children's video game play can be used as a new context for the study of children's social understanding.

Empathy and schizotypy following acquired brain damage

OBJECTIVES

Acquired brain damage is associated with a reduced capacity for empathy, and emerging evidence indicates that there may also be elevated levels of schizotypy. However, although a relationship between schizotypy and empathy has been identified in other populations, no study to date has tested whether this relationship is also evident following acquired brain damage, and if so, whether it is specific to certain types of brain damage, or specific types of empathy.

METHODS

People with acquired brain damage restricted to either frontal (N = 18) or non-frontal (N = 24) neural structures and demographically matched controls (N = 48) completed an assessment of schizotypy and a measure of empathy that differentiated between cognitive, emotional, and social skills empathy.

RESULTS

Relative to the control group, people with frontal and non-frontal brain injuries reported elevated schizotypy, with the frontal group also reporting lower social skills empathy. Only in the frontal group was there support for an association between schizotypy and empathy, and this was specific to the social skills component of empathy.

CONCLUSIONS

Schizotypy levels are elevated following brain damage, and frontal brain injury is linked to greater difficulties with the social skills component of empathy. Schizotypy appears to be an important consideration when understanding the link between empathy and frontal brain damage, with higher schizotypy levels associated with reduced social skills empathy in this population. Future research is now needed to establish whether problems with more implicit aspects of social understanding are relevant to understanding the relationship between schizotypy and poor social behavioural outcomes identified in other clinical groups that present with frontal brain damage.

PRACTITIONER POINTS

People with an acquired brain injury experience deficits in empathic processing as well as elevated levels of schizotypal traits. Schizotypy levels and social skills empathy were inversely related in people who had experienced a frontal acquired brain injury, suggesting that schizotypy might be important for understanding social skill difficulties in this particular population. These findings highlight the potential benefit of including social cognitive assessments and schizotypy measures in standard neuropsychological assessment batteries.

Interpretive theory of mind and empathic prosocial moral reasoning

Theory of mind (ToM) is seen as fundamental in development of social understanding. The study proposes that interpretive theory of mind (iToM), which follows ToM attainment, underlies important shifts towards mature social understanding. With ToM found to predict the needs orientation in prosocial moral reasoning (PMR), we hypothesized that iToM, unlike ToM, would account for PMR orientations requiring empathic reasoning. Those with iToM recognize the role of subjective processes, such as interpretation, in knowing. They can invoke others' subjective processes, not just their physical perspectives, in explaining others' decisions. A study with 225 7- to 11-year-old children (M_age  = 9.04, SD = 0.91) found that iToM, but not ToM, predicted empathic and internalized values PMR orientations when controlling for age, emotion understanding and inhibitory control. These findings show that iToM attainment plays a unique role in developing social understanding such as reflected in empathic reasoning-based PMR orientations.

Early pathways to bullying: A prospective longitudinal study examining the influences of theory of mind and social preference on bullying behaviour during the first 3 years of school

Research has focused on the role of theory of mind (ToM) for positive social behaviour, while the association between ToM and negative social behaviours is less well understood. This longitudinal study compares two mediation models examining the role of ToM and peer-rated social preference at ages 5 and 6 for bullying at age 7. Participants were 114 children (58 boys, M_age  = 67 months) at entry to primary school (T1). At Time 2 (T2), 106 children and, at Time 3 (T3), 96 children remained. Teacher-rated externalizing problems and children's language ability were controlled at T1. Poor ToM was found to indirectly predict later bullying via poor social preference, while for boys only, greater earlier ToM directly predicted greater bullying 2 years later. These results suggest that there are different pathways to bullying via ToM and social preference, which has implications for interventions to prevent the development of bullying behaviour.

