Explanation, understanding, objectivity and experience

Philosophy and the clinic: Stigma, respect and shame

Since its foundation in 2010, the annual philosophy thematic edition of this journal has been a forum for authors from a wide range of disciplines and backgrounds, enabling contributors to raise questions of an urgent and fundamental nature regarding the most pressing problems facing the delivery and organization of healthcare. Authors have successfully exposed and challenged underlying assumptions that framed professional and policy discourse in diverse areas, generating productive and insightful dialogue regarding the relationship between evidence, value, clinical research and practice. These lively debates continue in this thematic edition, which includes a special section on stigma, shame and respect in healthcare. Authors address the problems with identifying and overcoming stigma in the clinic, interactional, structural and phenomenological accounts of stigma and the 'stigma-shame nexus'. Papers examine the lived experience of discreditation, discrimination and degradation in a range of contexts, from the labour room to mental healthcare and the treatment of 'deviancy' and 'looked-after children'. Authors raise challenging questions about the development of our uses of language in the context of care, and the relationship between stigma, disrespect and important analyses of power asymmetry and epistemic injustice. The relationship between respect, autonomy and personhood is explored with reference to contributions from an important conference series, which includes analyses of shame in the context of medically unexplained illness, humour, humiliation and obstetric violence.

Treating real people: Science and humanity

Something important is happening in applied, interdisciplinary research, particularly in the field of applied health research. The vast array of papers in this edition are evidence of a broad change in thinking across an impressive range of practice and academic areas. The problems of complexity, the rise of chronic conditions, overdiagnosis, co-morbidity, and multi-morbidity are serious and challenging, but we are rising to that challenge. Key conceptions regarding science, evidence, disease, clinical judgement, and health and social care are being revised and their relationships reconsidered: Boundaries are indeed being redrawn; reasoning is being made "fit for practice." Ideas like "person-centred care" are no longer phrases with potential to be helpful in some yet-to-be-clarified way: Theorists and practitioners are working in collaboration to give them substantive import and application.

Reasoning, evidence, and clinical decision-making: The great debate moves forward

When the editorial to the first philosophy thematic edition of this journal was published in 2010, critical questioning of underlying assumptions, regarding such crucial issues as clinical decision making, practical reasoning, and the nature of evidence in health care, was still derided by some prominent contributors to the literature on medical practice. Things have changed dramatically. Far from being derided or dismissed as a distraction from practical concerns, the discussion of such fundamental questions, and their implications for matters of practical import, is currently the preoccupation of some of the most influential and insightful contributors to the on-going evidence-based medicine debate. Discussions focus on practical wisdom, evidence, and value and the relationship between rationality and context. In the debate about clinical practice, we are going to have to be more explicit and rigorous in future in developing and defending our views about what is valuable in human life.

Diseases, patients and the epistemology of practice: mapping the borders of health, medicine and care

Last year saw the 20th anniversary edition of JECP, and in the introduction to the philosophy section of that landmark edition, we posed the question: apart from ethics, what is the role of philosophy 'at the bedside'? The purpose of this question was not to downplay the significance of ethics to clinical practice. Rather, we raised it as part of a broader argument to the effect that ethical questions - about what we should do in any given situation - are embedded within whole understandings of the situation, inseparable from our beliefs about what is the case (metaphysics), what it is that we feel we can claim to know (epistemology), as well as the meaning we ascribe to different aspects of the situation or to our perception of it. Philosophy concerns fundamental questions: it is a discipline requiring us to examine the underlying assumptions we bring with us to our thinking about practical problems. Traditional academic philosophers divide their discipline into distinct areas that typically include logic: questions about meaning, truth and validity; ontology: questions about the nature of reality, what exists; epistemology: concerning knowledge; and ethics: how we should live and practice, the nature of value. Any credible attempt to analyse clinical reasoning will require us to think carefully about these types of question and the relationships between them, as they influence our thinking about specific situations and problems. So, the answers to the question we posed, about the role of philosophy at the bedside, are numerous and diverse, and that diversity is illustrated in the contributions to this thematic edition.

