Innate Ideas Revisited: For a Principle of Persistence in Infants' Physical Reasoning

Out of sight, not out of mind: New pupillometric evidence on object permanence in a sample of 10- and 12-month-old German infants

Findings on the emergence and interpretation of early object representation in the first year of life diverge widely between designs that employ looking times versus action-based measures. As a promising new approach, pupillometry has produced evidence for object permanence at 18 months of age, but not younger as of yet. In the current study, we (re)investigated object permanence following occlusion events in a pupillometric violation-of-expectation paradigm optimized for younger infants. During each trial, infants observed a toy object's occlusion and prompt reveal in the expected condition or its absence in the unexpected condition. Across two experiments, we show that 10- and 12-month-old infants' (total N = 82) pupils dilate in response to unexpected object disappearances relative to expected appearances. Control analyses revealed no differences between the scenes before the experimental manipulation, excluding perceptual interpretations. We further report an age-dependent effect of condition on pupil responses, with unexpected outcomes triggering greater pupil dilation in the older group. These results provide positive pupillometric evidence in support of object permanence in the context of a violation-of-expectation paradigm at 10 and 12 months of age.

The Cognitive Architecture of Infant Attachment

Meta-analytic evidence indicates that the quality of the attachment relationship that infants establish with their primary caregiver has enduring significance for socioemotional and cognitive outcomes. However, the mechanisms by which early attachment experiences contribute to subsequent development remain underspecified. According to attachment theory, early attachment experiences become embodied in the form of cognitive-affective representations, referred to as internal working models (IWMs), that guide future behavior. Little is known, however, about the cognitive architecture of IWMs in infancy. In this article, we discuss significant advances made in the field of infant cognitive development and propose that leveraging insights from this research has the potential to fundamentally shape our understanding of the cognitive architecture of attachment representations in infancy. We also propose that the integration of attachment research into cognitive research can shed light on the role of early experiences, individual differences, and stability and change in infant cognition, as well as open new routes of investigation in cognitive studies, which will further our understanding of human knowledge. We provide recommendations for future research throughout the article and conclude by using our collaborative research as an example.

Spontaneous eye blinks in horses (Equus caballus) are modulated by attention

Spontaneous eye blinks are brief closures of both eyelids. The spontaneous eye blink rate (SEBR) exceeds physiological corneal needs and is modulated by emotions and cognitive states, including vigilance and attention, in humans. In several animal species, the SEBR is modulated by stress and antipredator vigilance, which may limit the loss of visual information due to spontaneous eye closing. Here, we investigated whether the SEBR is modulated by attention in the domestic horse (Equus caballus). Our data supported previous studies indicating a tonic SEBR specific to each individual. We also found that, superimposed on a tonic SEBR, phasic changes were induced by cognitive processing. Attention downmodulated the SEBR, with the magnitude of blink inhibition proportional to the degree of attentional selectivity. On the other hand, reward anticipation upregulated the SEBR. Our data also suggested that horses possess the cognitive property of object permanence: they understand that an object that is no longer in their visual field has not ceased to exist. In conclusion, our results suggested that spontaneous eye blinks in horses are modulated by attentional cognitive processing.

A transdisciplinary view on curiosity beyond linguistic humans: animals, infants, and artificial intelligence

Curiosity is a core driver for life-long learning, problem-solving and decision-making. In a broad sense, curiosity is defined as the intrinsically motivated acquisition of novel information. Despite a decades-long history of curiosity research and the earliest human theories arising from studies of laboratory rodents, curiosity has mainly been considered in two camps: 'linguistic human' and 'other'. This is despite psychology being heritable, and there are many continuities in cognitive capacities across the animal kingdom. Boundary-pushing cross-disciplinary debates on curiosity are lacking, and the relative exclusion of pre-linguistic infants and non-human animals has led to a scientific impasse which more broadly impedes the development of artificially intelligent systems modelled on curiosity in natural agents. In this review, we synthesize literature across multiple disciplines that have studied curiosity in non-verbal systems. By highlighting how similar findings have been produced across the separate disciplines of animal behaviour, developmental psychology, neuroscience, and computational cognition, we discuss how this can be used to advance our understanding of curiosity. We propose, for the first time, how features of curiosity could be quantified and therefore studied more operationally across systems: across different species, developmental stages, and natural or artificial agents.

