How to Tell If a Particular Memory Is True or False

The autobiographical memory system and chronic pain: A neurocognitive framework for the initiation and maintenance of chronic pain

Chronic pain affects approximately 20% of the world's population, exerting a substantial burden on the affected individual, their families, and healthcare systems globally. Deficits in autobiographical memory have been identified among individuals living with chronic pain, and even found to pose a risk for the transition to chronicity. Recent neuroimaging studies have simultaneously implicated common brain regions central to autobiographical memory processing in the maintenance of and susceptibility to chronic pain. The present review proposes a novel neurocognitive framework for chronic pain explained by mechanisms underlying the autobiographical memory system. Here, we 1) summarize the current literature on autobiographical memory in pain, 2) discuss the role of the hippocampus and cortical brain regions including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, anterior temporal lobe, and amygdala in relation to autobiographical memory, memory schemas, emotional processing, and pain, 3) synthesize these findings in a neurocognitive framework that explains these relationships and their implications for patients' pain outcomes, and 4) propose translational directions for the prevention, management, and treatment of chronic pain.

Detecting recollection: Human evaluators can successfully assess the veracity of others' memories

Humans have the highly adaptive ability to learn from others' memories. However, because memories are prone to errors, in order for others' memories to be a valuable source of information, we need to assess their veracity. Previous studies have shown that linguistic information conveyed in self-reported justifications can be used to train a machine-learner to distinguish true from false memories. But can humans also perform this task, and if so, do they do so in the same way the machine-learner does? Participants were presented with justifications corresponding to Hits and False Alarms and were asked to directly assess whether the witness's recognition was correct or incorrect. In addition, participants assessed justifications' recollective qualities: their vividness, specificity, and the degree of confidence they conveyed. Results show that human evaluators can discriminate Hits from False Alarms above chance levels, based on the justifications provided per item. Their performance was on par with the machine learner. Furthermore, through assessment of the perceived recollective qualities of justifications, participants were able to glean more information from the justifications than they used in their own direct decisions and than the machine learner did.

False memories in forensic psychology: do cognition and brain activity tell the same story?

One of the most important problems in forensic psychology is the impossibility of reliably discriminating between true and false memories when the only prosecution evidence comes from the memory of a witness or a victim. Unfortunately, both children and adults can be persuaded that they have been victims of past criminal acts, usually of a sexual nature. In adults, suggestion often occurs in the context of suggestive therapies based on the belief that traumatic events are repressed, while children come to believe and report events that never occurred as a result of repeated suggestive questioning. Cognitive Researchers have designed false memory paradigms (i.e., misinformation effect, Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm, event implantation paradigm) to first form false memories and then determine whether it is possible to reliably differentiate between false and true memories. In the present study, we review the contribution of cognitive research to the formation of false memories and the neuropsychological approaches aimed to discriminate between true and false memories. Based on these results, we analyze the applicability of the cognitive and neuropsychological evidence to the forensic setting.

Journeying to the past: time travel and mental time travel, how far apart?

Spatial models dominated memory research throughout much of the twentieth century, but in recent decades, the concept of memory as a form of mental time travel (MTT) to the past has gained prominence. Initially introduced as a metaphor, the MTT perspective shifted the focus from internal memory processes to the subjective conscious experience of remembering. Despite its significant impact on empirical and theoretical memory research, there has been limited discussion regarding the meaning and adequacy of the MTT metaphor in accounting for memory. While in previous work I have addressed the general limitations of the MTT metaphor in explaining memory, the objective of this article is more focused and modest: to gain a better understanding of what constitutes MTT to the past. To achieve this objective, a detailed analysis of the characteristics of MTT to the past is presented through a comparison with time travel (TT) to the past. Although acknowledging that TT does not refer to an existing physical phenomenon, it is an older concept extensively discussed in the philosophical literature and provides commonly accepted grounds, particularly within orthodox theories of time, that can offer insights into the nature of MTT. Six specific characteristics serve as points of comparison: (1) a destination distinct from the present, (2) the distinction between subjective time and objective time, (3) the subjective experience of the time traveler, (4) their differentiation from the past self, (5) the existence of the past, and (6) its unchangeability. Through this research, a detailed exploration of the phenomenal and metaphysical aspects of MTT to the past is undertaken, shedding light on the distinct features that mental time travel to the past acquires when it occurs within the realm of the mind rather than as a physical phenomenon. By examining these characteristics, a deeper understanding of the nature of mental time travel is achieved, offering insights into how it operates in relation to memory and the past.

