Nosology, ontology and promiscuous realism

The mind electric: Challenges to clinical categories from a person-centred perspective and the possibilities of metaphysics and art for clinician, patient, and treatment

The paper proposes that frameworks typical to metaphysics and art could be used in clinical treatment in somatic and psychiatric contexts to ensure improved care. The concept of the "body electric" of somatic patients which I introduced in previous work is developed further and paired with the "mind electric" of psychiatric patients. Both are defined as a patient's personally generated metaphysical possibility of being healthy-within-illness which is experientially actualized. Both concepts are used here to explore the alternative and the serious challenges to treatment approaches focused on clinical categories, disease, provision, and promotion of standardized or "black-box" therapies. An argument against the idea implied by the hope for such mass treatments and corresponding overreliance on science, namely, that health comes from fixing and regularizing, is developed based on cultural history and the evidenced fact that personally assumed health, just like art and metaphysics, is transgressive of scientific data, and accommodates the untrue, the impossible or the irregular as actual and normal. Because normality is created only with the help of disorder and from within it for chronic patients, clinicians should offer them the metaphysical care they need to produce and actualize their possibility of irregular normality or their body/mind electric. Better treatments can only be provided when scientific advances will be matched with advances in the humanistic competence of clinicians.

Suffering without a medical diagnosis. A critical view on the biomedical attitudes towards persons suffering from burnout and the implications for medical care

The search for causal explanations in medically unexplained syndromes such as burnout has not been resolved by evidence-based medicine. A biomedical model encourages a reductionist diagnostic practice and a dualist split between physical and psychological symptoms. Therefore, diagnosing and treating these syndromes remains a challenge. Depression is a common aspect in burnout and, as a result, clinicians often diagnose burnout patients as depressed. The Norwegian government expects medical efficiency to reduce sick leaves. Medically treating depression has a documented effect. This practice may pose threats to the increasing number of individuals experiencing burnout. The clinical guidelines in evidence-based medicine mirror what counts as knowledge in medical inquiry, which in turn shapes attitudes towards individual patients. The aim of this article is 2-fold: firstly, to assess how the values that accompany the biomedical paradigm affect clinical care, and secondly, to replace the biomedical model with a genuine person-centred approach. In the study described, an existential phenomenological method was applied. Eight individuals, who experienced burnout, were included. They had been on long-term sick leave (>1 year) due to symptoms of fatigue and pain and fulfilled the criteria for Exhaustion Disorder (ICD-10, F43.8A). Their symptoms were not medically explained, and almost all the participants were labelled as depressed. Four themes emerged that described how they experienced living with burnout: "unhomelike being in the world," "the limit of diagnosis," "naked in the eyes of the public," and "a path to hopelessness." I identify 2 main problems; firstly, the mismatch between the patient's experience of his or her illness and the doctor's interpretation of the condition can lead to ineffective treatment. Secondly, the interviewees struggled to be recognized as ill. Thus, the inherent values in the biomedical paradigm might have serious implications for the medical care of patients with burnout.

Monistic dualism and the body electric: An ontology of disease, patient and clinician for person-centred healthcare

Ontology is involved in medical care, because what both doctors and patients think the disease, the patient and the doctor are affects the giving and receiving of care, and hence the definition of medical care as profession. Going back to ancient philosophical views of disease as 'bounded entity' or as 'relation' (still echoed in contemporary theories and mindsets), I propose a way to think ontologically about disease that places it in necessary connection with the patient as person. Drawing on Augustine's views on disease, bodily integrity, and the human person as mind-body unit, I speak of 'monistic dualism' as the view where the unit and health of the person is continuously and personally generated by the mind's attention to and action on the body, whether the body is impaired or not. Monistic dualism is identified as the ontological position of both patients who are (or can become) healthy within illness and clinicians who are 'healthy' in their profession. It is what guides both to create what their body is in a personal state of integrity or health. This 'metaphysical body' is termed 'the body electric' in patients, and I argue that clinicians can attend properly to the diseased body by attending to patients' metaphysical body. As clinicians offer metaphysical care to themselves, employing monistic dualism to create their metaphysical body, they should not deny it to patients. Ontology cannot be part of medical care without making metaphysical care a requirement.

Diseases, patients and the epistemology of practice: mapping the borders of health, medicine and care

Last year saw the 20th anniversary edition of JECP, and in the introduction to the philosophy section of that landmark edition, we posed the question: apart from ethics, what is the role of philosophy 'at the bedside'? The purpose of this question was not to downplay the significance of ethics to clinical practice. Rather, we raised it as part of a broader argument to the effect that ethical questions - about what we should do in any given situation - are embedded within whole understandings of the situation, inseparable from our beliefs about what is the case (metaphysics), what it is that we feel we can claim to know (epistemology), as well as the meaning we ascribe to different aspects of the situation or to our perception of it. Philosophy concerns fundamental questions: it is a discipline requiring us to examine the underlying assumptions we bring with us to our thinking about practical problems. Traditional academic philosophers divide their discipline into distinct areas that typically include logic: questions about meaning, truth and validity; ontology: questions about the nature of reality, what exists; epistemology: concerning knowledge; and ethics: how we should live and practice, the nature of value. Any credible attempt to analyse clinical reasoning will require us to think carefully about these types of question and the relationships between them, as they influence our thinking about specific situations and problems. So, the answers to the question we posed, about the role of philosophy at the bedside, are numerous and diverse, and that diversity is illustrated in the contributions to this thematic edition.