Infants can use temporary or scant categorical information to individuate objects

In a standard individuation task, infants see two different objects emerge in alternation from behind a screen. If they can assign distinct categorical descriptors to the two objects, they expect to see both objects when the screen is lowered; if not, they have no expectation at all about what they will see (i.e., two objects, one object, or no object). Why is contrastive categorical information critical for success at this task? According to the kind account, infants must decide whether they are facing a single object with changing properties or two different objects with stable properties, and access to permanent, intrinsic, kind information for each object resolves this difficulty. According to the two-system account, however, contrastive categorical descriptors simply provide the object-file system with unique tags for individuating the two objects and for communicating about them with the physical-reasoning system. The two-system account thus predicts that any type of contrastive categorical information, however temporary or scant it may be, should induce success at the task. Two experiments examined this prediction. Experiment 1 tested 14-month-olds (N = 96) in a standard task using two objects that differed only in their featural properties. Infants succeeded at the task when the object-file system had access to contrastive temporary categorical descriptors derived from the objects' distinct causal roles in preceding support events (e.g., formerly a support, formerly a supportee). Experiment 2 tested 9-month-olds (N = 96) in a standard task using two objects infants this age typically encode as merely featurally distinct. Infants succeeded when the object-file system had access to scant categorical descriptors derived from the objects' prior inclusion in static arrays of similarly shaped objects (e.g., block-shaped objects, cylinder-shaped objects). These and control results support the two-system account's claim that in a standard task, contrastive categorical descriptors serve to provide the object-file system with unique tags for the two objects.

Young infants' expectations about a self-propelled agent's body

What intuitive biological understandings do infants have? Recent work reports that 8-month-olds seem to identify self-propelled agents as animals and expect them to have a closed body. The present study examined a group of 6.5-month-old infants' (N = 50, 52% female, 84% White) biological expectations. The infants seemed to grasp the causal link between a novel self-propelled box agent's functioning and its body because they expected a temporary operation (i.e., an experimenter opening the box, exposing its insides, and closing it) to impair its ability to move. Further, infants accepted what was shown inside the box during the operation; whether it had an internal cuboid did not affect the results. Together, this suggests that infants at this young age appear to recognize the importance of having an intact body to a novel self-propelled agent's mobility but have no specific knowledge about what should be inside such an entity. These findings thus shed new light on the developmental origins of biological understandings.

When shapes are more than shapes: perceptual, developmental, and neurophysiological basis for attributions of animacy and theory of mind

Among a variety of entities in their environment, what do humans consider alive or animate and how does this attribution of animacy promote development of more abstract levels of mentalizing? By decontextualizing the environment of bodily features, we review how physical movements give rise to perceived animacy in Heider-Simmel style animations. We discuss the developmental course of how perceived animacy shapes our interpretation of the social world, and specifically discuss when and how children transition from perceiving actions as goal-directed to attributing behaviors to unobservable mental states. This transition from a teleological stance, asserting a goal-oriented interpretation to an agent's actions, to a mentalistic stance allows older children to reason about more complex actions guided by hidden beliefs. The acquisition of these more complex cognitive behaviors happens developmentally at the same time neural systems for social cognition are coming online in young children. We review perceptual, developmental, and neural evidence to identify the joint cognitive and neural changes associated with when children begin to mentalize and how this ability is instantiated in the brain.

Information Optimization and Transferable State Abstractions in Deep Reinforcement Learning

While humans and animals learn incrementally during their lifetimes and exploit their experience to solve new tasks, standard deep reinforcement learning methods specialize to solve only one task at a time. As a result, the information they acquire is hardly reusable in new situations. Here, we introduce a new perspective on the problem of leveraging prior knowledge to solve future tasks. We show that learning discrete representations of sensory inputs can provide a high-level abstraction that is common across multiple tasks, thus facilitating the transference of information. In particular, we show that it is possible to learn such representations by self-supervision, following an information theoretic approach. Our method is able to learn abstractions in locomotive and optimal control tasks that increase the sample efficiency in both known and unknown tasks, opening a new path to endow artificial agents with generalization abilities.

Protracted development of motor cortex constrains rich interpretations of infant cognition

Cognition in preverbal human infants must be inferred from overt motor behaviors such as gaze shifts, head turns, or reaching for objects. However, infant mammals - including human infants - show protracted postnatal development of cortical motor outflow. Cortical control of eye, face, head, and limb movements is absent at birth and slowly emerges over the first postnatal year and beyond. Accordingly, the neonatal cortex in humans cannot generate the motor behaviors routinely used to support inferences about infants' cognitive abilities, and thus claims of developmental continuity between infant and adult cognition are suspect. Recognition of the protracted development of motor cortex should temper rich interpretations of infant cognition and motivate more serious consideration of the role of subcortical mechanisms in early cognitive development.

