Electrophysiological evidence for the effect of prior probability on response preparation

Motor cortical signals reflecting decision making and action preparation

Decision making often requires accumulating evidence in favour of a particular option. When choices are expressed with a motor response, these actions are preceded by reductions in the power of oscillations in the alpha and beta range in motor cortices. For unimanual movements, these reductions are greater over the hemisphere contralateral to the response side. Such lateralizations are hypothesized to be an online index of the neural state of decisions as they develop over time of processing. In contrast, the lateralized readiness potential (LRP) is considered to selectively activate a response and appears shortly before the motor output. We investigated to what extent these neural signals reflect integration of decision evidence or more motor-related action preparation. Using two different experiments, we found that lateralization of alpha and beta power (APL and BPL, respectively) rapidly emerged after stimulus presentation, even when making an overt response was not yet possible. In contrast, we show that even after prolonged stimulus presentation, no LRP was present. Instead, the LRP emerged only after an imperative cue, prompting participants to indicate their choice. Furthermore, we could show that variations in sensory evidence strength modulate APL and BPL onset times, suggesting that integration of evidence is represented in these motor cortical signals. We conclude that APL and BPL reflect higher cognitive processes rather than pure action preparation, whereas LRP is more closely tied to motor performance. APL and BPL potentially encode decision information in motor areas serving the later preparation of overt decision output.

Temporal Context Actively Shapes EEG Signatures of Time Perception

Our subjective perception of time is optimized to temporal regularities in the environment. This is illustrated by the central tendency effect: When estimating a range of intervals, short intervals are overestimated, whereas long intervals are underestimated to reduce the overall estimation error. Most models of interval timing ascribe this effect to the weighting of the current interval with previous memory traces after the interval has been perceived. Alternatively, the perception of the duration could already be flexibly tuned to its temporal context. We investigated this hypothesis using an interval reproduction task in which human participants (both sexes) reproduced a shorter and longer interval range. As expected, reproductions were biased toward the subjective mean of each presented range. EEG analyses showed that temporal context indeed affected neural dynamics during the perception phase. Specifically, longer previous durations decreased contingent negative variation and P2 amplitude and increased beta power. In addition, multivariate pattern analysis showed that it is possible to decode context from the transient EEG signal quickly after both onset and offset of the perception phase. Together, these results suggest that temporal context creates dynamic expectations which actively affect the perception of duration.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The subjective sense of duration does not arise in isolation, but is informed by previous experiences. This is demonstrated by abundant evidence showing that the production of duration estimates is biased toward previously experienced time intervals. However, it is yet unknown whether this temporal context actively affects perception or only asserts its influence in later, postperceptual stages as proposed by most current formal models of this task. Using an interval reproduction task, we show that EEG signatures flexibly adapt to the temporal context during perceptual encoding. Furthermore, interval history can be decoded from the transient EEG signal even when the current duration was identical. Thus, our results demonstrate that context actively influences perception.

Expectations of reward and efficacy guide cognitive control allocation

The amount of mental effort we invest in a task is influenced by the reward we can expect if we perform that task well. However, some of the rewards that have the greatest potential for driving these efforts are partly determined by factors beyond one's control. In such cases, effort has more limited efficacy for obtaining rewards. According to the Expected Value of Control theory, people integrate information about the expected reward and efficacy of task performance to determine the expected value of control, and then adjust their control allocation (i.e., mental effort) accordingly. Here we test this theory's key behavioral and neural predictions. We show that participants invest more cognitive control when this control is more rewarding and more efficacious, and that these incentive components separately modulate EEG signatures of incentive evaluation and proactive control allocation. Our findings support the prediction that people combine expectations of reward and efficacy to determine how much effort to invest.

