Conscious Control over Action

Free Will as Defined by the Constrained Disorder Principle: a Restricted, Mandatory, Personalized, Regulated Process for Decision-Making

The concept of free will has challenged physicists, biologists, philosophers, and other professionals for decades. The constrained disorder principle (CDP) is a fundamental law that defines systems according to their inherent variability. It provides mechanisms for adapting to dynamic environments. This work examines the CDP's perspective of free will concerning various free will theories. Per the CDP, systems lack intentions, and the "freedom" to select and act is built into their design. The "freedom" is embedded within the response range determined by the boundaries of the systems' variability. This built-in and self-generating mechanism enables systems to cope with perturbations. According to the CDP, neither dualism nor an unknown metaphysical apparatus dictates choices. Brain variability facilitates cognitive adaptation to complex, unpredictable situations across various environments. Human behaviors and decisions reflect an underlying physical variability in the brain and other organs for dealing with unpredictable noises. Choices are not predetermined but reflect the ongoing adaptation processes to dynamic prssu½res. Malfunctions and disease states are characterized by inappropriate variability, reflecting an inability to respond adequately to perturbations. Incorporating CDP-based interventions can overcome malfunctions and disease states and improve decision processes. CDP-based second-generation artificial intelligence platforms improve interventions and are being evaluated to augment personal development, wellness, and health.

Control and Ownership of Neuroprosthetic Speech

Implantable brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) are being developed to restore speech capacity for those who are unable to speak. Patients with locked-in syndrome or amyotrophic lateral sclerosis could be able to use covert speech – vividly imagining saying something without actual vocalisation – to trigger neural controlled systems capable of synthesising speech. User control has been identified as particularly pressing for this type of BCI. The incorporation of machine learning and statistical language models into the decoding process introduces a contribution to (or ‘shaping of’) the output that is beyond the user’s control. Whilst this type of ‘shared control’ of BCI action is not unique to speech BCIs, the automated shaping of what a user ‘says’ has a particularly acute ethical dimension, which may differ from parallel concerns surrounding automation in movement BCIs. This paper provides an analysis of the control afforded to the user of a speech BCI of the sort under development, as well as the relationships between accuracy, control, and the user’s ownership of the speech produced. Through comparing speech BCIs with BCIs for movement, we argue that, whilst goal selection is the more significant locus of control for the user of a movement BCI, control over process will be more significant for the user of the speech BCI. The design of the speech BCI may therefore have to trade off some possible efficiency gains afforded by automation in order to preserve sufficient guidance control necessary for users to express themselves in ways they prefer. We consider the implications for the speech BCI user’s responsibility for produced outputs and their ownership of token outputs. We argue that these are distinct assessments. Ownership of synthetic speech concerns whether the content of the output sufficiently represents the user, rather than their morally relevant, causal role in producing that output.

Neural Efficiency in Athletes: A Systematic Review

According to the neural efficiency hypothesis (NEH), professionals have more effective cortical functions in cognitive tasks. This study is focusing on providing a systematic review of sport-related NEH studies with functional neuroimaging or brain stimulation while performing a sport-specific task, with the aim to answer the question: How does long-term specialized training change an athlete's brain and improve efficiency? A total of 28 studies (N = 829, Experimental Group n = 430) from 2001 to 2020 (Median = 2014, SD = 5.43) were analyzed and results were organized into four different sections: expert-novice samples, perceptual-cognitive tasks and neuroimaging technologies, efficiency paradox, and the cluster analysis. Researchers examined a wide range of sport-specific videos and multiple object tracking (MOT) specific to 18 different sports and utilized blood oxygenation-level dependent (BOLD) functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS), and electroencephalogram (EEG). Expert-novice comparisons were often adopted into investigations about the variations in general about optimal-controlled performance, neurophysiology, and behavioral brain research. Experts tended to perform at faster speeds, more accurate motor behavior, and with greater efficiency than novices. Experts report lower activity levels in the sensory and motor cortex with less energy expenditure, experts will possibly be more productive. These findings generally supported the NEH across the studies reviewed. However, an efficiency paradox and proficient brain functioning were revealed as the complementary hypothesis of the NEH. The discussion concentrates on strengths and key limitations. The conclusion highlights additional concerns and recommendations for prospective researchers aiming to investigate a broader range of populations and sports.

Intelligent action guidance and the use of mixed representational formats

My topic is the intelligent guidance of action. In this paper I offer an empirically grounded case for four ideas: that [a] cognitive processes of practical reasoning play a key role in the intelligent guidance of action, [b] these processes could not do so without significant enabling work done by both perception and the motor system, [c] the work done by perceptual and motor systems can be characterized as the generation of information (often conceptually structured information) specialized for action guidance, which in turn suggests that [d] the cognitive processes of practical reasoning that play a key role in the guidance of intelligent action are not the abstract, syllogistic ones philosophers often treat as the paradigm of practical reasoning. Rather, these cognitive processes are constrained by, and work well with, the specialized concepts outputted by perception and the feedback outputted by sensorimotor processes.