Concurrent associations between mothers' references to internal states and children's social understanding in middle childhood

Although it is well established that features of maternal speech are associated with children's social understanding in the preschool years, few studies explore this relationship in middle childhood. Within the context of a prospective longitudinal study of a representative community sample of families (subsample n = 207, mean age = 82.88 months), we investigated concurrent associations between mothers' internal state language and aspects of 7-year-olds' social understanding, including children's understanding of belief and spontaneous references to internal states during free play. When sociodemographic, maternal, and child characteristics were controlled, mothers' references to their own cognitions were associated with dimensions of children's social understanding. Our findings suggest that exposure to others' perspectives contributes to children's advanced understanding of minds, which has implications for interventions that foster social understanding.

Anthropomorphism, social understanding, and imaginary companions

In two studies, we investigated the correlates of anthropomorphism, the attribution of unobservable mental states to inanimate entities and non-human animals. In Study 1, we investigated the relations between anthropomorphism, social understanding, empathy, prosocial attitudes, and history of childhood imaginary companions in a college sample (N = 264; M_age  = 19 years, 2 months). In Study 2, we explored the relations between two different measures of anthropomorphism, theory of mind, imaginary companions, and social preferences in 73 children (M_age  = 5 years, 5 months). Anthropomorphism was not strongly correlated with social understanding in adults or with theory of mind in children. There was, however, some evidence for links between anthropomorphism and reports of having imaginary companions and social preferences. Moreover, the two measures of anthropomorphism were not correlated with each other and yielded different patterns of results in Study 2, a finding that is discussed in relation to different forms of anthropomorphism. Statement of contribution What is already known on this subject? There are individual differences in anthropomorphism in both adults and children. There are two different methods to assess anthropomorphism: self-reports and narration of movies of geometric shapes. The two different methods that are used to assess anthropomorphism yield different developmental patterns. What does this study add? Individual differences in social understanding or theory of mind are not associated with individual differences in anthropomorphism. Having a childhood imaginary companion is linked with a tendency to anthropomorphize in both children and adults. Two measures of anthropomorphism are not correlated in children, consistent with the view that there are different forms of anthropomorphism.

The Agent Brain: A Review of Non-invasive Brain Stimulation Studies on Sensing Agency

According to philosophy of mind and neuroscientific models, the sense of agency can be defined as the sense that I am the one that is generating an action and causing its effects. Such ability to sense ourselves as causal agents is critical for the definition of intentional behavior and is a primary root for human interaction skills. The present mini-review aims at discussing evidences from non-invasive brain stimulation (NIBS) studies targeting functional correlates of different aspects of agency and evidences on the way stimulation techniques affect such core feature of human subjective experience. Clinical and brain imaging studies helped in defining a neural network mediating agency-related processes, which includes the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), the cingulate cortex (CC), the supplementary and pre-supplementary motor areas (SMA and pre-SMA), the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) and its inferior regions and the cerebellum. However, while the plurality of those structures mirrors the complexity of the phenomenon, their actual roles with respect to different components of the experience of agency have been primarily explored via correlational techniques, without a clear evidence about their causal significance with respect to the integration of sensorimotor information, intentionalization, and action monitoring processes. Therefore, insights into the specific causal role of different cortical structures can be specified by using NIBS techniques, in order to provide improved understanding into the bases of our ability vs. inability to properly act in complex social contexts.

The Role of Second-Person Information in the Development of Social Understanding

We consider the second-person or interactive approach to social understanding, conceived as an understanding of intentional relations. We identify five forms of second-person information – self-directedness, contingency, reciprocity, affective engagement, and shared intentions – that occur only in interactions. We assess the extent to which these forms of information are available to observers of interactions as well as to the participants of an interaction and conclude that whereas observers may gain some second-person information, interactive participants have a privileged position. We also ask whether these forms of second-person information can deliver social understanding in terms of the understanding of intentional relations that are descriptive of persons. We argue that whereas none of these forms alone is sufficient for understanding intentional relations, they all play an important role in the developmental processes that enable the construction of social understanding. Therefore, the second-person approach, understood as theorizing how second-person information available in interactions is used in the development of social understanding, is a critically important approach to a full theory of social understanding.