Dissociable neural indices for time and space estimates during virtual distance reproduction

The perception and measurement of spatial and temporal dimensions have been widely studied. Yet, whether these two dimensions are processed independently is still being debated. Additionally, whether EEG components are uniquely associated with time or space, or whether they reflect a more general measure of magnitude quantity remains unknown. While undergoing EEG, subjects performed a virtual distance reproduction task, in which they were required to first walk forward for an unknown distance or time, and then reproduce that distance or time. Walking speed was varied between estimation and reproduction phases, to prevent interference between distance or time in each estimate. Behaviorally, subject performance was more variable when reproducing time than when reproducing distance, but with similar patterns of accuracy. During estimation, EEG data revealed the contingent negative variation (CNV), a measure previously associated with timing and expectation, tracked the probability of the upcoming interval, for both time and distance. However, during reproduction, the CNV exclusively oriented to the upcoming temporal interval at the start of reproduction, with no change across spatial distances. Our findings indicate that time and space are neurally separable dimensions, with the CNV both serving a supramodal role in temporal and spatial expectation, yet an exclusive role in preparing duration reproduction.

Neural Processes of Proactive and Reactive Controls Modulated by Motor-Skill Experiences

This study investigated the experience of open and closed motor skills on modulating proactive and reactive control processes in task switching. Fifty-four participants who were open-skilled (n = 18) or closed-skilled athletes (n = 18) or non-athletic adults (n = 18) completed a cued task-switching paradigm task. This task tapped into proactive or reactive controls of executive functions under different validity conditions. Electroencephalograms of the participants were captured during the task. In the 100% validity condition, the open-skilled participants showed significantly lower switch cost of response time than the closed-skilled and control participants. Results showed that the open-skilled participants had less positive-going parietal cue-locked P3 in the switch than repeat trials. Participants in the control group showed more positive-going cue-locked P3 in the switch than repeat trials, whereas the closed-skilled participants had no significant differences between the two types of trials. In the 50% validity condition, the open- and closed-skilled participants had less switch cost of response time than the control participants. Participants in the open- and closed-skilled groups showed less positive-going parietal stimulus-locked P3 in the switch than repeat trials, which was not the case for those in the control group. Our findings confirm the dissociation between proactive and reactive controls in relation to their modulations by the different motor-skill experiences. Both proactive and reactive controls of executive functions could be strengthened by exposing individuals to anticipatory or non-anticipatory enriched environments, suggesting proactive and reactive controls involved in motor-skill development seem to be transferable to domain-general executive functions.

Age Differences in Emotion Regulation and Facial Muscle Reactivity to Emotional Films

BACKGROUND

Age-related declines in many cognitive abilities are common in healthy aging. However, the ability to effectively regulate emotions is preserved, and possibly even enhanced, in late adulthood. This capacity has been examined most commonly in relation to low-intensity emotional stimuli that typically involve static pictures. Evidence is suggesting that older adults may become overwhelmed when exposed to emotional cues of heightened intensity.

OBJECTIVE

In the current study, we assessed whether older adults retain the ability to regulate emotions successfully when exposed to more emotionally evocative (e.g., dynamic) stimuli.

METHODS

Young and older adults were instructed to regulate, using expressive suppression, their outward behavioral expression of emotions while viewing dynamic stimuli involving amusing and sad films. Facial reactivity, as indexed using electromyography, self-rated emotional experience, and memory for the stimuli were assessed.

RESULTS

The results showed that, relative to young adults, older adults were unable to suppress zygomaticus (cheek) activity to amusing films or corrugator (brow) reactivity to sad films, which is likely due to their relatively reduced facial muscle reactivity. Expressive suppression did not affect young or older adults' subjective feelings or memory for the stimuli.

CONCLUSION

Our findings suggest that there are age differences in facial muscle reactivity to amusing and sad cues of heightened intensity. These findings suggest that older adults' ability to effectively regulate emotions may be limited, at least with expressive suppression, in the context of high-intensity emotional cues. Further research is needed to investigate possible exceptions the preservation of emotion regulation in older adults.

