Using Field-Based Epidemiological Methods to Investigate FMD Outbreaks: An Example from the 2002 Outbreak in Korea

Using an epidemiological framework and bovine spongiform encephalopathy investigation questionnaire to investigate suspect bovine spongiform encephalopathy cases: an example from a bovine spongiform encephalopathy case in Ireland in 2015

In several EU member states, bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) cases have been identified in cattle born after the reinforced ban (BARB cases), for reasons that are not entirely clear. Epidemiological investigation of these cases has proved challenging. The European Food Safety Authority recently recommended the collection of a predefined set of epidemiological data from BSE suspects and confirmed BSE cases to aid future investigations. In this study, we present an epidemiological framework and BSE investigation questionnaire to aid the investigation of suspect BSE cases, and illustrate its application during the investigation of a BSE case in Ireland in 2015. It is recommended that the framework and questionnaire are used concurrently: the framework provides structure and focus, whereas the questionnaire (with 135 questions) aids data collection. The framework focuses on confirmation and discrimination, estimating the date and location of exposure, and determining the method/source of exposure. The BSE case in Ireland in 2015 was a BARB case born in 2010. It was identified with classical BSE at an authorised knackery as part of Ireland's targeted active surveillance programme for BSE. No definitive source of infection with the BSE agent could be attributed in this case.

Epidemiology of the Foot-and-Mouth Disease Serotype O Epidemic of November 2010 to April 2011 in the Republic Of Korea

The largest epidemic of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) in Korea since the first record in 1911 occurred between November 2010 and April 2011. The outbreak was confirmed in 153 farms, and more than three million animals were destroyed. This study presents the temporal and spatial distribution patterns, epidemiological investigation and the control measures for the 2010/2011 epidemic in Korea. The index case of this 2010/2011 FMD epidemic was reported in a pig-farming complex with five piggeries in Andong, GyeongBuk Province, on 28 November 2010, and the outbreak lasted 145 days. The largest number of new detection of the infected farms per day was recorded in mid-January. Epidemiological investigation revealed that the FMD virus had spread from farm to farm through routine movements associated with animal husbandry operations. In contrast to FMD epidemics in other countries in which movement of the infected animals largely contributed to the spread of the disease, human behaviours were major factors in the spread of the FMD virus in the Korean epidemic. The 2010/2011 epidemic was first confirmed in a local small and medium city where share of smallholder producers is higher than that of other provinces. Although Korea had a well-developed emergent response system with the experience of controlling infection and re-obtaining FMD-free status after the previous epidemics, Korea was prompted to revise their contingency plan by tailoring it to its unique livestock environment. Practical contingency plans tailored to Korea for control of FMD can be fully effective when farmers, livestock-related agencies, veterinary service providers and the general public work together.

Estimation of the Infection Window for the 2010/2011 Korean Foot-and-Mouth Disease Outbreak

Objectives

This study aims to develop a method for calculating infection time lines for disease outbreaks on farms was developed using the 2010/2011 foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) epidemic in the Republic of Korea.

Methods

Data on farm demography, the detection date of FMD, the clinical history for the manifestation of lesions, the presence of antibodies against FMD virus (including antibodies against the structural and nonstructural proteins of serotype O), vaccination status (O1 Manisa strain), the number of reactors and information on the slaughter of infected animals were utilized in this method.

Results

Based on estimates of the most likely infection date, a cumulative detection probability that an infected farm would be identified on a specific day was determined. Peak infection was observed between late December and early January, but peak detection occurred in mid-January. The early detection probability was highest for pigs, followed by cattle (dairy, then beef) and small ruminants. Nearly 90% of the infected pig farms were detected by Day 11 post-infection while 13 days were required for detection for both dairy and beef cattle farms, and 21 days were necessary for small ruminant (goat and deer) farms. On average, 8.1 ± 3.1 days passed prior to detecting the presence of FMD virus on a farm. The interval between infection and detection of FMD was inversely associated with the intensity of farming.

Conclusion

The results of our study emphasize the importance of intensive clinical inspection, which is the quickest method of detecting FMD infection and minimizing the damage caused by an epidemic.