Temporal Bell inequalities in cognition

There is widespread evidence that human memory is constructive, so that recollective processes may alter the information retrieved or impact on subsequent recollections. We examine a framework for narrowing down the nature of such processes, from physics. In Physics, the Temporal Bell (TB) inequality offers a general test of the sensitivity of the context of previous measurements in sequential measurement scenarios, as predicted by quantum theory. We present an empirical memory paradigm that allows a test of the TB inequality, using a novel kind of "change judgment," whereby participants are asked to decide whether there has been a change in a question across different time points of a scenario. Across two experiments, we were able to observe evidence for the violation of a TB inequality in one case, offering evidence for quantum-like processes in memory. The present results complement other recent work purporting the relevance of quantum-like representations in memory and raise questions regarding the adaptive value of such representations.

Socially induced false memories in the absence of misinformation

Ample evidence shows that post-encoding misinformation from others can induce false memories. Here, we demonstrate in two experiments a new, tacit form of socially generated false memories, resulting from interpersonal co-monitoring at encoding without communication of misinformation. Pairs of participants jointly viewed semantically coherent word lists, presented successively in blue, green, or red letters. Each individual was instructed to memorize words presented in one of the colors. One color remained unassigned (control condition). Participants (total N = 113) reported more false memories for non-presented words (lures) semantically related to partner-assigned than to control lists, although both list types were equally irrelevant to their own task. Notably, this effect also persisted for particularly rich memories. These findings show for the first time that social induction of false memories, even subjectively rich ones, does not necessarily require communication of deceptive information. This has important implications both theoretically and practically (e.g., in forensic contexts).

A Personal Model of Trumpery: Linguistic Deception Detection in a Real-World High-Stakes Setting

Language use differs between truthful and deceptive statements, but not all differences are consistent across people and contexts, complicating the identification of deceit in individuals. By relying on fact-checked tweets, we showed in three studies (Study 1: 469 tweets; Study 2: 484 tweets; Study 3: 24 models) how well personalized linguistic deception detection performs by developing the first deception model tailored to an individual: the 45th U.S. president. First, we found substantial linguistic differences between factually correct and factually incorrect tweets. We developed a quantitative model and achieved 73% overall accuracy. Second, we tested out-of-sample prediction and achieved 74% overall accuracy. Third, we compared our personalized model with linguistic models previously reported in the literature. Our model outperformed existing models by 5 percentage points, demonstrating the added value of personalized linguistic analysis in real-world settings. Our results indicate that factually incorrect tweets by the U.S. president are not random mistakes of the sender.

Clinical Uses and Impacts of Emergency Manuals During Perioperative Crises

BACKGROUND

Performing key actions efficiently during crises can determine clinical outcomes, yet even expert clinicians omit key actions. Simulation-based studies of crises show that correct performance of key actions dramatically increases when emergency manuals (EMs) are used. Despite widespread dissemination of EMs, there is a need to understand in clinical contexts, when, how, and how often EMs are used and not used, along with perceived impacts.

METHODS

We conducted interviews with the anesthesia professionals involved in perioperative crises, identified with criterion-based sampling, occurring between October 2014 and May 2016 at 2 large academic medical centers with a history of EM training and implementation. Our convergent, mixed-methods study of the interview data extracted quantitative counts and qualitative themes of EM use and nonuse during clinical crises.