The influence of the global/local probability effect on the neural processing of cues and targets. A functional systems approach

Global and local probability effects were explored in a visuo-auditory version of the central cue Posner's paradigm through the analysis of the neural Event-Related Potentials (ERPs) generated in the interaction between validity sequence effects (local probability) and block validity effects (global probability). Four behavioral measures (response times, correct/incorrect anticipations, and incorrect responses), three pre-target ERPs (visual P1/N1 and Contingent Negative Variation (CNV)), and six post-target ERPs (auditory N1, P2, Processing Negativity (PN), P3a, P3b and Late Slow Positivity (LSP)) were considered. Four types of trial-sequences (Valid-Valid, Invalid-Valid, Invalid-Invalid, Valid-Invalid) and three types of trial-blocks, with different validity/invalidity proportions (50%, 68%, and 86% of valid trials), were employed. Present data replicate previous reports on the validity sequence effects on ERPs (local probability): (i) higher CNV on trials preceded by valid trials; (ii) higher PN on valid trials preceded by invalid trials compared to valid trials preceded by valid trials; and (iii) higher P3a/P3b and LSP on invalid trials preceded by valid trials compared to invalid trials preceded by invalid trials. In summary, local probability showed more effects modulating the brain responses than global probability and/or their interaction. Among a number of other hypotheses, the functional systems theory would account for the ability of the previous trial to modify processing in the current trial.

It Pays to Prepare: Human Motor Preparation Depends on the Relative Value of Potential Response Options

Alternative motor responses can be prepared in parallel. Here, we used electroencephalography (EEG) to test whether the parallel preparation of alternative response options is modulated by their relative value. Participants performed a choice response task with three potential actions: isometric contraction of the left, the right, or both wrists. An imperative stimulus (IS) appeared after a warning cue, such that the initiation time of a required action was predictable, but the specific action was not. To encourage advanced preparation, the target was presented 200 ms prior to the IS, and only correct responses initiated within ±100 ms of the IS were rewarded. At baseline, all targets were equally rewarded and probable. Then, responses with one hand were made more valuable, either by increasing the probability that the left or right target would be required (Exp. 1; n = 31) or by increasing the reward magnitude of one target (Exp. 2, n = 36). We measured reaction times, movement vigor, and an EEG correlate of action preparation (value-based lateralized readiness potential) prior to target presentation. Participants responded earlier to more frequent and more highly rewarded targets, and movements to highly rewarded targets were more vigorous. The EEG was more negative over the hemisphere contralateral to the more repeated/rewarded hand, implying an increased neural preparation of more valuable actions. Thus, changing the value of alternative response options can lead to greater preparation of actions associated with more valuable outcomes. This preparation asymmetry likely contributes to behavioral biases that are typically observed toward repeated or rewarded targets.

Motor skill experience modulates executive control for task switching

This study aimed to investigate the effect of types of motor skills, including open and closed skills on enhancing proactive and reactive controls for task switching. Thirty-six athletes in open (n=18) or closed (n=18) sports and a control group (n=18) completed the task-switching paradigm and the simple reaction task. The task-switching paradigm drew on the proactive and reactive control of executive functions, whereas the simple reaction task assessed the processing speed. Significant Validity×Group effect revealed that the participants with open skills had a lower switch cost of response time compared to the other two groups when the task cue was 100% valid; whereas the participants regardless of motor skills had a lower switch cost of response time compared to the control group when the task cue was 50% valid. Hierarchical stepwise regression analysis further confirmed these findings. For the simple reaction task, there were no differences found among the three groups. These findings suggest that experience in open skills has benefits of promoting both proactive and reactive controls for task switching, which corresponds to the activity context exposed by the participants. In contrast, experience in closed skills appears to only benefit development of reactive control for task switching. The neural mechanisms for the proactive and reactive controls of executive functions between experts with open and closed skills call for future study.

Timing in Predictive Coding: The Roles of Task Relevance and Global Probability

Predictive coding models of attention propose that attention and prediction operate synergistically to optimize perception, as reflected in interactive effects on early sensory neural responses. It is yet unclear whether attention and prediction based on the temporal attributes of expected events operate in a similar fashion. We investigated how attention and prediction based on timing interact by manipulating the task relevance and a priori probability of auditory stimulus onset timing within a go/no-go task while recording EEG. Preparatory activity, as indexed via the contingent negative variation, reflected temporally specific anticipation as a function of both attention and prediction. Higher stimulus probability led to significant predictive N1 suppression; however, we failed to find an effect of task relevance on N1 amplitude and an interaction of task relevance with prediction. We suggest the predictability of sensory timing is the predominant influence on early sensory responses where a priori probabilities allow for strong prior beliefs. When this is the case, we find that the effects of temporal prediction on early sensory responses are independent of the task relevance of sensory stimuli. Our findings contribute to the expansion of predictive coding frameworks to include the role of timing in sensory processing.