Rethinking the Relationship between Social Experience and False-Belief Understanding: A Mentalistic Account

It was long assumed that the capacity to represent false beliefs did not emerge until at least age four, as evidenced by children's performance on elicited-response tasks. However, recent evidence that infants appear to demonstrate false-belief understanding when tested with alternative, non-elicited-response measures has led some researchers to conclude that the capacity to represent beliefs emerges in the 1st year of life. This mentalistic view has been criticized for failing to offer an explanation for the well-established positive associations between social factors and preschoolers' performance on elicited-response false-belief tasks. In this paper, we address this criticism by offering an account that reconciles these associations with the mentalistic claim that false-belief understanding emerges in infancy. We propose that rather than facilitating the emergence of the capacity to represent beliefs, social factors facilitate the use of this ability via effects on attention, inference, retrieval, and response production. Our account predicts that the relationship between social factors and false-belief understanding should not be specific to preschoolers' performance in elicited-response tasks: this relationship should be apparent across the lifespan in a variety of paradigms. We review an accumulating body of evidence that supports this prediction.

Individual differences in toddlers' social understanding and prosocial behavior: disposition or socialization?

We examined how individual differences in social understanding contribute to variability in early-appearing prosocial behavior. Moreover, potential sources of variability in social understanding were explored and examined as additional possible predictors of prosocial behavior. Using a multi-method approach with both observed and parent-report measures, 325 children aged 18-30 months were administered measures of social understanding (e.g., use of emotion words; self-understanding), prosocial behavior (in separate tasks measuring instrumental helping, empathic helping, and sharing, as well as parent-reported prosociality at home), temperament (fearfulness, shyness, and social fear), and parental socialization of prosocial behavior in the family. Individual differences in social understanding predicted variability in empathic helping and parent-reported prosociality, but not instrumental helping or sharing. Parental socialization of prosocial behavior was positively associated with toddlers' social understanding, prosocial behavior at home, and instrumental helping in the lab, and negatively associated with sharing (possibly reflecting parents' increased efforts to encourage children who were less likely to share). Further, socialization moderated the association between social understanding and prosocial behavior, such that social understanding was less predictive of prosocial behavior among children whose parents took a more active role in socializing their prosociality. None of the dimensions of temperament was associated with either social understanding or prosocial behavior. Parental socialization of prosocial behavior is thus an important source of variability in children's early prosociality, acting in concert with early differences in social understanding, with different patterns of influence for different subtypes of prosocial behavior.

The intersubjective endeavor of psychopathology research: methodological reflections on a second-person perspective approach

Research in psychopathology may be considered as an intersubjective endeavor mainly concerned with understanding other minds. Thus, the way we conceive of social understanding influences how we do research in psychology in the first place. In this paper, we focus on psychopathology research as a paradigmatic case for this methodological issue, since the relation between the researcher and the object of study is characterized by a major component of “otherness.” We critically review different methodologies in psychopathology research, highlighting their relation to different social cognition theories (the third-, first-, and second-person approaches). Hence we outline the methodological implications arising from each theoretical stance. Firstly, we critically discuss the dominant paradigm in psychopathology research, based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and on quantitative methodology, as an example of a third-person methodology. Secondly, we contrast this mainstream view with phenomenological psychopathology which—by rejecting the reductionist view exclusively focused on behavioral symptoms—takes consciousness as its main object of study: it therefore attempts to grasp patients’ first-person experience. But how can we speak about a first-person perspective in psychopathology if the problem at stake is the experience of the other? How is it possible to understand the experience from “within,” if the person who is having this experience is another? By addressing these issues, we critically explore the feasibility and usefulness of a second-person methodology in psychopathology research. Notwithstanding the importance of methodological pluralism, we argue that a second-person perspective should inform the epistemology and methods of research in psychopathology, as it recognizes the fundamental circular and intersubjective construction of knowledge.