RESULTS

Interviews with 53 anesthesia professionals yielded 80 descriptions of applicable clinical crises, with varying durations and event types. Of 69 unique patients whose cases involved crises, the EM was used during 37 (54%; 95% confidence interval [CI], 41-66). Impacts on clinician team members included decreased stress for individual anesthesia professionals (95%), enabled teamwork (73%), and calmed atmosphere (46%). Impacts on delivery of patient care included specific action improvements, including catching errors of omission, for example, turning off anesthetic during cardiac arrest, only after EM use (59%); process improvements, for example, double-checking all actions were completed (41%); and impediments (0%). In 8% of crises, EM use was associated with potential distractions, although none were perceived to harm delivery of patient care. For 32 EM nonuses (46%; 95% CI, 34-59), participants self-identified errors of omission or delays in key actions (56%), all key actions performed (13%), and crisis too brief for EM to be used (31%).

CONCLUSIONS

This study provides evidence that EMs in operating rooms are being used during many applicable crises and that clinicians perceive EM use to add value. The reported negative effects were minimal and potentially offset by positive effects.

Discrete-state versus continuous models of the confidence-accuracy relationship in recognition memory

The relationship between confidence and accuracy in recognition memory is important in real-world settings (e.g., eyewitness identification) and is also important to understand at a theoretical level. Signal detection theory assumes that recognition decisions are based on continuous underlying memory signals and therefore inherently predicts that the relationship between confidence and accuracy will be continuous. Almost invariably, the empirical data accord with this prediction. Threshold models instead assume that recognition decisions are based on discrete-state memory signals. As a result, these models do not inherently predict a continuous confidence-accuracy relationship. However, they can accommodate that result by adding hypothetical mapping relationships between discrete states and the confidence rating scale. These mapping relationships are thought to arise from a variety of factors, including demand characteristics (e.g., instructing participants to distribute their responses across the confidence scale). However, until such possibilities are experimentally investigated in the context of a recognition memory experiment, there is no sense in which threshold models adequately explain confidence ratings at a theoretical level. Here, we tested whether demand characteristics might account for the mapping relationships required by threshold models and found that confidence was continuously related to accuracy (almost identically so) both in the presence of strong experimenter demands and in their absence. We conclude that confidence ratings likely reflect the strength of a continuous underlying memory signal, not an attempt to use the confidence scale in a manner that accords with the perceived expectations of the experimenter.

Do False Memories Look Real? Evidence That People Struggle to Identify Rich False Memories of Committing Crime and Other Emotional Events

Two studies examined whether people could identify rich false memories. Each participant in both studies was presented with two videos, one of a person recalling a true emotional memory, and one of the same person recalling a false memory. These videos were filmed during a study which involved implanting rich false memories (Shaw and Porter, 2015). The false memories in the videos either involved committing a crime (assault, or assault with a weapon) or other highly emotional events (animal attack, or losing a large sum of money) during adolescence. In study 1, participants (n = 124) were no better than chance at accurately classifying false memories (61.29% accurate), or false memories of committing crime (53.33% accurate). In study 2, participants (n = 82) were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, where they only had access to the (i) audio account of the memory with no video, (ii) video account with no audio, or (iii) the full audio-visual accounts. False memories were classified correctly by 32.14% of the audio-only group, 45.45% of the video-only group, and 53.13% of the audio-visual group. This research provides evidence that naïve judges are not able to reliably identify false memories of emotional or criminal events, or differentiate true from false memories. These findings are likely to be of particular interest to those working in legal and criminal justice settings.