Multidimensional cognitive evaluation of patients with disorders of consciousness using EEG: A proof of concept study

The use of cognitive evoked potentials in EEG is now part of the routine evaluation of non-communicating patients with disorders of consciousness in several specialized medical centers around the world. They typically focus on one or two cognitive markers, such as the mismatch negativity or the P3 to global auditory regularity. However it has become clear that none of these markers in isolation is at the same time sufficiently specific and sufficiently sensitive to be taken as the unique gold standard for diagnosing consciousness. A good way forward would be to combine several cognitive markers within the same test to improve evaluation. Furthermore, given the diversity of lesions leading to disorders of consciousness, it is important not only to probe whether a patient is conscious or not, but also to establish a more general and nuanced profile of the residual cognitive capacities of each patient using a combination of markers.

In the present study we built a unique EEG protocol that probed 8 dimensions of cognitive processing in a single 1.5 h session. This protocol probed variants of classical markers together with new markers of spatial attention, which has not yet been studied in these patients. The eight dimensions were: (1) own name recognition, (2) temporal attention, (3) spatial attention, (4) detection of spatial incongruence (5) motor planning, and (6,7,8) modulations of these effects by the global context, reflecting higher-level functions. This protocol was tested in 15 healthy control subjects and in 17 patients with various etiologies, among which 13 could be included in the analysis. The results in the control group allowed a validation and a specific description of the cognitive levels probed by each marker. At the single-subject level, this combined protocol allowed assessing the presence of both classical and newly introduced markers for each patient and control, and revealed that the combination of several markers increased diagnostic sensitivity. The presence of a high-level effect in any of the three tested domains distinguished between minimally conscious and vegetative patients, while the presence of low-level effects was similar in both groups. In summary, this study constitutes a validated proof of concept in favor of probing multiple cognitive dimensions to improve the evaluation of non-communicating patients. At a more conceptual level, this EEG tool can help achieve a better understanding of disorders of consciousness by exploring consciousness in its multiple cognitive facets.

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This new EEG protocol probes 8 cognitive functions within a single 1.5 h session.

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It allows a complete neuropsychological evaluation only based on brain activity.

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It increases sensitivity in detecting both low-level and high-level functions in patients.

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Only the high-level functions distinguish minimally conscious from vegetative states.

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Multidimensional EEG testing is feasible in patients and can improve evaluation.

Payoff Information Biases a Fast Guess Process in Perceptual Decision Making under Deadline Pressure: Evidence from Behavior, Evoked Potentials, and Quantitative Model Comparison

We used electroencephalography (EEG) and behavior to examine the role of payoff bias in a difficult two-alternative perceptual decision under deadline pressure in humans. The findings suggest that a fast guess process, biased by payoff and triggered by stimulus onset, occurred on a subset of trials and raced with an evidence accumulation process informed by stimulus information. On each trial, the participant judged whether a rectangle was shifted to the right or left and responded by squeezing a right- or left-hand dynamometer. The payoff for each alternative (which could be biased or unbiased) was signaled 1.5 s before stimulus onset. The choice response was assigned to the first hand reaching a squeeze force criterion and reaction time was defined as time to criterion. Consistent with a fast guess account, fast responses were strongly biased toward the higher-paying alternative and the EEG exhibited an abrupt rise in the lateralized readiness potential (LRP) on a subset of biased payoff trials contralateral to the higher-paying alternative ∼ 150 ms after stimulus onset and 50 ms before stimulus information influenced the LRP. This rise was associated with poststimulus dynamometer activity favoring the higher-paying alternative and predicted choice and response time. Quantitative modeling supported the fast guess account over accounts of payoff effects supported in other studies. Our findings, taken with previous studies, support the idea that payoff and prior probability manipulations produce flexible adaptations to task structure and do not reflect a fixed policy for the integration of payoff and stimulus information.

SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT

Humans and other animals often face situations in which they must make choices based on uncertain sensory information together with information about expected outcomes (gains or losses) about each choice. We investigated how differences in payoffs between available alternatives affect neural activity, overt choice, and the timing of choice responses. In our experiment, in which participants were under strong time pressure, neural and behavioral findings together with model fitting suggested that our human participants often made a fast guess toward the higher reward rather than integrating stimulus and payoff information. Our findings, taken with findings from other studies, support the idea that payoff and prior probability manipulations produce flexible adaptations to task structure and do not reflect a fixed policy.

Dynamic Control of Response Criterion in Premotor Cortex during Perceptual Detection under Temporal Uncertainty

Under uncertainty, the brain uses previous knowledge to transform sensory inputs into the percepts on which decisions are based. When the uncertainty lies in the timing of sensory evidence, however, the mechanism underlying the use of previously acquired temporal information remains unknown. We study this issue in monkeys performing a detection task with variable stimulation times. We use the neural correlates of false alarms to infer the subject's response criterion and find that it modulates over the course of a trial. Analysis of premotor cortex activity shows that this modulation is represented by the dynamics of population responses. A trained recurrent network model reproduces the experimental findings and demonstrates a neural mechanism to benefit from temporal expectations in perceptual detection. Previous knowledge about the probability of stimulation over time can be intrinsically encoded in the neural population dynamics, allowing a flexible control of the response criterion over time.

Expectation mismatch: differences between self-generated and cue-induced expectations

Expectation of upcoming stimuli and tasks can lead to improved performance, if the anticipated situation occurs, while expectation mismatch can lead to less efficient processing. Researchers have used methodological approaches that rely on either self-generated expectations (predictions) or cue-induced expectations to investigate expectation mismatch effects. Differentiating these two types of expectations for different contents of expectation such as stimuli, responses, task sets and conflict level, we review evidence suggesting that self-generated expectations lead to larger facilitating effects and conflict effects on the behavioral and neural level - as compared to cue-based expectations. On a methodological level, we suggest that self-generated as compared to cue-induced expectations allow for a higher amount of experimental control in many experimental designs on expectation effects. On a theoretical level, we argue for qualitative differences in how cues vs. self-generated expectations influence performance. While self-generated expectations might generally involve representing the expected event in the focus of attention in working memory, cues might only lead to such representations under supportive circumstances (i.e., cue of high validity and attended).

Lateralized readiness potentials reveal properties of a neural mechanism for implementing a decision threshold

Many perceptual decision making models posit that participants accumulate noisy evidence over time to improve the accuracy of their decisions, and that in free response tasks, participants respond when the accumulated evidence reaches a decision threshold. Research on the neural correlates of these models' components focuses primarily on evidence accumulation. Far less attention has been paid to the neural correlates of decision thresholds, reflecting the final commitment to a decision. Inspired by a model of bistable neural activity that implements a decision threshold, we reinterpret human lateralized readiness potentials (LRPs) as reflecting the crossing of a decision threshold. Interestingly, this threshold crossing preserves signatures of a drift-diffusion process of evidence accumulation that feeds in to the threshold mechanism. We show that, as our model predicts, LRP amplitudes and growth rates recorded while participants performed a motion discrimination task correlate with individual differences in behaviorally-estimated prior beliefs, decision thresholds and evidence accumulation rates. As such LRPs provide a useful measure to test dynamical models of both evidence accumulation and decision commitment processes non-invasively.

Veto and Vacillation: A Neural Precursor of the Decision to Withhold Action

The capacity to inhibit a planned action gives human behavior its characteristic flexibility. How this mechanism operates and what factors influence a decision to act or not act remain relatively unexplored. We used EEG readiness potentials (RPs) to examine preparatory activity before each action of an ongoing sequence, in which one action was occasionally omitted. We compared RPs between sequences in which omissions were instructed by a rule (e.g., “omit every fourth action”) and sequences in which the participant themselves freely decided which action to omit. RP amplitude was reduced for actions that immediately preceded a voluntary omission but not a rule-based omission. We also used the regular temporal pattern of the action sequences to explore brain processes linked to omitting an action by time-locking EEG averages to the inferred time when an action would have occurred had it not been omitted. When omissions were instructed by a rule, there was a negative-going trend in the EEG, recalling the rising ramp of an RP. No such component was found for voluntary omissions. The results are consistent with a model in which spontaneously fluctuating activity in motor areas of the brain could bias “free” decisions to act or not.