Stakeholder engagement analysis - a bioethics dilemma in patient-targeted intervention: patients with temporomandibular joint disorders

Modern health care in the field of Medicine, Dentistry and Nursing is grounded in fundamental philosophy and epistemology of translational science. Recently in the U.S major national initiatives have been implemented in the hope of closing the gaps that sometimes exist between the two fundamental components of translational science, the translational research and translational effectiveness. Subsequent to these initiatives, many improvements have been made; however, important bioethical issues and limitations do still exist that need to be addressed. One such issue is the stakeholder engagement and its assessment and validation. Federal, state and local organizations such as PCORI and AHRQ concur that the key to a better understanding of the relationship between translational research and translational effectiveness is the assessment of the extent to which stakeholders are actively engaged in the translational process of healthcare. The stakeholder engagement analysis identifies who the stakeholders are, maps their contribution and involvement, evaluates their priorities and opinions, and accesses their current knowledge base. This analysis however requires conceptualization and validation from the bioethics standpoint. Here, we examine the bioethical dilemma of stakeholder engagement analysis in the context of the person-environment fit (PE-fit) theoretical model. This model is an approach to quantifying stakeholder engagement analysis for the design of patient-targeted interventions. In our previous studies of Alzheimer patients, we have developed, validated and used a simple instrument based on the PE-fit model that can be adapted and utilized in a much less studied pathology as a clinical model that has a wide range of symptoms and manifestations, the temporomandibular joint disorders (TMD). The temporomandibular joint (TMJ) is the jaw joint endowed with sensory and motor innervations that project from within the central nervous system and its dysfunction can be manifested systemically in forms of movement disorders, and related pathological symptomatologies.

Currently, there is limited reliable evidence available to fully understand the complexity of the various domains of translational effectiveness, particularly in the context of stakeholder engagement and its assessment, validation as well as the bioethical implications as they pertain to evidence-based, effectivness-focused and patient-centered care.

Getting personal: can systems medicine integrate scientific and humanistic conceptions of the patient?

RATIONALE, AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

The practicing doctor, and most obviously the primary care clinician who encounters the full complexity of patients, faces several fundamental but intrinsically related theoretical and practical challenges - strongly actualized by so-called medically unexplained symptoms (MUS) and multi-morbidity. Systems medicine, which is the emerging application of systems biology to medicine and a merger of molecular biomedicine, systems theory and mathematical modelling, has recently been proposed as a primary care-centered strategy for medicine that promises to meet these challenges. Significantly, it has been proposed to do so in a way that at first glance may seem compatible with humanistic medicine. More specifically, it is promoted as an integrative, holistic, personalized and patient-centered approach. In this article, we ask whether and to what extent systems medicine can provide a comprehensive conceptual account of and approach to the patient and the root causes of health problems that can be reconciled with the concept of the patient as a person, which is an essential theoretical element in humanistic medicine.

METHODS

We answer this question through a comparative analysis of the theories of primary care doctor Eric Cassell and systems biologist Denis Noble.

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

We argue that, although systems biological concepts, notably Noble's theory of biological relativity and downward causation, are highly relevant for understanding human beings and health problems, they are nevertheless insufficient in fully bridging the gap to humanistic medicine. Systems biologists are currently unable to conceptualize living wholes, and seem unable to account for meaning, value and symbolic interaction, which are central concepts in humanistic medicine, as constraints on human health. Accordingly, systems medicine as currently envisioned cannot be said to be integrative, holistic, personalized or patient-centered in a humanistic medical sense.

Borrowed philosophy: bedside physicalism and the need for a sui generis metaphysic of medicine

The character of medicine has changed over the last 100 years such that medicine is more interested in diseases than the people who suffer from them. Despite notable efforts to address this, the medical humanities do not challenge doctors' fundamental view of the world. Students adopt a metaphysic of physicalism during basic science training that gets carried into medical training. While necessary for medical science, physicalism is insufficient for clinical care. Physicalism offers no foundation for the sine qua non of medicine, the doctor-patient relationship. The character of medicine will not see a renewed interest in humanity until educators address the insufficiency of physicalism for clinical care, and clinicians partner with experts in the humanities to build a sui generis philosophy of medicine.