The nature of neural object representations during dynamic occlusion

Objects disappearing briefly from sight due to occlusion is an inevitable occurrence in everyday life. Yet we generally have a strong experience that occluded objects continue to exist, despite the fact that they objectively disappear. This indicates that neural object representations must be maintained during dynamic occlusion. However, it is unclear what the nature of such representation is and in particular whether it is perception-like or more abstract, for example, reflecting limited features such as position or movement direction only. In this study, we address this question by examining how different object features such as object shape, luminance, and position are represented in the brain when a moving object is dynamically occluded. We apply multivariate decoding methods to Magnetoencephalography (MEG) data to track how object representations unfold over time. Our methods allow us to contrast the representations of multiple object features during occlusion and enable us to compare the neural responses evoked by visible and occluded objects. The results show that object position information is represented during occlusion to a limited extent while object identity features are not maintained through the period of occlusion. Together, this suggests that the nature of object representations during dynamic occlusion is different from visual representations during perception.

Intuitive physics learning in a deep-learning model inspired by developmental psychology

'Intuitive physics' enables our pragmatic engagement with the physical world and forms a key component of 'common sense' aspects of thought. Current artificial intelligence systems pale in their understanding of intuitive physics, in comparison to even very young children. Here we address this gap between humans and machines by drawing on the field of developmental psychology. First, we introduce and open-source a machine-learning dataset designed to evaluate conceptual understanding of intuitive physics, adopting the violation-of-expectation (VoE) paradigm from developmental psychology. Second, we build a deep-learning system that learns intuitive physics directly from visual data, inspired by studies of visual cognition in children. We demonstrate that our model can learn a diverse set of physical concepts, which depends critically on object-level representations, consistent with findings from developmental psychology. We consider the implications of these results both for AI and for research on human cognition.

Child-directed speech is optimized for syntax-free semantic inference

The way infants learn language is a highly complex adaptive behavior. This behavior chiefly relies on the ability to extract information from the speech they hear and combine it with information from the external environment. Most theories assume that this ability critically hinges on the recognition of at least some syntactic structure. Here, we show that child-directed speech allows for semantic inference without relying on explicit structural information. We simulate the process of semantic inference with machine learning applied to large text collections of two different types of speech, child-directed speech versus adult-directed speech. Taking the core meaning of causality as a test case, we find that in child-directed speech causal meaning can be successfully inferred from simple co-occurrences of neighboring words. By contrast, semantic inference in adult-directed speech fundamentally requires additional access to syntactic structure. These results suggest that child-directed speech is ideally shaped for a learner who has not yet mastered syntactic structure.

How do the object-file and physical-reasoning systems interact? Evidence from priming effects with object arrays or novel labels

How do infants reason about simple physical events such as containment, tube, and support events? According to the two-system model, two cognitive systems, the object-file (OF) and physical-reasoning (PR) systems, work together to guide infants' responses to these events. When an event begins, the OF system sends categorical information about the objects and their arrangements to the PR system. This system then categorizes the event, assigns event roles to the objects, and taps the OF system for information about features previously identified as causally relevant for the event category selected. All of the categorical and featural information included in the event's representation is interpreted by the PR system's domain knowledge, which includes core principles such as persistence and gravity. The present research tested a novel prediction of the model: If the OF system could be primed to also send, at the beginning of an event, information about an as-yet-unidentified feature, the PR system would then interpret this information using its core principles, allowing infants to detect core violations involving the feature earlier than they normally would. We examined this prediction using two types of priming manipulations directed at the OF system, object arrays and novel labels. In six experiments, infants aged 7-13 months (N = 304) were tested using different event categories and as-yet-unidentified features (color in containment events, height in tube events, and proportional distribution in support events) as well as different tasks (violation-of-expectation and action tasks). In each case, infants who were effectively primed reasoned successfully about the as-yet-unidentified feature, sometimes as early as six months before they would typically do so. These converging results provide strong support for the two-system model and for the claim that uncovering how the OF and PR systems represent and exchange information is essential for understanding how infants respond to physical events.