Probing interval timing with scalp-recorded electroencephalography (EEG)

Humans, and other animals, are able to easily learn the durations of events and the temporal relationships among them in spite of the absence of a dedicated sensory organ for time. This chapter summarizes the investigation of timing and time perception using scalp-recorded electroencephalography (EEG), a non-invasive technique that measures brain electrical potentials on a millisecond time scale. Over the past several decades, much has been learned about interval timing through the examination of the characteristic features of averaged EEG signals (i.e., event-related potentials, ERPs) elicited in timing paradigms. For example, the mismatch negativity (MMN) and omission potential (OP) have been used to study implicit and explicit timing, respectively, the P300 has been used to investigate temporal memory updating, and the contingent negative variation (CNV) has been used as an index of temporal decision making. In sum, EEG measures provide biomarkers of temporal processing that allow researchers to probe the cognitive and neural substrates underlying time perception.

Automatic temporal expectancy: a high-density event-related potential study

How we compute time is not fully understood. Questions include whether an automatic brain mechanism is engaged in temporally regular environmental structure in order to anticipate events, and whether this can be dissociated from task-related processes, including response preparation, selection and execution. To investigate these issues, a passive temporal oddball task requiring neither time-based motor response nor explicit decision was specifically designed and delivered to participants during high-density, event-related potentials recording. Participants were presented with pairs of audiovisual stimuli (S1 and S2) interspersed with an Inter-Stimulus Interval (ISI) that was manipulated according to an oddball probabilistic distribution. In the standard condition (70% of trials), the ISI lasted 1,500 ms, while in the two alternative, deviant conditions (15% each), it lasted 2,500 and 3,000 ms. The passive over-exposition to the standard ISI drove participants to automatically and progressively create an implicit temporal expectation of S2 onset, reflected by the time course of the Contingent Negative Variation response, which always peaked in correspondence to the point of S2 maximum expectation and afterwards inverted in polarity towards the baseline. Brain source analysis of S1- and ISI-related ERP activity revealed activation of sensorial cortical areas and the supplementary motor area (SMA), respectively. In particular, since the SMA time course synchronised with standard ISI, we suggest that this area is the major cortical generator of the temporal CNV reflecting an automatic, action-independent mechanism underlying temporal expectancy.

To err or to guess: an ERP study on the source of errors

Given the large contribution of human error in the failure of complex systems, understanding the source of errors is an important issue. It has been proposed that, in speeded situations, responses biases induce subjects to guess which response will be required. When the guess turns out to be wrong, a fast guess error occurs. In unbiased conditions the possible contribution of fast guess errors remains an open question. We used a response-locked event-related potential (N-40), assumed to reveal the presence of a response selection process during the reaction time, to probe the presence of a response selection in biased and unbiased situations. The N-40 was present without response bias but absent in biased situations. This lends physiological support to the idea that, in a priming paradigm as used here, most errors in biased conditions are fast guesses whereas most errors result from inappropriate response selections in unbiased conditions. This reveals different sources of errors.

What I Say is What I Get: Stronger Effects of Self-Generated vs. Cue-Induced Expectations in Event-Related Potentials

Expectations regarding future events enable preparatory processes and allow for faster responses to expected stimuli compared to unexpected stimuli. Expectations can have internal sources or follow external cues. While many studies on expectation effects use some form of cueing, a direct comparison with self-generated expectations involving behavioral and psychophysiological measures is lacking. In the present study we compare cue-induced expectations with self-generated expectations that are both expressed verbally in a within-subjects design, measuring behavioral performance, and event-related brain potentials (ERPs). Response time benefits for expected stimuli are much larger when expectations are self-generated as compared to externally cued. Increased amplitudes in both the N2 and P3 components for violations of self-generated expectations suggest that this advantage can at least partially be ascribed to greater perceptual preparation. This goes along with a missing benefit for stimuli matching the expected response only and is mirrored in the lateralized readiness potential (LRP). Taken together, behavioral and ERP findings indicate that self-generated expectations lead to increased premotoric preparation compared to cue-induced expectations. Underlying cognitive or neuronal functional differences between these types of expectation remain a subject for future studies.