Misremembering pain: A memory blindness approach to adding a better end

How people remember feeling in the past informs future decisions; however, memory for past emotion is subject to a number of biases. Previous research on choice blindness has shown that people often fail to notice when they are exposed to misinformation about their own decisions, preferences, and memories. This type of misinformation can influence how they later remember past events. In the present study, we examined the memory blindness effect in a new domain: memory for pain. Participants (N = 269) underwent a cold-pressor task and rated how much pain, distress, and positive and negative affect they had experienced. Later, participants were shown their pain ratings and asked to explain them. Some of the participants were shown lower pain ratings than they had actually made. In a second session, participants recalled how painful the task had been and how much distress and positive and negative affect they remembered experiencing. The results indicated that the majority of participants who were exposed to misinformation failed to detect the manipulation, and subsequently remembered the task as being less painful. The participants in the misinformation condition were not overall more willing to repeat the study tasks, but the participants who recalled less distress, less negative affect, and more positive affect were more willing to repeat the study tasks again in a future experiment. These results demonstrate the malleability of memory for painful experiences and that willingness to repeat aversive experiences may depend more on memory for affective reactions to the original experience than on memory for the physical pain itself.

Complexities of human memory: relevance to anaesthetic practice

Mechanisms of anaesthetic actions on memory have largely focused on easily definable aspects of episodic memory, with emphasis on particular drug interactions on specific memory processes. However, the memory landscape of the perioperative experience includes many facets that lie outside these conceptualisations. These include patient recall of preoperative conversations, patient beliefs regarding allergies and unusual/uncommon anaesthetic events, memories of awareness, and particularly vivid dreams during anaesthesia. In no small part, memories are influenced by a patient's interpretations of events in light of their own belief systems. From the practitioner's point of view, relating fully to the patient's experience requires some framework of understanding. The purpose of this review is to highlight research over the previous decades on belief systems and their interactions with autobiographical memory, which organises episodic memories into a personally relevant narrative. As a result, memory is a set of continuously malleable processes, and is best described as a (re)constructive rather than photographic instantiation. Belief systems are separate but closely interacting processes with autobiographical memory. The interaction of a constantly evolving set of memories with belief systems can explain phenomena such as illusions, distortions, and (re)constructions of factitious events. How anaesthetics and our patient interactions influence these behaviours, and vice versa, will be important questions to explore and define with future research.

The integrative memory model is detailed, but skimps on false memories and development

The integrative memory model combines five core memory systems with an attributional system. We agree with Bastin et al. that this melding is the most novel aspect of the model. But we await further evidence that the model's substantial complexity informs our understanding of false memories or of the development of recollection and familiarity.

False memories in music listening: exploring the misinformation effect and individual difference factors in auditory memory

The study of false memory has had a profound impact on our understanding of how and what we remember, as shown by the misinformation paradigm [Loftus, E. F. (2005). Planting misinformation in the human mind: A 30-year investigation of the malleability of memory. Learning & Memory, 12(4), 361-366. doi: 10.1101/lm.94705 ]. Though misinformation effects have been demonstrated extensively within visual tasks, they have not yet been explored in the realm of non-visual auditory stimuli. Thus, the present study aimed to investigate whether post-event information can create false memories of music listening episodes. In addition, we explored individual difference factors potentially associated with false memory susceptibility in music, including age, suggestibility, personality, and musical training. In two music recognition tasks, participants (N = 151) listened to an initial music track, which unbeknownst to them was missing an instrument. They were then presented with post-event information which either suggested the presence of the missing instrument or did not. The presence of misinformation resulted in significantly poorer performance on the music recognition tasks (d = .43), suggesting the existence of false musical memories. A random forest analysis indicated that none of the individual difference factors assessed were significantly associated with misinformation susceptibility. These findings support previous research on the fallibility of human memory and demonstrate, to some extent, the generality of the misinformation effect to a non-visual auditory domain.

La fragilidad de la memoria: creencias falsas y memoria autobiográfica, una revisión preliminar

La memoria es un proceso reconstructivo, donde distintos recuerdos buscan conformar una narrativa autobiográfica coherente. No obstante, dichos recuerdos no son completamente precisos, ya que en diversas investigaciones se ha encontrado que las personas tienden a reportar episodios de su pasado que sucedieron ya sea de manera distinta o que en realidad nunca ocurrieron. Tras considerar a la memoria autobiográfica como el mayor logro ontogenético humano, surge la interrogante respecto a cómo puede suceder un fenómeno tan impreciso como el de las memorias falsas. En el presente estudio teórico se revisa la principal evidencia científica respecto a la existencia de memorias falsas, se analiza su etiología y se profundiza en su posible rol adaptativo.