Concepts of objects and substances in language

People distinguish objects from the substances that constitute them. Many languages also distinguish count nouns and mass nouns. What is the relation between these two distinctions? The connection between them is complicated by the facts that (a) some mass nouns (e.g., toast) seem to name countable objects; (b) some count and mass nouns (e.g., pots and pottery) seem to name the same objects; (c) nouns for seemingly the same things can be count in one language (English: dishes) but mass in another (French: la vaisselle); (d) count nouns can be used to name substances (There is carrot in the soup) and mass nouns to name portions (She drank three whiskeys); and (e) some languages (e.g., Mandarin) appear to have no count nouns, whereas others (e.g., Yudja) appear to have no mass nouns. All these cases counter a simple object-to-count-noun and substance-to-mass-noun relation, but they provide opportunities to see whether the grammatical distinction affects the referential one. We examine evidence from such cases and find continuity through development: Infants appear to have the conceptual OBJECT/SUBSTANCE distinction very early on. Although this distinction may change with development, the acquisition of count/mass syntax does not appear to be an effective factor for change.

Catastrophic individuation failures in infancy: A new model and predictions

Comparison of infant findings from the physical-reasoning and object-individuation literatures reveals a contradictory picture. On the one hand, physical-reasoning results indicate that young infants can use featural information to guide their actions on objects and to detect interaction violations (when objects interact in ways that are not physically possible) as well as change violations (when objects spontaneously undergo featural changes that are not physically possible). On the other hand, object-individuation results indicate that young infants typically cannot use featural information to detect individuation violations (when the number of objects revealed at the end of an event is less than the number of objects introduced during the event). In this article, we attempt to reconcile these two bodies of research. In a new model of early individuation, we propose that two systems help infants individuate objects in physical events: the object-file and physical-reasoning systems. Under certain conditions, disagreements between the systems result in catastrophic individuation failures, leading infants to hold no expectation at all about how many objects are present. We report experiments with 9- to 11-month-old infants (N = 216) that tested predictions from the model. After two objects emerged in alternation from behind a screen, infants detected no violation when the screen was lowered to reveal no object. Similarly, after two objects emerged in alternation from inside a box, which was then shaken, infants detected no violation when the box remained silent, as though empty. We end with new directions, suggested by our model, for research on early object representations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Using automated controlled rearing to explore the origins of object permanence

What are the origins of object permanence? Despite widespread interest in this question, methodological barriers have prevented detailed analysis of how experience shapes the development of object permanence in newborn organisms. Here, we introduce an automated controlled-rearing method for studying the emergence of object permanence in strictly controlled virtual environments. We used newborn chicks as an animal model and recorded their behavior continuously (24/7) from the onset of vision. Across four experiments, we found that object permanence can develop rapidly, within the first few days of life. This ability developed even when chicks were reared in impoverished visual environments containing no object occlusion events. Object permanence failed to develop, however, when chicks were reared in environments containing temporally non-smooth objects (objects moving on discontinuous spatiotemporal paths). These results suggest that experience with temporally smooth objects facilitates the development of object permanence, confirming a key prediction of temporal learning models in computational neuroscience.

Sciences of Observation

Multiple sciences have converged, in the past two decades, on a hitherto mostly unremarked question: what is observation? Here, I examine this evolution, focusing on three sciences: physics, especially quantum information theory, developmental biology, especially its molecular and “evo-devo” branches, and cognitive science, especially perceptual psychology and robotics. I trace the history of this question to the late 19th century, and through the conceptual revolutions of the 20th century. I show how the increasing interdisciplinary focus on the process of extracting information from an environment provides an opportunity for conceptual unification, and sketch an outline of what such a unification might look like.

Explanation-based learning in infancy

In explanation-based learning (EBL), domain knowledge is leveraged in order to learn general rules from few examples. An explanation is constructed for initial exemplars and is then generalized into a candidate rule that uses only the relevant features specified in the explanation; if the rule proves accurate for a few additional exemplars, it is adopted. EBL is thus highly efficient because it combines both analytic and empirical evidence. EBL has been proposed as one of the mechanisms that help infants acquire and revise their physical rules. To evaluate this proposal, 11- and 12-month-olds (n = 260) were taught to replace their current support rule (that an object is stable when half or more of its bottom surface is supported) with a more sophisticated rule (that an object is stable when half or more of the entire object is supported). Infants saw teaching events in which asymmetrical objects were placed on a base, followed by static test displays involving a novel asymmetrical object and a novel base. When the teaching events were designed to facilitate EBL, infants learned the new rule with as few as two (12-month-olds) or three (11-month-olds) exemplars. When the teaching events were designed to impede EBL, however, infants failed to learn the rule. Together, these results demonstrate that even infants, with their limited knowledge about the world, benefit from the knowledge-based approach of EBL.