Does explicit expectation really affect preparation?

Expectation enables preparation for an upcoming event and supports performance if the anticipated situation occurs, as manifested in behavioral effects (e.g., decreased RT). However, demonstrating coincidence between expectation and preparation is not sufficient for attributing a causal role to the former. The content of explicit expectation may simply reflect the present preparation state. We targeted this issue by experimentally teasing apart demands for preparation and explicit expectations. Expectations often originate from our experience: we expect that events occurring with a high frequency in the past are more likely to occur again. In addition to expectation, other task demands can feed into action preparation. In four experiments, frequency-based expectation was pitted against a selective response deadline. In a three-choice reaction time task, participants responded to stimuli that appeared with varying frequency (60, 30, 10%). Trial-by-trial stimulus expectations were either captured via verbal predictions or induced by visual cues. Predictions as well as response times quickly conformed to the variation in stimulus frequency. After two (of five) experimental blocks we forced participants by selective time pressure to respond faster to a less frequent stimulus. Therefore, participants had to prepare for one stimulus (medium frequency) while often explicitly expecting a different one (high frequency). Response times for the less frequent stimulus decreased immediately, while explicit expectations continued to indicate the (unchanged) presentation frequencies. Explicit expectations were thus not just reflecting preparation. In fact, participants responded faster when the stimulus matched the trial-wise expectations, even when task demands discouraged their use. In conclusion, we argue that explicit expectation feeds into preparatory processes instead of being a mere by-product.

An electroencephalographic investigation of the filled-duration illusion

The study investigated how the brain activity changed when participants were engaged in a temporal production task known as the “filled-duration illusion.” Twelve right-handed participants were asked to memorize and reproduce the duration of time intervals (600 or 800 ms) bounded by two flashes. Random trials contained auditory stimuli in the form of three 20 ms sounds between the flashes. In one session, the participants were asked to ignore the presence of the sounds, and in the other, they were instructed to pay attention to sounds. The behavioral results showed that duration reproduction was clearly affected by the presence of the sounds and the duration of time intervals. The filled-duration illusion occurred when there were sounds; the participants overestimated the interval in the 600-ms interval condition with sounds. On the other hand, the participants underestimated the 800-ms interval condition without sounds. During the presentation of the interval to be encoded, the contingent negative variation (CNV) appeared around the prefrontal scalp site, and P300 appeared around the parieto-central scalp site. The CNV grew larger when the intervals contained the sounds, whereas the P300 grew larger when the intervals were 800 ms and did not contain the sounds. During the reproduction of the interval to be presented, the Bereitschaftspotential (BP) appeared over the fronto-central scalp site from 1000 ms before the participants’ response. The BP could refer to the decision making process associated with the duration reproduction. The occurrence of three event-related potentials (ERPs), the P300, CNV, and BP, suggests that the fronto-parietal area, together with supplementary motor area (SMA), is associated with timing and time perception, and magnitude of these potentials is modulted by the “filled-duration illusion”.

Response-level probability effects on reaction time: now you see them, now you don't

Many reaction time (RT) experiments have tested for response-level probability effects. Their results have been mixed, which is surprising because psychophysiological studies provide clear evidence of motor-level changes associated with an anticipated response. A survey of the designs used in the RT studies reveals many potential problems that could conceal the effects of response probability. We report five new RT experiments testing for response-level probability effects with the most promising of the previous designs-that of Blackman ( 1972 )-and with new designs. Some of these experiments yield evidence of response-level probability effects, but others do not. It appears that response-level probability effects are present primarily in simple tasks with a strong emphasis on response preparation, possibly because participants only expend effort on response preparation in these tasks.