A Causal Theory of Mnemonic Confabulation

This paper attempts to answer the question of what defines mnemonic confabulation vis-à-vis genuine memory. The two extant accounts of mnemonic confabulation as “false memory” and as ill-grounded memory are shown to be problematic, for they cannot account for the possibility of veridical confabulation, ill-grounded memory, and well-grounded confabulation. This paper argues that the defining characteristic of mnemonic confabulation is that it lacks the appropriate causal history. In the confabulation case, there is no proper counterfactual dependence of the state of seeming to remember on the corresponding past representation.

Eavesdropping on Memory

For more than four decades, I have been studying human memory. My research concerns the malleable nature of memory. Information suggested to an individual about an event can be integrated with the memory of the event itself, so that what actually occurred, and what was discussed later about what may have occurred, become inextricably interwoven, allowing distortion, elaboration, and even total fabrication. In my writings, classes, and public speeches, I've tried to convey one important take-home message: Just because someone tells you something in great detail, with much confidence, and with emotion, it doesn't mean that it is true. Here I describe my professional life as an experimental psychologist, in which I've eavesdropped on this process, as well as many personal experiences that may have influenced my thinking and choices.

False memories and real epistemic problems

The dichotomy between ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ in relation to memory is difficult to clearly sustain. The veridicality of memory is typically established by drawing on the local, normative procedures that operate in a given setting (e.g. legal, clinical, social). Since all procedures are strictly relative, all memories are technically either ‘relatively falsified’ or ‘relatively as-yet-unfalsified’. False memory studies claim to be able explain the production of false memories, but do not offer criterion to effectively differentiate populations of so-called ‘true’ and ‘false’ victims. The narrative of the discovery of the ‘false memories’ themselves is inconsistent and demonstrates a significant level of imagination inflation and suggestibility to dominant narratives in post-war psychology. In attending to the setting specificity of memory, researchers may wish to consider how their work impacts on the experience–ecologies to which they contribute.

On the importance of considering heterogeneity in witnesses' competence levels when reconstructing crimes from multiple witness testimonies

Aggregating information across multiple testimonies may improve crime reconstructions. However, different aggregation methods are available, and research on which method is best suited for aggregating multiple observations is lacking. Furthermore, little is known about how variance in the accuracy of individual testimonies impacts the performance of competing aggregation procedures. We investigated the superiority of aggregation-based crime reconstructions involving multiple individual testimonies and whether this superiority varied as a function of the number of witnesses and the degree of heterogeneity in witnesses' ability to accurately report their observations. Moreover, we examined whether heterogeneity in competence levels differentially affected the relative accuracy of two aggregation procedures: a simple majority rule, which ignores individual differences, and the more complex general Condorcet model (Romney et al., Am Anthropol 88(2):313-338, 1986; Batchelder and Romney, Psychometrika 53(1):71-92, 1988), which takes into account differences in competence between individuals. 121 participants viewed a simulated crime and subsequently answered 128 true/false questions about the crime. We experimentally generated groups of witnesses with homogeneous or heterogeneous competences. Both the majority rule and the general Condorcet model provided more accurate reconstructions of the observed crime than individual testimonies. The superiority of aggregated crime reconstructions involving multiple individual testimonies increased with an increasing number of witnesses. Crime reconstructions were most accurate when competences were heterogeneous and aggregation was based on the general Condorcet model. We argue that a formal aggregation should be considered more often when eyewitness testimonies have to be assessed and that the general Condorcet model provides a good framework for such aggregations.