When Thinking is Doing: Responsibility for BCI-Mediated Action

Technologies controlled directly by the brain are being developed, evolving based on insights gained from neuroscience, and rehabilitative medicine. Besides neuro-controlled prosthetics aimed at restoring function lost somehow, technologies controlled via brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) may also extend a user’s horizon of action, freed from the need for bodily movement. Whilst BCI-mediated action ought to be, on the whole, treated as conventional action, law and policy ought to be amended to accommodate BCI action by broadening the definition of action as “willed bodily movement”. Moreover, there are some dimensions of BCI mediated action that are significantly different to conventional cases. These relate to control. Specifically, to limits in both controllability of BCIs via neural states, and in foreseeability of outcomes from such actions. In some specific type of case, BCI-mediated action may be due to different ethical evaluation from conventional action.

Why does the mind wander?

I seek an explanation for the etiology and the function of mind wandering episodes. My proposal-which I call the cognitive control proposal-is that mind wandering is a form of non-conscious guidance due to cognitive control. When the agent's current goal is deemed insufficiently rewarding, the cognitive control system initiates a search for a new, more rewarding goal. This search is the process of unintentional mind wandering. After developing the proposal, and relating it to the literature on mind wandering and on cognitive control, I discuss explanations the proposal affords, testable predictions the proposal makes, and philosophical implications the proposal has.

Intentions: The dynamic hierarchical model revisited

Ten years ago, one of us proposed a dynamic hierarchical model of intentions that brought together philosophical work on intentions and empirical work on motor representations and motor control (Pacherie, 2008). The model distinguished among Distal intentions, Proximal intentions, and Motor intentions operating at different levels of action control (hence the name DPM model). This model specified the representational and functional profiles of each type of intention, as well their local and global dynamics, and the ways in which they interact. A core insight of the model was that action control is the result of integrated, coordinated activity across these levels of intention. Since the proposal of the model, empirical and theoretical works in philosophy and cognitive science have emerged that would seem to support and expand on this central insight. In particular, an updated understanding of the nature of sensorimotor processing and motor representations, as well as of how the different levels of intention and control interface and interact, allows for the further specification and precisification of the original DPM model. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Psychological Capacities Psychology > Motor Skill and Performance Philosophy > Action.

Sense of agency for movements

In this paper, we argue that the comparator model is not a satisfactory model of sense of agency (SoA). We present a theoretical argument and experimental studies. We show (1) most studies of SoA neglect a distinction between SoA associated with movements (narrow SoA) and SoA associated with environmental events (broad SoA); (2) the comparator model emerges from experimental studies of sensory consequences narrowly associated with movements; (3) narrow SoA can be explained by a comparator model, but a motor signal model is simpler and explain narrow SoA equally well; and (4) standard experimental paradigms study only broad SoA. Finally, we present results from two experiments, where we have failed to induce illusory narrow SoA in healthy participants. We believe our experimental approaches should have led to illusory SoA, if the comparator model of SoA was correct. The results challenge proponents of the comparator model of narrow SoA.

The influence of ball-swing on the timing and coordination of a natural interceptive task

Successful interception relies on the use of perceptual information to accurately guide an efficient movement strategy that allows performers to be placed at the right place at the right time. Although previous studies have highlighted the differences in the timing and coordination of movement that underpin interceptive expertise, very little is known about how these movement patterns are adapted when intercepting targets that follow a curvilinear flight-path. The aim of this study was to examine how curvilinear ball-trajectories influence movement patterns when intercepting a fast-moving target. Movement timing and coordination was examined when four groups of cricket batters, who differed in their skill level and/or age, hit targets that followed straight or curvilinear flight-paths. The results revealed that when compared to hitting straight trials, (i) mixing straight with curvilinear trials altered movement coordination and when the ball was hit, (ii) curvilinear trajectories reduced interceptive performance and significantly delayed the timing of all kinematic moments, but there were (iii) larger decrease in performance when the ball swung away from (rather than in towards) the performer. Movement coordination differed between skill but not age groups, suggesting that skill-appropriate movement patterns that are apparent in adults may have fully emerged by late adolescence.

Through the forest of motor representations

Following neuroscience, and using different labels, several philosophers have addressed the idea of the presence of a single representational mechanism lying in between (visual) perceptual processes and motor processes involved in different functions and useful for shaping suitable action performances: a motor representation (MR). MRs are the naturalized mental antecedents of action. This paper presents a new, non-monolithic view of MRs, according to which, contrarily to the received view, when looking at in between (visual) perceptual processes and motor processes, we find not only a single representational mechanism with different functions, but an ensemble of different sub-representational phenomena, each of which with a different function. This new view is able to avoid several issues emerging from the literature and to address something the literature is silent about, which however turns out to be crucial for a theory of MRs.