Effects of parametrical and trial-to-trial variation in prior probability processing revealed by simultaneous electroencephalogram/functional magnetic resonance imaging

Prior knowledge of the probabilities concerning decision alternatives facilitates the selection of more likely alternatives to the disadvantage of others. The neural basis of prior probability (PP) integration into the decision-making process and associated preparatory processes is, however, still essentially unknown. Furthermore, trial-to-trial fluctuations in PP processing have not been considered thus far. In a previous study, we found that the amplitude of the contingent negative variation (CNV) in a precueing task is sensitive to PP information (Scheibe et al., 2009). We investigated brain regions with a parametric relationship between neural activity and PP and those regions involved in PP processing on a trial-to-trial basis in simultaneously recorded electroencephalographic (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data. Conventional fMRI analysis focusing on the information content of the probability precue revealed increasing activation of the posterior medial frontal cortex with increasing PP, supporting its putative role in updating action values. EEG-informed fMRI analysis relating single-trial CNV amplitudes to the hemodynamic signal addressed trial-to-trial fluctuations in PP processing. We identified a set of regions mainly consisting of frontal, parietal, and striatal regions that represents unspecific response preparation on a trial-to-trial basis. A subset of these regions, namely, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the inferior frontal gyrus, and the inferior parietal lobule, showed activations that exclusively represented the contributions of PP to the trial-to-trial fluctuations of the CNV.

The development of inhibitory control: an averaged and single-trial Lateralized Readiness Potential study

Inhibitory control (IC) is an important contributor to educational performance, and undergoes rapid development in childhood. Age-related changes in IC were assessed using an in-depth analysis of reaction time, the Lateralized Readiness Potential (LRP), and other event-related potential (ERP) measures to control for speed of processing. Five-year-olds, 8-year-olds and adults completed an adapted Stroop task. Both reaction time and ERP results suggest that IC does develop in this age range, over and above changes in speed of processing. The LRP identified two processes that contribute to IC. These processes develop at different rates--an early process, involving how the conflict is initially responded to is mature by age 5, while a later process, involving how the conflict is overcome is still developing after 8 years of age. We propose that these early and late processes reflect interference suppression and response inhibition, respectively. Further, a single-trial analysis of the LRP in the incongruent condition provides evidence that the LRP is consistent across trials and functionally similar in each age group. These results corroborate previous findings regarding the development of IC, and present a new and useful tool for assessing IC across development.

The effect of priming on interceptive actions

Time constraints in ball sports encourage players to take advantage of any relevant advance information available to prepare their actions. Advance information, therefore, can serve to prime movement parameters (e.g. movement direction) and reduce the amount of time required to prepare the upcoming movement. Regularly, however, players face situations in which the information used to prepare the action turns out to be outdated just prior to movement initiation and the prepared action needs to be changed as soon as possible. The aim of the experiment presented here was to determine whether the priming effect, generally reported for reaction time tasks, could be generalised to interceptive actions. A secondary aim was to examine the strategies employed by the participants to cope with valid, invalid, or no advance information. The results indicate that, when available, the participants used advance information to prepare their movements. More specifically, in comparison with valid advance information, hit rate and spatial accuracy were reduced when the participants had no advance information and were even smaller when the information conveyed was invalid. The results also suggest that in the absence of valid advance information, the strategies employed to intercept the moving target were tuned to the time remaining until the interception was due to occur.

The neural substrate of prior information in perceptual decision making: a model-based analysis

PRIOR INFORMATION BIASES THE DECISION PROCESS: actions consistent with prior information are executed swiftly, whereas actions inconsistent with prior information are executed slowly. How is this bias implemented in the brain? To address this question we conducted an experiment in which people had to decide quickly whether a cloud of dots moved coherently to the left or to the right. Cues provided probabilistic information about the upcoming stimulus. Behavioral data were analyzed with the linear ballistic accumulator (LBA) model, confirming that people used the cue to bias their decisions. The functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data showed that presentation of the cue differentially activated orbitofrontal cortex, hippocampus, and the putamen. Directional cues selectively activated the contralateral putamen. The fMRI analysis yielded results only when the LBA bias parameter was included as a covariate, highlighting the practical benefits of formal modeling. Our results suggest that the human brain uses prior information by increasing cortico-striatal activation to selectively disinhibit preferred responses.