More on the genetical theory of multilevel selection

Reuniting philosophy and science to advance cancer research

Cancers rely on multiple, heterogeneous processes at different scales, pertaining to many biomedical fields. Therefore, understanding cancer is necessarily an interdisciplinary task that requires placing specialised experimental and clinical research into a broader conceptual, theoretical, and methodological framework. Without such a framework, oncology will collect piecemeal results, with scant dialogue between the different scientific communities studying cancer. We argue that one important way forward in service of a more successful dialogue is through greater integration of applied sciences (experimental and clinical) with conceptual and theoretical approaches, informed by philosophical methods. By way of illustration, we explore six central themes: (i) the role of mutations in cancer; (ii) the clonal evolution of cancer cells; (iii) the relationship between cancer and multicellularity; (iv) the tumour microenvironment; (v) the immune system; and (vi) stem cells. In each case, we examine open questions in the scientific literature through a philosophical methodology and show the benefit of such a synergy for the scientific and medical understanding of cancer.

Sewall Wright's criticism of the gene's-eye view of evolution

The gene's-eye view of evolution has played a central but contentious role in evolutionary biology for the past half-century. By envisioning evolutionary history as a struggle between competing selfish genes, it accelerated the shift from organism-centric to gene-centric explanations that began with the emergence population genetics a century ago. At the forefront of this shift were George C. Williams and Richard Dawkins, who advocated an approach to thinking about evolution first introduced by R. A. Fisher. In this Perspective, I discuss the criticism of the gene's-eye view developed by another architect of population genetics, Sewall Wright, whose "On genic and organismic selection" was published in Evolution in 1980. I start by outlining the history of the gene's-eye view and then show how some long-standing differences in opinion over its value can be traced back to disagreements between Fisher and Wright, especially over Fisher's concept of genetic variance and the importance of epistasis. I end with some reflections on the role of genes and organisms in evolutionary explanations.

Explanatory goals and explanatory means in multilevel selection theory

It has become customary in multilevel selection theory to use the same terms (namely "multilevel selection 1" and "multilevel selection 2") to denote both two explanatory goals (explaining why certain individual- and, respectively, group-level traits spread) and two explanatory means (namely, two kinds of group selection we may appeal to in such explanations). This paper spells out some of the benefits that derive from avoiding this terminological conflation. I argue that keeping explanatory means and goals well apart allows us to see that, contrary to a popular recent idea, Price's equation and contextual analysis-the statistical methods most extensively used for measuring the effects of certain evolutionary factors (like individual selection, group selection etc.) on the change in the focal individual trait in multilevel selection scenarios-do not come with built-in notions of group selection and, therefore, the efficacy of these methods at analyzing various kinds of cases does not constitute a basis for deciding how group selection should best be defined. Moreover, contrary to another widely accepted idea, I argue that more than one type of group selection may serve as explanatory means when one's goal is that of explaining the evolution of individual traits in multilevel selection scenarios and I spell out how this explanatory role should be understood.

Price's equation made clear

Price's equation provides a very simple-and very general-encapsulation of evolutionary change. It forms the mathematical foundations of several topics in evolutionary biology, and has also been applied outwith evolutionary biology to a wide range of other scientific disciplines. However, the equation's combination of simplicity and generality has led to a number of misapprehensions as to what it is saying and how it is supposed to be used. Here, I give a simple account of what Price's equation is, how it is derived, what it is saying and why this is useful. In particular, I suggest that Price's equation is useful not primarily as a predictor of evolutionary change but because it provides a general theory of selection. As an illustration, I discuss some of the insights Price's equation has brought to the study of social evolution. This article is part of the theme issue 'Fifty years of the Price equation'.

Sexual selection in complex communities: Integrating interspecific reproductive interference in structured populations

The social structure of populations plays a key role in shaping variation in sexual selection. In nature, sexual selection occurs in communities of interacting species; however, heterospecifics are rarely included in characterizations of social structure. Heterospecifics can influence the reproductive outcomes of intrasexual competition by interfering with intraspecific sexual interactions (interspecific reproductive interference [IRI]). We outline the need for studies of sexual selection to incorporate heterospecifics as part of the social environment. We use simulations to show that classic predictions for the effect of social structure on sexual selection are altered by an interaction between social structure and IRI. This interaction has wide-ranging implications for patterns of sexual conflict and kin-selected reproductive strategies in socially structured populations. Our work bridges the gap between sexual selection research on social structure and IRI, and highlights future directions to study sexual selection in interacting communities.

Generalizing Contextual Analysis

Okasha, in Evolution and the Levels of Selection, convincingly argues that two rival statistical decompositions of covariance, namely contextual analysis and the neighbour approach, are better causal decompositions than the hierarchical Price approach. However, he claims that this result cannot be generalized in the special case of soft selection and argues that the Price approach represents in this case a better option. He provides several arguments to substantiate this claim. In this paper, I demonstrate that these arguments are flawed and argue that neither the Price equation nor the contextual and neighbour partitionings sensu Okasha are adequate causal decompositions in cases of soft selection. The Price partitioning is generally unable to detect cross-level by-products and this naturally also applies to soft selection. Both contextual and neighbour partitionings violate the fundamental principle of determinism that the same cause always produces the same effect. I argue that a fourth partitioning widely used in the contemporary social sciences, under the generic term of 'hierarchical linear model' and related to contextual analysis understood broadly, addresses the shortcomings of the three other partitionings and thus represents a better causal decomposition. I then defend this model against the argument that because it predicts that there is some organismal selection in some specific cases of segregation distortion then it should be rejected. I show that cases of segregation distortion that intuitively seem to contradict the conclusion drawn from the hierarchical linear model are in fact cases of multilevel selection 2 while the assessment of the different partitionings are restricted to multilevel selection 1.

Kin and multilevel selection in social evolution: a never-ending controversy?

Kin selection and multilevel selection are two major frameworks in evolutionary biology that aim at explaining the evolution of social behaviors. However, the relationship between these two theories has been plagued by controversy for almost half a century and debates about their relevance and usefulness in explaining social evolution seem to rekindle at regular intervals. Here, we first provide a concise introduction into the kin selection and multilevel selection theories and shed light onto the roots of the controversy surrounding them. We then review two major aspects of the current debate: the presumed formal equivalency of the two theories and the question whether group selection can lead to group adaptation. We conclude by arguing that the two theories can offer complementary approaches to the study of social evolution: kin selection approaches usually focus on the identification of optimal phenotypes and thus on the endresult of a selection process, whereas multilevel selection approaches focus on the ongoing selection process itself. The two theories thus provide different perspectives that might be fruitfully combined to promote our understanding of the evolution in group-structured populations.