Assessment of the management practices facilitating the establishment and spread of exotic diseases of pigs in the Sydney region

A Comparative Assessment of the Risks of Introduction and Spread of Foot-and-Mouth Disease among Different Pig Sectors in Australia

Small-scale pig producers are believed to pose higher biosecurity risks for the introduction and spread of exotic diseases than commercial pig producers. However, the magnitude of these risks is poorly understood. This study is a comparative assessment of the risk of introduction and spread of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) through different sectors of the pig industry: (1) large-scale pig producers; (2) small-scale producers (<100 sows) selling at saleyards and abattoirs; and (3) small-scale producers selling through informal means. An exposure and consequence assessments were conducted using the World Organization for Animal Health methodology for risk analysis, assuming FMD virus was introduced into Australia through illegal importation of infected meat. A quantitative assessment, using scenario trees and Monte Carlo stochastic simulation, was used to calculate the probabilities of exposure and spread. Input data for these assessments were obtained from a series of data gathering exercises among pig producers, industry statistics, and literature. Findings of this study suggest there is an Extremely low probability of exposure (8.69 × 10⁻⁶ to 3.81 × 10⁻⁵) for the three sectors of the pig industry, with exposure through direct swill feeding being 10–100 times more likely to occur than through contact with infected feral pigs. Spread of FMD from the index farm is most likely to occur through movement of contaminated fomites, pigs, and ruminants. The virus is more likely to spread from small-scale piggeries selling at saleyards and abattoirs than from other piggeries. The most influential factors on the spread of FMD from the index farm is the ability of the farmer to detect FMD, the probability of FMD spread through contaminated fomites and the presence of ruminants on the farm. Although small-scale producers selling informally move animals less frequently and do not use external staff, movement of pigs to non-commercial pathways could jeopardize animal traceability in the event of a disease outbreak. This study suggests that producers’ awareness on and engagement with legislative and industry requirements in relation to biosecurity and emergency animal disease management needs to be improved. Results from this study could be used by decision-makers to prioritize resource allocation for improving animal biosecurity in the pig industry.

On-farm characteristics and biosecurity protocols for small-scale swine producers in eastern Australia

Pigs are considered high risk for the introduction and spread of foot and mouth disease (FMD) in Australia. Facilities where animals from different origins are commingled, such as saleyards, pose a high risk for disease spread. Sound on-farm management practices and biosecurity protocols are the first line of defence against a potential on-farm disease outbreak. This study evaluated the practices of 104 producers (vendors who sold pigs and purchasers of live pigs for grow-out) who traded pigs at 6 peri-urban and rural saleyards in eastern Australia. Specifically, management and on-farm biosecurity practices were assessed using an in-depth questionnaire. Univariable and multivariable logistic regression analyses were used to investigate (1) producer associations: producer type, State, motivation to keep pigs, farm type, gender, years having owned pigs, and the acquisition of formal livestock qualifications; and (2) pig associations: herd size, housing, management (husbandry and feeding) practices and biosecurity (including pig movement) practices. Backyard operations (<20 sows) were undertaken by 60.6% of participants, followed by small-scale pig operations (28.8%; 21-100 sows). Few producers (16.3%) reported residing in close proximity (<5 km) to commercial operations; however, less rural producers had neighbouring hobby pig operations within 5 km of their property (P=0.033). Motivation for keeping pigs was significantly associated with a number of biosecurity practices. Producers who kept pigs for primary income were more likely to provide footwear precautions (P=0.007) and ask visitors about prior pig contacts (P=0.004). Approximately 40% of backyard and small-scale producers reported not having any quarantine practices in place for incoming pigs, compared to only 9.1% among larger producers. The main reasons cited for not adopting on-farm biosecurity practices in this study included having no need on their property (43.1%) and a lack of information and support (by the industry and/or authorities; 18.5%). Up to three-quarters of all producers maintained an open breeding herd, regularly introducing new pigs to the main herd. Saleyards are an important source of income for backyard and small-scale producers as well as an important risk factor for the introduction and dissemination of endemic and emerging animal diseases. Differing management and biosecurity practices as well as the motivations of these producers keeping pigs in small numbers and trading pigs at saleyards need to be taken into account in the development of successful biosecurity extension programmes for this sector of the Australian pork industry.