A neural substrate for object permanence in monkey inferotemporal cortex

We take it for granted that objects continue to exist after being occluded. This knowledge – known as object permanence – is present even in childhood, but its neural basis is not fully understood. Here, we show that monkey inferior temporal (IT) neurons carry potential signals of object permanence even in animals that received no explicit behavioral training. We compared two conditions with identical visual stimulation: the same object emerged from behind an occluder as expected following its occlusion, or unexpectedly after occlusion of a different object. Some neurons produced a larger (surprise) signal when the object emerged unexpectedly, whereas other neurons produced a larger (match) signal when the object reappeared as expected. Neurons carrying match signals also reinstated selective delay period activity just before the object emerged. Thus, signals related to object permanence are present in IT neurons and may arise through an interplay of memory and match computations.

Building on what you have learned

Object construction involves organizing multiple objects into a unified structure (e.g., stacking blocks into a tower) and may provide infants with unique spatial information. Because object construction entails placing objects in spatial locations relative to one another, infants can acquire information about spatial relations during construction activity. To acquire words representing spatial relations, children must link sensorimotor experience to their language system. It is proposed that the development of construction skills during infancy influences knowledge of words indicating spatial relations at three years. Infants who develop early construction skills are expected to comprehend more words describing spatial relations than infants who develop construction skills later. Infants were tested monthly with seven construction tasks from 10–14 months and were tested at three years for their comprehension of spatial relations words. In addition, both the Preschool Language Scales, 5th edition (PLS-5) (three years) and the Bayley cognitive sub-scale (two years) were assessed to examine whether infants with differing construction skills would perform differently on general language and cognitive abilities in infants, as well as spatial words. “High” constructors understood more spatial relations words than “low” constructors, although there were no differences for general language (PLS-5) or cognitive ability (Bayley cognitive sub-scale). Since infant construction skill did not also relate to general language or cognitive ability, rather only to comprehension of spatial words, object construction activity may uniquely afford opportunities for spatial information, which becomes relevant to the development of spatial words.

Developmental changes in children's understanding of horizontal projectile motion

This study investigated 5- to 13-year-old children's performance in solving horizontal projectile motion problems, in which they predicted the trajectory of a carried object released from a carrier in three different contexts. The results revealed that 5- and 8-year-olds' trajectory predictions were easily distracted by salient contextual features (e.g. the relative spatial locations between objects), whereas a proportion of 11- and 13-year-olds' performance suggested the engagement of the impetus concept in trajectory prediction. The impetus concept is a typical misconception of inertial motion that assumes that motion is caused by force. Children's performance across ages suggested that their naïve knowledge of projectile motion was neither well-developed and coherent nor completely fragmented. Instead, this study presented the dynamic process in which children with age gradually overcame the influences of contextual features and consistently used the impetus concept across motion problems.

Motion, identity and the bias toward agency

The well-documented human bias toward agency as a cause and therefore an explanation of observed events is typically attributed to evolutionary selection for a "social brain". Based on a review of developmental and adult behavioral and neurocognitive data, it is argued that the bias toward agency is a result of the default human solution, developed during infancy, to the computational requirements of object re-identification over gaps in observation of more than a few seconds. If this model is correct, overriding the bias toward agency to construct mechanistic explanations of observed events requires structure-mapping inferences, implemented by the pre-motor action planning system, that replace agents with mechanisms as causes of unobserved changes in contextual or featural properties of objects. Experiments that would test this model are discussed.

(The Feeling of) Meaning-as-Information

The desire for meaning is recognized as a central human motive. Yet, knowing that people want meaning does not explain its function. What adaptive problem does this experience solve? Drawing on the feelings-as-information hypothesis, we propose that the feeling of meaning provides information about the presence of reliable patterns and coherence in the environment, information that is not provided by affect. We review research demonstrating that manipulations of stimulus coherence influence subjective reports of meaning in life but not affect. We demonstrate that manipulations that foster an associative mindset enhance meaning. The meaning-as-information perspective embeds meaning in a network of foundational functions including associative learning, perception, cognition, and neural processing. This approach challenges assumptions about meaning, including its motivational appeal, the roles of expectancies and novelty in this experience, and the notion that meaning is inherently constructed. Implications for constructed meaning and existential meanings are discussed.