Latent variables underlying the memory beliefs of Chartered Clinical Psychologists, Hypnotherapists and undergraduate students

In courts in the United Kingdom, understanding of memory phenomena is often assumed to be a matter of common sense. To test this assumption 337 UK respondents, consisting of 125 Chartered Clinical Psychologists, 88 individuals who advertised their services as Hypnotherapists (HTs) in a classified directory, the Yellow Pages^TM, and 124 first year undergraduate psychology students, completed a questionnaire that assessed their knowledge of 10 memory phenomena about which there is a broad scientific consensus. HTs' responses were the most inconsistent with the scientific consensus, scoring lowest on six of these ten items. Principal Components Analysis indicated two latent variables - reflecting beliefs about memory quality and malleability - underlying respondents' responses. In addition, respondents were asked to rate their own knowledge of the academic memory literature in general. There was no significant relationship between participants' self reported knowledge and their actual knowledge (as measured by their responses to the 10-item questionnaire). There was evidence of beliefs among the HTs that could give rise to some concern (e.g., that early memories from the first year of life are accurately stored and are retrievable).

The fallibility of memory in judicial processes: lessons from the past and their modern consequences

The capability of adult and child witnesses to accurately recollect events from the past and provide reliable testimony has been hotly debated for more than 100 years. Prominent legal cases of the 1980s and 1990s sparked lengthy debates and important research questions surrounding the fallibility and general reliability of memory. But what lessons have we learned, some 35 years later, about the role of memory in the judicial system? In this review, we focus on what we now know about the consequences of the fallibility of memory for legal proceedings. We present a brief historical overview of false memories that focuses on three critical forensic areas that changed memory research: children as eyewitnesses, historic sexual abuse and eyewitness (mis)identification. We revisit some of the prominent trials of the 1980s and 1990s to not only consider the role false memories have played in judicial decisions, but also to see how this has helped us understand memory today. Finally, we consider the way in which the research on memory (true and false) has been successfully integrated into some courtroom procedures.

Constructing Rich False Memories of Committing Crime

Memory researchers long have speculated that certain tactics may lead people to recall crimes that never occurred, and thus could potentially lead to false confessions. This is the first study to provide evidence suggesting that full episodic false memories of committing crime can be generated in a controlled experimental setting. With suggestive memory-retrieval techniques, participants were induced to generate criminal and noncriminal emotional false memories, and we compared these false memories with true memories of emotional events. After three interviews, 70% of participants were classified as having false memories of committing a crime (theft, assault, or assault with a weapon) that led to police contact in early adolescence and volunteered a detailed false account. These reported false memories of crime were similar to false memories of noncriminal events and to true memory accounts, having the same kinds of complex descriptive and multisensory components. It appears that in the context of a highly suggestive interview, people can quite readily generate rich false memories of committing crime.

The development of differential mnemonic effects of false denials and forced confabulations

The current experiment was designed to assess the mnemonic consequences of false denials and forced confabulations. Children (aged 6-8 and 10-12 years) and adults viewed a video and then their memory and belief about the event were tested. Participants were then divided into three groups. In the "cued recall" condition, participants were asked to answer true- and false-event questions, but could choose not to respond if they did not know the answer. In the "forced confabulation" group, participants received the same set of questions, but were forced to answer all of them. In the "false denial" group, participants were instructed to falsely deny in response to each question. One week later, participants received a source memory test, and they had to provide memory and belief ratings once more. Forced confabulations resulted in false memories in the youngest group. Moreover, our analyses showed that repeated false denials led children and adults to be highly inclined to falsely deny that they had talked to the experimenter about certain presented details, when in fact they had done so. Furthermore, false denial and non-believed memory rates were more pronounced in younger than in older children and adults. Our results imply that denying experienced events is not a good strategy in an interviewing setting, as it adversely affects memory statements about the interview.