Structure, dynamics and movement patterns of the Australian pig industry

OBJECTIVE

To assess management practices and movement patterns that could influence the establishment and spread of exotic animal diseases (EAD) in pigs in Australia.

METHODS

A literature review of published information and a telephone survey of 370 pig producers owning >10 pigs who were registered with the PigPass national vendor declaration scheme.

RESULTS

The movement and marketing patterns of Australian pig producers interviewed were divided into two groups based predominantly on the size of the herd. Major pig producers maintain closed herds, use artificial insemination and market direct to abattoirs. Smaller producers continue to purchase from saleyards and market to other farms, abattoirs and through saleyards in an apparently opportunistic fashion. The role of saleyards in the Australian pig industry continues to decline, with 92% of all pigs marketed directly from farm to abattoir.

CONCLUSIONS

This survey described movement patterns that will assist in modelling the potential spread of EAD in the Australian pig industry. Continued movement towards vertical integration and closed herds in the Australian pig industry effectively divides the industry into a number of compartments that mitigate against the widespread dissemination of disease to farms adopting these practices.

Use of stakeholder analysis to inform risk communication and extension strategies for improved biosecurity amongst small-scale pig producers

Extension and communication needs amongst small-scale pig producers, described as pig producers with less than 100 sows, have been previously identified. These producers, who are believed to pose a biosecurity risk to commercial livestock industries, are characterized by a lack of formal networks, mistrust of authorities, poor disease reporting behaviour and motivational diversity, and reliance on other producers, veterinarians and family for pig health and production advice. This paper applies stakeholder identification and analysis tools to determine stakeholders' influence and interest on pig producers' practices. Findings can inform a risk communication process and the development of an extension framework to increase producers' engagement with industry and their compliance with biosecurity standards and legislation in Australia. The process included identification of stakeholders, their issues of concerns regarding small-scale pig producers and biosecurity and their influence and interest in each of these issues. This exercise identified the capacity of different stakeholders to influence the outcomes for each issue and assessed their success or failure to do so. The disconnection identified between the level of interest and influence suggests that government and industry need to work with the small-scale pig producers and with those who have the capacity to influence them. Successful biosecurity risk management will depend on shared responsibility and building trust amongst stakeholders. Flow-on effects may include legitimating the importance of reporting and compliance systems and the co-management of risk. Compliance of small-scale pig producers with biosecurity industry standards and legislation will reduce the risks of entry and spread of exotic diseases in Australia.

Assessment of current disease surveillance activities for pigs post-farmgate in New South Wales

OBJECTIVES

Evaluate current disease surveillance activities at saleyards and abattoirs in New South Wales (NSW) in order to establish the prevalence of clinical anomalies in pigs at different sites and to compare the sensitivity of detecting anomalies inside versus outside of pens.

PROCEDURE

Routine inspections of pigs by staff and government inspectors were observed at two saleyards and two abattoirs in NSW during three visits over a 2-month period (January 2008-March 2008). All pigs presented for sale or slaughter were examined for 19 clinical anomalies from either the side of the pen or while animals were moving outside the pen, with data being combined to give an assumed 'gold standard'. We compared the prevalence of anomalies among animals at the four sites using logistic regression, as well as the sensitivity of detection of the two inspection methods.

RESULTS

Frequency and methodology of routine inspection varied among sites. Of the 7747 pigs inspected, 822 (10.6%) showed at least one clinical anomaly. There was moderate agreement between detecting anomalies in penned pigs versus while being moved. Pigs at one abattoir exhibited significantly fewer anomalies than pigs at the other sites.

CONCLUSION

The prevalence of anomalies among pigs at saleyards and abattoirs in NSW was relatively high ( approximately 10%). Weaknesses in current disease surveillance activities for pigs post-farmgate have been identified. Increased regulation, surveillance training and modification of standard operational procedures for inspection have the potential to improve the current system.