The role of distancing in Werner and Kaplan’s account of symbol formation and beyond

The concept of distancing or polarization plays a central role in Werner and Kaplan’s account of symbol formation. It refers to the process of progressive differentiation and hierarchic integration of the four components constitutive of symbolic activity: addressor, addressee, symbolic vehicle and referent. Specifically, Werner and Kaplan suggest that distancing takes place between person and referent, between person and symbolic vehicle, between symbolic vehicle and referent and between addressor and addressee. We describe the theoretical context and different aspects of the distancing process. Furthermore, we argue that the distancing process identifies central prerequisites of symbolic activity that are largely ignored by contemporary developmental theories. We demonstrate the different aspects of the distancing process in several domains of symbolic development, including words, gestural development and pretend play. Finally, we compare Werner and Kaplan’s concept of distancing to ideas of distancing developed in recent developmental theories.

Factors influencing infants' ability to update object representations in memory

Remembering persisting objects over occlusion is critical to representing a stable environment. Infants remember hidden objects at multiple locations and can update their representation of a hidden array when an object is added or subtracted. However, the factors influencing these updating abilities have received little systematic exploration. Here we examined the flexibility of infants' ability to update object representations. We tested 11-month-olds in a looking-time task in which objects were added to or subtracted from two hidden arrays. Across five experiments, infants successfully updated their representations of hidden arrays when the updating occurred successively at one array before beginning at the other. But when updating required alternating between two arrays, infants failed. However, simply connecting the two arrays with a thin strip of foam-core led infants to succeed. Our results suggest that infants' construal of an event strongly affects their ability to update memory representations of hidden objects. When construing an event as containing multiple updates to the same array, infants succeed, but when construing the event as requiring the revisiting and updating of previously attended arrays, infants fail.

Probabilistic inference in human infants

In this chapter, we review empirical evidence in support of infants' ability to make rudimentary probabilistic inferences. A recent surge of research in cognitive developmental psychology examines whether human learners, from infancy through adulthood, reason in ways consistent with Bayesian inference. However, when exploring this question an important first step is to identify the available inference mechanisms and computational machinery that might allow infants and young children to make inductive inferences. A number of recent studies have asked if infants may be "intuitive statisticians," making inferences about the relationship between samples and populations in both looking-time and choice tasks. Furthermore, infants make these inferences under a variety of sampling conditions and integrate prior domain knowledge into their probability calculations. The competences demonstrated in the reviewed experiments appear to draw on an intuitive probability notion that is early emerging and does not appear to be available for conscious reflection.

Reconstructing constructivism: causal models, Bayesian learning mechanisms, and the theory theory

We propose a new version of the "theory theory" grounded in the computational framework of probabilistic causal models and Bayesian learning. Probabilistic models allow a constructivist but rigorous and detailed approach to cognitive development. They also explain the learning of both more specific causal hypotheses and more abstract framework theories. We outline the new theoretical ideas, explain the computational framework in an intuitive and nontechnical way, and review an extensive but relatively recent body of empirical results that supports these ideas. These include new studies of the mechanisms of learning. Children infer causal structure from statistical information, through their own actions on the world and through observations of the actions of others. Studies demonstrate these learning mechanisms in children from 16 months to 4 years old and include research on causal statistical learning, informal experimentation through play, and imitation and informal pedagogy. They also include studies of the variability and progressive character of intuitive theory change, particularly theory of mind. These studies investigate both the physical and the psychological and social domains. We conclude with suggestions for further collaborative projects between developmental and computational cognitive scientists.

The very same thing: Extending the object token concept to incorporate causal constraints on individual identity

The contributions of feature recognition, object categorization, and recollection of episodic memories to the re-identification of a perceived object as the very same thing encountered in a previous perceptual episode are well understood in terms of both cognitive-behavioral phenomenology and neurofunctional implementation. Human beings do not, however, rely solely on features and context to re-identify individuals; in the presence of featural change and similarly-featured distractors, people routinely employ causal constraints to establish object identities. Based on available cognitive and neurofunctional data, the standard object-token based model of individual re-identification is extended to incorporate the construction of unobserved and hence fictive causal histories (FCHs) of observed objects by the pre-motor action planning system. It is suggested that functional deficits in the construction of FCHs are associated with clinical outcomes in both autism spectrum disorders and later-stage stage Alzheimer’s disease.