Positive consequences of false memories

Previous research is replete with examples of the negative consequences of false memories. In the current research, we provide a different perspective on false memories and their development and demonstrate that false memories can have positive consequences. Specifically, we examined the role false memories play in subsequent problem-solving tasks. Children and adults studied and recalled neutral or survival-relevant lists of associated words. They then solved age-normed compound remote associates, some of whose solutions had been primed by false memories created when studying the previous lists. The results showed that regardless of age: (a) survival-related words were not only better recollected but were also more susceptible than neutral words to false memory illusions; and (b) survival-related false memories were better than neutral false memories as primes for problem-solving. These findings are discussed in the context of recent speculation concerning the positive consequences of false memories, and the adaptive nature of reconstructive memory.

Recent advances in false memory research

In the last few years, substantial gains have been made in our understanding of human memory errors and the phenomenon of false memory, wherein individuals remember entire events that did not happen at all. Research had established that false memories can be consequential and emotional, that they can last for long periods of time, and that they are not merely the product of demand characteristics or the recovery of extant but hidden memories. These recent advances are discussed as extensions of earlier foundational research.

The "subjective" pupil old/new effect: is the truth plain to see?

Human memory is an imperfect process, prone to distortion and errors that range from minor disturbances to major errors that can have serious consequences on everyday life. In this study, we investigated false remembering of manipulatory verbs using an explicit recognition task and pupillometry. Our results replicated the "classical" pupil old/new effect as well as data in false remembering literature that show how items must be recognize as old in order for the pupil size to increase (e.g., "subjective" pupil old/new effect), even though these items do not necessarily have to be truly old. These findings support the strength-of-memory trace account that affirms that pupil dilation is related to experience rather than to the accuracy of recognition. Moreover, behavioral results showed higher rates of true and false recognitions for manipulatory verbs and a consequent larger pupil diameter, supporting the embodied view of language.

Constructive memory: past and future

Human memory is not a literal reproduction of the past, but instead relies on constructive processes that are sometimes prone to error and distortion. Understanding of constructive memory has accelerated during recent years as a result of research that has linked together its cognitive and neural bases. This article focuses on three aspects of constructive memory that have been the target of recent research: (i) the idea that certain kinds of memory distortions reflect the operation of adaptive cognitive processes that contribute to the efficient functioning of memory; (ii) the role of a constructive memory system in imagining or simulating possible future events; and (iii) differences between true and false memories that have been revealed by functional neuroimaging techniques. The article delineates the theoretical implications of relevant research, and also considers some clinical and applied implications.

Memory distortion: an adaptive perspective

Memory is prone to distortions that can have serious consequences in everyday life. Here we integrate emerging evidence that several types of memory distortions - imagination inflation, gist-based and associative memory errors, and post-event misinformation - reflect adaptive cognitive processes that contribute to the efficient functioning of memory, but produce distortions as a consequence of doing so. We consider recent cognitive and neuroimaging studies that link these distortions with adaptive processes, including simulation of future events, semantic and contextual encoding, creativity, and memory updating. We also discuss new evidence concerning factors that can influence the occurrence of memory distortions, such as sleep and retrieval conditions, as well as conceptual issues related to the development of an adaptive perspective.

Individual differences in false memory from misinformation: cognitive factors

This research investigated the cognitive correlates of false memories that are induced by the misinformation paradigm. A large sample of Chinese college students (N=436) participated in a misinformation procedure and also took a battery of cognitive tests. Results revealed sizable and systematic individual differences in false memory arising from exposure to misinformation. False memories were significantly and negatively correlated with measures of intelligence (measured with Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices and Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale), perception (Motor-Free Visual Perception Test, Change Blindness, and Tone Discrimination), memory (Wechsler Memory Scales and 2-back Working Memory tasks), and face judgement (Face Recognition and Facial Expression Recognition). These findings suggest that people with relatively low intelligence and poor perceptual abilities might be more susceptible to the misinformation effect.

Adaptive misbeliefs and false memories

McKay & Dennett (M&D) suggest that some positive illusions are adaptive. But there is a bidirectional link between memory and positive illusions: Biased autobiographical memories filter incoming information, and self-enhancing information is preferentially attended and used to update memory. Extending M&D's approach, I ask if certain false memories might be adaptive, defending a broad view of the psychosocial functions of remembering.