A qualitative study of the management and biosecurity practices of 13 interviewed pig owners selling via informal means in New South Wales, Australia

There is increasing interest in the trading practices of producers who market pigs at live auction in Australia and the potential for infectious disease establishment and spread. The practices that underpin the commercial pork industry in Australia are well known. However, little is known about informal movements of pigs in Australia, and the biosecurity risks associated with pig production enterprises that utilise these methods of trade. The aim of this study was to qualitatively evaluate the biosecurity and pig-keeping practices of owners who trade pigs informally for Foot and Mouth Disease and Classical Swine Fever exposure and spread. Interviews were conducted with 13 pig owners who trade via informal means between April and June 2009. Information provided by producers was able to be validated for the six interviews conducted on-farm. There was limited application of recommended biosecurity practices on-farm and few kept health and management records. All interviewees reared other livestock species, such as ruminants and/or poultry, as well as pigs. Most interviewed owners claimed to quarantine introduced pigs from the main herd; however, few complied with industry recommendations. The results of this study suggest that pig owners (n = 13 interviewed) who currently trade their pigs informally pose few threats for the introduction of emergency animal disease. Pig keepers largely obtained their pig feed from reputable sources and appeared to have a sound understanding of swill feeding. However, the lack of on-farm biosecurity, variable quarantine practices and the failure to keep health records could play a role in the spread of an emergency animal disease if it was to be introduced. Further work is being undertaken to determine, qualitatively, the risk associated with the management practices undertaken by informal pig traders and Foot and Mouth Disease and Classical Swine Fever introduction and spread.

Lifetime traceability of weaner pigs in concrete-based and deep-litter production systems in Australia1,2

A field study was conducted on a 2,300-sow piggery in southwestern New South Wales, Australia, over a 17-wk period (from weaning at 4 wk of age) to assess the suitability for lifetime traceability of weaners of 4 identification devices: 1) full duplex ear tag (FDX, Allflex), 2) half duplex ear tag designed for cattle (HDX, Leadertronic), 3) conventional ear tag (Leader), and 4) ear tattoo (Ketchum ear tattoo 101). Visual readability, retention rate, electronic failures, and adverse side effects were assessed at 8 wk after application at both sites and before slaughter at 14 or 17 wk after application at site A and site B, respectively. A total of 394 weaner pigs were randomly assigned after weaning to 6 treatment groups and reared either in small groups in intensive, indoor, concrete-based pens (n = 224; site A) or in a large group on deep litter (n = 170; site B). Visual readability was similar for all ear tag types before slaughter (P > 0.05); however, visual readability of the ear tattoo was lower (P < 0.05), with between 78.2 and 60.0% illegible due to ink fading. Few tags were lost in the 8-wk period after application; however, tag loss increased for each tag device after this period and varied with housing system. Conventional tag loss was greater among pigs housed at site A (29.0%) than in pigs housed at site B (4.9%) in the 6- to 9-wk period before slaughter. The overall readability of FDX and HDX tags did not differ (P > 0.05) between sites; however, overall readability of FDX tags at 98.4% was better (P < 0.05) than 71.8% for HDX tags. Tag costs ranged from $0.73 for the conventional ear tag to $2.42 for the HDX ear tag. The identification devices did not induce production-limiting adverse effects after they were applied. Under conditions of this study, FDX electronic ear tags were the most efficacious for lifetime identification of weaner pigs on-farm.

Review of identification and traceability legislation for pigs in Australia

OBJECTIVE

To assess Australia's capability to trace pig movements in the event of an exotic disease outbreak by highlighting the commonalities and inconsistencies between the various state and territory legislations in defining how pig producers are located; their pigs are identified; and whether movement records are required post-farm gate.

PROCEDURE

A review of the identification and traceability legislation applicable to pigs in Australia was undertaken over a 6 month period. The appropriate legislative Acts and Regulations were downloaded from the Australasian Legal Information Institute internet site (http://www.austlii.edu.au/) and reviewed.

RESULTS

The Australian pig industry currently uses the branding method (tattooing) to identify pigs for sale or slaughter, with each state responsible for its own pig identification and movement control systems. Areas of concern identified included inconsistencies with the minimum weight or age of pigs that require identification; discrepancies between methods of tattoo registration and shortfalls in documentation for recording pig movements.

CONCLUSION

Our findings highlight the flaws in Australia's current state legislative Acts and Regulations for identifying pigs and tracking their movements, which compromise the ability of jurisdictions to meet the endorsed National Performance Standards. Improvements in these areas will enhance security to the pig and other livestock industries in the event of future exotic disease outbreaks.